Tuesday, March 31, 2009

new Tax Court Rules

Tax Court Press Release

March 31, 2009

Tax Court Rule 11

Tax Court Rule 20

Tax Court Rule 21

Tax Court Rule 37

Tax Court Rule 50

Tax Court Rule 70

Tax Court Rule 71

Tax Court Rule 72

Tax Court Rule 73

Tax Court Rule 75

Tax Court Rule 76

Tax Court Rule 80

Tax Court Rule 81

Tax Court Rule 82

Tax Court Rule 91

Tax Court Rule 100

Tax Court Rule 103

Tax Court Rule 104

Tax Court Rule 143

Tax Court Rule 147

Tax Court Rule 151

Tax Court Rule 155

Tax Court Rule 181

Tax Court Rule 202

Tax Court Rule 215

Tax Court : Rules of Practice and Procedure : Proposed amendments .




UNITED STATES TAX COURT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20217


March 27, 2009




PRESS RELEASE


Chief Judge John O. Colvin announced today that the United States Tax Court has proposed amendments to its Rules of Practice and Procedure. Several of the proposed amendments conform the Tax Court's Rules more closely with selected procedures from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, amendments are proposed to Rule 202 (procedures applicable to disciplinary proceedings) and to Rule 11 (payment of certain fees and charges by credit card). The proposed amendments are contained in the Notice attached to this press release and are available at the Tax Court's Web site at www.ustaxcourt.gov.

The Tax Court invites public comment on the proposed amendments. Written comments must be received by May 27, 2009. Comments must be addressed to:


Robert R. DiTrolio



Clerk of the Court



U.S. Tax Court



400 Second Street, N.W., Room 111



Washington, D.C. 20217





NOTICE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES


Pursuant to section 7453 of the Internal Revenue Code as amended and Rule 1 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, the United States Tax Court hereby provides notice that it proposes the attached amendments to its Rules of Practice and Procedure and invites public comment thereon. Written comments must be addressed to:


Robert R. DiTrolio



Clerk of the Court



U.S. Tax Court



400 Second Street, N.W., Room 111



Washington, D.C. 20217


The proposed amendments and explanations are as follows:



I. Ownership Disclosure Statements




Rule 11 is deleted and replaced with the following.





RULE 11. PAYMENTS TO THE COURT


All payments to the Court for fees or charges of the Court shall be made either in cash or by check, money order, or other draft made payable to the order of "Clerk, United States Tax Court", and shall be mailed or delivered to the Clerk of the Court at Washington, D.C. Payment may also be made by credit card presented at the Court in Washington, D.C. For the Court's address, see Rule 10(e). For particular payments, see Rules 12(c) (copies of Court records), 20(d) (filing of petition), 173(a)(2) (small tax cases), 200(a) (application to practice before Court), 200(g) (periodic registration fee), 271(c) (filing of petition for administrative costs), 281(c) (filing of petition for review of failure to abate interest), 291(d) (filing of petition for redetermination of employment status), 311(c) (filing of petition for declaratory judgment relating to treatment of items other than partnership items with respect to an oversheltered return), 321(d) (filing of petition for determination of relief from joint and several liability on a joint return), 331(d) (filing of petition for lien and levy action), and 341(c) (filing of petition for whistleblower action). For fees and charges payable to the Court, see Appendix II.

New paragraph (c) of Rule 20 is added and current paragraph (c) is redesignated as paragraph (d). [Paragraphs (a) and (b) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




Rule 20. COMMENCEMENT OF CASE


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(c) Disclosure Statement: A nongovernmental corporation, a partnership, or a limited liability company filing a petition with the Court shall submit with its petition a separate disclosure statement. In the case of a nongovernmental corporation, the disclosure statement shall identify any parent corporation and any publicly held entity owning 10 percent or more of petitioner's stock or state that there is no such entity. In the case of a partnership or a limited liability company, the disclosure statement shall identify any publicly held entity owning an interest in such partnership or limited liability company or state that there is no such entity. A petitioner shall promptly submit a supplemental statement if there is any change in the information required under this rule.

(d) Filing Fee: At the time of filing a petition, a fee of $60 shall be paid. The payment of any fee under this paragraph may be waived if the petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the Court by an affidavit containing specific financial information the inability to make such payment.




Explanation




Introduction

Rule 7.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a nongovernmental corporate party to file two copies of a disclosure statement that (1) identifies any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation owning 10 percent or more of its stock, or (2) states that there is no such corporation. See 207 F.R.D. 50 (Apr. 29, 2002); see also 195 F.R.D. 95 (May 2000). Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1 states that a nongovernmental corporate party must file the disclosure statement with its first appearance, pleading, petition, motion, response, or other request addressed to the court, and promptly file a supplemental statement if any required information changes. The Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1 explain that the rule was drawn from the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (rule 26.1) and was adopted to aid judges in making properly informed disqualification decisions consistent with the "financial interest" standard of Canon 3C(1)(c) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. The Advisory Committee Notes acknowledge that the rule "does not cover all of the circumstances that may call for disqualification under the financial interest standard" but the rule is "calculated to reach a majority of the circumstances that are likely to call for disqualification". Some Federal district courts have adopted local rules that require partnerships and other entities, in addition to corporations, to file disclosure statements as described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1.

Tax Court Judges and Special Trial Judges adhere to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. Canon 3C(1)(c) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges provides that a judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances in which the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse or minor child residing in the judge's household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be affected substantially by the outcome of the proceeding. Canon 3C(3)(c) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges defines the term "financial interest" in pertinent part to mean ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, in a party to the litigation.



Proposed Amendment

The Court proposes to amend Rule 20 to require a nongovernmental corporation, partnership, or limited liability company filing a petition with the Court to submit with its petition a separate disclosure statement identifying any parent corporation and any publicly held entity owning an interest in the petitioner. The proposed amendment is intended to enhance the ability of Tax Court Judges and Special Trial Judges to timely identify matters in which automatic disqualification would be appropriate under the financial interest standard. A conforming amendment to Rule 11 is also proposed. An additional amendment to Rule 11 is proposed in section VIII (Payment of Tax Court Fees and Charges By Credit Card).



II. Service of Papers

Paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 21 is deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraphs (a) and (b)(2) remain unchanged and are omitted here.]




RULE 21. SERVICE OF PAPERS


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(b) Manner of Service: (1) General: All petitions shall be served by the Clerk. Unless otherwise provided in these Rules or directed by the Court, all other papers required to be served on a party shall be served by the party filing the paper, and the original paper shall be filed with a certificate by a party or a party's counsel that service of that paper has been made on the party to be served or such party's counsel. For the form of such certificate of service, see Form 9, Appendix I. Such service may be made by:


(A) Mail directed to the party or the party's counsel at such person's last known address. Service by mail is complete upon mailing, and the date of such mailing shall be the date of such service.



(B) Delivery to a party, or a party's counsel or authorized representative in the case of a party other than an individual (see Rule 24(b)).



(C) Mail directed or delivery to the Commissioner's counsel at the office address shown in the Commissioner's answer filed in the case or, if no answer has been filed, the Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Washington, D.C. 20224.



(D) Electronic means if the person served consented in writing, in which event service is complete upon transmission, but is not effective if the serving party learns that it did not reach the person to be served.


Service on a person other than a party shall be made in the same manner as service on a party, except as otherwise provided in these Rules or directed by the Court. In cases consolidated pursuant to Rule 141, a party making service of a paper shall serve each of the other parties or counsel for each of the other parties, and the original and copies thereof required to be filed with the Court shall each have a certificate of service attached.

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Explanation




Introduction

Rule 21(b)(1) provides that the Clerk of the Court will serve all petitions filed with the Court. The Rule also provides that, unless otherwise provided by the Court's Rules or directed by the Court, the Clerk will serve all other papers required to be served on a party unless the original paper is filed with a certificate by a party or party's counsel that service has been made on the party to be served or the party's counsel. Rule 5(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that all papers after the complaint must be filed with a certificate of service showing service on the opposing party or counsel. Amending Rule 21(b)(1) to conform with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) would permit the Court to enforce service of documents by the parties, while allowing discretion to provide service by the Clerk when directed by the Court.

With respect to the Court's implementation of electronic filing, questions have been raised regarding the Court's responsibility to make service of an electronically filed document on an individual or counsel who has not consented to receive electronic service and so must be served by conventional paper service, when no certificate of service is attached to the electronically filed document, and no paper copies are provided for service. Also, when documents are filed electronically, it is anticipated that some electronic transmissions will fail due to improper e-mail addresses or other technological issues, and there are questions as to who has the ultimate responsibility for re-serving the documents. Amending Rule 21(b)(1) would help effectuate the Court's previously announced policy of placing the burden on the party filing a document electronically to make service on the opposing party or counsel using conventional paper service or to re-serve a document electronically.

Amending Rule 21(b)(1) would also align the Court's Rules with both the general practice among practitioners and the Court's Standing Pretrial Order, which requires that every pleading, motion, letter, or other document (with the exception of simultaneously filed briefs) submitted to the Court after a case is calendared for trial be served by the filing party on every other party and contain a certificate of service.



Proposed Amendment

The Court proposes to amend Rule 21(b)(1) to require that, unless otherwise provided by the Court's Rules or directed by the Court, a party filing a paper other than a petition must make service of the paper on the opposing party and attach to the paper a certificate showing that service was made. Conforming changes to various Rules also are proposed, although no amendment is proposed to the requirement in Rule 151(c) that the Clerk shall serve simultaneous briefs.

Paragraph (c) of Rule 37 is deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraphs (a), (b), (d), and (e) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




RULE 37. REPLY


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(c) Effect of Reply or Failure Thereof: Where a reply is filed, every affirmative allegation set out in the answer and not expressly admitted or denied in the reply shall be deemed to be admitted. Where a reply is not filed, the affirmative allegations in the answer will be deemed denied unless the Commissioner, within 45 days after expiration of the time for filing the reply, files a motion that specified allegations in the answer be deemed admitted. That motion may be granted unless the required reply is filed within the time directed by the Court.

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Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 37(c) to delete the language referring to service of the motion. The amendment would conform the Rule with the proposed amendment to Rule 21(b)(1) and require the Commissioner to serve on the taxpayer his motion that undenied allegations in the answer be admitted, which is consistent with existing practice.

Paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 50 is deleted and replaced with the following. Paragraph (f) of Rule 50 is deleted and current paragraph (g) is redesignated as paragraph (f). [Paragraphs (a), (b)(2), (b)(3), (c), (d), and (e) remain unchanged and are omitted here.]




RULE 50. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS


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(b) Disposition of Motions: A motion may be disposed of in one or more of the following ways, in the discretion of the Court:


(1) The Court may take action after directing that a written response be filed. In that event, the opposing party shall file such response within such period as the Court may direct. Written response to a motion shall conform to the same requirements of form and style as apply to motions.


* * * * * * *

(f) Effect of Orders: Orders shall not be treated as precedent, except as may be relevant for purposes of establishing the law of the case, res judicata, collateral estoppel, or other similar doctrine.




Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 50(b)(1) to delete the language in that Rule referring to service by the Court of a motion with its order directing the filing of a written response. The amendment would conform Rule 50(b)(1) with the proposed amendment to Rule 21(b)(1), requiring service of the motion by the filing party. It is also proposed that paragraph (f) of Rule 50 be deleted as unnecessary and paragraph (g) be relettered as paragraph (f).

Paragraph (d) of Rule 76 is deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (e), (f), (g), and (h) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




RULE 76. DEPOSITION OF EXPERT WITNESSES


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(d) Procedure: (1) In General: A party desiring to depose an expert witness under paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule shall file a written motion and shall set forth therein the matters specified in subparagraph (2). The Court shall take such action on the motion as it deems appropriate.


(2) Content of Motion: Any motion seeking an order authorizing the deposition of an expert witness under paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule shall set forth the following:



(A) The name and address of the witness to be examined;



(B) a statement describing any books, papers, documents, or tangible things to be produced at the deposition of the witness to be examined;



(C) a statement of issues in controversy to which the expected testimony of the expert witness, or the document or thing, relates, and the reasons for deposing the witness;



(D) the time and place proposed for the deposition;



(E) the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken;



(F) any provision desired with respect to the payment of the costs, expenses, fees, and charges relating to the deposition (see paragraph (g)); and



(G) if the movant proposes to video record the deposition, then a statement to that effect and the name and address of the video recorder operator and the operator's employer. (The video recorder operator and the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken may be the same person.)


If the movant proposes to take the deposition of the expert witness on written questions, then the movant shall annex to the motion a copy of the questions to be propounded. The movant shall also show that prior notice of the motion has been given to the expert witness whose deposition is sought and to each other party, or counsel for each other party, and shall state the position of each of these persons with respect to the motion, in accordance with Rule 50(a).


(3) Disposition of Motion: Any objection or other response to the motion for order to depose an expert witness under paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule shall be filed with the Court within 15 days after service of the motion. A hearing on the motion will be held only if directed by the Court. If the Court approves the taking of a deposition, then it will issue an order which will include in its terms the name of the person to be examined, the time and place of the deposition, and the officer before whom it is to be taken. If the deposition is to be video recorded, then the Court's order will so state.


* * * * * * *




Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 76(d)(3) to delete the parenthetical requiring the attachment of a certificate of service. Such requirement is contained in the proposed amendment to Rule 21(b)(1). An additional amendment to Rule 76 is proposed in section V (Electronically Stored Information).

Paragraph (b) of Rule 81 is deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraphs (a), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (j) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




RULE 81. DEPOSITIONS IN PENDING CASE


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(b) The Application: (1) Content of Application: The application to take a deposition pursuant to paragraph (a) of this Rule shall be signed by the party seeking the deposition or such party's counsel, and shall show the following:


(A) The names and addresses of the persons to be examined;



(B) the reasons for deposing those persons rather than waiting to call them as witnesses at the trial;



(C) the substance of the testimony which the party expects to elicit from each of those persons;



(D) a statement showing how the proposed testimony or document or thing is material to a matter in controversy;



(E) a statement describing any books, papers, documents, or tangible things to be produced at the deposition by the persons to be examined;



(F) the time and place proposed for the deposition;



(G) the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken;



(H) the date on which the petition was filed with the Court, and whether the pleadings have been closed and the case placed on a trial calendar;



(I) any provision desired with respect to payment of expenses, fees, and charges relating to the deposition (see paragraph (g) of this Rule, and Rule 103); and



(J) if the applicant proposes to video record the deposition, then the application shall so state, and shall show the name and address of the video recorder operator and of the operator's employer. (The video recorder operator and the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken may be the same person. See subparagraph (2) of paragraph (j) of this Rule.)



The application shall also have annexed to it a copy of the questions to be propounded, if the deposition is to be taken on written questions. For the form of application to take a deposition, see Appendix I.



(2) Filing and Disposition of Application: The application may be filed with the Court at any time after the case is docketed in the Court, but must be filed at least 45 days prior to the date set for the trial of the case. The application and a conformed copy thereof, together with an additional conformed copy for each additional docket number involved, shall be filed with the Clerk. In addition to serving each of the other parties to the case, the applicant shall serve a copy of the application on such other persons who are to be examined pursuant to the application, and shall file with the Clerk a certificate showing such service. Such other parties or persons shall file their objections or other response, with the same number of copies and with a certificate of service thereof on the other parties and such other persons, within 15 days after such service of the application. A hearing on the application will be held only if directed by the Court. Unless the Court shall determine otherwise for good cause shown, an application to take a deposition will not be regarded as sufficient ground for granting a continuance from a date or place of trial theretofore set. If the Court approves the taking of a deposition, then it will issue an order which will include in its terms the name of the person to be examined, the time and place of the deposition, and the officer before whom it is to be taken. If the deposition is to be video recorded, then the Court's order will so state.


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Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 81(b)(2) to reflect the proposed amendment to Rule 21(b)(1) requiring service of the filed application on each of the other parties to the case. An additional amendment to Rule 81 is proposed in section V (Electronically Stored Information).

Paragraph (f)(1) of Rule 91 is deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f)(2), (f)(3), and (f)(4) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




RULE 91. STIPULATIONS FOR TRIAL


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(f) Noncompliance by a Party: (1) Motion To Compel Stipulation: If, after the date of issuance of trial notice in a case, a party has refused or failed to confer with an adversary with respect to entering into a stipulation in accordance with this Rule, or a party has refused or failed to make such a stipulation of any matter within the terms of this Rule, the party proposing to stipulate may, at a time not later than 45 days prior to the date set for call of the case from a trial calendar, file a motion with the Court for an order directing the delinquent party to show cause why the matters covered in the motion should not be deemed admitted for the purposes of the case. The motion shall: (A) Show with particularity and by separately numbered paragraphs each matter which is claimed for stipulation; (B) set forth in express language the specific stipulation which the moving party proposes with respect to each such matter and annex thereto or make available to the Court and the other parties each document or other paper as to which the moving party desires a stipulation; (C) set forth the sources, reasons, and basis for claiming, with respect to each such matter, that it should be stipulated; and (D) show that opposing counsel or the other parties have had reasonable access to those sources or basis for stipulation and have been informed of the reasons for stipulation.

* * * * * * *




Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 91(f) (1) to delete the requirement that the party filing a motion to compel stipulation show proof of service, as a certificate of service would be required by the proposed amendment to Rule 21(b)(1).

Paragraph (c) of Rule 151 is deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraphs (a), (b), (d), and (e) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




RULE 151. BRIEFS


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(c) Service: Each brief shall be served upon the opposite party when it is filed, except that, in the event of simultaneous briefs, such brief shall be served by the Clerk after the corresponding brief of the other party has been filed, unless the Court directs otherwise. Delinquent briefs will not be accepted unless accompanied by a motion setting forth reasons deemed sufficient by the Court to account for the delay. In the case of simultaneous briefs, the Court may return without filing a delinquent brief from a party after such party's adversary's brief has been served upon such party.

* * * * * * *




Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 151(c) to require that the parties serve seriatim briefs on each other. The Rule retains the requirement that the Clerk serve simultaneous briefs on the parties after both briefs have been filed. It is also proposed that the language referring to service in partnership actions be deleted, as the service requirements for partnership actions would not differ from those contained in proposed Rule 21(b)(1).

Paragraph (b) of Rule 155 is deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraphs (a) and (c) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




RULE 155. COMPUTATION BY PARTIES FOR ENTRY OF DECISION


* * * * * * *

(b) Procedure in Absence of Agreement: If, however, the parties are not in agreement as to the amount to be included in the decision in accordance with the findings and conclusions of the Court, then either of them may file with the Court a computation of the amount believed by such party to be in accordance with the Court's findings and conclusions. In the case of an overpayment, the computation shall also include the amount and date of each payment made by the petitioner. The Clerk will serve upon the opposite party a notice of such filing and if, on or before a date specified in the Clerk's notice, the opposite party fails to file an objection, accompanied or preceded by an alternative computation, then the Court may enter decision in accordance with the computation already submitted. If in accordance with this Rule computations are submitted by the parties which differ as to the amount to be entered as the decision of the Court, then the parties may, at the Court's discretion, be afforded an opportunity to be heard in argument thereon and the Court will determine the correct amount and will enter its decision accordingly.

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Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 155(b) to eliminate the requirement that the Clerk serve an unagreed computation on the opposite party.

Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 215 are deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraph (c) remains unchanged and is omitted here. ]




RULE 215. JOINDER OF PARTIES


(a) Joinder in Retirement Plan Action: The joinder of parties in retirement plan actions shall be subject to the following requirements:


(1) Permissive Joinder: Any person who, under Code section 7476(b)(1), is entitled to commence an action for declaratory judgment with respect to the qualification of a retirement plan may join in filing a petition with any other such person in such an action with respect to the same plan. If the Commissioner has issued a notice of determination with respect to the qualification of the plan, then any person joining in the petition must do so within the period specified in Code section 7476(b)(5). If more than one petition is filed with respect to the qualification of the same retirement plan, then see Rule 141 (relating to the possibility of consolidating the actions with respect to the plan).



(2) Joinder of Additional Parties: Any party to an action for declaratory judgment with respect to the qualification of a retirement plan may move to have joined in the action any employer who established or maintains the plan, plan administrator, or any person in whose absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties. Unless otherwise permitted by the Court, any such motion must be filed not later than 30 days after joinder of issue. See Rule 214. In addition to serving the parties to the action, the movant shall cause personal service to be made on each person sought to be joined by a United States marshal or by a deputy marshal, or by any other person who is not a party and is not less than 18 years of age, who shall make a return of service. See Form 9, Appendix I. Such return of service shall be filed with the motion, but failure to do so or otherwise to make proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. Unless otherwise permitted by the Court, any objection to such motion shall be filed within 30 days after the service of the motion. The motion will be granted whenever the Court finds that in the interests of justice such person should be joined. If the motion is granted, such person will thereupon become a party to the action, and the Court will enter such orders as it deems appropriate as to further pleading and other matters. See Rule 50(b) with respect to actions on motions.



(3) Nonjoinder of Necessary Parties: If the Court determines that any person described in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph is a necessary party to an action for declaratory judgment and that such person has not been joined, then the Court may, on its own motion or on the motion of any party or any such person, dismiss the action on the ground that the absent person is necessary and that justice cannot be accomplished in the absent person's absence, or direct that any such person be made a party to the action. An order dismissing a case for nonjoinder of a necessary party may be conditional or absolute.


(b) Joinder in Estate Tax Installment Payment Action: The joinder of parties in estate tax installment payment actions shall be subject to the following requirements:


(1) Permissive Joinder: Any person who, under Code section 7479(b)(1), is entitled to commence an action for declaratory judgment relating to the eligibility of an estate with respect to installment payments under Code section 6166 may join in filing a petition with any other such person in such an action with respect to such estate. If the Commissioner has issued a notice of determination with respect to the eligibility of the estate, then any person joining in the petition must do so within the period specified in Code section 7479(b)(3). If more than one petition is filed with respect to the eligibility of the same estate, then see Rule 141 (relating to the possibility of consolidating the actions with respect to the estate).



(2) Joinder of Additional Parties: Any party to an action for declaratory judgment relating to the eligibility of an estate with respect to installment payments under Code section 6166 may move to have joined in the action any executor or any person who has assumed an obligation to make payments under Code section 6166 with respect to such estate. Unless otherwise permitted by the Court, any such motion must be filed not later than 30 days after joinder of issue. See Rule 214. In addition to serving the parties to the action, the movant shall cause personal service to be made on each person sought to be joined by a United States marshal or by a deputy marshal, or by any other person who is not a party and is not less than 18 years of age, who shall make a return of service. See Form 9, Appendix I. Such return of service shall be filed with the motion, but failure to do so or otherwise to make proof of service does not affect the validity of the service. Unless otherwise permitted by the Court, any objection to such motion shall be filed within 30 days after the service of the motion. The motion will be granted whenever the Court finds that in the interests of justice such person should be joined. If the motion is granted, such person will thereupon become a party to the action, and the Court will enter such orders as it deems appropriate as to further pleading and other matters. See Rule 50(b) with respect to actions on motions.



(3) Nonjoinder of Necessary Parties: If the Court determines that any person described in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph is a necessary party to an action for declaratory judgment, or, in the case of an action brought by a person described in Code section 7479(b)(1)(B), is another such person described in Code section 7479(b)(1)(B), and that such person has not been joined, then the Court may, on its own motion or on the motion of any party or any such person, dismiss the action on the ground that the absent person is necessary and that justice cannot be accomplished in the absence of such person, or direct that any such person be made a party to the action. An order dismissing a case for nonjoinder of a necessary party may be conditional or absolute.


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Explanation


The Court proposes to amend paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 215 to clarify that the party moving for joinder of additional parties must serve the motion on the other parties to the case, as well as on the person sought to be joined.



III. Limitation On Number of Interrogatories

Paragraph (a) of Rule 71 is deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e) remain unchanged and are omitted here.]




RULE 71. INTERROGATORIES


(a) Availability: Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the Court, a party may serve upon any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts, to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmental agency, by an officer or agent who shall furnish such information as is available to the party. A motion for leave to serve additional interrogatories may be granted by the Court to the extent consistent with Rule 70(b)(2).

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Explanation




Introduction

Rule 33(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party may serve on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts of an interrogatory. See 146 F.R.D. 401, 672-677 (Dec. 1, 1993). Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a) was implemented in conjunction with broader changes to discovery procedures in Federal district courts, including amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) that impose on the parties an affirmative duty to disclose (without awaiting formal discovery) basic information that the parties need in most cases to prepare for trial or make an informed decision about settlement. The Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a) state that experience in Federal district courts confirmed that interrogatory limits were useful and manageable, and the 25 interrogatory limit was imposed to reduce the frequency and increase the efficiency of interrogatory practice.

The term "discrete subparts" is not defined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a). The Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a) discuss the meaning of "discrete subparts" and the manner in which separate interrogatories are to be counted as follows:


Parties cannot evade [the 25 interrogatory limit] through the device of joining as "subparts" questions that seek information about discrete separate subjects. However, a question asking about communications of a particular type should be treated as a single interrogatory even though it requests that the time, place, persons present, and contents be stated separately for each communication.


Rule 70(a)(1) states in pertinent part that "the Court expects the parties to attempt to attain the objectives of discovery through informal consultation or communication before utilizing the discovery procedures provided in these Rules." See Branerton v. Commissioner , 61 T.C. 691, 692 (1974). Rule 70(a)(1) is akin to so much of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) as imposes on the parties an affirmative duty to disclose basic information (without awaiting formal discovery).

Although, when established, the Tax Court's discovery procedures generally were more restrictive than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Note 60 T.C. 1057, 1097 (1973), Rule 71, which governs the use of interrogatories, does not impose any limit on the number of written interrogatories one party mayserve on another party. To conform Rule 71 with Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a), and with the aims of (1) encouraging the parties to voluntarily exchange information, (2) enhancing the efficiency of interrogatory practice, and (3) allowing the Court to exercise greater discretion over the use of interrogatories, the Court proposes to amend Rule 71 to generally limit to 25 the number of interrogatories one party may serve on another party.

The presumptive limit on the number of interrogatories one party may serve on another is not intended to prevent needed discovery but requires the agreement of the parties or judicial scrutiny before the limit may be exceeded. Consistent with Rule 70(b)(2), a motion by a party for leave to serve more than 25 interrogatories on an opposing party may be denied if (A) the interrogatories are unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or the information sought is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive, (B) the party seeking additional interrogatories has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought, or (C) the interrogatories are unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. Interrogatories "should be simple, concise and concerning only matters relevant to the action" and should be framed as a single, definite question. Pleier v. Commissioner , 92 T.C. 499, 501 (1989).



Proposed Amendment

The Court proposes to amend Rule 71(a) to include a presumptive limit of 25 interrogatories that one party may serve on another party. An additional amendment to Rule 71 is proposed in section V (Electronically Stored Information).



IV. Depositions Of A Party (Without Consent)

New paragraph (e) of Rule 75 is added and current paragraph (e) is redesignated as paragraph (f). [Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




RULE 75. DEPOSITIONS FOR DISCOVERY PURPOSES --WITHOUT CONSENT OF PARTIES IN CERTAIN CASES


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(e) Deposition of a Party: (1) When Depositions May Be Taken: After a notice of trial has been issued or after a case has been assigned to a Judge or Special Trial Judge of the Court, and within the time for completion of discovery under Rule 70(a)(2), any party may file a motion to take the deposition of another party or in the exercise of its discretion the Court may order the taking of a deposition of a party in the circumstances described in paragraph (e)(2) of this Rule. A motion to take the deposition of a party may be granted by the Court to the extent consistent with Rule 70(b)(2).


(2) Availability: The taking of a deposition of a party under this Rule is an extraordinary method of discovery and may be used only where a party can give testimony or possesses documents, electronically stored information, or things which are discoverable within the meaning of Rule 70(b) and where such testimony, documents, electronically stored information, or things practicably cannot be obtained through informal consultation or communication (Rule 70(a)(1)), interrogatories (Rule 71), a request for production of documents (Rule 72), or a deposition taken with consent of the parties (Rule 74).



(3) Service of Motion and Objection: Upon the filing of a motion to take the deposition of a party, the Court shall issue an order directing the non-moving party to file a written objection thereto.


(f) Other Applicable Rules: Depositions for discovery purposes under this Rule shall be governed by the provisions of the following Rules with respect to the matters to which they apply: Rule 74(d) (transcript), and 74(e) (depositions upon written questions); Rule 81(c) (designation of person to testify), 81(e) (person before whom deposition taken), 81(f) (taking of deposition), 81(g) (expenses), 81(h) (execution, form, and return of deposition), and 81(i) (use of deposition); and Rule 85(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) (objections and irregularities). For Rules concerned with the timing and frequency of depositions, supplementation of answers, protective orders, effect of evasive or incomplete answers or responses, and sanctions and enforcement action, see Title X.




Explanation




Introduction

Rule 30(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that one party generally may take the deposition of another party without leave of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A) provides that leave of court is required to take a deposition if (i) the parties have not stipulated to the deposition, and (ii) the deposition would result in more than 10 depositions by one of the parties, the deponent was already deposed in the case, or the party seeks to take the deposition before scheduling a discovery conference with the opposing party.

The use of depositions as a discovery tool in Tax Court practice has evolved gradually over time. When the Court adopted its first discovery rules in 1973, discovery was limited to interrogatories and requests for production of documents. At the time, the Notes to Rule 70(a) stated that any additional benefits that might be associated with depositions as a discovery tool were outweighed by the problems and burdens depositions would entail for the parties and the Court. See 60 T.C. 1097. The Court's reluctance to permit discovery depositions "was based primarily on the concern for the burden and cost imposed on litigants". H. Dubroff, Recent Developments In The Business And Procedures Of The United States Tax Court, 52 Alb. L. Rev. 33, 222 (1987-88).

By 1979, the Court's position with regard to discovery depositions began to change, and it added Rule 74 (then titled "Depositions for Discovery Purposes"), which provides that, upon consent of all the parties to a case, a deposition for discovery purposes may be taken of either a party or a nonparty witness. The Notes to Rule 74 stated that the Rule limits the availability of depositions to avoid the excessive and abusive use of discovery depositions. See 71 T.C. at 1195. A few years later, in 1982, the Court added Rule 75 (titled "Depositions for Discovery Purposes --Without Consent of Parties in Certain Cases") which provides for the taking of discovery depositions of nonparty witnesses --"an extraordinary method of discovery which may be used only where the information sought cannot be obtained by informal consultation or by other discovery methods." See 79 T.C. at 1141-1142. A deposition under Rule 75 may only be taken after a notice of trial has been issued or after a case has been assigned to a Judge or Special Trial Judge, and within the time for completion of discovery under Rule 70(a)(2). Finally, in 1990, the Court added Rule 76 (titled "Deposition of Expert Witnesses") which authorizes depositions of expert witnesses upon the consent of all the parties (under Rule 74) or, in extraordinary cases, without the consent of all the parties. The Notes to Rule 76 stated that the Court's experience led the Court to reconsider the utility of depositions of experts and "it is expected that such depositions will not only enhance trial preparation and hence the presentation of evidence at trial, but will also increase the number of settlements in cases requiring the assistance of experts." See 93 T.C. at 910-911.

The Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure currently do not permit a party to take the deposition of another party for discovery purposes absent consent to the deposition under Rule 74. 1 In some cases, a Judge or Special Trial Judge may conclude that the inability of one party to depose an opposing party may both hamper a party's ability to prepare for trial and unnecessarily complicate the presentation of evidence at trial.



Proposed Amendment

The Court proposes to amend Rule 75 to provide that a party may move to take the deposition of another party or the Court in the exercise of its discretion may order the deposition of a party sua sponte. The deposition of a party under Rule 75 is an extraordinary method of discovery and may be taken only pursuant to an order of the Court. Whether to issue such an order is a matter solely within the discretion of the Judge or Special Trial Judge who is responsible for the case. Discretion may be exercised either sua sponte or pursuant to a motion filed by a party. A Judge or Special Trial Judge should only order such a deposition where the testimony or information sought practicably cannot be obtained through informal communications or the Court's normal discovery procedures and to the extent consistent with Rule 70(b)(2). An additional amendment to Rule 75 is proposed in section V (Electronically Stored Information).



V. Electronically Stored Information

Subparagraph (a) (1) of Rule 70 is deleted and replaced with the following and new subparagraph (b)(3) is added to the Rule. [Subparagraphs (a)(2) and (3), subparagraphs (b)(1) and (2), and paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (f) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




RULE 70. GENERAL PROVISIONS


(a) General: (1) Methods and Limitations of Discovery: In conformity with these Rules, a party may obtain discovery by written interrogatories (Rule 71), by production of documents, electronically stored information, or things (Rules 72 and 73), by depositions upon consent of the parties (Rule 74), by depositions without consent of the parties in certain cases (Rule 75), or by depositions of expert witnesses (Rule 76). However, the Court expects the parties to attempt to attain the objectives of discovery through informal consultation or communication before utilizing the discovery procedures provided in these Rules. Discovery is not available under these Rules through depositions except to the limited extent provided in Rules 74, 75, and 76. See Rules 91(a) and 100 regarding relationship of discovery to stipulations.

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(b) Scope of Discovery:

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(3) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information: A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the Court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 70(b)(2). The Court may specify conditions for the discovery.


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Explanation




Introduction

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery procedures state that, in addition to "documents", "records", and "things", a discovery request may encompass any type of information that is stored electronically in any medium from which information can be obtained. See 234 F.R.D. 219 (Dec. 1, 2006). For example, the Advisory Committee Notes underlying Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 (Producing Documents, Electronically Stored Information, and Tangible Things, or Entering Onto Land, For Inspection and Other Purposes), state in pertinent part:


Discoverable information often exists in both paper and electronic form and the same or similar information might exist in both. The items listed in Rule 34(a) show different ways in which information may be recorded or stored. Images, for example, might be hard-copy documents or electronically stored information. The wide variety of computer systems currently in use, and the rapidity of technological change, counsel against a limiting or precise definition of electronically stored information. Rule 34(a)(1) is expansive and includes any type of information that is stored electronically. A common example often sought in discovery is electronic communications, such as e-mail. The rule covers --either as documents or as electronically stored information --information "stored in any medium," to encompass future developments in computer technology. Rule 34(a)(1) is intended to be broad enough to cover all current types of computer-based information and flexible enough to encompass future changes and developments.



Reference elsewhere in the rules to "electronically stored information" should be understood to invoke this expansive approach.


However, the Advisory Committee Notes underlying Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) recognize that the burden and cost of locating, retrieving, and providing discovery of some electronically stored information may make such information not reasonably accessible. Thus, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) provides that the Court may limit discovery from such sources in appropriate circumstances. The Advisory Committee Notes underlying Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3) state that the parties should engage in early discussions of the forms of production of electronically stored information so that both parties' needs might be met and to "help avoid the expense and delay of searches or productions using inappropriate forms."

In addition, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) limits the imposition of sanctions for failure to provide electronically stored information in certain circumstances. The Advisory Committee Notes underlying Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) (formerly rule 37(f)) state as follows:


Subdivision (f). Subdivision (f) is new. It focuses on a distinctive feature of computer operations, the routine alteration and deletion of information that attends ordinary use. Many steps essential to computer operation may alter or destroy information for reasons that have nothing to do with how that information might relate to litigation. As a result, the ordinary operation of computer systems creates a risk that a party may lose potentially discoverable information without culpable conduct on its part. Under Rule 37(f), absent exceptional circumstances, sanctions cannot be imposed for loss of electronically stored information resulting from the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.



Rule 37(f) applies only to information lost due to the "routine operation of an electronic information system" --the ways in which such systems are generally designed, programmed, and implemented to meet the party's technical and business needs. The "routine operation" of computer systems includes the alteration and overwriting of information, often without the operator's specific direction or awareness, a feature with no direct counterpart in hard-copy documents. Such features are essential to the operation of electronic information systems.


Information subject to discovery in a Tax Court case may be stored electronically in a variety of devices and formats. In this regard, electronically stored information is different from paper records, documents, and tangible things. Electronically stored information can pose unique discovery problems due to the volume of such information, the lack of accessibility to such information, the format in which it is stored and/or produced, the potential for destruction or loss of such information, and difficulties related to assertion of a privilege and/or inadvertent waiver of a privilege. The Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure currently do not make reference to the discovery or use of electronically stored information in Tax Court proceedings.



Proposed Amendment

The Court proposes to amended its Rules 2 to include an express reference to electronically stored information and to provide specific rules applicable to the discovery of electronically stored information. The amendments are intended to clarify that electronically stored information generally is subject to discovery in Tax Court proceedings and that a cooperative effort may be required to ensure that such information is disclosed in a form or format that will be useful to the parties and the Court. The term "electronically stored information" is intended to be broad enough to cover all current types of computer-based information and flexible enough to encompass future changes and technological developments.

The Court proposes to amend Rule 70(a)(1) to include a reference to electronically stored information and to add new subparagraph (b)(3) to the Rule to prescribe possible limits on discovery of electronically stored information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (2) (B).

Paragraph (e) of Rule 71 is deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




RULE 71. INTERROGATORIES


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(e) Option To Produce Business Records: If the answer to an interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from the business records (including electronically stored information) of the party upon whom the interrogatory has been served, or from an examination, audit, or inspection of such records, or from a compilation, abstract, or summary based thereon, and the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party served, it is sufficient answer to such interrogatory to specify the records from which the answer may be derived or ascertained and to afford to the party serving the interrogatory reasonable opportunity to examine, audit, or inspect such records and to make copies, compilations, abstracts, or summaries.




Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 71(e) to include a reference to discovery of electronically stored information. An additional amendment to Rule 71 is proposed in section III (Limitation on Number of Interrogatories).

Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 72 are deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraph (c) remains unchanged and is omitted here. ]



RULE 72. PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION, AND THINGS

(a) Scope: Any party may, without leave of Court, serve on any other party a request to:


(1) Produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on such party's behalf, to inspect and copy, test, or sample any designated documents or electronically stored information (including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data compilations stored in any medium from which information can be obtained, either directly or translated, if necessary, by the responding party into a reasonably usable form), or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible thing, to the extent that any of the foregoing items are in the possession, custody, or control of the party on whom the request is served; or



(2) Permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession or control of the party upon whom the request is served for the purpose of inspection and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property or any designated object or operation thereon.


(b) Procedure:


(1) Contents of the Request: The request shall set forth the items to be inspected, either by individual item or category, describe each item and category with reasonable particularity, and may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced. It shall specify a reasonable time, place, and manner of making the inspection and performing the related acts.



(2) Responses and Objections: The party upon whom the request is served shall serve a written response within 30 days after service of the request. The Court may allow a shorter or longer time. The response shall state, with respect to each item or category, that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested, unless the request is objected to in whole or in part, in which event the reasons for objection shall be stated. If objection is made to part of an item or category, then that part shall be specified. The response may state an objection to a requested form for producing electronically stored information. If the responding party objects to a requested form --or if no form was specified in the request --the party shall state the form or forms it intends to use. To obtain a ruling on an objection by the responding party, on a failure to respond, or on a failure to produce or permit inspection, the requesting party shall file an appropriate motion with the Court and shall annex thereto the request, with proof of service on the other party, together with the response and objections if any. Prior to a motion for such a ruling, neither the request nor the response shall be filed with the Court.



(3) Producing Documents or Electronically Stored Information: Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the Court, these procedures apply to producing documents or electronically stored information: (A) A party shall produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or shall organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the request; (B) If a request does not specify a form for producing electronically stored information, a party shall produce it in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms; and (C) A party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one form.


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Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 72(a) and (b) to include references to discovery of electronically stored information and to prescribe specific procedures applicable to the production of electronically stored information. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.

Paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Rule 73 are deleted and replaced with the following.




RULE 73. EXAMINATION BY TRANSFEREES


(a) General: Upon application to the Court and subject to these Rules, a transferee of property of a taxpayer shall be entitled to examine before trial the books, papers, documents, correspondence, electronically stored information, and other evidence of the taxpayer or of a preceding transferee of the taxpayer's property, but only if the transferee making the application is a petitioner seeking redetermination of such transferee's liability in respect of the taxpayer's tax liability (including interest, additional amounts, and additions provided by law). Such books, papers, documents, correspondence, electronically stored information, and other evidence may be made available to the extent that the same shall be within the United States, will not result in undue hardship to the taxpayer or preceding transferee, and in the opinion of the Court are necessary in order to enable the transferee to ascertain the liability of the taxpayer or preceding transferee.

(b) Procedure: A petitioner desiring an examination permitted under paragraph (a) shall file an application with the Court, showing that such petitioner is entitled to such an examination, describing the documents, electronically stored information, and other materials sought to be examined, giving the names and addresses of the persons to produce the same, and stating a reasonable time and place where the examination is to be made. If the Court shall determine that the applicable requirements are satisfied, then it shall issue a subpoena, signed by a Judge, directed to the appropriate person and ordering the production at a designated time and place of the documents, electronically stored information, and other materials involved. If the person to whom the subpoena is directed shall object thereto or to the production involved, then such person shall file the objections and the reasons therefor in writing with the Court, and serve a copy thereof upon the applicant, within 10 days after service of the subpoena or on or before such earlier time as may be specified in the subpoena for compliance. To obtain a ruling on such objections, the applicant for the subpoena shall file an appropriate motion with the Court. In all respects not inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule, the provisions of Rule 72(b) shall apply where appropriate.

(c) Scope of Examination: The scope of the examination authorized under this Rule shall be as broad as is authorized under Rule 72(a), including, for example, the copying of such documents, electronically stored information, and materials.




Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 73(a), (b), and (c) to include references to discovery of electronically stored information.

Paragraph (b) of Rule 75 is deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (e) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




RULE 75. DEPOSITIONS FOR DISCOVERY PURPOSES --WITHOUT CONSENT OF PARTIES IN CERTAIN CASES


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(b) Availability: The taking of a deposition of a nonparty witness under this Rule is an extraordinary method of discovery and may be used only where a nonparty witness can give testimony or possesses documents, electronically stored information, or things which are discoverable within the meaning of Rule 70(b) and where such testimony, documents, electronically stored information, or things practicably cannot be obtained through informal consultation or communication (Rule 70(a) (1)) or by a deposition taken with consent of the parties (Rule 74). If such requirements are satisfied, then a deposition may be taken under this Rule, for example, where a party is a member of a partnership and an issue in the case involves an adjustment with respect to such partnership, or a party is a shareholder of an electing small business corporation (as described in Code section 1371(a)), and an issue in the case involves an adjustment with respect to such corporation. See Title XXIV, relating to partnership actions, brought under provisions first enacted by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.

* * * * * * *




Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 75(b) to include references to the discovery of electronically stored information. An additional amendment to Rule 75 is proposed in section IV (Depositions of a Party (Without Consent)).

Paragraph (d) of Rule 76 is deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (e) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




RULE 76. DEPOSITION OF EXPERT WITNESSES


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(d) Procedure: (1) In General: A party desiring to depose an expert witness under paragraph (a) (2) of this Rule shall file a written motion and shall set forth therein the matters specified in subparagraph (2). The Court shall take such action on the motion as it deems appropriate.


(2) Content of Motion: Any motion seeking an order authorizing the deposition of an expert witness under paragraph (a) (2) of this Rule shall set forth the following:



(A) The name and address of the witness to be examined;



(B) a statement describing any books, papers, documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things to be produced at the deposition of the witness to be examined;



(C) a statement of issues in controversy to which the expected testimony of the expert witness, or the document, electronically stored information, or thing, relates, and the reasons for deposing the witness;



(D) the time and place proposed for the deposition;



(E) the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken;



(F) any provision desired with respect to the payment of the costs, expenses, fees, and charges relating to the deposition (see paragraph (g)); and



(G) if the movant proposes to video record the deposition, then a statement to that effect and the name and address of the video recorder operator and the operator's employer. (The video recorder operator and the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken may be the same person.)


If the movant proposes to take the deposition of the expert witness on written questions, then the movant shall annex to the motion a copy of the questions to be propounded. The movant shall also show that prior notice of the motion has been given to the expert witness whose deposition is sought and to each other party, or counsel for each other party, and shall state the position of each of these persons with respect to the motion, in accordance with Rule 50(a).

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Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 76(d) to include references to discovery of electronically stored information. An additional amendment to Rule 76 is proposed in section II (Service of Papers).

Paragraph (a) of Rule 80 is deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraph (b) remains unchanged and is omitted here. ]




RULE 80. GENERAL PROVISIONS


(a) General: On complying with the applicable requirements, depositions to perpetuate evidence may be taken in a pending case before trial (Rule 81), or in anticipation of commencing a case in this Court (Rule 82), or in connection with the trial (Rule 83). Depositions under this Title may be taken only for the purpose of making testimony or any document, electronically stored information, or thing available as evidence in the circumstances herein authorized by the applicable Rules. Depositions for discovery purposes may be taken only in accordance with Rules 74, 75, and 76.

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Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 80(a) to include a reference to electronically stored information.

Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 81 are deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraphs (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (j) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




RULE 81. DEPOSITIONS IN PENDING CASE


(a) Depositions To Perpetuate Testimony: A party to a case pending in the Court, who desires to perpetuate testimony or to preserve any document, electronically stored information, or thing, shall file an application pursuant to these Rules for an order of the Court authorizing such party to take a deposition for such purpose. Such depositions shall be taken only where there is a substantial risk that the person or document, electronically stored information, or thing involved will not be available at the trial of the case, and shall relate only to testimony or document, electronically stored information, or thing which is not privileged and is material to a matter in controversy.

(b) The Application: (1) Content of Application: The application to take a deposition pursuant to paragraph (a) of this Rule shall be signed by the party seeking the deposition or such party's counsel, and shall show the following:


(A) The names and addresses of the persons to be examined;.



(B) the reasons for deposing those persons rather than waiting to call them as witnesses at the trial;



(C) the substance of the testimony which the party expects to elicit from each of those persons;



(D) a statement showing how the proposed testimony or document, electronically stored information, or thing is material to a matter in controversy;



(E) a statement describing any books, papers, documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things to be produced at the deposition by the persons to be examined;



(F) the time and place proposed for the deposition;



(G) the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken;



(H) the date on which the petition was filed with the Court, and whether the pleadings have been closed and the case placed on a trial calendar;



(I) any provision desired with respect to payment of expenses, fees, and charges relating to the deposition (see paragraph (g) of this Rule, and Rule 103); and



(J) if the applicant proposes to video record the deposition, then the application shall so state, and shall show the name and address of the video recorder operator and of the operator's employer. (The video recorder operator and the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken may be the same person. See subparagraph (2) of paragraph (j) of this Rule.) The application shall also have annexed to it a copy of the questions to be propounded, if the deposition is to be taken on written questions. For the form of application to take a deposition, see Appendix I.


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Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 81(a) and (b) to include references to electronically stored information. An additional amendment to Rule 81 is proposed in section II (Service of Papers).

Rule 82 is deleted and replaced with the following.




RULE 82. DEPOSITIONS BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF CASE


A person who desires to perpetuate testimony or to preserve any document, electronically stored information, or thing regarding any matter that may be cognizable in this Court may file an application with the Court to take a deposition for such purpose. The application shall be entitled in the name of the applicant, shall otherwise be in the same style and form as apply to a motion filed with the Court, and shall show the following: (1) The facts showing that the applicant expects to be a party to a case cognizable in this Court but is at present unable to bring it or cause it to be brought; (2) the subject matter of the expected action and the applicant's interest therein; and (3) all matters required to be shown in an application under paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 81 except item (H) thereof. Such an application will be entered upon a special docket, and service thereof and pleading with respect thereto will proceed subject to the requirements otherwise applicable to a motion. A hearing on the application may be required by the Court. If the Court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony or the preservation of the document, electronically stored information, or thing may prevent a failure or delay of justice, then it will make an order authorizing the deposition and including such other terms and conditions as it may deem appropriate consistently with these Rules. If the deposition is taken, and if thereafter the expected case is commenced in this Court, then the deposition may be used in that case subject to the Rules which would apply if the deposition had been taken after commencement of the case.




Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 82 to include references to electronically stored information.

Rule 100 is deleted and replaced with the following.




RULE 100. APPLICABILITY


The Rules in this Title apply according to their terms to written interrogatories (Rule 71), production of documents, electronically stored information, or things (Rule 72), examination by transferees (Rule 73), depositions (Rules 74, 75, 76, 81, 82, 83, and 84), and requests for admission (Rule 90). Such procedures may be used in anticipation of the stipulation of facts required by Rule 91, but the existence of such procedures or their use does not excuse failure to comply with the requirements of that Rule. See Rule 91(a)(2).




Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 100 to include a reference to electronically stored information.

Rule 103(a) is deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraph (b) remains unchanged and is omitted here.]




RULE 103. PROTECTIVE ORDERS


(a) Authorized Orders : Upon motion by a party or any other affected person, and for good cause shown, the Court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or other person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including but not limited to one or more of the following:


(1) That the particular method or procedure not be used.



(2) That the method or procedure be used only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place.



(3) That a method or procedure be used other than the one selected by the party.



(4) That certain matters not be inquired into, or that the method be limited to certain matters or to any other extent.



(5) That the method or procedure be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the Court.



(6) That a deposition or other written materials, after being sealed, be opened only by order of the Court.



(7) That a trade secret or other information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.



(8) That the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the Court.



(9) That expense involved in a method or procedure be borne in a particular manner or by specified person or persons.



(10) That documents or records (including electronically stored information) be impounded by the Court to ensure their availability for purpose of review by the parties prior to trial and use at the trial.


If a discovery request has been made, then the movant shall attach as an exhibit to a motion for a protective order under this Rule a copy of any discovery request in respect of which the motion is filed.

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Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 103(a) to include references to electronically stored information.

New paragraph (e) is added to Rule 104. [Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) remain unchanged and are omitted here. ]




RULE 104. ENFORCEMENT ACTION AND SANCTIONS


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(e) Failure to Provide Electronically Stored Information: Absent exceptional circumstances, sanctions may not be imposed under this Rule on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information that was lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.




Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 104 by adding new paragraph (e) to limit the imposition of sanctions for failure to provide electronically stored information in certain circumstances. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e).

Paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of Rule 147 are deleted and replaced with the following. [Paragraphs (c) and (e) remain unchanged and are omitted here.]




RULE 147. SUBPOENAS


(a) Attendance of Witnesses; Form; Issuance: Every subpoena shall be issued under the seal of the Court, shall state the name of the Court and the caption of the case, and shall command each person to whom it is directed to attend and give testimony at a time and place therein specified. A subpoena, including a subpoena for the production of documentary evidence or electronically stored information, signed and sealed but otherwise blank, shall be issued to a party requesting it, who shall fill it in before service. Subpoenas may be obtained at the Office of the Clerk in Washington, D.C., or from a trial clerk at a trial session. See Code sec. 7456(a).

(b) Production of Documentary Evidence and Electronically Stored Information: A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things designated therein, and may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be produced. The Court, upon motion made promptly and in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, may (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or (2) condition denial of the motion upon the advancement by the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued of the reasonable cost of producing the books, papers, documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things.

* * * * * * *

(d) Subpoena for Taking Depositions: (1) Issuance and Response: The order of the Court approving the taking of a deposition pursuant to Rule 81(b)(2), the executed stipulation pursuant to Rule 81(d), or the service of the notice of deposition pursuant to Rule 74(b) or 75(c), constitutes authorization for issuance of subpoenas for the persons named or described therein. The subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to produce and permit inspection and copying of designated books, papers, documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things, which come within the scope of the order or stipulation pursuant to which the deposition is taken. Within 15 days after service of the subpoena or such earlier time designated therein for compliance, the person to whom the subpoena is directed may serve upon the party on whose behalf the subpoena has been issued written objections to compliance with the subpoena in any or all respects. Such objections should not include objections made, or which might have been made, to the application to take the deposition pursuant to Rule 81(b)(2) or to the notice of deposition under Rule 74(c) or 75(d). If an objection is made, the party serving the subpoena shall not be entitled to compliance therewith to the extent of such objection, except as the Court may order otherwise upon application to it. Such application for an order may be made, with notice to the other party and to any other objecting persons, at any time before or during the taking of the deposition, subject to the time requirements of Rule 70(a)(2) or 81(b)(2). As to availability of protective orders, see Rule 103; and, as to enforcement of such subpoenas, see Rule 104.

* * * * * * *




Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 147(a), (b), and (d) to include references to electronically stored information.

Rule 181 is deleted and replaced with the following.




RULE 181. POWERS AND DUTIES


Subject to the specifications and limitations in orders designating Special Trial Judges and in accordance with the applicable provisions of these Rules, Special Trial Judges have and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in any matter before them, including the conduct of trials, pretrial conferences, and hearings on motions, and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of their duties. They may require the production before them of evidence upon all matters embraced within their assignment, including the production of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, electronically stored information, and writings applicable thereto, and they have the authority to put witnesses on oath and to examine them. Special Trial Judges may rule upon the admissibility of evidence, in accordance with the provisions of Code sections 7453 and 7463, and may exercise such further and incidental authority, including ordering the issuance of subpoenas, as may be necessary for the conduct of trials or other proceedings.




Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 181 to include a reference to electronically stored information.



VI. Contemporaneous Transmission of Testimony From Different Location

New paragraph (b) is added to Rule 143 and current paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) are redesignated as paragraphs (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively. [Paragraph (a) remains unchanged and is omitted here.]




RULE 143. EVIDENCE


* * * * * * *

(b) Testimony: The testimony of a witness generally must be taken in open court except as otherwise provided by the Court or these Rules. For good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the Court may permit testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location.

(c) Ex Parte Statements: Ex parte affidavits, statements in briefs, and unadmitted allegations in pleadings do not constitute evidence. As to allegations in pleadings not denied, see Rules 36(c) and 37(c) and (d).

(d) Depositions: Testimony taken by deposition shall not be treated as evidence in a case until offered and received in evidence. Error in the transcript of a deposition may be corrected by agreement of the parties, or by the Court on proof it deems satisfactory to show an error exists and the correction to be made, subject to the requirements of Rules 81(h)(1) and 85(e). As to the use of a deposition, see Rule 81(i).

(e) Documentary Evidence: (1) Copies: A copy is admissible to the same extent as an original unless a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the copy in lieu of the original. Where the original is admitted in evidence, a clearly legible copy may be substituted later for the original or such part thereof as may be material or relevant, upon leave granted in the discretion of the Court.


(2) Return of Exhibits: Exhibits may be disposed of as the Court deems advisable. A party desiring the return at such party's expense of any exhibit belonging to such party, shall, within 90 days after the decision of the case by the Court has become final, make written application to the Clerk, suggesting a practical manner of delivery. If such application is not timely made, the exhibits in the case will be destroyed.


(f) Interpreters: The parties ordinarily will be expected to make their own arrangements for obtaining and compensating interpreters. However, the Court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and may fix the interpreter's reasonable compensation, which compensation shall be paid by one or more of the parties or otherwise as the Court may direct.

(g) Expert Witness Reports: (1) Unless otherwise permitted by the Court upon timely request, any party who calls an expert witness shall cause that witness to prepare a written report for submission to the Court and to the opposing party. The report shall set forth the qualifications of the expert witness and shall state the witness's opinion and the facts or data on which that opinion is based. The report shall set forth in detail the reasons for the conclusion, and it will be marked as an exhibit, identified by the witness, and received in evidence as the direct testimony of the expert witness, unless the Court determines that the witness is not qualified as an expert. Additional direct testimony with respect to the report may be allowed to clarify or emphasize matters in the report, to cover matters arising after the preparation of the report, or otherwise at the discretion of the Court. After the case is calendared for trial or assigned to a Judge or Special Trial Judge, each party who calls any expert witness shall serve on each other party, and shall submit to the Court, not later than 30 days before the call of the trial calendar on which the case shall appear, a copy of all expert witness reports prepared pursuant to this subparagraph. An expert witness's testimony will be excluded altogether for failure to comply with the provisions of this paragraph, unless the failure is shown to be due to good cause and unless the failure does not unduly prejudice the opposing party, such as by significantly impairing the opposing party's ability to cross-examine the expert witness or by denying the opposing party the reasonable opportunity to obtain evidence in rebuttal to the expert witness's testimony.


(2) The Court ordinarily will not grant a request to permit an expert witness to testify without a written report where the expert witness's testimony is based on third-party contacts, comparable sales, statistical data, or other detailed, technical information. The Court may grant such a request, for example, where the expert witness testifies only with respect to industry practice or only in rebuttal to another expert witness.



(3) For circumstances under which the transcript of the deposition of an expert witness may serve as the written report required by subparagraph (1), see Rule 76(e)(1).





Explanation




Introduction

Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that "For good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the court may permit testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location." The Advisory Committee Notes underlying Fed. R. Civ. P. 43 include the following cautionary language:


Contemporaneous transmission of testimony from a different location is permitted only on showing good cause in compelling circumstances. The importance of presenting live testimony in court cannot be forgotten. The very ceremony of trial and the presence of the factfinder may exert a powerful force for truthtelling. The opportunity to judge the demeanor of a witness face-to-face is accorded great value in our tradition. Transmissions cannot be justified merely by showing that it is inconvenient for the witness to attend the trial.



The most persuasive showings of good cause and compelling circumstances are likely to arise when a witness is unable to attend trial for unexpected reasons, such as an accident or illness, but remains able to testify from a different place. Contemporaneous transmission may be better than an attempt to reschedule the trial, particularly if there is a risk that other --and perhaps more important --witnesses might not be available at a later time.



Other possible justifications for remote transmission must be approached cautiously. Ordinarily depositions, including video depositions, provide a superior means of securing the testimony of a witness who is beyond the reach of a trial subpoena, or of resolving difficulties in scheduling a trial that can be attended by all witnesses. Deposition procedures ensure the opportunity of all parties to be represented while the witness is testifying. An unforseen need for the testimony of a remote witness that arises during trial, however, may establish good cause and compelling circumstances. Justification is particularly likely if the need arises from the interjection of new issues during trial or from the unexpected inability to present testimony as planned from a different witness.



Good cause and compelling circumstances may be established with relative ease if all parties agree that testimony should be presented by transmission. The court is not bound by a stipulation, however, and can insist on live testimony. Rejection of the parties' agreement will be influenced, among other factors, by the apparent importance of the testimony in the full context of the trial.



A party who could reasonably foresee the circumstances offered to justify transmission of testimony will have special difficulty in showing good cause and the compelling nature of the circumstances. Notice of a desire to transmit testimony from a different location should be given as soon as the reasons are known, to enable other parties to arrange a deposition, or to secure an advance ruling on transmission so as to know whether to prepare to be present with the witness while testifying.



No attempt is made to specify the means of transmission that may be used. Audio transmission without video images may be sufficient in some circumstances, particularly as to less important testimony. Video transmission ordinarily should be preferred when the cost is reasonable in relation to the matters in dispute, the means of the parties, and the circumstances that justify transmission. Transmission that merely produces the equivalent of a written statement ordinarily should not be used.



Safeguards must be adopted that ensure accurate identification of the witness and that protect against influence by persons present with the witness. Accurate transmission likewise must be assured.



Other safeguards should be employed to ensure that advance notice is given to all parties of foreseeable circumstances that may lead the proponent to offer testimony by transmission. Advance notice is important to protect the opportunity to argue for attendance of the witness at trial. Advance notice also ensures an opportunity to depose the witness, perhaps by video record, as a means of supplementing transmitted testimony.


The Tax Court is a court of national jurisdiction --its Judges and Special Trial Judges travel to 75 cities to conduct hearings and trial sessions, and its subpoena power extends nationwide so that a witness may be compelled to attend a trial or hearing from anywhere in the United States. I.R.C. sec. 7456. The Court also conducts motions hearings in Washington, D.C., and these hearings occasionally require witness testimony. Rules 50(b)(2), 130(a), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Situations sometimes arise in which a witness is unable to attend a trial or hearing for unexpected reasons, such as an accident or illness, and the parties may suffer substantial delays and incur significant additional costs if it is necessary to reschedule the trial or hearing to accommodate such a witness. However, if the witness is able to testify from a different location, the interests of justice may be better served by accepting the witness's testimony by contemporaneous transmission, particularly if there is a risk that other --and perhaps more important --witnesses might not be available at a later time.

The Tax Court has a "high-tech" courtroom enabling the Court to receive testimony from a witness who is in a different location. The Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure currently do not provide for the contemporaneous transmission of testimony from a different location. Recognizing that situations may arise in which it is necessary and appropriate for the Court to receive testimony from a witness in a different location, the Court should articulate a standard for receiving such testimony.



Proposed Amendment

The Court proposes to amend Rule 143 by adding new paragraph (b) to provide that the Court may permit testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from another location. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a).



VII. Disciplinary Matters

New paragraphs (b) and (d) are added to Rule 202. Current paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) are redesignated as paragraphs (c), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), respectively. [Paragraph (a) remains unchanged and is omitted here. ]




RULE 202. DISCIPLINARY MATTERS


* * * * * * *

(b) Reporting Convictions and Discipline: A member of the Bar of this Court who has been convicted of any felony or of any lesser crime described in paragraph (a)(1), who has been disciplined as described in paragraph (a)(2), or who has been disbarred or suspended from practice before an agency of the United States Government exercising professional disciplinary jurisdiction, shall inform the Chair of the Court's Committee on Admissions, Ethics, and Discipline of such action in writing no later than 30 days after entry of the judgment of conviction or order of discipline.

(c) Disciplinary Actions: Discipline may consist of disbarment, suspension from practice before the Court, reprimand, admonition, or any other sanction that the Court may deem appropriate. The Court may, in the exercise of its discretion, immediately suspend a practitioner from practice before the Court until further order of the Court. Except as provided in paragraph (d), no person shall be suspended for more than 60 days or disbarred until such person has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. A Judge of the Court may immediately suspend any person for not more than 60 days for contempt or misconduct during the course of any trial or hearing.

(d) Interim Suspension Pending Final Disposition of Disciplinary Proceedings: If a member of the Bar of this Court is convicted in any court of the United States, or of the District of Columbia, or of any State, territory, commonwealth, or possession of the United States of any felony or of any lesser crime described in paragraph (a)(1), then, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal of the conviction, if any, the Court may, in the exercise of its discretion, immediately suspend such practitioner from practice before the Court pending final disposition of the disciplinary proceedings described in paragraph (e).

(e) Disciplinary Proceedings: Upon the occurrence or allegation of any event described in paragraph (a)(1) through (a)(4), except for any suspension imposed for 60 days or less pursuant to paragraph (c), the Court shall issue to the practitioner an order to show cause why the practitioner should not be disciplined or shall otherwise take appropriate action. The order to show cause shall direct that a written response be filed within such period as the Court may direct and shall set a prompt hearing on the matter before one or more Judges of the Court. If the disciplinary proceeding is predicated upon the complaint of a Judge of the Court, the hearing shall be conducted before a panel of three other Judges of the Court.

(f) Reinstatement: (1) A practitioner suspended for 60 days or less pursuant to paragraph (c) shall be automatically reinstated at the end of the period of suspension.


(2) A practitioner suspended for more than 60 days or disbarred pursuant to this Rule may not resume practice before the Court until reinstated by order of the Court.



(A) A disbarred practitioner or a practitioner suspended for more than 60 days who wishes to be reinstated to practice before the Court must file a petition for reinstatement. Upon receipt of the petition for reinstatement, the Court may set the matter for prompt hearing before one or more Judges of the Court. If the disbarment or suspension for more than 60 days was predicated upon the complaint of a Judge of the Court, any such hearing shall be conducted before a panel of three other Judges of the Court.



(B) In order to be reinstated before the Court, the practitioner must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence in the petition for reinstatement and at any hearing that such practitioner's reinstatement will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Court's Bar or to the administration of justice, or subversive of the public interest.



(C) No petition for reinstatement under this Rule shall be filed within 1 year following an adverse decision upon a petition for reinstatement filed by or on behalf of the same person.


(g) Right to Counsel: In all proceedings conducted under the provisions of this Rule, the practitioner shall have the right to be represented by counsel.

(h) Appointment of Court Counsel: The Court, in its discretion, may appoint counsel to the Court to assist it with respect to any disciplinary matters.

(i) Jurisdiction: Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to deny to the Court such powers as are necessary for the Court to maintain control over proceedings conducted before it, such as proceedings for contempt under Code Section 7456 or for costs under Code Section 6673(a)(2).




Explanation




Introduction

The Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, adopted by the American Bar Association House of Delegates in August 1989 and last amended in August 2002, recommend that a lawyer admitted to practice be referred to the appropriate lawyer disciplinary agency in the jurisdiction with respect to the lawyer's conviction of a serious crime or the discipline of the lawyer in another jurisdiction. Mod. Rules Law. Displ. Enforce. rule 22 (Aug. 2002). The Model Rules also suggest that a court place a lawyer on interim suspension immediately upon proof that the lawyer has been found guilty of a serious crime, regardless of the pendency of an appeal. Mod. Rules Law. Displ. Enforce. rule 19 (Aug. 2002). As the commentaries to the Model Rules state, continued practice by a lawyer found guilty of a serious crime or judicially determined to be unfit leaves the public unprotected, exposes innocent clients to harm, and undermines public confidence in the legal profession. Similar rules are found in the rules of a number of State courts. See, e.g., Sup. Ct. Va. R. 8.3(e); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code sec. 6068(o); D.C. Bar R. XI, sec. 10(c).



Proposed Amendment

The Court proposes to amend Rule 202 to add new paragraphs (b) and (d). Proposed new paragraph (b) would require a member of the Tax Court Bar to notify the Court within 30 days after: (1) Conviction of any felony, or conviction of any lesser crime described in paragraph (a)(1) of Rule 202; (2) imposition of discipline by any other court; and (3) disbarment or suspension from practice before an agency of the United States Government exercising professional disciplinary jurisdiction. Similar notice requirements are recommended by rule 22 of the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1989 and last amended in August 2002, and are found in the rules of a number of State courts. See, e.g., Sup. Ct. Va. R. 8.3(e), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code sec. 6068(o). Proposed new paragraph (d) would give the Court discretionary authority to suspend a member of the Bar who is convicted of certain serious crimes pending final disposition of the disciplinary proceedings in this Court. Again, similar provisions are recommended by rule 19 of the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, and are found in the rules of various States. See, e.g., D.C. Bar R. XI, sec. 10(c). Various conforming amendments are also proposed.



VIII. Payment Of Tax Court Fees And Charges By Credit Card

Rule 11 is deleted and replaced with the following.




RULE 11. PAYMENTS TO THE COURT


All payments to the Court for fees or charges of the Court may be made in cash or by check, money order, or other draft made payable to the order of "Clerk, United States Tax Court", and shall be mailed or delivered to the Clerk of the Court at Washington, D.C. The Court may also permit specified fees or charges to be paid by credit card. For the Court's address, see Rule 10(e). For particular payments, see Rules 12(c) (copies of Court records), 20(c) (filing of petition), 173(a)(2) (small tax cases), 200(a) (application to practice before Court), 200(g) (periodic registration fee), 271(c) (filing of petition for administrative costs), 281(c) (filing of petition for review of failure to abate interest), 291(d) (filing of petition for redetermination of employment status), 311(c) (filing of petition for declaratory judgment relating to treatment of items other than partnership items with respect to an oversheltered return), 321(d) (filing of petition for determination of relief from joint and several liability on a joint return), 331(d) (filing of petition for lien and levy action), and 341(c) (filing of petition for whistleblower action). For fees and charges payable to the Court, see Appendix II.




Explanation


The Court proposes to amend Rule 11 to clarify that the Court may permit specified fees and charges to be paid by credit card. The Court's Web site provides specific information regarding the fees and charges that may be paid by credit card either in person at the Court, over the telephone, or through designated electronic payment systems. An additional conforming amendment to Rule 11 is proposed in section I (Ownership Disclosure Statements).

1 Since 1973, Title VIII of the Court's Rules of Practice and Procedure (Rules 80-85) have permitted depositions of party and non-party witnesses for the (non-discovery) purpose of making testimony and documents available as evidence at trial. See 60 T.C. 1103-1114 (1973). Such depositions may be taken in a pending case before trial (Rule 81), in anticipation of commencing a case (Rule 82), or in connection with the trial (Rule 83).

2 The Court proposes to amend Rules 70(a) and (b), 71(e), 72(a) and (b), 73(a), (b), and (c), 75(b), 76(d)(2), 80(a), 81(a) and (b), 82, 100, 103(a), 104(e), 147(a), (b), and (d), and 181)

Labels:

Monday, March 30, 2009

Passive activity loss issues -

The IRS will always challange passive loss issues. In this case the taxpayers's losses from a real estate rental activity were not subject to the passive activity loss limitation because the wife was a qualifying real estate professional. The wife was a licensed real estate salesperson who worked on a contract basis for a real property brokerage firm; therefore, she was engaged in a brokerage trade or business under Code Sec. 469(c)(7)(C). In addition, she owned an interest in the rental properties, performed more than one-half of her personal services in a real property trade or business, and performed more than 750 hours of services in a real property trade or business in which she materially participated. Thus, the taxpayers could deduct the rental activity losses on their returns for the tax years in question.

The taxpayers, however, were liable for the accuracy-related penalty under Code Sec. 6662 for underpayment of their tax liability due to negligence. The taxpayers conceded that they were not entitled to certain deductions claimed for two tax years and failed to show that there was a reasonable cause or that they acted in good faith. They stipulated the losses. Other examiners would have hit them with civi fraud penalties or referred the case for criminal penalty considerations.

S. G. Agarwal, TC Summary Opinion 2009-29

[T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-29]
Shri G. and Sudha Agarwal v. Commissioner.

Docket No. 12670-07S . Filed March 2, 2009.


Married taxpayers's losses from a real estate rental activity were not subject to the passive activity loss limitation because the wife was a qualifying real estate professional. The wife was a licensed real estate salesperson who worked on a contract basis for a real property brokerage firm; therefore, she was engaged in a brokerage trade or business under Code Sec. 469(c)(7)(C). In addition, she owned an interest in the rental properties, performed more than one-half of her personal services in a real property trade or business, and performed more than 750 hours of service in a real property trade or business in which she materially participated. Thus, the taxpayers could deduct the rental activity losses on their returns for the tax years in question. --C
Background
During 2001 and 2002 Shri Agarwal (Mr. Agarwal) worked full time as an engineer. During 2001 and 2002 Sudha Agarwal (Mrs. Agarwal) worked full time as a real estate agent at "Century 21 Albert Foulad Realty" (brokerage firm). 2 During 2001 and 2002 Mrs. Agarwal was licensed as a real estate agent under California law; she was not a licensed as a broker. 3 She worked for a brokerage firm pursuant to an "Independent Contractor Agreement (Between Broker and Associate Licensee)". The contract provided that she was an independent contractor, not an employee of the brokerage firm. Consistent with Mrs. Agarwal's independent contractor status, the brokerage firm issued a Form 1099 to her for each year, and it did not pay her a salary; rather, she received commissions. The contract also required Mrs. Agarwal to sell, exchange, lease, or rent properties and solicit additional listings, clients, and customers diligently and with her best efforts.

During 2001 and 2002 petitioners owned two rental properties. Together they spent approximately 170 hours managing the "Wanda Property" and approximately 170 hours managing the "Mohave Property" during 2001 and 2002. They were the only persons who managed their rental properties. Mrs. Agarwal spent a total of 1,400 and 1,600 hours managing petitioners' rental properties and selling real estate in 2001 and 2002, respectively.

For 2001 Mrs. Agarwal reported commissions of $13,912 as gross receipts on Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business. She also reported total expenses of $14,084 for a $172 loss with respect to her Schedule C real estate business. For 2002 she reported commissions of $14,119 as gross receipts on Schedule C and total expenses of $13,401 for a profit of $718.

For 2001 petitioners reported total rents of $36,367 on Schedule E. They also reported total expenses of $76,471.78 for a $40,104.78 loss (which they rounded down to $40,104). For 2002 they reported total rents of $45,521 on Schedule E and total expenses of $65,177 for a $19,656 loss.

In the notice of deficiency issued to petitioners, respondent disallowed their Schedule E losses for each year because: (1) Passive losses are allowed only to the extent that they qualify for the special allowance for rental real estate and the transitional phase-in rule; and (2) petitioners' losses were in excess of their passive income, the special allowance, and the phase-in rule.


Discussion




I. Burden of Proof
The Commissioner's determinations in a notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden to prove that the determinations are in error. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). But the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the "taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to * * * such issue." See sec. 7491(a)(1). Petitioners have not alleged that section 7491(a) applies; however, the Court need not decide whether the burden shifted to respondent since there is no dispute as to any factual issue. Accordingly, the case is decided by the application of law to the undisputed facts, and section 7491(a) is inapplicable.



II. Petitioners' Losses and Application of Section 469
Section 469(a) generally disallows any passive activity loss. A passive activity loss is defined as the excess of the aggregate losses over the aggregate income from all passive activities. Sec. 469(d)(1). A passive activity is any trade or business or an activity engaged in for the production of income in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. Sec. 469(c)(1), (6). Material participation means that the taxpayer is involved in the activity's operations on a regular, continuous, and substantial basis. Sec. 469(h); see also sec. 1.469-5T(a), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 5725 (Feb. 25, 1988) (an individual is treated as materially participating if the individual satisfies any one of the seven enumerated tests).

The general rule is that a rental activity is treated as a per se passive activity regardless of whether the taxpayer materially participates. Sec. 469(c)(2), (4). But under section 469(c)(7), rental activities of a qualifying taxpayer in a real property trade or business are not a per se passive activity under section 469(c)(2). Kosonen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-107. Rather, the qualifying taxpayer's rental activities are treated as a trade or business --subject to the material participation requirements of section 469(c)(1). Fowler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-223; sec. 1.469-9(e)(1), Income Tax Regs. And in determining whether a taxpayer materially participates, the participation of the taxpayer's spouse is taken into account. Sec. 469(h)(5).

A taxpayer may qualify for the real property trade or business exception if: (1) More than one-half of the personal services performed in trades or businesses by the taxpayer during the taxable year are performed in real property trades or businesses in which the taxpayer materially participates; and (2) the taxpayer performs more than 750 hours of services during the taxable year in real property trades or businesses in which the taxpayer materially participates. Sec. 469(c)(7)(B)(i) and (ii). In the case of a joint return, either spouse must satisfy both requirements. Sec. 469(c)(7)(B).

Section 469(c)(7)(C) defines the term "real property trade or business" as "any real property development, redevelopment, construction, reconstruction, acquisition, conversion, rental, operation, management, leasing, or brokerage trade or business." [Emphasis added.]

A. The Parties' Arguments

Petitioners argue that real estate agents should be considered real estate professionals because real estate agents are engaged in a real property brokerage business in that real estate agents "bring together buyers and sellers".

In reply, respondent argues that Mrs. Agarwal was a licensed real estate agent, not a licensed real estate broker. Thus, under California law, according to respondent, Mrs. Agarwal could not be engaged in a brokerage trade or business, and therefore, she was not engaged in a real property trade or business as defined by section 469(c)(7)(C).

B. Brokerage Defined

The term "brokerage" is not defined in section 469, within the legislative history of section 469, or by any court decision. Thus, the Court turns to principles of statutory construction to determine its meaning. See Baker v. Wash. Group Intl., Inc., No. 1:06-CV-1874 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2008); Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 355 F. Supp. 2d 544, 555 (D.D.C. 2005); Weber v. Heitkamp (In re Hopson), 324 Bankr. 284, 287 (S.D. Tex. 2005).

"Statutory words are uniformly presumed, unless the contrary appears, to be used in their ordinary and usual sense, and with the meaning commonly attributed to them." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-486 (1917). In addition, a statutory term is construed "in its context and in light of the terms surrounding it." Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004); see also Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) ("a word is known by the company it keeps"). Legislatures are presumed to have intended that a statute's terms "'be given a reasonable construction'". Hazlett v. Evans, 943 F. Supp. 785, 788 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (quoting D.L.C. v. Walsh, 908 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)); see also Beck v. N. Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018, 1024 (10th Cir. 1999); In re Nofziger, 925 F.2d 428, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

A term's common or approved usage may be established by a dictionary. Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 (2005); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-229 (1993). Webster's Third New International Dictionary 282 (2002) defines the term "brokerage" as "the business of a broker" or "the fee or commission for transacting business as a broker." [Emphasis added.]

The Court concludes that Congress is presumed to have defined the term "brokerage" in its common or ordinary meaning. The Court further concludes that for purposes of section 469, the "business" of a real estate broker includes, but is not limited to: (1) Selling, exchanging, purchasing, renting, or leasing real property; (2) offering to do those activities; (3) negotiating the terms of a real estate contract; (4) listing of real property for sale, lease, or exchange; or (5) procuring prospective sellers, purchasers, lessors, or lessees. See Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895); Lawrence Gas Co. v. Hawkeye Oil Co., 165 N.W. 445, 447 (Iowa 1917); Schmidt v. Maples, 289 N.W. 140, 143 (Mich. 1939); Commonwealth v. Jones & Robins, Inc., 41 S.E.2d 720, 727 (Va. 1947); In re Pipes, 748 A.2d 118, 121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); Commonwealth v. Fahnestock, 15 Pa. C. 598 (Pa. Quar. Sess. 1895); see also Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 324.010(1) (LexisNexis 2007) (defining "Real estate brokerage"); Md. Code Ann. Bus. Occ. & Prof. sec. 17-101(l) (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2008) (defining "Provide real estate brokerage services"); Wis. Stat. Ann. sec. 452.01(3e) (West 2006) (defining "Brokerage service").

C. Application of the Definition to Mrs. Agarwal's Activities

As is relevant here, California law defines the term "real estate broker" as a person who does, or negotiates to do, any one of the enumerated activities for compensation. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code sec. 10131 (West 2008). Similarly, California law also defines the term "real estate salesman" as a person who is employed by a broker and who does any one of the enumerated activities. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code sec. 10132 (West 2008). But whether Mrs. Agarwal is characterized as a broker or a salesperson for State law purposes is irrelevant for Federal income tax purposes --the test is whether she was engaged in "brokerage" within the meaning of section 469, as defined supra. Consistent with her real estate salesman's license and pursuant to her contract with the brokerage firm, Mrs. Agarwal was engaged in "brokerage"; i.e., she sold, exchanged, leased, or rented real property and solicited listings. Therefore, Mrs. Agarwal was engaged in a "brokerage" trade or business within the meaning of section 469(c)(7)(C).

Because Mrs. Agarwal owned an interest in a rental property, performed more than one-half of her personal services in real property trades or businesses in which she materially participated, and performed more than 750 hours of services in real property trades or businesses in which she materially participated, she is a qualifying taxpayer. See sec. 469(c)(7); sec. 1.469-9(b)(6), (c)(1), Income Tax Regs. Because Mrs. Agarwal is a qualifying taxpayer and she materially participated with respect to each property, 4 petitioners are entitled to deduct their 2001 and 2002 Schedule E losses. See sec. 469(c)(7); sec. 1.469-9(e)(1), (3), (4) Example (i), Income Tax Regs.; sec. 1.469-5T(a), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra (defining material participation); see also Fowler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-223; Shaw v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-35.



III. Accuracy-Related Penalty
Initially, the Commissioner has the burden of production with respect to any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount. Sec. 7491(c). The Commissioner satisfies this burden of production by coming forward with sufficient evidence that indicates that it is appropriate to impose the penalty. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). Once the Commissioner satisfies this burden of production, the taxpayer must persuade the Court that the Commissioner's determination is in error by supplying sufficient evidence of reasonable cause, substantial authority, or a similar provision. Id.

In pertinent part, section 6662(a) and (b)(1) and (2) imposes an accuracy-related penalty equal to 20 percent of the underpayment that is attributable to: (1) Negligence or disregard of rules or regulations; or (2) a substantial understatement of income tax. 5 Section 6662(c) defines the term "negligence" to include "any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this title," and the term "disregard" to include "any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard." Negligence also includes any failure by the taxpayer to keep adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly. Sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.

Section 6664(c)(1) provides an exception to the section 6662(a) penalty: no penalty is imposed with respect to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was reasonable cause therefor and the taxpayer acted in good faith. Section 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., incorporates a facts and circumstances test to determine whether the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. The most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess his proper tax liability. Id. "Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of * * * the experience, knowledge, and education of the taxpayer." Id.

Because petitioners concede that they are not entitled to certain deductions, see supra note 1, the Court finds that respondent has met his burden of production and that petitioners were negligent. Petitioners did not establish a defense for their noncompliance with the Code's requirements. See sec. 6001 (requiring taxpayers to keep records sufficient to establish the amounts of the items required to be shown on their Federal income tax returns). Respondent's determination is sustained.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

1 In a "Stipulation of Settled Issues" the parties agree that: (1) Petitioners are entitled to a net capital loss of $856 (rather than $5,988.16) for 2001; (2) they are not entitled to a self-employed health insurance deduction of $2,332 for 2001; (3) they are not entitled to additional exemptions of $9,048 and $1,920 for 2001 and 2002, respectively; and (4) itemized deductions adjustments for 2001 and 2002 are computational.

2 The brokerage firm is a licensed broker under California law. The brokerage firm is franchised by a broker, Albert Foulad.

3 Mrs. Agarwal became a licensed broker in December 2007.

4 If the taxpayer is a qualifying taxpayer, then each interest in rental real estate is treated as a separate activity unless the taxpayer elects to treat all interests in rental real estate as one activity. Sec. 469(c)(7)(A); Fowler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-223. And the determination of whether the qualifying taxpayer materially participated pursuant to sec. 469(c)(1) must be met with respect to each rental activity, unless the taxpayer elected to treat all of the taxpayer's rental activities as a single activity. Sec. 469(c)(7)(A); Fowler v. Commissioner, supra; Shaw v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-35; sec. 1.469-9(e)(1), (4) Example (i), Income Tax Regs.

5 Because the Court finds that petitioners were negligent or disregarded rules or regulations, the Court need not discuss whether there is a substantial understatement of income tax. See sec. 6662(b); Fields v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-207.

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Friday, March 27, 2009

No penalties for offshore disclosure

The IRS has made an appealing offer to not assess civil or criminal fraud penalties for voluntary disclosures of offshore bank accounts. It is very easy for the IRS to bring in return preparers for "aiding" in offshore tax avoidance or evasion. Obviously, these penalties are far more serious than the 6694 penalties. I recommend that return preparer to have clients make a written denial that they have offshore assets or income. I have tax return preparer clients who are presently under criminal investigation. The IRSS has a priority program to check out the accuracy of returns prepared by tax return preparers and a high error rate will trigger a return preparer civil or criminal examination.


March 27, 2009



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20224

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

March 23, 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER, LARGE AND MID-SIZE BUSINESS DIVISION
COMMISSIONER, SMALL BUSINESS/SELF-EMPLOYED DIVISION

FROM: Linda E. Stiff
Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement

SUBJECT: Authorization to Apply Penalty Framework to Voluntary Disclosure Requests Regarding Unreported Offshore Accounts and Entities

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth a penalty framework to be applied to voluntary disclosure requests containing offshore issues. The outlined framework will be applied to all such requests that have been submitted to the IRS and are not yet resolved, and will remain in effect for six months from the date of this memorandum. All voluntary disclosure requests are mandatory work.

As Criminal Investigation (CI) makes preliminary determinations that taxpayers are eligible to make voluntary disclosures, it will forward voluntary disclosure requests with offshore implications to the Philadelphia Offshore Identification Unit (POIU) for civil processing. Those requests will be distributed to and worked by examiners who specialize in offshore examinations. All resulting closing agreements will be reviewed and executed as prescribed by existing delegation orders.

Effective as of the date of this memorandum, you are authorized to execute agreements to resolve the tax liabilities related to offshore issues of taxpayers who make voluntary disclosure requests in the following manner:
(1) Assess all taxes and interest due going back six years (exception: where an account/entity was formed or acquired within the six year look back period, taxes and interest will be assessed starting with the earliest year in which an account was opened/acquired or entity formed). Require the taxpayer to file or amend all returns, including information returns and Form TD F 90-22.1, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts. commonly known as an "FBAR".

(2) Assess either an accuracy or delinquency penalty on all years (no reasonable cause exception may be applied). and

(3) In lieu of all other penalties that may apply, including FBAR and information return penalties, assess a penalty equal to 20% of the amount in foreign bank accounts/entities in the year with the highest aggregate account/asset value.

If, (a) the taxpayer did not open or cause any accounts to be opened or entities formed, (b) there has been no activity in any account or entity (no deposits. withdrawals, etc.) during the period the account/entity was controlled by the taxpayer, and (c) all applicable U.S. taxes have been paid on the funds in the accounts/entities (where only account/entity earnings have escaped U.S. taxation). then the penalty in (3) is reduced to 5%.

The terms outlined herein are only applicable to taxpayers that make voluntary disclosure requests, and who fully cooperate with the IRS. both civilly and criminally.

cc: Acting Chief Counsel
Senior Advisor to the Commissioner

Commissioner, Tax Exempt and Govemment Entities

Chief, Criminal Investigation
IRS Small Business/Self-Employed Division, Large and Mid Size Business Division, Criminal Investigation Division Memorandum on Routing of Voluntary Disclosure Cases

March 27, 2009

Tax crimes : Voluntary disclosure : Updated practices .

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Washington, D.C. 20224

Small Business/Self-Employed Division

Large and Mid-Size Business Division

Criminal Investigation Division

March 23, 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR SBSE EXAMINATION AREA DIRECTORS
LMSB INDUSTRY DIRECTORS

CI DIRECTORS OF FIELD OPERATIONS

FROM: Faris R. Fink
Deputy Commissioner, SBSE

Barry B. Shott

Deputy Commissioner, LMSB International

Victor Song

Deputy Chief, Criminal Investigation

SUBJECT: Routing of Voluntary Disclosure Cases

The purpose of this memorandum is to alert you to a change in the processing of voluntary disclosure requests containing offshore issues. All voluntary disclosure requests are mandatory work.

All incoming voluntary disclosure requests will continue to initially be screened by Criminal Investigation (CI) to determine if the taxpayer is eligible to make a voluntary disclosure. Refer to IRM 9.5.11.9 for questions pertaining to taxpayer eligibility. For voluntary disclosure requests containing only domestic issues, where CI has preliminarily deterrnined taxpayer eligibility, CI will continue to forward those requests to the appropriate Area/Industry PSP for civil processing.

Effective as of the date of this memorandum, voluntary disclosure requests containing offshore issues, where CI has preliminarily determined taxpayer eligibility, will now be forwarded by CI to the Philadelphia Offshore Identification Unit (POIU) for civil processing. Additionally, any voluntary disclosures with offshore issues that are currently in Area/Industry case inventories (whether or not there has been prior taxpayer contact by SBSE or LMSB) should also be forwarded to the POIU.

The address for the POIU follows:

Internal Revenue Service
11501 Roosevelt Blvd.
South Bldg., Room 2002
Philadelphia, PA 19154
Attn: Charlie Judge, Offshore Unit, DP S-611

If you have questions, members of your staff may contact Karen Warfel, SBSE Offshore Program Manager ***** Frank Bucci, SBSE Offshore Technical Advisor ***** or Lon Nichols, LMSB Director, International Compliance Strategy and Policy.

IRS Voluntary Disclosure Practice

March 27, 2009

Tax crimes : Voluntary disclosure : Updated practices .



IRS Voluntary Disclosure Practice



TAX CRIMES - GENERAL



IRM 9.5.11.9



Voluntary Disclosure Practice

(1) It is currently the practice of the IRS that a voluntary disclosure will be considered along with all other factors in the investigation in determining whether criminal prosecution will be recommended. This voluntary disclosure practice creates no substantive or procedural rights for taxpayers, but rather is a matter of internal IRS practice, provided solely for guidance to IRS personnel. Taxpayers cannot rely on the fact that other similarly situated taxpayers may not have been recommended for criminal prosecution.

(2) A voluntary disclosure will not automatically guarantee immunity from prosecution; however, a voluntary disclosure may result in prosecution not being recommended. This practice does not apply to taxpayers with illegal source income.

(3) A voluntary disclosure occurs when the communication is truthful, timely, complete, and when:

a. the taxpayer shows a willingness to cooperate (and does in fact cooperate) with the IRS in determining his or her correct tax liability; and

b. the taxpayer makes good faith arrangements with the IRS to pay in full, the tax, interest, and any penalties determined by the IRS to be applicable.

(4) A disclosure is timely if it is received before:

a. the IRS has initiated a civil examination or criminal investigation of the taxpayer, or has notified the taxpayer that it intends to commence such an examination or investigation;

b. the IRS has received information from a third party (e.g., informant, other governmental agency, or the media) alerting the IRS to the specific taxpayer's noncompliance;

c. the IRS has initiated a civil examination or criminal investigation which is directly related to the specific liability of the taxpayer; or

d. the IRS has acquired information directly related to the specific liability of the taxpayer from a criminal enforcement action (e.g., search warrant, grand jury subpoena).

(5) Any taxpayer who contacts the IRS in person or through a representative regarding voluntary disclosure will be directed to Criminal Investigation for evaluation of the disclosure. Special agents are encouraged to consult Area Counsel, Criminal Tax on voluntary disclosure issues.

(6) Examples of voluntary disclosures include:

a. a letter from an attorney which encloses amended returns from a client which are complete and accurate (reporting legal source income omitted from the original returns), which offers to pay the tax, interest, and any penalties determined by the IRS to be applicable in full and which meets the timeliness standard set forth above. This is a voluntary disclosure because all elements of (3), above are met.

b. a disclosure made by a taxpayer of omitted income facilitated through a barter exchange after the IRS has announced that it has begun a civil compliance project targeting barter exchanges; however the IRS has not yet commenced an examination or investigation of the taxpayer or notified the taxpayer of its intention to do so. In addition, the taxpayer files complete and accurate amended returns and makes arrangements with the IRS to pay in full, the tax, interest, and any penalties determined by the IRS to be applicable. This is a voluntary disclosure because the civil compliance project involving barter exchanges does not yet directly relate to the specific liability of the taxpayer and because all other elements of (3), above are met

c. a disclosure made by a taxpayer of omitted income facilitated through a widely promoted scheme regarding which the IRS has begun a civil compliance project and already obtained information which might lead to an examination of the taxpayer; however, the IRS has not yet commenced an examination or investigation of the taxpayer or notified the taxpayer of its intent to do so. In addition, the taxpayer files complete and accurate returns and makes arrangements with the IRS to pay in full, the tax, interest, and any penalties determined by the IRS to be applicable. This is a voluntary disclosure because the civil compliance project involving the scheme does not yet directly relate to the specific liability of the taxpayer and because all other elements of (3), above are met.

d. A disclosure made by an individual who has not filed tax returns after the individual has received a notice stating that the IRS has no record of receiving a return for a particular year and inquiring into whether the taxpayer filed a return for that year. The individual files complete and accurate returns and makes arrangements with the IRS to pay the tax, interest, and any penalties determined by the IRS to be applicable in full. This is a voluntary disclosure because the IRS has not yet commenced an examination or investigation of the taxpayer or notified the taxpayer of its intent to do so and because all other elements of (3), above, are met.

(7) Examples of what are not voluntary disclosures include:

a. a letter from an attorney stating his or her client, who wishes to remain anonymous, wants to resolve his or her tax liability. This is not a voluntary disclosure until the identity of the taxpayer is disclosed and all other elements of (3) above have been met.

b. a disclosure made by a taxpayer who is under grand jury investigation. This is not a voluntary disclosure because the taxpayer is already under criminal investigation. The conclusion would be the same whether or not the taxpayer knew of the grand jury investigation.

c. a disclosure made by a taxpayer, who is not currently under examination or investigation, of omitted gross receipts from a partnership, but whose partner is already under investigation for omitted income skimmed from the partnership. This is not a voluntary disclosure because the IRS has already initiated an investigation which is directly related to the specific liability of this taxpayer. The conclusion would be the same whether or not the taxpayer knew of the ongoing investigation.

d. a disclosure made by a taxpayer, who is not currently under examination or investigation, of omitted constructive dividends received from a corporation which is currently under examination. This is not a voluntary disclosure because the IRS has already initiated an examination which is directly related to the specific liability of this taxpayer. The conclusion would be the same whether or not the taxpayer knew of the ongoing examination.

e. a disclosure made by a taxpayer after an employee has contacted the IRS regarding the taxpayer's double set of books. This is not a voluntary disclosure even if no examination or investigation has yet commenced because the IRS has already been informed by the third party of the specific taxpayer's noncompliance. The conclusion would be the same whether or not the taxpayer knew of the informant's contact with the IRS.

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Thursday, March 26, 2009

First-time homebuyer credit

There are several different ways that taxpayers may claim the new $8,000 first-time homebuyer credit for 2009 home purchases, even if they have already filed their 2008 tax return. Taxpayers who are buying a home in the near future and who have already filed their 2008 tax return should consider filing an amended 2008 tax return. Filing an amended 2008 tax return would allow them to claim the first-time homebuyer credit without waiting until next year. Alternatively, taxpayers can wait and claim the homebuyer credit when they file their 2009 tax return. Waiting to claim the credit could benefit taxpayers who might qualify for a higher credit on their 2009 return, such as those with a job loss or a drop in investment income. Taxpayers who are buying a home soon but have not yet filed their 2008 returns can request a six-month extension of time to file. Alternatively, these taxpayers (especially those due a sizeable refund) could file their return now and follow up with an amended 2008 return to claim the homebuyer credit. Or, they could simply wait and claim the homebuyer credit when they file the 2009 tax return.




IRS News Release IR-2009-27 , March 18, 2009.

[ Code Sec. 36]






As part of the Treasury Department's consumer outreach effort and with the April 15 individual tax filing deadline approaching, the Internal Revenue Service began a concerted effort to educate taxpayers about additional options at their disposal to claim the new $8,000 first-time homebuyer credit for 2009 home purchases. For people who recently purchased a home or are considering buying in the next few months, there are several different ways that they can get this tax credit even if they've already filed their tax return.

The Treasury Department encourages taxpayers to explore these options to maximize their credit and get their money back as fast as possible.

"The new credit can get money in the pockets of first-time homebuyers quickly," said IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman. "For people who recently purchased a home or are considering buying in the next few months, there are several different ways that they can get this tax credit even if they've already filed their tax return."

First-time homebuyers represent a significant portion of existing single-family home sales. The expansion in the first-time homebuyer credit will make it easier for first-time homebuyers to enter the housing market this year.

Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, qualifying taxpayers who purchase a home before Dec. 1 receive up to $8,000 or $4,000 for married individuals filing separately. People can claim the credit either on their 2008 tax returns due April 15 or on their 2009 tax returns next year.

The filing options to consider are:


File an extension. Taxpayers who haven't yet filed their 2008 returns but are buying a home soon can request a six-month extension to October 15. This step would be faster than waiting until next year to claim it on the 2009 tax return. Even with an extension, taxpayers could still file electronically, receiving their refund in as few as 10 days with direct deposit.



File now, amend later. Taxpayers due a sizable refund for their 2008 tax return but who also are considering buying a house in the next few months can file their return now and claim the credit later. Taxpayers would file their 2008 tax forms as usual, then follow up with an amended return later this year to claim the homebuyer credit.



Amend the 2008 tax return. Taxpayers buying a home in the near future who have already filed their 2008 tax return can consider filing an amended tax return. The amended tax return will allow them to claim the homebuyer credit on the 2008 return without waiting until next year to claim it on the 2009 return.


Claim the credit in 2009 rather than 2008. For some taxpayers, it may make more financial sense to wait and claim the homebuyer credit next year when they file the 2009 tax return rather than claiming it now on the 2008 tax return. This could benefit taxpayers who might qualify for a higher credit on the 2009 tax return. This could include people who have less income in 2009 than 2008 because of factors such as a job loss or drop in investment income.


The IRS reminds taxpayers the amount of the credit begins to phase out for taxpayers whose modified adjusted gross income is more than $75,000, or $150,000 for joint filers. Taxpayers can claim 10 percent of the purchase price up to $8,000, or $4,000 for married individuals filing separately.

For more information, including guidance for people who bought their first homes in 2008, visit IRS.gov. To learn more about the overall implementation of the Recovery Act, visit http://www.recovery.gov/.

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Wednesday, March 25, 2009

IRS Notice 2009-5 - 6694 interim guidance

Updated interim guidance was issued concerning the Code Sec. 6694(a) tax return preparer penalty, as recently modified by the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343). The updated guidances addresses the changes to the definition of "unreasonable position," provides guidance concerning the meaning of "substantial authority" and discusses the interim penalty compliance rules for tax shelter transactions. Other than for tax shelters, the guidance is generally effective for advice rendered, and returns, amended returns and claims for refund prepared after May 27, 2007. The interim guidance with respect to such tax shelters and reportable transactions to which Code Sec. 6662A is effective for positions on tax returns for taxable years ending after October 3, 2008. Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 2008-3, 282, is modified and clarified. Focus on the guidance for the 6694 penalty for the 2008 tax year.






Notice 2009-5 , I.R.B. 2009-3, December 15, 2008.






This notice provides guidance regarding implementation of the tax return preparer penalty under section 6694(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, Div. C. of Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (October 3, 2008) (the 2008 Act).

With this notice, the Treasury Department and the IRS are simultaneously issuing final regulations revising the regulatory scheme governing tax return preparer penalties in accordance with the amendments to sections 6694 and 6695 (and related provisions under sections 6060, 6107, 6109, 6696, and 7701(a)(36)) in both the 2008 Act and the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Title VIII-B of Pub. L. No. 110-28 (121 Stat. 190) (May 25, 2007) (the 2007 Act). Section 1.6694-2 of the final regulations, however, does not provide substantive guidance reflecting certain amendments to section 6694(a) made by the 2008 Act. Rather, the Treasury Department and the IRS are reserving §1.6694-2(c) in those final regulations and are issuing this notice. This notice provides interim guidance on the 2008 Act's changes to section 6694(a) and solicits public comments on this guidance.



BACKGROUND

Section 6694(a) imposes a penalty on a tax return preparer who prepares a return or claim for refund reflecting an understatement of liability due to an "unreasonable position" if the tax return preparer knew (or reasonably should have known) of the position. No penalty is imposed, however, if it is shown that there is reasonable cause for the understatement and the tax return preparer acted in good faith. Immediately prior to the 2008 Act, under the standards of conduct implemented by the 2007 Act's amendment to section 6694(a), a position would be treated as unreasonable unless(i) there was a reasonable belief that it would more likely than not be sustained on the merits, or (ii) the position was properly disclosed and had a reasonable basis. The Treasury Department and the IRS issued Notice 2007-54, 2007-27 I.R.B. 12, on June 11, 2007, which provided transitional relief under section 6694(a). On December 31, 2007, the Treasury Department and the IRS released both Notice 2008-11, 2008-3 I.R.B. 279, which clarified the earlier transition relief provided in Notice 2007-54, and Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 282, which provided interim penalty compliance rules under the 2007 Act version of section 6694. On June 17, 2008, the Treasury Department and the IRS published in the Federal Register (73 F.R. 34560) proposed amendments to the section 6694 regulations reflecting amendments made by the 2007 Act.

After the issuance of the proposed regulations, the 2008 Act revised section 6694(a) to provide that a position would be treated as unreasonable unless (i) there is or was substantial authority for the position or (ii) the position was properly disclosed and had a reasonable basis. The 2008 Act also enacted a special rule if the position is with respect to a tax shelter (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)) or a reportable transaction to which section 6662A applies (including both reportable transactions with a significant purpose of Federal tax avoidance or evasion and listed transactions), under which a position is treated as unreasonable unless it is reasonable to believe that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits. The 2008 Act did not modify the section 6694(b) penalty for understatements due to willful or reckless conduct.

The 2008 Act's change in the general standard under section 6694(a) to substantial authority is retroactively effective for tax returns and claims for refund prepared after May 25, 2007. The special rule applicable to tax shelters and reportable transactions to which section 6662A applies is effective for tax returns and claims for refund prepared for taxable years ending after October 3, 2008, the 2008 Act's date of enactment.

This notice provides interim guidance to tax return preparers regarding the application of section 6694(a) as revised by the 2008 Act in order to provide immediate guidance for signing and nonsigning tax return preparers. Specifically, this interim guidance discusses the following issues: (1) the effect of the 2008 Act's changes to Notices 2007-54, 2008-11, and 2008-13, which provide guidance on the application of section 6694(a) under the 2007 Act; (2) the definition of substantial authority for purposes of section 6694(a)(2)(A); and (3) the interim penalty compliance rules for "tax shelter" transactions as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii). Tax return preparers may rely on the interim guidance in this notice with respect to these issues until further guidance is issued. The final regulations under section 6694 govern all other issues with respect to this penalty.

The guidance regarding effective dates addresses the retroactive effect of the 2008 Act's revisions to section 6694 and also addresses the different effective dates for the 2008 Act's general standard (which applies retroactively) and the special rule for tax shelters and reportable transactions to which section 6662A applies (which does not apply retroactively). The guidance also clarifies the interaction between the 2008 Act's effective dates and the effective dates for Notices 2007-54, 2008-11, and 2008-13.

The interim guidance regarding substantial authority generally adopts the analysis provided under existing substantial authority regulations under section 6662. The interim guidance clarifies certain aspects of the application of the substantial authority regulations in § 1.6662-4(d) in the context of section 6694.

This interim guidance addresses the application of section 6694 while the Treasury Department and IRS consider further guidance for tax return preparers and taxpayers on the definition of tax shelter for purposes of sections 6694 and 6662(d)(2)(C). A broad interpretation of tax shelter for purposes of section 6694 could be inconsistent with the 2008 Act's changes to section 6694 by requiring tax return preparers to comply with the general standard previously imposed under the 2007 Act (a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits) rather than the new general standard under the 2008 Act (substantial authority).



INTERIM GUIDANCE UNDER SECTION 6694(a)



A. Effect of the 2008 Act on Applicability of Notices 2007-54, 2008-11, and 2008-13

Notices 2007-54 and 2008-11 provided transitional relief for (1) all tax returns, amended tax returns, and claims for refund (other than employment and excise tax returns) filed on or after May 25, 2007, and on or before December 31, 2007; (2) all employment and excise tax returns filed on or after May 25, 2007, and on or before January 31, 2008; and (3) advice provided on or after May 25, 2007, and on or before December 31, 2007. Tax return preparers may continue to rely upon the transitional relief rules provided in Notices 2007-54 and 2008-11 for returns or claims for refund for the periods covered by those notices.

Notice 2008-13 provided interim guidance on, among other issues, the standards of conduct applicable to tax return preparers under section 6694(a) and interim penalty compliance obligations applicable to tax return preparers. Notice 2008-13 is effective for (1) all tax returns, amended tax returns, and claims for refund (other than 2007 employment and excise tax returns) filed on or after January 1, 2008, and before January 1, 2009 (the effective date of the final regulations under section 6694(a)); (2) all 2007 employment and excise tax returns filed on or after February 1, 2008, and before January 1, 2009; and (3) advice provided on or after January 1, 2008 and before January 1, 2009.

Consistent with the 2007 Act, the interim guidance provided by Notice 2008-13 generally held tax return preparers to a more stringent standard under section 6694(a) than the substantial authority standard imposed by the 2008 Act's revisions to section 6694. Accordingly, for positions other than with respect to tax shelters (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)) and reportable transactions to which section 6662A applies, tax return preparers may apply the substantial authority standard consistent with the 2008 Act or may rely upon the interim guidance provided in Notice 2008-13 when preparing returns or claims for refund for the periods covered by that notice.

The 2008 Act's special rule for tax shelters (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)) and reportable transactions to which section 6662A applies does not apply retroactively, and therefore the provisions of Notice 2008-13 will apply to tax shelter and section 6662A reportable transaction positions on returns or claims for refund for tax years ending prior to the date of enactment of the 2008 Act and otherwise covered by Notice 2008-13, as set forth above. The interim guidance provided in this notice with respect to tax shelters (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)) and reportable transactions to which section 6662A applies is effective for returns or claims for refund for tax years ending after the date of enactment of the 2008 Act.



B. Definition of Substantial Authority

Until further guidance is issued, solely for purposes of section 6694(a), "substantial authority" has the same meaning as in § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (or any successor provision) of the accuracy-related penalty regulations. The analysis prescribed by § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i) through (ii) (or any successor provisions) applies for purposes of determining whether substantial authority is present. The authorities considered in determining whether there is substantial authority for a position are those authorities described in § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (or any successor provision).

There is substantial authority for a position for purposes of section 6694 if the taxpayer is the subject of a "written determination" as provided in § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iv)(A). In the case of a tax return preparer, however, a written determination with a misstatement or omission of material fact is substantial authority unless the tax return preparer knew or should have known of the misstatement or omission of material fact when the return or claim for refund was filed. The applicability of court cases to the taxpayer's situation by reason of the taxpayer's residence in a particular jurisdiction is not taken into account in determining whether there is substantial authority for a position in accordance with § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iv)(B). Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, there is substantial authority for a position if the position is supported by controlling precedent of a United States Court of Appeals to which the taxpayer has a right of appeal with respect to the position. Finally, there is substantial authority for a position only if there is substantial authority on the date the return or claim for refund is deemed prepared, as prescribed by § 1.6694-1(a)(2), or there was substantial authority on the last day of the taxable year to which the return relates.

Conclusions reached in treatises, legal periodicals, legal opinions, or opinions rendered by tax professionals (including tax return preparers) are not authority. The authorities underlying such expressions of opinion, if applicable to the facts of a particular case, however, may give rise to substantial authority for the position. Solely for purposes of section 6694(a), a tax return preparer nevertheless will be considered to have met the standard in section 6694(a)(2)(A) if the tax return preparer relies in good faith and without verification on the advice of another advisor, another tax return preparer, or other party. Factors used in evaluating a tax return preparer's good faith reliance on the advice of another are found in § 1.6694-2(e)(5).



C. Interim Penalty Compliance Rules for Tax Shelter Transactions

Until further guidance is issued, solely for purposes of section 6694(a), a position with respect to a tax shelter (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)) will not be deemed an "unreasonable position" described in section 6694(a)(2)(A) through (C) if there is substantial authority for the position and the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of the penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer in the event that the transaction is deemed to have a significant purpose of Federal tax avoidance or evasion. This advice to the taxpayer must explain that, if the position has a significant purpose of tax avoidance or evasion, then there needs to be at a minimum substantial authority for the position, the taxpayer must possess a reasonable belief that the tax treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment in order to avoid a penalty under section 6662(d) as applicable, and disclosure in accordance with § 1.6662-4(f) will not protect the taxpayer from assessment of an accuracy-related penalty if section 6662(d)(2)(C) applies to the position. The tax return preparer must contemporaneously document the advice in the tax return preparer's files.

If a nonsigning tax return preparer provides advice to another tax return preparer regarding a position with respect to a tax shelter (as defined in section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)), the position will not be deemed an "unreasonable position" described in section 6694(a)(2)(A) through (C) if there is substantial authority for the position and the nonsigning tax return preparer provides a statement to the other tax return preparer about the penalty standards applicable to the tax return preparer under section 6694. Contemporaneously prepared documentation in the nonsigning tax return preparer's files is sufficient to establish that the statement was given to the other tax return preparer. If a nonsigning tax return preparer and other tax return preparer are employed by the same firm, then contemporaneous documentation of advice provided by any tax return preparer in that firm to the taxpayer regarding applicable penalty standards, as described in the immediately preceding paragraph, is also sufficient to establish that the statement was given by a nonsigning tax return preparer to the other tax return preparers within the firm.

The above interim penalty compliance rules do not apply to a position described in section 6662A (a reportable transaction with a significant purpose of Federal tax avoidance or evasion or a listed transaction).



REQUESTS FOR COMMENTS

Interested parties are invited to submit comments on this notice by Monday, March 16, 2009. Comments should be submitted to: Internal Revenue Service, CC:PA:LPD:PR (Notice 2009-5), Room 5203, P.O. Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20224. Alternatively, comments may be hand-delivered Monday through Friday between the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. to: CC:PA:LPD:PR (Notice 2009-5), Courier's Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, DC. Comments may also be submitted electronically via the following e-mail address: Notice.Comments@irscounsel.treas.gov. Please include Notice 2009-5 in the subject line of any electronic submissions.



Effect on Other Documents

This notice modifies and clarifies Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 282.



EFFECTIVE DATE

For positions other than tax shelters and reportable transaction positions, this notice is effective for all advice rendered or returns, amended returns, and claims for refund prepared after May 25, 2007. The interim guidance in this notice for tax shelters (within the meaning of section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)) and reportable transactions to which section 6662A applies is effective for tax shelter and reportable transaction positions on tax returns for taxable years ending after the 2008 Act's date of enactment, October 3, 2008.



CONTACT INFORMATION

The principal authors of this notice are Matthew S. Cooper and Michael E. Hara of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and Administration). For further information regarding this notice, contact Mr. Cooper at (202) 622-4940 or Mr. Hara at (202) 622-4910 (not toll-free calls).

Labels:

Tuesday, March 24, 2009

6694-6662 substantiation issues

This is a near perfect case for tax return preparers to download and read because it identifies multiple substantiation issues that were all held to be negligent. Negligence for the 2008 tax year equates to multiple $5,000 penalties. I do not see how it is possible for return preparer to avoid the 6694 penalty risk without fully checking on the ability of your client to substantiate client business expenses and other deductions. If you have any question about that issue contact ab@irstaxattorney.com.


T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-39]
Freddy W. Fuentes v. Commissioner.

Docket No. 16020-07S . Filed March 23, 2009.



DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section references are to the Code in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

For 2005 respondent determined an $8,238 deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax and a $1,647.60 accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a). The issues remaining for decision 1 are whether petitioner is: (1) Entitled to deductions for business expenses claimed on his amended Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business; (2) entitled to itemized deductions in an amount in excess of the standard deduction; (3) entitled to a personal exemption for his spouse, Yvonne Fuentes, and a dependency exemption deduction for his father, Hector Fuentes; and (4) liable for the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a). 2


Background

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts and the exhibits received into evidence are incorporated herein by reference. When the petition was filed, petitioner resided in New York.

During 2005 petitioner worked as a telecommunications supervisor for MIS and for the Manhattan Soccer Club (soccer club), training boys' and girls' teams age levels U-9 and U-12. Neither MIS nor the soccer club reimbursed petitioner for his 2005 local expenditures.

Petitioner's contract with the soccer club provided that he was required to supply his own equipment. But the soccer club would "pay for coach's lodging, meals and car travel expenses for any tournaments out of the tri-state area." During 2005 he traveled to various locations for practices, games, and tournaments, which included travel to Long Island and Manhattan, New York, Virginia, and New Jersey. He also traveled to Westchester, Pennsylvania, to acquire a "B" license issued by the National Soccer Coaches Association (NSCA).

Petitioner's return preparer timely filed petitioner's Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, electronically for 2005. On Schedule C, petitioner reported $19,643 in gross receipts and $26,211 in total expenses (discussed infra) for a $6,568 net loss. On Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, petitioner claimed $21,083 in total itemized deductions (discussed infra). He also filed as single and claimed one personal exemption for himself.

Upon examination of petitioner's Form 1040, respondent sent a notice of deficiency to his last known address. Respondent determined an $8,238 deficiency and a $1,647.60 accuracy-related penalty and proposed the following adjustments:



Per
Item Return Adjustment

Sched. C supplies $6,422 $6,422

Sched. C car and truck
expenses 11,191 11,191

SE AGI Adjustment -0- 781

Self-employment tax -0- 1,561

Unreimbursed employee
expenses 10,597 10,597

State and local taxes 2,588 181

Noncash contributions 2,315 2,315

Cash contributions 3,120 3,120

Total itemized deductions 21,083 21,083

Standard deduction -0- 5,000


Respondent allowed petitioner a $4,671 deduction for medical and dental expenses (before application of the 7.5-percent floor). Respondent also made a computational adjustment to petitioner's "Net Medical and Dental Expense" to reflect changes to his adjusted gross income.

In response, petitioner sought the advice of another return preparer, who submitted for 2005 a Form 1040X, Amended U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, and amended schedules to the IRS. 3 On petitioner's amended Schedule C, he claimed $19,643 in gross receipts and $24,649 in total expenses (discussed infra) for a $5,006 net loss. On petitioner's amended Schedule A, he claimed $14,475 in itemized deductions (discussed infra). He changed his filing status from single to married filing jointly. Petitioner also claimed two personal exemptions for himself and his wife and a dependency exemption deduction for his father.


Discussion

The Commissioner's determinations in a notice of deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden to prove that the determinations are in error. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). But the burden of proof on factual issues that affect the taxpayer's tax liability may be shifted to the Commissioner where the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to the issue and the taxpayer has satisfied certain conditions. See sec. 7491(a)(1). Petitioner has not alleged that section 7491(a) applies, and he has neither complied with the substantiation requirements nor maintained all required records. See sec. 7491(a)(2)(A) and (B). Accordingly, the burden of proof remains on him.

Ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business are generally deductible. Sec. 162(a). But as a general rule no deduction is allowed for travel, meals and entertainment, or "listed property" 4 unless the taxpayer complies with certain substantiation requirements. Sec. 274(d). The Court therefore may not estimate a taxpayer's expenses with respect to the items enumerated in section 274(d). See Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827 (1968), affd. per curiam 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969).



I. Schedule C Deductions
A. Car and Truck Expenses

In order to substantiate the amount of an automobile expense, the taxpayer must prove: (1) The amount of the expenditure (i.e., cost of maintenance, repairs, or other expenditures); (2) the amount of each business use and the amount of the vehicle's total use by establishing the amount of its business mileage and total mileage; (3) time (i.e., the date of the expenditure or use); and (4) the business purpose of the expenditure or use. Sec. 1.274-5T(b)(6), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985). The taxpayer may substantiate the amount of mileage by "adequate records" or sufficient evidence that corroborates his statements. Sec. 274(d). A record of the mileage made at or near the time of the automobile's use that is supported by documentary evidence has a high degree of credibility not present with a subsequently prepared statement. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1) through (3), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016-46020 (Nov. 6, 1985).

To meet the adequate records requirement, the taxpayer must maintain an account book, diary, log, statement of expense, trip sheets, or similar record and documentary evidence that in combination are sufficient to establish each element of expenditure or use. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2)(i), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra. An adequate record must be prepared or maintained in such manner that each recording of an element of an expenditure or use is made at or near the time of the expenditure or use. Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2)(ii), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra. "'[M]ade at or near the time of the expenditure or use' means [that] the elements of an expenditure or use are recorded at a time when, in relation to the use or making of an expenditure, the taxpayer has full present knowledge of each element of the expenditure or use". Sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2)(ii)(A), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra.

Petitioner claims a $7,961 deduction for car and truck expenses on his amended Schedule C, consisting of 11,660 "business" miles, 21,780 "commuting" miles, and 20,800 "other" miles. He provided a spreadsheet and an attached supplement that purports to reflect the miles he drove in 2005. The spreadsheet's mileage categories consist of 21,780 miles for commuting from petitioner's home to MIS and 19,360 miles for travel with respect to his coaching activity. The coaching activity's mileage consists of mileage from MIS to soccer fields (Tuesdays through Fridays), from a soccer field to another soccer field(s), return trips from a soccer field to his home, and trips from his home to a soccer field (on the weekends). 5 He also included various schedules for practices, games, and tournaments of his teams.

Petitioner's testimony established that he did not record the miles driven from day to day or for traveling in his coaching activity for 2005. Rather, his mileage records were created after the fact. Therefore, his spreadsheet, the attached supplement, and the various schedules do not satisfy the adequate record requirement. See sec. 1.274-5T(c)(2)(i) and (ii)(A), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra. Although the Court believes that petitioner accrued mileage in his coaching activity, the Court may not apply the Cohan rule to estimate his deductible expense. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); Sanford v. Commissioner, supra at 827. Accordingly, respondent's determination is sustained.

B. Tolls

On petitioner's "Supporting Statement" attached to his Form 1040X, he claims a $2,772 deduction computed as follows: 44  7 = 308 Trips  $9. He also stated that the expenditures were made in his coaching activity with respect to "Car-Truck Wks (KIA RIO)". The Court assumes that the deduction was claimed for toll expenses, which generally may be deducted as a separate item. See Rev. Proc. 2004-64, sec. 5.04, 2004-2 C.B. 900, 924. But petitioner has not provided any receipts to substantiate his expenditures, and he has not proven that he was not reimbursed by the soccer club for his expenditures as provided in his contract. See supra p. 3. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to the deduction. Respondent's determination is sustained.

C. Expense for the Business Use of Petitioner's Home

Expenses for the business use of a taxpayer's residence are deductible under limited circumstances. The taxpayer must show that a portion of the residence was exclusively used on a regular basis as his principal place of business. Sec. 280A(c)(1). The term "'a portion of the dwelling unit'" refers to "'a room or other separately identifiable space;'" a permanent partition marking off the area is not necessary. Hefti v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-128 (quoting section 1.280A-2(g)(1), Proposed Income Tax Regs., 48 Fed. Reg. 33324 (July 21, 1983)). The term "principal place of business" includes a place of business used by the taxpayer to perform administrative or management activities related to the trade or business if there is no other fixed location of the trade or business where substantial administrative or management activities are undertaken. Sec. 280A(c)(1).

Petitioner claims a deduction of $5,120 for "Office expense" for the business use of his home in his coaching activity on his amended Schedule C. His expenses consist of $2,600 for rent, $120 for electricity, $150 for paint, $700 for furniture, $1,200 for a computer, $200 for a printer, and $150 for a fax machine.

Petitioner's evidence consisted of an American Express statement showing two purchases from "Futon Beds & More" for $1,738 and $81.46 and a $211.29 purchase from "East Islip Paint", a letter from his landlord stating that petitioner was renting an apartment in her house at $1,300 per month in 2005, photographs (which indicate that the room was used for nothing more than to store the equipment), and his testimony.

Petitioner testified that he rented a six-room apartment in which he had converted one of the three bedrooms into an office for which he claimed one-sixth of the rent and electricity for the year. He testified that he purchased paint for $150 and related equipment for $215. These purchases were evidenced by the American Express statement. He also testified that the $700 deduction for furniture consisted of a couch purchased in 2005 for his office. Finally, he testified that he purchased a computer, a printer, and a fax machine in 2005 for his office, but he did not have a receipt to substantiate those purchases.

Petitioner, however, has not proven that the bedroom was exclusively used on a regular basis as his principal place of business for his coaching activity. See sec. 280A(c)(1). In addition, he has not adequately substantiated his expenses; i.e., he did not provide receipts for his purchases and the American Express statement does not prove that the expenditures were for furniture and paint for the office. Finally, he has provided no evidence that substantiates his claimed deductions for the expenses related to his computer and peripheral equipment in accordance with section 274 and the regulations thereunder. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to a deduction for expenses related to the business use of his home. Respondent's determination is sustained.

D. Utilities

Petitioner claims a $2,485 deduction for "Utilities" 6 on his amended Schedule C. His deduction for utilities consists of:



Description Amount

Cell phone for soccer $160 per month $1,920.00

Internet $29 per month 348.00

New cell phone 216.74


Expenses for cell phone use must be substantiated in accordance with section 274 and the regulations thereunder. Sec. 274(d); see supra note 4.

Petitioner testified that he used one of his cell phones strictly for phone calls and e-mails in his coaching activity while his other cell phone was used for personal purposes. He has provided no evidence that substantiates his cell phone expense in accordance with section 274 and the regulations thereunder. Thus, petitioner is not entitled to those deductions, and the Court may not apply the Cohan rule to estimate his deductible expense. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. at 827. The Court has characterized Internet expenses as utility expenses. Verma v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-132. Strict substantiation therefore does not apply, and the Court may apply the Cohan rule to estimate petitioner's deductible expense, provided that the Court has a reasonable basis for making an estimate. See Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985) (an estimate must have a reasonable evidentiary basis); Pistoresi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-39.

Petitioner testified that he used the Internet for researching different teams, newer equipment, and soccer camps in his coaching activity. He also testified that he did not use the Internet for personal use because he had Internet access at work. Petitioner, however, has provided no receipts or other documentation to substantiate his Internet expense. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to the deduction, and the Court cannot estimate his expense because he has not provided the Court with any basis for making an estimate. Respondent's determination is sustained.

E. Supplies

Petitioner claims a $6,235 deduction for supplies on his amended Schedule C. His supplies consist of:



Description Amount

Screening TV for games with projector $1,200

Office supplies 300

Soccer balls, nets, etc. 3,000

CDs for training 300

Uniforms --sweat suit 175

Shorts & shirts 5 sets 300

Soccer cleats 250

Hats & gloves 50

Laundry costs $15 per week  44 660


Petitioner testified that players, coaches, and managers came to his home once or twice a month to view "presentations on how we would play, and how they are going to defend, and things like that." He testified that the projector and screen was not used for any other purpose because "it was just a plain wide screen and you project games on it." He also testified that he had a Sony TV in his apartment. He submitted a receipt from "Tigerdirect.com" to substantiate his purchase of the projector and screen. The receipt shows that he paid $1,376.13 for the items. The Court concludes that petitioner is entitled to a $1,376.13 deduction for the projector and screen rather than the $1,200 that respondent conceded. See supra note 1.

Petitioner also testified that his office supplies consisted of "papers, pens, pencils, you name it." To substantiate his deduction for office supplies, he submitted a copy of his American Express statement that shows a purchase was made from Costco for $174.52. But the statement does not prove that the amount was expended for paper, pens, or the like. The Court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to a $300 deduction for office supplies, and respondent's determination is sustained.

To substantiate petitioner's $3,000 deduction for supplies, he has submitted photographs of soccer equipment, a "Team Quote" of $290.83 from "BigToe Sports", an American Express statement showing a purchase of $63.05 from Haydees Sports Soccer, and a document setting forth item numbers, descriptions, quantities, and prices for a total purchase price of $3,225.54 (the document). Although the document shows shipping costs of $94.03 and a total purchase price of $3,225.54, the document does not bear a retailer's name or other evidence of proof of payment by petitioner. Upon the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to a deduction of only $63.05 for the equipment. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d at 544 (estimates of a taxpayer's deductions bear heavily against the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his or her own making). Although the Court believes because of the photographs that petitioner made expenditures for the equipment, he has not provided any reasonable evidentiary basis for making an estimate of his expenses (other than the self-serving document). See Vanicek v. Commissioner, supra at 742-743. Therefore, respondent's disallowance of the remaining $2,936.95 is sustained.

To substantiate petitioner's $300 deduction for training CDs, he has submitted a receipt for the purchase of a soccer CD for $64.95 and the aforementioned document alleging that he made payments of $26.99 and $22.49 for DVDs entitled "Training Sessions Around the World" and "NSCAA Tactical Development", respectively. The Court concludes that petitioner is entitled to a deduction of $64.95 for the training CDs rather than the $59.95 that respondent conceded. See supra note 1. Respondent's disallowance of the remaining $235.05 is sustained because petitioner failed to produce credible evidence to substantiate his expenditures or provide the Court with a reasonable basis for estimating his deduction.

With respect to petitioner's $250 deduction for soccer cleats, petitioner's only evidence consisted of the aforementioned document alleging that he purchased one pair of Predator Pulsion cleats for $80.99 and two pairs of Lotto Primato cleats for $107.98. As stated earlier, the document does not prove that petitioner made the purchases or provide the Court with a reasonable basis for estimating his deduction. Therefore, respondent's determination is sustained.

With respect to the deductions for uniforms (sweat suit), five sets of shorts and shirts, and hats and gloves, petitioner has provided no evidence, such as a receipt, to substantiate his deductions. The document does not provide the Court with a reasonable basis for estimating his deduction. Accordingly, respondent's determination is sustained.

Petitioner testified that his $660 deduction for laundry included the cost of his wife's washing of the teams' pennies and his uniforms, sweat suits, or shorts. He has provided no receipts to substantiate his expenditures for laundry detergent or fabric softener, and he has not provided any utility bills to establish his expenditures for water, gas, or electricity. He has not provided the Court with a reasonable basis for estimating his deduction for laundry. Accordingly, respondent's determination is sustained.

F. Taxes and Licenses

Petitioner claims a $2,047 deduction for taxes and licenses on his amended Schedule C. On petitioner's "Supporting Statement" attached to his Form 1040X, he set forth the following:



Description Amount

License $986.00

Cost of taking tests-2 weeks 300.00

Meals --14 days $50 day 700.00

Transport --L.I. to Westchester 125 Mi 
.415 51.87

Toll 9.00


Other than petitioner's testimony that he spent 2 weeks testing to obtain a "B" license from NSCA, there is no evidence substantiating a $2,047 deduction. In addition, he has not substantiated the travel and meal expenses associated with his license in accordance with section 274(d) and the regulations thereunder. Respondent's determination is sustained.

G. Travel and Meals and Entertainment

Petitioner claims a $281 deduction for travel and a $400 deduction for meals and entertainment on his amended Schedule C. On petitioner's "Supporting Statement" attached to his Form 1040X, he set forth the following:



Description Amount

Labor Day Tournament $125

Meals 100

Tournaments in New Jersey 6

Meals 50

Meetings with managers and assistant
coaches 400


To substantiate deductions for travel and meals and entertainment, taxpayers must substantiate the amount of the expense, the time and place of the travel or entertainment, the business purpose of each expense, and the business relationship to the taxpayer of the persons entertained. Sec. 274(d); sec. 1.274-5T, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46014 (Nov. 6, 1985).

Petitioner has provided no evidence satisfying the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d) and the regulations thereunder. He also has not proven that the soccer club did not reimburse him for the expenditures as provided in his contract. See supra p. 3. Petitioner is not entitled to the deductions, and respondent's determinations are sustained. See Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. at 827.

H. Other: Magazines, Books, and Publications

Petitioner claims a $120 deduction for magazines, books, and publications on his amended Schedule C. He has provided no receipts or other evidence to substantiate his deduction. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to the deduction, and the Court cannot estimate his expense because he has not provided the Court with any basis for making an estimate. Respondent's determination is sustained.



II. Schedule A Deductions
A. State and Local Taxes

Section 164(a) allows a taxpayer deductions for State and local income taxes, real property taxes, and personal property taxes.

Although respondent allowed a deduction of $2,407 for Schedule A State and local taxes, petitioner claims a deduction for State and local taxes of $2,926. His deduction consists of State and local income taxes of $2,376 and real property taxes of $550 with respect to a "TIMESHARE" on his amended Schedule A. He provided an "Account Detail/History" that shows that he made a $93.61 payment for "Property TAX" on November 22, 2005. Petitioner, however, has not shown that respondent has not already given him credit for this $93.61 payment, and he has not substantiated payments greater than the $2,407 that respondent allowed. Accordingly, respondent's determination is sustained.

B. Charitable Contributions

1. Gifts by Cash or Check

In pertinent part, section 1.170A-13(f)(1), Income Tax Regs., provides that separate contributions of less than $250 are not subject to the "contemporaneous written acknowledgment" requirement of section 170(f)(8) regardless of whether the sum of the contributions to such organization equals $250 or more. Rather, monetary charitable contributions of less than $250 must be substantiated by a canceled check, a receipt from the organization that shows the organization's name, the date of the contribution, and the amount thereof; or "other reliable written records" that show the organization's name, the date of the contribution, and the amount thereof. Sec. 1.170A-13(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. 7

Petitioner claims on his amended Schedule A a $1,300 deduction for charitable contributions paid by cash or checks. He testified that his charitable contributions paid by "Cash or check [were] for the church that I gave to somebody and I think all of that is provided in there, I think." He has provided no other evidence to substantiate his deductions for charitable contributions for 2005. The Court does not accept his uncorroborated, self-serving testimony. See Urban Redev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 1961), affg. 34 T.C. 845 (1960); Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986). Without other reliable evidence to substantiate petitioner's purported charitable contributions, he is not entitled to claim a deduction for them, and the Court will not apply the Cohan rule to estimate a deductible amount. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d at 543-544; see also Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 32, 41 (1993) ("the reporting requirements [of section 1.170A-13, Income Tax Regs.,] are directory and not mandatory."); Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. at 742-743. Accordingly, respondent's determinations are sustained.

2. Gifts Other Than by Cash or Check

To verify a charitable contribution of property other than money, the regulations require the taxpayer to maintain a receipt from the organization for each contribution showing: (1) The organizations's name; (2) the contribution's date and location; and (3) the property's description in detail reasonably sufficient under the circumstances. Sec. 1.170A-13(b)(1), Income Tax Regs. A letter or other written communication from the organization acknowledging receipt of the contribution, showing the date thereof, and containing the required description of the property contributed constitutes a receipt. Id. Where it is impractical to obtain a receipt, the taxpayer must maintain "other reliable written records" of the noncash contributions. Id. The other reliable written records shall contain: (1) The organization's name and address; (2) the contribution's date and location; (3) the property's description; (4) the property's fair market value at the time of the donation; (5) the method utilized in determining the property's fair market value; (6) the property's basis if the taxpayer is required to reduce the contribution by the amount of ordinary income or capital gain that would have been realized had the taxpayer sold the property for its fair market value; and (7) any agreements or conditions that relate to the use, sale, or other disposition of the contributed property. Sec. 1.170A-13(b)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs. Additionally, where a taxpayer claims a deduction for a charitable contribution of property in excess of $500, the taxpayer is also required to attach Form 8283, Noncash Charitable Contributions, to the taxpayer's Form 1040 and maintain a written record that indicates how the property was acquired and the taxpayer's basis in the property. Sec. 1.170-13A(b)(3), Income Tax Regs.

The reliability of the other reliable written records is determined on the basis of all of the facts and circumstances. Sec. 1.170A-13(a)(2), Income Tax Regs. Factors indicative of reliability include but are not limited to: (1) The contemporaneousness of the writing evidencing the contribution; (2) the regularity of the taxpayer's recordkeeping procedures, e.g., a contemporaneous diary entry stating the amount and date of the contribution and the organization's name that is made by a taxpayer who regularly makes such diary entries; and (3) in the case of a de minimis contribution, any written or other evidence from the organization evidencing the contribution that would not otherwise constitute a "receipt" (including a "token" traditionally associated with the organization and regularly given by it to persons making cash donations). Sec. 1.170A-13(a)(2)(i), (b)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs.

But deductions for contributions of cash or property of $250 or more must be substantiated by a contemporaneous written acknowledgment from the organization. Sec. 170(f)(8); see also sec. 1.170A-13(f)(1), Income Tax Regs. A written acknowledgment is contemporaneous if it is obtained by the taxpayer on or before the earlier of the date the taxpayer files the original return for the taxable year of the contribution or the due date (including extensions) for filing the original return for the year. Sec. 170(f)(8)(C); sec. 1.170A-13(f)(3), Income Tax Regs. The written acknowledgment must state the amount of cash and a description (but not necessarily the value) of any property other than cash that the taxpayer donated and whether the organization provided any consideration to the taxpayer in exchange for the donation. Sec. 170(f)(8)(B)(i) and (ii); sec. 1.170A-13(f)(2)(i) and (ii), Income Tax Regs.

Petitioner claims on his amended Schedule A a $1,735 deduction for charitable contributions of property donated to the Promesa Foundation (Promesa) on various dates in 2005. His purported donations consist of clothing, jackets, suits, dresses, gowns, and a computer and related equipment. He reported a total cost basis of $3,665 and a total fair market value of $1,735. He also reported that the method used to determine the fair market value was "FAIR MARKET VALUE".

With respect to the clothing, jackets, suits, dresses, and gowns, petitioner has not provided a receipt from Promesa or a reliable written record satisfying the requirements of section 1.170A-13(b)(2)(ii), Income Tax Regs. 8 The Court does not accept his uncorroborated, self-serving testimony regarding his purported donations. See Urban Redev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d at 332; Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. at 77. Without other reliable evidence to substantiate those charitable contributions, petitioner is not entitled to claim a deduction for them, and the Court will not apply the Cohan rule to estimate a deductible amount. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d at 543-544; see also Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. at 41. Respondent's determinations are sustained.

To substantiate petitioner's contributions of the fax computer and related equipment, he submitted a letter from Promesa, dated June 10, 2008. The letter's author claims that petitioner purchased the computer in 2005 and donated it later that year. The letter's author also claims: "Based upon my knowledge and based upon a review of several catalogues available from 2005 the following are the values:"



Property Value

Printer HP Model 1022 LaserJet $199.98

Fax HP Model 1050 fax with answering
machine 149.99

Open model Pentium IV-1.2 GHZ 40 GB HD
256 MB RAM Windows XP Professional Office
2003 15" Monitor 1,200.00


The Court accords little weight to the letter acknowledging the contributions of the computer and related equipment because it was written about 3 years after the contributions. With respect to the computer and monitor, the letter does not satisfy the contemporaneous written acknowledgment requirement of section 170(f)(8) and the regulations thereunder. Specifically, the letter is not contemporaneous, and it fails to satisfy the requirement that the organization provide a statement as to whether the organization provided any goods or services in consideration for the donation. Additionally, the values of the contributions appear to be based upon the values of such equipment in a new rather than a used condition. Since the computer and related equipment were used, this method overstated their actual values. See Mack v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1980-401, affd. without published opinion 690 F.2d 906 (11th Cir. 1982). Petitioner did not introduce any other evidence supporting the estimated values. He has not satisfied the requirements of section 1.170A-13(b) and (f), Income Tax Regs. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to the claimed deductions, and the Court will not apply the Cohan rule to estimate a deductible amount. See Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d at 543-544. Accordingly, respondent's determinations are sustained.

C. Unreimbursed Employee Business Expenses

1. Professional Subscriptions

Petitioner claims a $1,464 deduction for professional subscriptions as an unreimbursed employee expense on his amended Schedule A. On petitioner's "Supporting Statement" attached to his Form 1040X, he set forth the following:



Description Amount

Daily newspaper $234

Satellite for job $90 per month 1,080

"Magazines-Dummy Books" 150


Petitioner testified that his subscriptions expense related to magazines and "stuff" for soccer. He has provided no receipts or other evidence to substantiate those deductions. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to the deductions, and the Court cannot estimate his expense because he has not provided the Court with any basis for making an estimate. Respondent's determination is sustained.

Petitioner testified that the deductions for his satellite expense related to soccer games that his players and the other coaches watched at his home. He also testified that he deducted only a portion of the expense, i.e., $90, and that his monthly satellite cost was $160 or $180. He provided respondent with a credit card statement reflecting a one-time fee to Dish Network for $234.17 in 2005.

Petitioner has provided no other evidence to substantiate his monthly expenditures for the satellite in his coaching activity. In addition, he has not provided any evidence that establishes either his personal or business use of the satellite. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to the deduction, and the Court cannot estimate his expense because he has not provided the Court with any basis for making an estimate. Respondent's determination is sustained.

2. Uniforms and Protective Clothing

Petitioner claims a $3,615 deduction for uniforms as an unreimbursed employee expense on his amended Schedule A. On petitioner's "Supporting Statement" attached to his Form 1040X, he set forth the following:



Description Amount

Shirts  7 $175

Pants  7 245

Special T-shirts  7 105

Work shoes  2 160

Socks 10 pair 30

Jackets 125

Winter jacket 75

Hats, gloves, & scarves 100

Laundry costs $20 per week 1,040

Dry cleaning $30 per week 1,560


Clothing is a deductible expense only if it is required for the taxpayer's employment, is unsuitable for general or personal wear and is not so worn. See Hynes v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1266, 1290 (1980); Yeomans v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 757, 767 (1958). If the cost of acquiring clothing is deductible, then the cost of maintaining the clothing is also deductible. Fisher v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 218 (1954), affd. 230 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1956).

Petitioner testified that his "uniform" for MIS consisted of jeans and long-sleeve shirts during the winter. He testified that MIS let him pick out what he wanted to wear and what he wanted to purchase. He also testified that his laundry and dry cleaning costs were for expenditures he made for cleaning his MIS uniforms.

Petitioner admitted that MIS did not require him to wear a specific uniform. Moreover, his uniform consisted of clothing that is suitable for general or personal wear, and he has failed to prove otherwise. He also failed to substantiate either the cost of purchase or the cost of maintaining of his uniforms. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to his claimed deductions, and respondent's determinations are sustained.

3. Other: Supplies

On petitioner's original and amended Schedules A he claimed a $345 deduction for supplies as an unreimbursed employee expense. Petitioner presented neither evidence nor argument concerning his supplies expenses and is thus deemed to have conceded that issue. See Nielsen v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 311, 312 (1973); Mikalonis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-281.



III. Exemptions
A. Petitioner's Spouse

Petitioner did not claim a personal exemption for his wife on his Form 1040, but he did claim a personal exemption for his wife on his Form 1040X.

Section 151(b) provides a taxpayer with an exemption for a spouse if the taxpayer and the spouse do not file a joint return, the spouse had no gross income, and the spouse is not dependent on another taxpayer during the calendar year in which the taxpayer's tax year began. 9

Petitioner did not prove that he satisfied the requirements of section 151(b). He failed to prove that his wife did not have gross income and that she was not dependent on another taxpayer during 2005. 10 Respondent's determination is sustained.

B. Petitioner's Father

Petitioner did not claim a dependency exemption deduction for his father on his Form 1040, but he did claim a dependency exemption deduction for his father on his amended Form 1040X.

Generally, taxpayers may claim dependency exemption deductions for their dependents (as defined in section 152). Sec. 151(c). The term "dependent" includes a "qualifying relative." Sec. 152(a). Under section 152(d)(1) a qualifying relative is an individual: (1) Who bears a qualifying relationship to the taxpayer, such as the taxpayer's father, sec. 152(d)(2)(C); (2) whose gross income for the year is less than the section 151(d) exemption amount ($2,000 for 2005); (3) who receives over one-half of his support from the taxpayer for the taxable year; and (4) who is not a qualifying child of the taxpayer or of any other taxpayer for the taxable year.

Petitioner provided a copy of his father's Social Security card and a letter purportedly written by his father. The letter's author claims that he lived with petitioner and petitioner's wife during 2005, that he had no income for 2005, and that petitioner paid all of his expenses.

Petitioner testified that his father lived with him during 2005, that his father was in his "late fifties" in 2005, and that his father stopped working or retired in 2004 because he had cancer and Ecuador's economy was not very good. He also testified that nobody else supported his father because there were no other family members "here to support him."

Petitioner did not call his father (or any other person) as a witness. In addition, the Court is reluctant to rely on the letter and petitioner's self-serving testimony. Without other corroborative evidence, petitioner is not entitled to the dependency exemption deduction for his father. Respondent's determination is sustained.



IV. Accuracy-Related Penalty
Initially, the Commissioner has the burden of production with respect to any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount. Sec. 7491(c). The Commissioner satisfies this burden of production by coming forward with sufficient evidence that indicates it is appropriate to impose the penalty. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001). Once the Commissioner satisfies this burden of production, the taxpayer must persuade the Court that the Commissioner's determination is in error by supplying sufficient evidence of reasonable cause, substantial authority, or a similar provision. Id.

In pertinent part, section 6662(a) and (b)(1) and (2) imposes an accuracy-related penalty equal to 20 percent of the underpayment that is attributable to: (1) Negligence or disregard of rules or regulations; or (2) a substantial understatement of income tax. 11 Section 6662(c) defines the term "negligence" to include "any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this title," and the term "disregard" to include "any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard." Negligence also includes any failure by the taxpayer to keep adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly. Sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.

Section 6664(c)(1) is an exception to the section 6662(a) penalty: no penalty is imposed with respect to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was reasonable cause therefor and the taxpayer acted in good faith. Section 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., incorporates a facts and circumstances test to determine whether the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. The most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess his proper tax liability. Id. "Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of * * * the experience, knowledge and education of the taxpayer." Id.

The Court finds that respondent has met his burden of production and that petitioner was negligent. Petitioner did not properly substantiate his deductions as required by the Code and the regulations. In addition, he conceded that several of his deductions were inaccurate. See supra note 3. Petitioner did not establish a defense for his noncompliance with the Code's requirements. Respondent's determination is therefore sustained.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

1 In respondent's pretrial memorandum, he conceded that petitioner was entitled the following deductions: (1) $525 for software purchased for his work with Promesa Systems (hereinafter MIS as petitioner referred to Promesa Systems as "MIS") as an unreimbursed employee expense; (2) $1,200 for a projector and screen used in petitioner's soccer coaching activity (coaching activity); and (3) $59.95 for soccer training CDs.

2 Adjustments for the following are computational and are to be resolved consistent with the Court's decision: (1) Petitioner's liability for self-employment tax and his deduction therefor; (2) whether petitioner is entitled to itemize his deductions or is limited to the standard deduction; and (3) the amount of petitioner's net medical and dental expenses and his entitlement to a deduction for medical and dental expenses.

3 By submitting amended Schedules A and C, petitioner effectively, and is therefore deemed to have, conceded that the following deductions were inaccurate:


Original Amended
Item Schedules Schedules
Advertising $400.00 -0-
Commissions and fees 300.00 -0-
Car and truck expenses 11,191.00 $7,961
"Office expense" 3,240.00 5,120
Supplies 6,422.00 6,235
Utilities 1,320.00 2,485
Travel 1,038.00 281
Sch. C taxes & licenses 1,200.00 2,047
Meals and entertainment 1,100.00 400
Other expenses -0- 120
Sch. A State and local income
taxes 2,407.00 2,376
"NYSDI" 31.20 -0-
"TOBACCO TAX" 150.00 -0-
Real estate taxes -0- 550
Charitable contributions paid
by cash or check 3,120.00 1,300
Charitable contributions of
property 2,315.00 1,735
Sch. A vehicle expense 7,477.00 -0-
Sch. A parking fees, tolls
and transportation 300.00 -0-
Professional subscriptions 630.00 1,464
Uniforms and protective
clothing 1,100.00 3,615


See Neaderland v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 532, 540 (1969) (taxpayer admitted by filing amended returns, inter alia, that his claimed deduction was excessive), affd. 424 F.2d 639 (2d Cir 1970); Lare v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 739, 750 (1974) (statements made in a tax return signed by a taxpayer may be treated as admissions), affd. without published opinion 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975).

4 Listed property is defined to include passenger automobiles, computers and peripheral equipment, and cell phones. Sec. 280F(d)(4)(A).

5 The Court also notes that any expenses petitioner incurred in commuting between his residence and either job are nondeductible personal expenses. See secs. 162, 262; Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973); secs. 1.162-2(e), 1.262-1(b)(5), Income Tax Regs. But transportation expenses incurred on trips between places of business may be deductible. Steinhort v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 496, 503-504 (5th Cir. 1964), affg. and remanding T.C. Memo. 1962-233. Petitioner, however, did not substantiate his mileage for trips between places of employment. Additionally, petitioner did not prove that the soccer club did not reimburse him for his expenses as provided in his contract. See supra p. 3.

6 Petitioner claimed the expenditures as a separate item on line 25, Utilities, on his amended Schedule C rather than on line 30, Expenses for business use of your home. Generally, utilities attributable to the taxpayer's maintenance of a home office are deductible as business expenses under sec. 280A. Sec. 1.262-1(b)(3), Income Tax Regs. Because the expenditures are otherwise disallowed, the Court does not address whether petitioner mischaracterized his deductions.

7 The Court assumes that petitioner's payments for charitable contributions did not equal or exceed $250 and therefore are not subject to the more exacting standard of sec. 170(f)(8) and the regulations thereunder.

8 The Court assumes that the deduction claimed for each of these items did not equal or exceed $250 and therefore are not subject to the more exacting standard of sec. 170(f)(8) and the regulations thereunder.

9 Although petitioner submitted a Form 1040X to respondent that purports to be a joint return and claims a personal exemption for his wife, the Form 1040X was not signed by his wife and has not been accepted by respondent as filed. In addition, sec. 6013(b)(2) provides that an election to file a joint return after the filing of a separate return may not be made where a notice of deficiency has been mailed to either spouse and such spouse has filed a petition with the Court. Respondent mailed the notice of deficiency to petitioner's last known address on July 2, 2007. Petitioner filed his petition on July 16, 2007, and he submitted the Form 1040X on July 24, 2007. Accordingly, the Court concludes that a joint return was not filed and that sec. 151(b) governs the Court's analysis of this issue.

10 Petitioner did not call his wife as a witness to testify about these issues.

11 Because the Court finds that petitioner was negligent or disregarded rules or regulations, the Court need not discuss whether there is a substantial understatement of income tax. See sec. 6662(b); Fields v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-207.

Labels:

Monday, March 23, 2009

Madoff theft losses

--------------The new 2009020 Rev Proc dealing with Ponzi losses, particularly Madoff, was posted last week.

With the roll-up of those losses, your clients NEED TO FILE A CLAIM FOR REFUND FOR THE PRAST THREE YEARS NOW - before April 5, 2009 in order to get refnd for the 2005 tax year. If you file a claim after April 5, you will lose the refund for 2009 due to the 3 year statute of limitations on refunds.

I have received a fair number of e-mails on these issues.

Attahced is a White Paper and, somehow, they do not get into the refund issue.
However they make the point that the test loss should be reported to the IRS. I think that is good advice.

Madoff and Other Fraudulent Schemes: Tax and Planning Implications


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Continue to send requests for advice to ab@irstaxattorney.com

March 23, 2009

White paper : Madoff Ponzi scheme : Fraudulent schemes : Tax planning .



Madoff and Other Fraudulent Schemes: Tax and Planning Implications
Overview

The following discussion highlights the various tax and planning implications that arise as a result of investment in the Madoff Ponzi scheme. This White Paper should be viewed as an evolving document --it will be updated on an ongoing basis as guidance is issued. In fact, on March 17, 2009, the IRS issued guidance on how to treat theft losses resulting from investments in fraudulent schemes and provided a safe harbor for computing such losses (see page 7). 1 Although this White Paper focuses on the Madoff situation, the discussion is also applicable to investments in other fraudulent schemes.



Madoff Ponzi Scheme

The SEC contends that Bernard L. Madoff, and his firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC, (BMIS) perpetrated a giant Ponzi scheme in which principal from new investors was utilized to make income and redemption payments to other investors. This scheme enabled Madoff and his firm to deliver fraudulent strong investment results and defraud investors out of an estimated $50 billion.


Bankruptcy Recovery and Clawbacks

Before one can understand the tax implications associated with the Madoff scandal, one must have at least a cursory knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings and the potential "clawbacks" under the bankruptcy law. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), having taken over BMIS in conjunction with the Bankruptcy Court, has appointed Irving Picard as Trustee to oversee the orderly liquidation of the assets of BMIS and related entities. (Surprisingly enough, in a SIPC type proceeding, Picard's fees and the fees of lawyers, accountants, and other experts will be paid by SIPC and not from the assets of the investors.)

In the course of this proceeding, Trustee Picard will work diligently to discover the assets within and outside of the United States. Those assets, including Madoff's market making business, will be liquidated with investors receiving an extremely limited recovery. At this time, it has been reported that recovery of less than $1 billion has been made compared to the $40 - $50 billion that was believed to be invested with Madoff immediately before the fraud was discovered. In any event, it seems unlikely that the eventual recovery will exceed 10 to 15 percent.

Perhaps the greater concern coming from the bankruptcy is that of clawbacks. Although not a technical financial term, but rather a term of art, the phrase clawback refers to a trustee's legal ability to require investors to repay distributions to the bankruptcy estate. Although a technical discussion of the law surrounding clawbacks is beyond the scope of this tax analysis, it suffices to say that some investors will be required to repay the trustee. On February 21, 2009, Picard and his counsel, David Sheehan, hosted an investors meeting, followed by questions and answers. In the course of this meeting, no clear guidance was given as to exactly how the clawbacks would work. However, several things became clear:
1. Investors with inside or special knowledge would have a greater risk of clawback.


2. Investors who were "net winners" would also have a more likely chance of clawback compared to investors who were "net losers."


3. The prudent course of action for tax attorneys or CPAs is to recommend to their clients that they seek separate bankruptcy counsel for advice regarding clawbacks.



Computation of Eventual Recovery

In the question-and-answer session hosted by Picard and Sheehan, they specifically discussed the following examples:
Example 4: An investor had $800,000 invested with Madoff, received a SIPC recovery of $500,000 and was entitled to a 50-percent bankruptcy recovery. What is the total amount recoverable? The amount would ordinarily be the sum of the two amounts, or $900,000. However, because this amount would exceed the total investment, recovery would be limited to $800,000.

Example 5: Using the same general fact pattern as in Example 4, if the bankruptcy recovery was only 10 percent (a more realistic assumption), the investor would receive a $500,000 payment from SIPC and an $80,000 recovery from the trustee.



SIPC Recovery

As explained in more detail below (see page 4), a theft loss deduction is ordinarily taken in the year the theft is discovered. If the taxpayer has a claim for reimbursement in that year, however, the portion of the loss that may be reimbursed cannot be deducted until the tax year in which it is reasonably certain that reimbursement will not be received. Such recovery could come from either the bankruptcy estate (described above) or from SIPC.

As a broker-dealer registered with the SEC, Bernard L. Madoff Investments Securities LLC (BMIS) is a member of SIPC. SIPC membership is not voluntary but is required by law. SIPC is a nonprofit, private membership corporation to which most registered brokers and dealers are required to belong. SIPC was created by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA) and insures customers of SIPC members in case a broker-dealer liquidates. SIPC proceedings are a specialized form of bankruptcy. 2 A trustee and counsel are designated by SIPC and appointed by the federal District Court. The case is then referred to the appropriate federal Bankruptcy Court for all purposes.

Bernard Madoff was arrested by the FBI on December 11, 2008, and charged with securities fraud in violation of Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. On December 15, 2008, SIPC filed an application with the federal District Court seeking a decree adjudicating the customers of BMIS in need of the protections afforded under SIPA. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered an order placing BMIS's customers under the protections of SIPA. The Protective Order appointed the Trustee for the liquidation of the business of BMIS and removed the SIPA liquidation proceeding to the federal Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.

Unsecured claimants in a SIPA liquidation are generally classified as either "customers" or general unsecured creditors of SIPC. As a result, a SIPA proceeding generally involves two estates from which customer claims and general unsecured claims are satisfied. The first is the general estate, which is the only estate from which general unsecured creditors can seek satisfaction of their claims. The second, and relevant estate, is the customer estate. The customer estate is a fund consisting of customer property and is limited exclusively to satisfying customer claims. 3 Accordingly, customers, as defined by SIPA, enjoy a preferred status and are afforded special protections under SIPA. 4 A denial of customer status relegates an investor to the status of a general unsecured creditor.

The SIPC may advance up to $500,000 per customer on account of missing securities, of which up to $100,000 may be based on a claim for cash. SIPC does not protect against market loss. The maximum amount is $500,000, even if the valid amount of the claim is much higher. The amount of recovery beyond the amount advanced by SIPC will depend on the amount of customer property the trustee is able to recover. Customer property is never used to pay any administrative costs in a SIPC proceeding.

SIPA defines "customer," in relevant part, as any person who has deposited cash with the debtor for the purpose of purchasing securities. The mere act of entrusting cash to the debtor for the purpose of effecting securities transactions triggers customer status. A recent U.S. Bankruptcy Court case clarified that the investment needed to establish customer status under SIPA is triggered at the moment the funds are deposited in the firm's account. 5 Thus, an investor who wired $10 million to Madoff's firm six days before Madoff was arrested for securities fraud was a customer of the firm within the meaning of SIPA, even though the fund was closed until the New Year and no trade ever took place. According to the court, the funds were wired and held in the Madoff firm's account for the purpose of investing when the funds reopened. Regardless of whether the funds were to be invested immediately or upon the investor's authorization, reasoned the court, the fact remained that the sole purpose of wiring the funds to the firm's account was to effectuate future securities transactions. The customer relinquished all control over the funds once the wire was processed.

SIPA defines "customer property," in relevant part, as cash and securities at any time received, acquired, or held by or for the account of a debtor from or for the securities accounts of a customer, and the proceeds of any such property transferred by the debtor, including property unlawfully converted. Essentially, the fund of customer property includes all property that was or should have been set aside for customers and includes bank accounts containing customer funds. Under SIPA, the trustee is explicitly directed to distribute customer property pro rata among claimants who qualify as customers. Any contrary distribution of the funds would preclude the trustee from exercising his or her statutorily mandated duties and run afoul of the clear command of SIPA.

As set by the Bankruptcy Court, Madoff customer claims had to be filed by March 4, 2009. However, SIPA allows a six-month time period for filing customer claims. Any claim of a customer or other creditor of the debtor that is received by the trustee after the expiration of the six-month period beginning on the date of publication of notice will not be allowed, except in certain circumstances. The court may grant a reasonable, fixed extension of time for the filing of a claim by the United States, by a State or political subdivision thereof, or by an infant or incompetent person without a guardian. Thus, it is clear from the face of the statute that the six-month time limit for filing is subject to extension at the discretion of the court in only three specified instances, none of which is applicable to the Madoff liquidation.

Claims of customers must actually be received by the trustee within the six-month period from the date of publication of notice. The six-month time limit is the absolute outer limit. Thus, all Madoff claims must be received on or before July 2, 2009. The Instructions for completing the Madoff customer claim form note that claims received after March 4, 2009, but on or before July 2, 2009, may result in less protection. The claims are subject to delayed processing and to being satisfied on less favorable terms. 6



Analysis of Tax Issues



Theft Loss

Code Sec. 165 allows an income tax deduction for "any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise." 7 To be allowable as a deduction under Code Sec. 165(a), a loss must be (1) evidenced by closed and completed transactions, (2) fixed by identifiable events, and (3) with certain exceptions (e.g., for theft losses), actually sustained during the taxable year. 8 If the taxpayer is an individual, Code Sec. 165(c) imposes an additional limitation. The loss is deductible only if:
1. it is incurred in a trade or business (Code Sec. 165(c)(1));

2. it is incurred in a transaction entered into for profit (Code Sec. 165(c)(2)); or

3. it arises from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft (Code Sec. 1 65(c)(3)).

The IRS and the courts have generally taken the position that losses from Ponzi schemes and similar frauds should be claimed as theft losses under Code Sec. 1 65(c)(3). 9



Definition of Theft Loss

The term "theft" has been defined very broadly. In Rev. Rul. 72-112, 10 the IRS stated that theft includes "any felonious taking of money or property by which a taxpayer sustains a loss...Thus, to qualify as a "theft" loss...the taxpayer needs only to prove that his loss resulted from a taking of property that is illegal under the law of the state where it occurred and that the taking was done with criminal intent. 11 Similarly, in A.C. Edwards Exr. , 12 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that for tax purposes "'theft' is not...a technical word of art with a narrowly defined meaning but is, on the contrary, a word of general and broad connotation...covering any criminal appropriation of another's property to the use of the taker, particularly including theft by swindling, false pretenses, and any other form of guile."

This is not to say that there are not significant limits on a taxpayer's ability to take a theft deduction, however. An essential element of theft under the law of most states is specific intent to obtain the victim's property. Implicit in this requirement is a relationship of privity between the perpetrator and the victim. Lack of privity has been held to bar a theft deduction in a number of cases. 13 In the context of securities fraud, where taxpayers purchased stock in reliance on fraudulent representations by corporations, theft loss deductions have not been allowed where the taxpayer purchased the stock on the open market. 14 Nor was a deduction allowed where a taxpayer purchased stock from a broker that subsequently became worthless due to the fraudulent actions of corporate officers because the taxpayer could not prove that the broker had guilty knowledge or intent to deceive. 15 Thus, the case law suggests that there must be a direct buyer-seller relationship between the buyer and the perpetrator. This might block recovery for victims who invested through brokers or feeder funds. Although federal securities laws do not always require privity, they do not help the taxpayer because there must be a theft under state law.



Timing of Loss Deduction

Theft losses are generally treated as arising in the tax year in which they are discovered. 16 Thus, a theft loss is not deductible in the year it occurs unless that is also the year in which the theft is discovered. If, in the year of discovery, the taxpayer has a claim for reimbursement with respect to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery, however, the portion of the loss that may be reimbursed cannot be deducted until the tax year in which it becomes reasonably certain, no reimbursement will be made. 17 A loss is treated as discovered when a reasonable person in similar circumstances would have realized that he or she had suffered a loss. 18



Reasonable Prospect of Recovery

Whether there is a reasonable prospect of recovery is a question of fact to be determined by looking at all the circumstances of the case. 19 In general, there is a reasonable prospect of recovery when the taxpayer has a bona fide claim for recoupment and there is a substantial possibility that the claim will be decided in the taxpayer's favor. 20 Although there is bright line rule for making the determination, the courts have laid down some helpful guidelines. First, whether a taxpayer has a reasonable prospect of recovery is determined at the time the deduction is claimed and not later with the benefit of hindsight. 21 Second, the standard to be applied is primarily objective, although a taxpayer's subjective attitude and beliefs are not to be ignored. 22 Third, some courts have found that filing a lawsuit soon after the tax year in which the loss is claimed suggests that the taxpayer did not consider the loss a closed and completed transaction. 23 Other courts have noted, however, that taxpayers sometimes bring lawsuits, even when their chances of prevailing are quite low (e.g., 10 percent). 24 Moreover, filing a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding is considered a ministerial act and carries less weight than filing a lawsuit. 25 Fourth, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to show that there was no reasonable prospect of recovery in the year the theft loss deduction was claimed. 26 Fifth, courts may consider whether the taxpayer ultimately won on the lawsuit. 27 Finally, although the term "reasonable prospect is difficult to quantify, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that a 40- to 50-percent chance of recovery might be a reasonable standard. 28



Reasonable Prospect of Recovery Bars Amount of Theft Loss Deduction

In Ramsay Scarlett & Co. 29 the Tax Court held that the amount of the theft loss deduction is equal to the excess of the total loss claimed on the return over the amount the taxpayer has a reasonable prospect of recovering. The portion of the loss for which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery will not be considered to be sustained at that time, and it will not be deductible until the tax year in which it is determined with reasonable certainty that such reimbursement will not be obtained. 30



Amount and Character of the Deduction

If the theft involves personal use property (i.e., Code Sec. 165(c)(3) applies), the amount of the deductible loss is the lesser of the property's fair market value (FMV) immediately before the theft or its adjusted basis. 31 This amount is then reduced by the amount of insurance or other compensation received or recoverable. 32 Two limitations must then be applied. First, the initial $100 of loss on each theft is disallowed. 33 The remaining amount is then netted against any personal casualty gains and any net loss is deductible only to the extent it exceeds 10 percent of adjusted gross income (AGI). 34
Example 6: Assume that Tom suffers a personal theft loss. The stolen asset had a basis and FMV of $20,000. 35 Tom has AGI of $50,000. The first limitation reduces Tom's loss from $20,000 to $1 9,900 ($20,000 - $100). This amount is then deductible to the extent it exceeds 10 percent of Tom's AGI ($5,000). Thus, the theft deduction is $1 4,900 ($19,900 - $5,000). The $14,900 is an itemized deduction against ordinary income.

If the theft involves business or investment property, the amount of the deduction is the adjusted basis of the property reduced by insurance or other compensation recoverable, but the $100 and 10-percent-of-AGI floors do not apply. 36 Thus, whether the loss is properly deductible under Code Sec. 1 65(c) (2) or 165(c)(3) is important.



Deduction under Code Sec. 165(c)(2) or 165(c)(3)?

As noted above, Code Sec. 165(c)(2) allows a deduction for losses incurred in a transaction entered into for profit, while Code Sec. 165(c)(3) allows a deduction for losses of property not connected with a trade or business or a transaction entered into for profit if such loss arises from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty or from theft. It is not clear whether Code Sec. 165(c)(2) or Code Sec. 165(c)(3) would apply to theft losses arising from a Ponzi scheme or similar fraud. The uncertainty results from the fact that, although Code Sec. 1 65(c)(3) refers specifically to losses from theft, it also excludes transactions, like Ponzi scheme investments, that were entered into for profit.

In Rev. Rul. 71-381, 37 the IRS took the position that theft losses resulting from transactions entered into for profit are deductible only under Code Sec. 165(c)(3), subject to the $100 and 10-percent-of-AGI floors. Subsequent developments cast doubt on the IRS position, however. In Z. Premji, 38 the Tax Court suggested that when a taxpayer enters into a transaction for profit, Code Sec. 1 65(c)(2) controls not Code Sec. 165(c)(3), stating that "[t]he parties agree that Mr. Premji and Mr. Norby sustained theft losses (Sec. 165(a) and (e)). They also agree that Mr. Premji and Mr. Norby incurred losses in transactions entered into for profit. Hence, section 165(c)(2) controls the reporting of their theft losses."

Prior to 1984, Code Sec. 165(c)(3) provided that a theft loss was deductible:
(3) except as provided in subsection (h) losses of property not connected with a trade or business if such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.

The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 39 added the underlined language, making Code Sec. 165(c)(3) to read as follows:
(3) except as provided in subsection (h) losses of property not connected with a trade or business or a transaction entered into for profit , if such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.

The change would seem to strengthen the case for application of Code Sec. 165(c)(2) rather than Code Sec. 165(c)(3) to theft losses. Not only does Code Sec. 165(c)(2) specifically apply to transactions entered into for profit, but Code Sec. 165(c)(3) now specifically excludes transactions entered into for profit.

In CCA 200451030, the IRS came close to acknowledging that the position it took in Rev. Rul. 71-381 40 might not be correct but noted that the official IRS position had not changed:
Since the investors entered into the loan transactions with an expectation of profit, arguably their losses are deductible under §165(c)(2), not §165(c)(3) --although the timing of the loss would still be governed by §165(e). See, for example, the government's apparent concession to this effect in Premji. However, the official position of the Service is that such a loss is deductible only under §165(c)(3). See Rev. Rul. 71-381. As such, it is subject to the limitations in §165(h).

Thus, the bottom line appears to be that, although taxpayers would have a strong argument for claiming Madoff losses under Code Sec. 165(c)(2) and avoiding the $100 and 10-percent limitations, they might expect to be challenged by the IRS.

To report the full amount of a theft loss without applying the $100 and 10-percent-of-AGI floors, a return preparer would ordinarily either need to have substantial authority for taking the position or a reasonable basis plus disclosure. 41 If a significant purpose of the deduction is the avoidance of tax (the IRS would probably argue this), the threshold would be the more likely than not standard. Note that disclosure is not required merely for taking a position contrary to a ruling (in this case Rev. Rul. 71-381), 42 but only for taking a position contrary to a regulation.



Phantom Income and the Open Transaction Doctrine

In addition to claiming a theft loss, investors may be able to amend tax returns filed in prior years to eliminate income or treat it as a return of capital. Assuming a tax year is still open, returns may be amended to get rid of amounts reported as income that were not in fact actually or constructively received. 43 It may also be possible to eliminate income that was received by treating it as a return of capital under the open transaction doctrine.

The open transaction doctrine was first enunciated in Burnet v. Logan, 44 in which a taxpayer sold stock for cash plus a royalty of 60 cents per ton on all ore that the purchaser of the stock received from a certain mine. Because the amount to be received on the sale was uncertain, the taxpayer argued that it should not recognize any taxable income until the total amount received exceeded basis and the court agreed.

There are numerous cases and rulings in which taxpayers have attempted to apply the open transaction doctrine to income reported from fraudulent transactions. Sometimes taxpayers have won 45 and sometimes they have lost. 46 The key variables are (1) whether recovery was uncertain, (2) whether the taxpayer was an innocent investor, and (3) whether the amounts received were in the nature of interest or capital gain income or merely payments from later investors to conceal fraud.

Uncertainty of Recovery. The rationale for using the open transaction doctrine is that the seller or investor does not know the amount that will ultimately be received. The IRS takes the position that the open transaction doctrine can apply to Ponzi scheme payments, but only those payments received after discovery of the fraud. The rationale is that the typical investor would ordinarily not conclude that recovery of principal was uncertain until that time. 47 Moreover, some courts have held that receipts from a fraudulent scheme were income in the year received where the taxpayer could not establish that recovery of the principal amount was uncertain. 48

Innocent Investor. The IRS will deny open transaction treatment where the taxpayer is not an innocent investor. Early investors who are also promoters or who expect to make money because of money collected from later investors will not receive return of capital treatment. 49

Income vs. Payments from Other Investors. Interest income has been defined as compensation for the use or forbearance of money. 50 Where payments received in a Ponzi scheme were not for the use or forbearance of money, but rather payments from later investors made to conceal fraud, the payments were return of capital and not income. 51 Trustee Picard has stated that "there is no evidence to indicate securities were purchased for customer accounts in the past 13 years." Thus, it appears that payments received in the Madoff fraud were made to conceal the fraud.

Statute of Limitations. The statute of limitations for amending income tax returns is generally three years. Thus, for 2008, the 2005, 2006, and 2007 returns are open for amendment. 52 States have their own statutes of limitations for filing amended returns. Some examples are: Wisconsin, four years; Michigan, four years; Illinois three years; and Minnesota, 3.5 years. Both federal and state protective claims should be filed to keep these years open.

What about the interaction of amending returns and claiming net operating loss (NOL) carryovers? One strategy would be to file amended returns for the open years first and protective NOL claims for "open years" basis.

Pre-2005 Phantom Income. As explained above, it may be possible to amend returns back to 2005 to reverse out phantom income or treat amounts received as return of capital, but what about income reported by taxpayers in tax years prior to 2005? Is it possible to add closed-year income to the 2008 theft loss? There are several theories that might prove successful: (1) mitigation of the effect of the limitations period under Code Secs. 1311-1314, (2) common law estoppel to prevent unjust enrichment, (3) claim of right doctrine or Code Sec. 1341 53 or (4) equitable recoupment.

Planning to Maximize Deductions. There are two potential strategies. One would be to file amend returns for open years reversing phantom income and to file a protective claim for reportable basis. The theft loss could still be carried back three years and forward 20 years. For smaller investors and investors who need immediate cash this may be the most favorable approach. The other would be to claim a theft loss for accumulated investment (principal plus earnings less withdrawals). Under this alternative, the taxpayer would not file amended returns for the open years because the phantom income would already be included in the theft. This theft loss could then be carried back three years and forward 20 years. 54 It would be necessary to file a protective claim for the phantom income. CCA 200451030 may provide some authority for this position. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act extends the NOL carryback period to five years for qualified small businesses (including pass-through entities). 55



IRS Guidance on Ponzi Schemes

On March 17, 2009, the IRS issued guidance to assist victims of Ponzi-type investment schemes. 56 Although the guidance makes no mention of the Madoff scheme by name, new Rev. Rul 2009-9 clarifies the favorable tax treatment to which these and other similarly situated "investors" are entitled. New Rev.Proc 2009-20 provides these taxpayers with an optional safe harbor that greatly alleviates burden-ofproof issues. IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman at a press conference on March 17, 2009, noted that the guidance "assist[s] taxpayers who are victims of losses from Ponzi-type investment schemes." The guidance is not specific to the Madoff case, he indicated.



Theft Loss Treatment

Rev. Rul. 2009-9 covers the tax treatment of fraudulent investment arrangements under which income amounts that are wholly or partially fictitious have been reported as income to the investors. The IRS clarified that:
1. The investor is entitled to an ordinary theft loss rather than just a capital loss.

2. An investment theft loss is not subject to the $100 per event (for pre-2009 years) or 10-percent adjusted gross income personal casualty loss floors; but it remains available only to those who itemize deductions.

3. The investment theft loss is deductible in the year that the fraud is discovered, subject to reduction for amounts for which a reasonable prospect for recovery remains.

4. The investment theft loss includes the investor's unrecovered investment and fictitious income that may have been reported in a past year as taxable income (and was not distributed).

5. The investment theft loss forms part of the taxpayer's NOL that may be carried back or forward under normal NOL rules.

In lieu of taking a loss deduction, taxpayers continue to be free to file amended returns for those open tax years in which tax had been paid on phantom income, bogus gains and dividends. The IRS, however, ruled that closed years will not be reopened to make these adjustments.

The IRS emphasized that "any deduction for casualty or theft losses allowable under Code Sec. 165(c)(2) or (3) is treated as a business deduction for Code Sec. 172 [NOL] purposes." Therefore, if the loss is discovered in 2008, Rev. Rul. 2009-9 treats an individual investor or proprietorship as a small business that is eligible for the extended five-year NOL carryback period under the American Recovery Act for any 2008 NOL. If the taxpayer's $15 million maximum gross income limit is not met for purposes of qualifying for the extended American Recovery and Reinvestment Act NOL carryback, the regular three-year NOL carryback arising for casualty or theft losses may be taken.



Safe Harbor Rule

In recognition of the magnitude of recently discovered fraudulent investment arrangements, the IRS announced safe harbor treatment using two simplifying assumptions.

First, the IRS will deem the loss to be the result of theft if: (1) the promoter was charged under federal or state law with the commission of fraud, embezzlement, or a similar theft-type crime or was subject to a criminal complaint alleging the commission of such a crime and (2) there exists some evidence of an admission of guilt by the promoter or a trustee was appointed to freeze the assets of the scheme.

Second, the IRS will deem the amount of the investor's prospect of recovery, which limits the amount of the investor's immediate theft loss deduction, to five percent of the investor's net investment plus any actual recovery in the year of discovery and the amount of any recovery expected from private or other insurance (including insurance under SIPC). The five-percent amount applies to investors suing the creator of the scheme. For investors suing persons other than the promoter class, however, the five-percent prospect amount is raised to 25 percent.

According to IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman, the safe harbor will provide a uniform approach that avoids difficult burdens of proof in determining the amount of fictitious income, and minimizes compliance burdens on taxpayers and administrative burdens on the IRS.

At a press briefing, IRS officials commented that investors who participated in a Ponzi scheme through a "feeder fund" cannot use the safe harbor directly. The fund can use the safe harbor to determine its total losses. If the fund is a partnership, it will report a share of the losses to each investor on Schedule K-1. Further, noted officials, investors who do not use the safe harbor may claim a loss under the "standard rules," applied on a case-by-case basis. These rules are less clear than the safe harbor.

Future Recoveries. If the deduction taken in the year that the theft is discovered turns out to be too large, the taxpayer must recognize income in the year that a future recovery of that excess is realized. If the initial deduction turns out to be too small because the actual loss recovered is less than anticipated, an additional deduction in the year of recovery may be taken.

Safe-Harbor Statement. Rev. Proc. 2009-20 contains the sanctioned safe harbor statement --in fill-in-the-blank format --that the IRS will require for a taxpayer to use the safe harbor assumptions. An investor claiming the safe harbor recovery amount must claim the entire loss for the year of discovery. An investor who previously filed original or amended prior year returns to claim the investment losses may claim the safe harbor amount but must identify the inconsistent prior year returns on Appendix A of Rev. Proc. 2009-20.

See the Appendix for the full-text of Rev. Rul. 2009-9 and Rev. Proc. 2009-20.



Estates and Trusts

Thus far, we have been assuming that the theft loss is discovered while the investor is alive. If the investor dies before the loss is discovered, the tax consequences become more complicated.



Deductions Available

The income or estate tax deductions available depend on when the loss was incurred and when it was discovered. There are three common situations:
1. the theft occurs before the decedent dies, but is discovered during estate administration;

2. the theft occurs and is discovered during estate administration; and

3. the theft occurs after the accounts have been distributed.

Situation 1. Under these facts, the estate can claim an income tax deduction under Code Sec. 165(c), even though the loss occurred during a tax year of the decedent. 57 An estate tax deduction is allowable only for losses that occurred during estate administration, however. 58

Situation 2. Such a loss is deductible on either Form 706 (U.S. Estate (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return) as an estate tax deduction or on Form 1041 (U.S. Income Tax Return for Estates and Trusts) as an income tax deduction. 59 The default rule is that theft losses are claimed as an estate tax deduction under Code Sec. 2054, but a special election can be made to instead claim an income tax deduction under Code Sec. 165. If the election is made, the estate must file a statement reciting that the items in question have not been deducted under Code Sec. 2053 or 2054 and that the right to claim deductions under these Code Sections has been waived. 60 Once made, the election is irrevocable. 61

Situation 3. In this situation, the losses cannot be deducted by the estate under either Code Sec. 165(c) or Code Sec. 2054. 62 The losses would be deductible by the beneficiary, but only for income tax purposes. 63 If estate administration is unduly prolonged, the estate may not be able to deduct the loss even if it still holds the asset. An argument could be made that the estate would no longer be holding the asset for the estate but as an agent for the beneficiary.



Repayment to the Bankruptcy Estate

As explained above (see page 2), the Trustee of the Madoff estate may file clawback suits against investors who received distributions from Madoff. If such investors died before the scheme was discovered, the bankruptcy trustee may try to collect from their estates. Practitioners should explore the possibility of deducting such repayments under Code Secs. 2053 or 2054. Estates should also file both income tax and estate tax protective claims.



Refunds

If a taxpayer has phantom income resulting from a Ponzi scheme, the proper tax treatment probably depends on when the taxpayer dies. If the taxpayer died before the fraud was discovered, an argument can be made that income tax refunds would not be part of the gross estate for estate tax purposes. On the other hand, if the taxpayer died after the loss was discovered, any future income tax refunds would presumably be included in the gross estate.



Carrybacks and Carryforwards

Under the general rule, taxpayers can carry theft losses back three years and forward 20. 64 A special rule extends the carryback period to three years for casualty and theft losses, however. 65 If a theft loss was discovered before a taxpayer's death, any further carryforwards would probably be lost. The taxpayer has filed his or her last Form 1040 (U.S. Individual Income Tax Return) and there are no further tax years to which the loss could be carried forward. This would leave only the three-year carryback period. Moreover, taxpayers dying before April 18, 2009, probably could not take advantage of the five-year extended carryback period under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. 66 Again, filing protective claims is extremely important.



Value of Brokerage Accounts in the Estate

If the theft loss was discovered before death, the reduced value of brokerage accounts should be reflected in their estate tax value regardless of whether the date of death or alternate valuation date value was used. If the loss was discovered after the date of death but before the six-month alternate valuation period, the alternate valuation date could be used to reflect the lower value. Note, however, that if an executor elects the alternate valuation date, any estate tax deduction for administration expenses under Code Sec. 2053(b) or for theft or casualty losses under Code Sec. 2054 is disallowed to the extent the item in question is, in effect, taken into account by using the alternate valuation method. 67 In other words, there can be no double dipping.



Tax Planning for Trusts

Trusts with assets invested in a Ponzi scheme will generally have much larger losses in the current year than they can use. Income tax planning for such trusts involves using the losses as soon as possible and making sure all of them can be utilized. To accomplish this, the trust must generate more taxable income. There are several ways this can be accomplished. First, additional gifts can be made to the trust. More trust assets means more income and the more income, the faster the losses can be used up. Second, leveraged sales can be made to the trust. Assuming that the assets sold to the trust produce a total return in excess of the interest rate on the note, the value of the trust will increase. Finally, wills can be amended to increase trust funding.



IRAs

In discussing the tax implications for Madoff investors, we cannot forget those individuals who invested through Madoff with their IRAs or qualified plans. 68



Deduction for IRA Losses

For purposes of determining the taxation of IRA distributions, all traditional IRAs maintained for an individual must be aggregated and treated as one IRA. 69 An IRA loss may be recognized only if all of an individual's IRAs have been distributed and the amounts distributed are less than the individual's unrecovered basis. 70 The basis in a traditional IRA is the total amount of the nondeductible contributions in the IRAs. 71 If an IRA owner has a zero basis in the IRA because all of the contributions were deductible, then there will be no loss available.

However, Roth IRAs do have basis and, therefore, a loss would be available. In order to recognize a loss on a Roth IRA, all of an individual's Roth IRA accounts must be distributed and the amounts distributed must be less than the individual's unrecovered basis. 72

An IRA loss is claimed as a miscellaneous itemized deduction, subject to the two-percent-ofadjusted-gross-income limit that applies to certain miscellaneous itemized deductions on Schedule A, Form 1040 (U.S. Individual Income Tax Return). 73 Any IRA losses, however, are added back to taxable income for purposes of calculating the alternative minimum tax. 74 This creates a real problem, in essence making a large loss valueless.

IRAs may also be subject to clawbacks. If the funds being repaid were previously reported as income on the taxpayer's prior income tax returns, as would have been the case for IRA required minimum distributions from IRAs, the taxpayer may be able to take a deduction for the repaid funds on his or her current income tax return under the claim of right doctrine. In the alternative, taxpayers may be able to increase their Code Sec. 165 theft loss deduction for these amounts.

Code Sec. 1341 and Reg. §1.1341-1 set forth the requirements for a deduction under the claim of right doctrine. In order to claim a deduction under Code Sec. 1341, the following five requirements must be satisfied:
1. The item was included in gross income in a previous taxable year;

2. The inclusion occurred because the taxpayer appeared to have an unrestricted right to the item;

3. In a later year, the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction;

4. The deduction is allowed because it was established after the close of the year of inclusion that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to the item; and

5. The amount of the deduction exceeds $3,000.

One question that will need to be answered is whether the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to the IRA distributions or an absolute right in the year received, and whether a deduction for the clawback is allowed under other statutory provisions, such as Code Sec. 165. 75 Although it is not certain yet if a deduction under the claim of right doctrine would prevail, the prudent advisor should be aware of the possibility and review their client's facts accordingly.



Recovery of IRA Losses and Rollovers

In the event that a taxpayer is able to recover some of the IRA losses from SIPC or the bankruptcy estate, it is likely the taxpayer will be able to obtain a private letter ruling allowing the replacement of these monies into the IRA as a restorative payment. Restorative payments are payments made to restore losses to a plan resulting from actions by a fiduciary for which there is reasonable risk of liability for breach of a fiduciary duty under Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 76 or under other applicable federal or state law, where plan participants who are similarly situated are treated similarly with respect to the payments. 77 Generally, payments to a defined contribution plan are restorative payments only if the payments are made in order to restore some or all of the plan's losses due to an action (or a failure to act) that creates a reasonable risk of liability for such a breach of fiduciary duty (other than a breach of fiduciary duty arising from failure to remit contributions to the plan). 78 In contrast, payments made to an IRA to make up for losses due to market fluctuations or poor investment returns are generally treated as contributions and not as restorative payments.

In IRS Letter Rulings 200738025 and 200705031, the IRS ruled that amounts received by the taxpayers from a company pursuant to an arm's length settlement of a good faith claim of liability constituted a restorative payment rather than additional contributions. Therefore, the payments were eligible to be placed into the IRAs and constituted valid transactions without regard to the limitations placed on IRA contributions.

In these rulings, the IRS noted that a determination of whether settlement proceeds should be treated as a replacement payment, rather than an ordinary contribution, must be based on all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the payment of the settlement proceeds. It cited Rev. Rul. 2002-45 79 , which applies a facts and circumstances test to determine whether a payment to a qualified plan is a restorative payment to a plan as opposed to a plan contribution, and felt it appropriate to apply the same reasoning to IRAs.
Example 7: John suffered $500,000 of losses in his IRA due to Madoff investments. More than 60 days after the loss, John recovered $50,000 of his losses through SPIC and $100,000 through the bankruptcy estate. If he obtained a favorable letter ruling, he could roll over the $150,000 to his IRA and not be subject to any income taxes or excess contribution penalty.

Any letter ruling request on this subject would ask that (1) the payments received be considered restorative payments and, thus, not subject to the IRA contribution limits and (2) that the taxpayer be granted an extension of the 60-day rollover period to place such amounts into the IRA. It is our hope that the IRS would issue guidance that would clearly allow taxpayers to place these restorative payments in the IRA without the need to seek a costly private letter ruling.



Phantom Income

If a taxpayer reported income that never really existed on a prior income tax return, a practitioner should consider amending the prior income tax returns to remove the phantom income (i.e., the overstated income) for open years. In the case of a traditional IRA, however, the taxpayer generally will have actually received the monies that triggered the reported income, thus making the phantom income argument more difficult. Prudence would suggest filing protective claims in the event this option is determined to be available in the event of a clawback.



Roth Conversions

If individuals converted their traditional IRA to a Roth IRA and the Roth has since declined in value (in this case, because of a Madoff investment), they can recharacterize the Roth back to a traditional IRA no later than October 15 of the year following the year of the conversion. 80 If the taxpayer recharacterizes the Roth IRA, he or she can obtain a refund of the taxes paid on the conversion. If the October 15 deadline has passed, taxpayers should consider applying for a private letter ruling to allow for a late recharacterization.

Reg. §301.9100-3 permits the IRS to grant an extension of time to make a regulatory election, when such extension does not meet the requirements of an automatic extension. The IRS, in Announcement 99-57, 81 ruled that a recharacterization constitutes a regulatory election.

Relief will be granted when the taxpayer provides the evidence to establish to the satisfaction of the IRS that the taxpayer acted reasonably and in good faith, and the grant of relief will not prejudice the interests of the government. 82

A taxpayer is deemed to have acted reasonably and in good faith if, the taxpayer:
1. Requests relief under this section before the failure to make the regulatory election is discovered by the IRS;

2. Failed to make the election because of intervening events beyond the taxpayer's control;

3. Failed to make the election because, after exercising reasonable diligence (taking into account the taxpayer's experience and the complexity of the return or issue), the taxpayer was unaware of the necessity for the election;

4. Reasonably relied on the written advice of the IRS; or

5. Reasonably relied on a qualified tax professional, including a tax professional employed by the taxpayer, and the tax professional failed to make, or advise the taxpayer to make, the election. 83

Under Reg. §301.9100-3(c)(1)(i), the interests of the government are deemed to be prejudiced if granting relief would result in a taxpayer having a lower tax liability in the aggregate for all taxable years affected by the election than the taxpayer would have had if the election had been timely made (taking into account the time value of money). Similarly, if the tax consequences of more than one taxpayer are affected by the election, the government's interests are prejudiced if extending the time for making the election may result in the affected taxpayers, in the aggregate, having a lower tax liability than if the election had been timely made.

If a taxpayer had timely made the election to recharacterize the Roth IRA, the tax liability would not have been more than if the late recharacterization is allowed under this ruling request. The interests of the government are ordinarily prejudiced if the taxable year in which the regulatory election should have been made or any taxable years that would have been affected by the election had it been timely made are closed. 84

A taxpayer, however, will not be deemed to have not acted reasonably or in good faith if the taxpayer uses hindsight in requesting relief. If specific facts that make the election advantageous to a taxpayer have changed since the due date for making the election, the IRS will not ordinarily grant relief. In such a case, the IRS will grant relief only when the taxpayer provides strong proof that the taxpayer's decision to seek relief did not involve hindsight. 85

It is difficult to say whether the IRS would allow taxpayers to make late recharacterizations under a Madoff scenario or whether it would consider the taxpayer to be acting in hindsight. If the dollars are large enough, attempting to obtain a ruling may be worthwhile in order to recapture the tax paid on the original Roth conversion. If a recharacterization is not available, a deduction for basis will be available, or even better, perhaps open years could be amended to revalue the original conversion to its true value. However, this will be a difficult case because the fraud was not discovered until 2008.



Theft Loss

A theft loss could potentially be available in relation to a Roth IRA since a Roth IRA has basis. Any loss arising from theft is allowable as a deduction under Code Sec. 165(a). There is currently no guidance from the IRS on whether this is a remedy available to a Roth IRA or traditional IRA with basis, but practitioners should consider filing protective claims to leave this possibility open.



Preparing Income Tax Returns

At the time of this writing, the IRS has not provided guidance with regard to the proper tax treatment of the theft loss, phantom income, and IRA issues. This creates a tremendously complex situation for CPAs and tax attorneys preparing and providing advice to Madoff investors. The most pressing issue is filing amended returns, or at least protective claims, with regard to the 2005 phantom income. For federal tax purposes, the statute of limitations on most 2005 returns will lapse on April 15, 2009. Naturally, once the statute of limitations has lapsed, those years will now be "closed" for tax purposes and taxpayers will be barred from making future claims. As discussed above (see page 6), many practitioners believe that an amended return should be filed to remove the phantom income from an individual's return. To accomplish this, one would file a Form 1040-X (Amended U.S. Individual Income Tax Return), removing the "income" from the return. Although it is impossible to say for certain because of Greenberg and Taylor, discussed above, it would appear that substantial authority exists for this position. Further, to the extent that the client would like to receive 2006 and 2007 refunds in a timely manner, amended returns could also be filed for those years, as well. Unlike the carryback of the theft loss, to be discussed below, the refunds, if any, associated with the 2005, 2006 and 2007 returns, will carry interest. However, unlike the 45-day rule for the theft loss, the IRS does not have a time frame, in which they have to answer the amended return.

If a person is not comfortable filing these amended returns but would prefer to wait for guidance from the IRS, a protective claim should be filed. The protective claim, when filed properly, tolls the statute of limitations until the IRS responds. If the IRS responds denying the claim, then the taxpayer would be able to file a suit in federal District Court or in the U.S. Court of Claims. Because there is not a tax due per se, but rather a refund is being requested, it appears that one could not file a petition in the U.S. Tax Court.



The Theft Loss Itself

Assuming that practitioners can get to the point where they believe a theft loss is warranted, they would prepare a 2008 return claiming the theft loss. To the extent that the theft loss exceeded 2008 income, they would then have a choice of carrying the theft loss back three years and/or forward for a period of 20 years. Further, some investors, in small business partnerships, may be able to carry the loss back for a period of five years. 86

To take a simple example, if a taxpayer invested $5 million in late 2008, never reported any gains or losses, and is expecting a SIPC recovery of $500,000 and a bankruptcy recovery of $100,000, he or she would take a theft loss deduction of $4.4 million. The taxpayer would also file a protective claim for the remaining $600,000. The protective claim allows for the possibility that there is no further SIPC or bankruptcy recovery.

This loss could then be carried forward or carried back, based upon the taxpayer's personal tax strategy. In the event that the taxpayer reported substantial capital gains in earlier years, with very little ordinary income, it may not be prudent to carry the loss back. However, if the taxpayer reported substantial ordinary income from other investments in earlier years, carrying the loss back may be a good idea and would result in a timely refund. The tax preparer will need to carefully analyze the benefit of removing phantom income and carrybacks or carryforwards. Modeling various scenarios will be advisable until a somewhat optimal mathematical solution can be determined.

Perhaps the most important thing to remember will be to always file protective claims for alternative positions. For example, if a person following Greenberg 87 and Taylor 88 were to file a return removing phantom income, they would also file a protective claim adding the phantom income to their total theft loss. Although taxpayers need to be careful not to double count by removing income and availing themselves of the theft loss deduction for the same income, they must also be cautious not to let a particular statute of limitations lapse.



Reportable Transactions

Code Sec. 6662A provides for a $10,000 penalty, per year, if the individual fails to report a transaction on the IRS reportable transaction list. Surprisingly, one of the items on the list is a theft loss. Although there is an exception for theft losses reported under Code Sec. 165(a)(3), there is no exception for theft losses reported under Code Sec. 165(a)(2). Accordingly, if a taxpayer is taking a theft loss under Code Sec. 165(a) (2) that exceeds $2 million in a particular year, or $4 million over a series of years, the taxpayer will be required to file Form 8886 (Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement) with the IRS. It is also important to note that unless the authority for a reportable transaction exceeds more likely than not, it is necessary to file a Form 8275 (Disclosure Statement) to disclose the transaction.



Preparer Penalties

While being a strong advocate for his or her client, the practitioner must always be mindful of the ethical responsibilities to the profession and to the law. Each position that a practitioner takes, whether it is removing phantom income, calculating the theft loss, addressing the 10-percent rule, just to name a few, must be measured against the need to have substantial authority to sign a return without disclosure. Further, as discussed above, when a transaction is a reportable transaction, the standard changes from substantial authority to more likely than not.

These losses will be substantial, and it is very likely that they will be carefully reviewed by the IRS. In many cases, there will be very little harm in disclosing the transaction and disclosure will reduce the risk both to the taxpayer and to the preparer. By disclosing, the client may avoid the 20-percent accuracy penalty under Code Sec. 6662 and the tax professional may avoid preparer penalties. In the ideal world, the IRS would issue a notice, discussing its positions and would provide some "guardrails" for the IRS, the investors, and tax preparers. 89



Tax Planning

On a going forward basis, it is very likely that many Madoff investors will have substantial carryforwards. This is especially true in the case of trusts created for the benefit of children and grandchildren. See the discussion above on tax planning for trusts (see page 9).

On individual returns, the first question will be whether the individual, during the course of the next 20 years will be able to utilize the carryforwards. The next question will be how additional income can be shifted to these taxpayers. A variety of ideas have surfaced including family members setting up a trust for the benefit of the Madoff investor, with the trustee distributing income on an annual basis. The trust income distributed would then be offset by a theft loss carryforward. It has also been suggested that defective trusts be used as a way to shift income to the taxpayer with the loss carryforward while preserving assets in trust for the benefit of future generations. 90

Tax planning strategies for trusts with large theft loss carryforwards will develop over time. However, preparers who have created inter vivos trusts that reflect the intentions in their testamentary estate plan should consider modifying their wills and revocable trusts, to leave property to the existing trusts with large loss carryforwards. Later income from the property bequeathed to the trust, including items of income in respect to the decedent will be sheltered by virtue of the theft loss carryforward.



Appendix

Rev. Rul. 2009-9 and Rev. Proc. 2009- 20, released by the IRS on March 17, 2009, contain IRS guidance on the tax treatment of losses resulting from investments in Ponzi schemes. Both are scheduled to be published in I.R.B. 2009-14, dated April 6, 2009.

Also reproduced is the prepared testimony of IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman before the Senate Finance Committee on March 17, 2009.



Rev. Rul. 2009-9



Part I



Section 165. --Losses.

26 CFR: § 1.165-8: Theft losses.

(Also: §§ 63, 67, 68, 172, 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1341)



Rev. Rul. 2009-9



ISSUES

(1) Is a loss from criminal fraud or embezzlement in a transaction entered into for profit a theft loss or a capital loss under § 165 of the Internal Revenue Code?

(2) Is such a loss subject to either the personal loss limits in § 165(h) or the limits on itemized deductions in §§ 67 and 68?

(3) In what year is such a loss deductible?

(4) How is the amount of such a loss determined?

(5) Can such a loss create or increase a net operating loss under § 172?

(6) Does such a loss qualify for the computation of tax provided by § 1341 for the restoration of an amount held under a claim of right?

(7) Does such a loss qualify for the application of §§ 1311-1314 to adjust tax liability in years that are otherwise barred by the period of limitations on filing a claim for refund under § 6511?



FACTS

A is an individual who uses the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting and files federal income tax returns on a calendar year basis. B holds himself out to the public as an investment advisor and securities broker.

In Year 1, A , in a transaction entered into for profit, opened an investment account with B , contributed $100 x to the account, and provided B with power of attorney to use the $100 x to purchase and sell securities on A 's behalf. A instructed B to reinvest any income and gains earned on the investments. In Year 3, A contributed an additional $20 x to the account.

B periodically issued account statements to A that reported the securities purchases and sales that B purportedly made in A 's investment account and the balance of the account. B also issued tax reporting statements to A and to the Internal Revenue Service that reflected purported gains and losses on A 's investment account. B also reported to A that no income was earned in Year 1 and that for each of the Years 2 through 7 the investments earned $10 x of income (interest, dividends, and capital gains), which A included in gross income on A 's federal income tax returns.

At all times prior to Year 8 and part way through Year 8, B was able to make distributions to investors who requested them. A took a single distribution of $30 x from the account in Year 7.

In Year 8, it was discovered that B 's purported investment advisory and brokerage activity was in fact a fraudulent investment arrangement known as a "Ponzi" scheme. Under this scheme, B purported to invest cash or property on behalf of each investor, including A , in an account in the investor's name. For each investor's account, B reported investment activities and resulting income amounts that were partially or wholly fictitious. In some cases, in response to requests for withdrawal, B made payments of purported income or principal to investors. These payments were made, at least in part, from amounts that other investors had invested in the fraudulent arrangement.

When B 's fraud was discovered in Year 8, B had only a small fraction of the funds that B reported on the account statements that B issued to A and other investors. A did not receive any reimbursement or other recovery for the loss in Year 8. The period of limitation on filing a claim for refund under § 6511 has not yet expired for Years 5 through 7, but has expired for Years 1 through 4.

B 's actions constituted criminal fraud or embezzlement under the law of the jurisdiction in which the transactions occurred. At no time prior to the discovery did A know that B 's activities were a fraudulent scheme. The fraudulent investment arrangement was not a tax shelter as defined in § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) with respect to A .



LAW AND ANALYSIS



Issue 1. Theft loss.

Section 165(a) allows a deduction for losses sustained during the taxable year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise. For individuals, § 165(c)(2) allows a deduction for losses incurred in a transaction entered into for profit, and § 165(c)(3) allows a deduction for certain losses not connected to a transaction entered into for profit, including theft losses. Under § 165(e), a theft loss is sustained in the taxable year the taxpayer discovers the loss. Section 165(f) permits a deduction for capital losses only to the extent allowed in §§ 1211 and 1212. In certain circumstances, a theft loss may be taken into account in determining gains or losses for a taxable year under § 1231.

For federal income tax purposes, "theft" is a word of general and broad connotation, covering any criminal appropriation of another's property to the use of the taker, including theft by swindling, false pretenses and any other form of guile. Edwards v. Bromberg , 232 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956); see also § 1.165-8(d) of the Income Tax Regulations ("theft" includes larceny and embezzlement). A taxpayer claiming a theft loss must prove that the loss resulted from a taking of property that was illegal under the law of the jurisdiction in which it occurred and was done with criminal intent. Rev. Rul. 72-112, 1972-1 C.B. 60. However, a taxpayer need not show a conviction for theft. Vietzke v. Commissioner , 37 T.C. 504, 510 (1961), acq ., 1962-2 C.B. 6.

The character of an investor's loss related to fraudulent activity depends, in part, on the nature of the investment. For example, a loss that is sustained on the worthlessness or disposition of stock acquired on the open market for investment is a capital loss, even if the decline in the value of the stock is attributable to fraudulent activities of the corporation's officers or directors, because the officers or directors did not have the specific intent to deprive the shareholder of money or property. See Rev. Rul. 77-17, 1977-1 C.B. 44.

In the present situation, unlike the situation in Rev. Rul. 77-17, B specifically intended to, and did, deprive A of money by criminal acts. B 's actions constituted a theft from A , as theft is defined for § 165 purposes. Accordingly, A 's loss is a theft loss, not a capital loss.



Issue 2. Deduction limitations.

Section 165(h) imposes two limitations on casualty loss deductions, including theft loss deductions, for property not connected either with a trade or business or with a transaction entered into for profit.

Section 165(h)(1) provides that a deduction for a loss described in § 165(c)(3) (including a theft) is allowable only to the extent that the amount exceeds $100 ($500 for taxable years beginning in 2009 only).

Section 165(h)(2) provides that if personal casualty losses for any taxable year (including theft losses) exceed personal casualty gains for the taxable year, the losses are allowed only to the extent of the sum of the gains, plus so much of the excess as exceeds ten percent of the individual's adjusted gross income.

Rev. Rul. 71-381, 1971-2 C.B. 126, concludes that a taxpayer who loans money to a corporation in exchange for a note, relying on financial reports that are later discovered to be fraudulent, is entitled to a theft loss deduction under § 165(c)(3). However, § 165(c)(3) subsequently was amended to clarify that the limitations applicable to personal casualty and theft losses under § 165(c)(3) apply only to those losses that are not connected with a trade or business or a transaction entered into for profit. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 711 (1984). As a result, Rev. Rul. 71-381 is obsolete to the extent that it holds that theft losses incurred in a transaction entered into for profit are deductible under § 165(c)(3), rather than under § 165(c)(2).

In opening an investment account with B , A entered into a transaction for profit. A 's theft loss therefore is deductible under § 165(c)(2) and is not subject to the § 165(h) limitations.

Section 63(d) provides that itemized deductions for an individual are the allowable deductions other than those allowed in arriving at adjusted gross income (under § 62) and the deduction for personal exemptions. A theft loss is not allowable under § 62 and is therefore an itemized deduction.

Section 67(a) provides that miscellaneous itemized deductions may be deducted only to the extent the aggregate amount exceeds two percent of adjusted gross income. Under § 67(b)(3), losses deductible under § 165(c)(2) or (3) are excepted from the definition of miscellaneous itemized deductions.

Section 68 provides an overall limit on itemized deductions based on a percentage of adjusted gross income or total itemized deductions. Under § 68(c)(3), losses deductible under § 165(c)(2) or (3) are excepted from this limit.

Accordingly, A 's theft loss is an itemized deduction that is not subject to the limits on itemized deductions in §§ 67 and 68.



Issue 3. Year of deduction.

Section 165(e) provides that any loss arising from theft is treated as sustained during the taxable year in which the taxpayer discovers the loss. Under §§ 1.165-8(a)(2) and 1.165-1(d), however, if, in the year of discovery, there exists a claim for reimbursement with respect to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery, no portion of the loss for which reimbursement may be received is sustained until the taxable year in which it can be ascertained with reasonable certainty whether or not the reimbursement will be received, for example, by a settlement, adjudication, or abandonment of the claim. Whether a reasonable prospect of recovery exists is a question of fact to be determined upon examination of all facts and circumstances.

A may deduct the theft loss in Year 8, the year the theft loss is discovered, provided that the loss is not covered by a claim for reimbursement or other recovery as to which A has a reasonable prospect of recovery. To the extent that A 's deduction is reduced by such a claim, recoveries on the claim in a later taxable year are not includible in A 's gross income. If A recovers a greater amount in a later year, or an amount that initially was not covered by a claim as to which there was a reasonable prospect of recovery, the recovery is includible in A 's gross income in the later year under the tax benefit rule, to the extent the earlier deduction reduced A 's income tax. See § 111; § 1.165-1(d)(2)(iii). Finally, if A recovers less than the amount that was covered by a claim as to which there was a reasonable prospect of recovery that reduced the deduction for theft in Year 8, an additional deduction is allowed in the year the amount of recovery is ascertained with reasonable certainty.



Issue 4. Amount of deduction.

Section 1.165-8(c) provides that the amount deductible in the case of a theft loss is determined consistently with the manner described in § 1.165-7 for determining the amount of a casualty loss, considering the fair market value of the property immediately after the theft to be zero. Under these provisions, the amount of an investment theft loss is the basis of the property (or the amount of money) that was lost, less any reimbursement or other compensation.

The amount of a theft loss resulting from a fraudulent investment arrangement is generally the initial amount invested in the arrangement, plus any additional investments, less amounts withdrawn, if any, reduced by reimbursements or other recoveries and reduced by claims as to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery. If an amount is reported to the investor as income in years prior to the year of discovery of the theft, the investor includes the amount in gross income, and the investor reinvests the amount in the arrangement, this amount increases the deductible theft loss.

Accordingly, the amount of A 's theft loss for purposes of § 165 includes A 's original Year 1 investment ($100 x ) and additional Year 3 investment ($20 x ). A 's loss also includes the amounts that A reported as gross income on A 's federal income tax returns for Years 2 through 7 ($60 x ). A 's loss is reduced by the amount of money distributed to A in Year 7 ($30 x ). If A has a claim for reimbursement with respect to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery, A may not deduct in Year 8 the portion of the loss that is covered by the claim.



Issue 5. Net operating loss.

Section 172(a) allows as a deduction for the taxable year the aggregate of the net operating loss carryovers and carrybacks to that year. In computing a net operating loss under § 172(c) and (d)(4), nonbusiness deductions of noncorporate taxpayers are generally allowed only to the extent of nonbusiness income. For this purpose, however, any deduction for casualty or theft losses allowable under § 165(c)(2) or (3) is treated as a business deduction. Section 172(d)(4)(C).

Under § 172(b)(1)(A), a net operating loss generally may be carried back 2 years and forward 20 years. However, under § 172(b)(1)(F), the portion of an individual's net operating loss arising from casualty or theft may be carried back 3 years and forward 20 years.

Section 1211 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (February 17, 2009), amends § 172(b)(1)(H) of the Internal Revenue Code to allow any taxpayer that is an eligible small business to elect either a 3, 4, or 5-year net operating loss carryback for an "applicable 2008 net operating loss."

Section 172(b)(1)(H)(iv) provides that the term "eligible small business" has the same meaning given that term by § 172(b)(1)(F)(iii), except that § 448(c) is applied by substituting "$15 million" for "$5 million" in each place it appears. Section 172(b)(1)(F)(iii) provides that a small business is a corporation or partnership that meets the gross receipts test of § 448(c) for the taxable year in which the loss arose (or in the case of a sole proprietorship, that would meet such test if the proprietorship were a corporation).

Because § 172(d)(4)(C) treats any deduction for casualty or theft losses allowable under § 165(c)(2) or (3) as a business deduction, a casualty or theft loss an individual sustains after December 31, 2007, is considered a loss from a "sole proprietorship" within the meaning of § 172(b)(1)(F)(iii). Accordingly, an individual may elect either a 3, 4, or 5-year net operating loss carryback for an applicable 2008 net operating loss, provided the gross receipts test provided in § 172(b)(1)(H)(iv) is satisfied. See Rev. Proc. 2009 - 19, 2009-14 I.R.B. (April 6, 2009).

To the extent A 's theft loss deduction creates or increases a net operating loss in the year the loss is deducted, A may carry back up to 3 years and forward up to 20 years the portion of the net operating loss attributable to the theft loss. If A 's loss is an applicable 2008 net operating loss and the gross receipts test in § 172(b)(1)(H)(iv) is met, A may elect either a 3, 4, or 5-year net operating loss carryback for the applicable 2008 net operating loss.



Issue 6. Restoration of amount held under claim of right.

Section 1341 provides an alternative tax computation formula intended to mitigate against unfavorable tax consequences that may arise as a result of including an item in gross income in a taxable year and taking a deduction for the item in a subsequent year when it is established that the taxpayer did not have a right to the item. Section 1341 requires that: (1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year or years because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to the item, (2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was established after the close of the prior taxable year or years that the taxpayer did not have a right to the item or to a portion of the item, and (3) the amount of the deduction exceeds $3,000. Section 1341(a)(1) and (3).

If § 1341 applies, the tax for the taxable year is the lesser of: (1) the tax for the taxable year computed with the current deduction, or (2) the tax for the taxable year computed without the deduction, less the decrease in tax for the prior taxable year or years that would have occurred if the item or portion of the item had been excluded from gross income in the prior taxable year or years. Section 1341(a)(4) and (5).

To satisfy the requirements of § 1341(a)(2), a deduction must arise because the taxpayer is under an obligation to restore the income. Section 1.1341-1(a)(1)-(2); Alcoa, Inc. v. United States , 509 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2007); Kappel v. United States , 437 F.2d 1222, 1226 (3d Cir.), cert. denied , 404 U.S. 830 (1971).

When A incurs a loss from criminal fraud or embezzlement by B in a transaction entered into for profit, any theft loss deduction to which A may be entitled does not arise from an obligation on A 's part to restore income. Therefore, A is not entitled to the tax benefits of § 1341 with regard to A 's theft loss deduction.



Issue 7. Mitigation provisions.

The mitigation provisions of §§ 1311-1314 permit the Service or a taxpayer in certain circumstances to correct an error made in a closed year by adjusting the tax liability in years that are otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. O'Brien v. United States , 766 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1995). The party invoking these mitigation provisions has the burden of proof to show that the specific requirements are satisfied. Id . at 1042.

Section 1311(a) provides that if a determination (as defined in § 1313) is described in one or more of the paragraphs of § 1312 and, on the date of the determination, correction of the effect of the error referred to in § 1312 is prevented by the operation of any law or rule of law (other than §§ 1311-1314 or § 7122), then the effect of the error is corrected by an adjustment made in the amount and in the manner specified in § 1314.

Section 1311(b)(1) provides in relevant part that an adjustment may be made under §§ 1311-1314 only if, in cases when the amount of the adjustment would be credited or refunded under § 1314, the determination adopts a position maintained by the Secretary that is inconsistent with the erroneous prior tax treatment referred to in § 1312.

A cannot use the mitigation provisions of §§ 1311-1314 to adjust tax liability in Years 2 through 4 because there is no inconsistency in the Service's position with respect to A 's prior inclusion of income in Years 2 through 4. See § 1311(b)(1). The Service's position that A is entitled to an investment theft loss under § 165 in Year 8 (as computed in Issue 4, above), when the fraud loss is discovered, is consistent with the Service's position that A properly included in income the amounts credited to A 's account in Years 2 through 4. See § 1311(b)(1)(A).



HOLDINGS

(1) A loss from criminal fraud or embezzlement in a transaction entered into for profit is a theft loss, not a capital loss, under § 165.

(2) A theft loss in a transaction entered into for profit is deductible under § 165(c)(2), not § 165(c)(3), as an itemized deduction that is not subject to the personal loss limits in § 165(h), or the limits on itemized deductions in §§ 67 and 68.

(3) A theft loss in a transaction entered into for profit is deductible in the year the loss is discovered, provided that the loss is not covered by a claim for reimbursement or recovery with respect to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery.

(4) The amount of a theft loss in a transaction entered into for profit is generally the amount invested in the arrangement, less amounts withdrawn, if any, reduced by reimbursements or recoveries, and reduced by claims as to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery. Where an amount is reported to the investor as income prior to discovery of the arrangement and the investor includes that amount in gross income and reinvests this amount in the arrangement, the amount of the theft loss is increased by the purportedly reinvested amount.

(5) A theft loss in a transaction entered into for profit may create or increase a net operating loss under § 172 that can be carried back up to 3 years and forward up to 20 years. An eligible small business may elect either a 3, 4, or 5-year net operating loss carryback for an applicable 2008 net operating loss.

(6) A theft loss in a transaction entered into for profit does not qualify for the computation of tax provided by § 1341.

(7) A theft loss in a transaction entered into for profit does not qualify for the application of §§ 1311-1314 to adjust tax liability in years that are otherwise barred by the period of limitations on filing a claim for refund under § 6511.



DISCLOSURE OBLIGATION UNDER § 1.6011-4

A theft loss in a transaction entered into for profit that is deductible under § 165(c)(2) is not taken into account in determining whether a transaction is a loss transaction under § 1.6011-4(b)(5). See § 4.03(1) of Rev. Proc. 2004-66, 2004-2 C.B. 966.



EFFECT ON OTHER DOCUMENTS

Rev. Rul. 71-381 is obsoleted to the extent that it holds that a theft loss incurred in a transaction entered into for profit is deductible under § 165(c)(3) rather than § 165(c)(2).



DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this revenue ruling is Andrew M. Irving of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting). For further information regarding this revenue ruling, contact Mr. Irving at (202) 622-5020 (not a toll-free call.)



Rev. Proc. 2009-20



Part III Administrative, Procedural, and Miscellaneous

26 CFR 601.105 Examination of returns and claims for refund, credit or abatement; determination of correct tax liability.

(Also Part I, §§ 165; 1.165-8(c))



Rev. Proc. 2009-20



SECTION 1. PURPOSE

This revenue procedure provides an optional safe harbor treatment for taxpayers that experienced losses in certain investment arrangements discovered to be criminally fraudulent. This revenue procedure also describes how the Internal Revenue Service will treat a return that claims a deduction for such a loss and does not use the safe harbor treatment described in this revenue procedure.



SECTION 2. BACKGROUND

.01 The Service and Treasury Department are aware of investment arrangements that have been discovered to be fraudulent, resulting in significant losses to taxpayers. These arrangements often take the form of so-called "Ponzi" schemes, in which the party perpetrating the fraud receives cash or property from investors, purports to earn income for the investors, and reports to the investors income amounts that are wholly or partially fictitious. Payments, if any, of purported income or principal to investors are made from cash or property that other investors invested in the fraudulent arrangement. The party perpetrating the fraud criminally appropriates some or all of the investors' cash or property.

.02 Rev. Rul. 2009-9, 2009 I.R.B (April 6, 2009), describes the proper income tax treatment for losses resulting from these Ponzi schemes.

.03 The Service and Treasury Department recognize that whether and when investors meet the requirements for claiming a theft loss for an investment in a Ponzi scheme are highly factual determinations that often cannot be made by taxpayers with certainty in the year the loss is discovered.

.04 In view of the number of investment arrangements recently discovered to be fraudulent and the extent of the potential losses, this revenue procedure provides an optional safe harbor under which qualified investors (as defined in § 4.03 of this revenue procedure) may treat a loss as a theft loss deduction when certain conditions are met. This treatment provides qualified investors with a uniform manner for determining their theft losses. In addition, this treatment avoids potentially difficult problems of proof in determining how much income reported in prior years was fictitious or a return of capital, and alleviates compliance and administrative burdens on both taxpayers and the Service.



SECTION 3. SCOPE

The safe harbor procedures of this revenue procedure apply to taxpayers that are qualified investors within the meaning of section 4.03 of this revenue procedure.



SECTION 4. DEFINITIONS

The following definitions apply solely for purposes of this revenue procedure.

.01 Specified fraudulent arrangement . A specified fraudulent arrangement is an arrangement in which a party (the lead figure) receives cash or property from investors; purports to earn income for the investors; reports income amounts to the investors that are partially or wholly fictitious; makes payments, if any, of purported income or principal to some investors from amounts that other investors invested in the fraudulent arrangement; and appropriates some or all of the investors' cash or property. For example, the fraudulent investment arrangement described in Rev. Rul. 2009-9 is a specified fraudulent arrangement.

.02 Qualified loss . A qualified loss is a loss resulting from a specified fraudulent arrangement in which, as a result of the conduct that caused the loss --

(1) The lead figure (or one of the lead figures, if more than one) was charged by indictment or information (not withdrawn or dismissed) under state or federal law with the commission of fraud, embezzlement or a similar crime that, if proven, would meet the definition of theft for purposes of § 165 of the Internal Revenue Code and § 1.165-8(d) of the Income Tax Regulations, under the law of the jurisdiction in which the theft occurred; or

(2) The lead figure was the subject of a state or federal criminal complaint (not withdrawn or dismissed) alleging the commission of a crime described in section 4.02(1) of this revenue procedure, and either -

(a) The complaint alleged an admission by the lead figure, or the execution of an affidavit by that person admitting the crime; or

(b) A receiver or trustee was appointed with respect to the arrangement or assets of the arrangement were frozen.

.03 Qualified investor . A qualified investor means a United States person, as defined in § 7701(a)(30) --

(1) That generally qualifies to deduct theft losses under § 165 and § 1.165-8;

(2) That did not have actual knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the investment arrangement prior to it becoming known to the general public;

(3) With respect to which the specified fraudulent arrangement is not a tax shelter, as defined in § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii); and

(4) That transferred cash or property to a specified fraudulent arrangement. A qualified investor does not include a person that invested solely in a fund or other entity (separate from the investor for federal income tax purposes) that invested in the specified fraudulent arrangement. However, the fund or entity itself may be a qualified investor within the scope of this revenue procedure.

.04 Discovery year . A qualified investor's discovery year is the taxable year of the investor in which the indictment, information, or complaint described in section 4.02 of this revenue procedure is filed.

.05 Responsible group . Responsible group means, for any specified fraudulent arrangement, one or more of the following:

(1) The individual or individuals (including the lead figure) who conducted the specified fraudulent arrangement;

(2) Any investment vehicle or other entity that conducted the specified fraudulent arrangement, and employees, officers, or directors of that entity or entities;

(3) A liquidation, receivership, bankruptcy or similar estate established with respect to individuals or entities who conducted the specified fraudulent arrangement, in order to recover assets for the benefit of investors and creditors; or

(4) Parties that are subject to claims brought by a trustee, receiver, or other fiduciary on behalf of the liquidation, receivership, bankruptcy or similar estate described in section 4.05(3) of this revenue procedure.

.06 Qualified investment .

(1) Qualified investment means the excess, if any, of --

(a) The sum of --

(i) The total amount of cash, or the basis of property, that the qualified investor invested in the arrangement in all years; plus

(ii) The total amount of net income with respect to the specified fraudulent arrangement that, consistent with information received from the specified fraudulent arrangement, the qualified investor included in income for federal tax purposes for all taxable years prior to the discovery year, including taxable years for which a refund is barred by the statute of limitations; over

(b) The total amount of cash or property that the qualified investor withdrew in all years from the specified fraudulent arrangement (whether designated as income or principal).

(2) Qualified investment does not include any of the following --

(a) Amounts borrowed from the responsible group and invested in the specified fraudulent arrangement, to the extent the borrowed amounts were not repaid at the time the theft was discovered;

(b) Amounts such as fees that were paid to the responsible group and deducted for federal income tax purposes;

(c) Amounts reported to the qualified investor as taxable income that were not included in gross income on the investor's federal income tax returns; or

(d) Cash or property that the qualified investor invested in a fund or other entity (separate from the qualified investor for federal income tax purposes) that invested in a specified fraudulent arrangement.

.07 Actual recovery . Actual recovery means any amount a qualified investor actually receives in the discovery year from any source as reimbursement or recovery for the qualified loss.

.08 Potential insurance/SIPC recovery . Potential insurance/SIPC recovery means the sum of the amounts of all actual or potential claims for reimbursement for a qualified loss that, as of the last day of the discovery year, are attributable to --

(1) Insurance policies in the name of the qualified investor;

(2) Contractual arrangements other than insurance that guaranteed or otherwise protected against loss of the qualified investment; or

(3) Amounts payable from the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), as advances for customer claims under 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a) (the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970), or by a similar entity under a similar provision.

.09 Potential direct recovery . Potential direct recovery means the amount of all actual or potential claims for recovery for a qualified loss, as of the last day of the discovery year, against the responsible group.

.10 Potential third-party recovery . Potential third-party recovery means the amount of all actual or potential claims for recovery for a qualified loss, as of the last day of the discovery year, that are not described in section 4.08 or 4.09 of this revenue procedure.



SECTION 5. APPLICATION

.01 In general . If a qualified investor follows the procedures described in section 6 of this revenue procedure, the Service will not challenge the following treatment by the qualified investor of a qualified loss --

(1) The loss is deducted as a theft loss;

(2) The taxable year in which the theft was discovered within the meaning of § 165(e) is the discovery year described in section 4.04 of this revenue procedure; and

(3) The amount of the deduction is the amount specified in section 5.02 of this revenue procedure.

.02 Amount to be deducted . The amount specified in this section 5.02 is calculated as follows --

(1) Multiply the amount of the qualified investment by --

(a) 95 percent, for a qualified investor that does not pursue any potential third-party recovery; or

(b) 75 percent, for a qualified investor that is pursuing or intends to pursue any potential third-party recovery; and

(2) Subtract from this product the sum of any actual recovery and any potential insurance/SIPC recovery.

The amount of the deduction calculated under this section 5.02 is not further reduced by potential direct recovery or potential third-party recovery.

.03 Future recoveries . The qualified investor may have income or an additional deduction in a year subsequent to the discovery year depending on the actual amount of the loss that is eventually recovered. See § 1.165-1 (d); Rev. Rul. 2009-9.



SECTION 6. PROCEDURE

.01 A qualified investor that uses the safe harbor treatment described in section 5 of this revenue procedure must --

(1) Mark "Revenue Procedure 2009-20" at the top of the Form 4684, Casualties and Thefts, for the federal income tax return for the discovery year. The taxpayer must enter the "deductible theft loss" amount from line 10 in Part II of Appendix A of this revenue procedure on line 34, section B, Part I, of the Form 4684 and should not complete the remainder of section B, Part I, of the Form 4684;

(2) Complete and sign the statement provided in Appendix A of this revenue procedure; and

(3) Attach the executed statement provided in Appendix A of this revenue procedure to the qualified investor's timely filed (including extensions) federal income tax return for the discovery year. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, if, before April 17, 2009, the taxpayer has filed a return for the discovery year or an amended return for a prior year that is inconsistent with the safe harbor treatment provided by this revenue procedure, the taxpayer must indicate this fact on the executed statement and must attach the statement to the return (or amended return) for the discovery year that is consistent with the safe harbor treatment provided by this revenue procedure and that is filed on or before May 15, 2009.

.02 By executing the statement provided in Appendix A of this revenue procedure, the taxpayer agrees --

(1) Not to deduct in the discovery year any amount of the theft loss in excess of the deduction permitted by section 5 of this revenue procedure;

(2) Not to file returns or amended returns to exclude or recharacterize income reported with respect to the investment arrangement in taxable years preceding the discovery year;

(3) Not to apply the alternative computation in § 1341 with respect to the theft loss deduction allowed by this revenue procedure; and

(4) Not to apply the doctrine of equitable recoupment or the mitigation provisions in §§ 1311-1314 with respect to income from the investment arrangement that was reported in taxable years that are otherwise barred by the period of limitations on filing a claim for refund under § 6511.



SECTION 7. EFFECTIVE DATE

This revenue procedure applies to losses for which the discovery year is a taxable year beginning after December 31, 2007.



SECTION 8. TAXPAYERS THAT DO NOT USE THE SAFE HARBOR TREATMENT PROVIDED BY THIS REVENUE PROCEDURE

.01 A taxpayer that chooses not to apply the safe harbor treatment provided by this revenue procedure to a claimed theft loss is subject to all of the generally applicable provisions governing the deductibility of losses under § 165. For example, a taxpayer seeking a theft loss deduction must establish that the loss was from theft and that the theft was discovered in the year the taxpayer claims the deduction. The taxpayer must also establish, through sufficient documentation, the amount of the claimed loss and must establish that no claim for reimbursement of any portion of the loss exists with respect to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery in the taxable year in which the taxpayer claims the loss.

.02 A taxpayer that chooses not to apply the safe harbor treatment of this revenue procedure to a claimed theft loss and that files or amends federal income tax returns for years prior to the discovery year to exclude amounts reported as income to the taxpayer from the investment arrangement must establish that the amounts sought to be excluded in fact were not income that was actually or constructively received by the taxpayer (or accrued by the taxpayer, in the case of a taxpayer using an accrual method of accounting). However, provided a taxpayer can establish the amount of net income from the investment arrangement that was reported and included in the taxpayer's gross income consistent with information received from the specified fraudulent arrangement in taxable years for which the period of limitation on filing a claim for refund under § 6511 has expired, the Service will not challenge the taxpayer's inclusion of that amount in basis for determining the amount of any allowable theft loss, whether or not the income was genuine.

.03 Returns claiming theft loss deductions from fraudulent investment arrangements are subject to examination by the Service.



SECTION 9. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT

The collection of information contained in this revenue procedure has been reviewed and approved by the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3507) under control number 1545-0074. Please refer to the Paperwork Reduction Act statement accompanying Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for further information.



DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this revenue procedure is Norma Rotunno of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting). For further information regarding this revenue procedure, contact Ms. Rotunno at (202) 622-7900.



APPENDIX A


Statement by Taxpayer Using the Procedures in Rev. Proc. 2009-20 to Determine a Theft Loss Deduction Related to a Fraudulent Investment Arrangement




Part 1. Identification

1. Name of Taxpayer ...

2. Taxpayer Identification Number ...



Part II. Computation of deduction

(See Rev. Proc. 2009-20 for the definitions of the terms used in this worksheet.)


____________________________________________________________________________________
Line Computation of Deductible Theft Loss Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2009-20

____________________________________________________________________________________
1 Initial investment

____________________________________________________________________________________
2 Plus: Subsequent investments

____________________________________________________________________________________
3 Plus: Income reported in prior years

____________________________________________________________________________________
4 Less: Withdrawals ( )

____________________________________________________________________________________
5 Total qualified investment (combine lines 1 through 4)

____________________________________________________________________________________
6 Percentage of qualified investment (95% of line 5 for
investors with no potential third-party recovery; 75% of
line 5 for investors with potential third-party recovery)

____________________________________________________________________________________
7 Actual recovery

____________________________________________________________________________________
8 Potential insurance/SIPC recovery

____________________________________________________________________________________
9 Total recoveries (add lines 7 and 8) ( )

____________________________________________________________________________________
10 Deductible theft loss (line 6 minus line 9)

____________________________________________________________________________________




Part III. Required statements and declarations

1. I am claiming a theft loss deduction pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2009-20 from a specified fraudulent arrangement conducted by the following individual or entity (provide the name, address, and taxpayer identification number (if known)). ...

2 I have written documentation to support the amounts reported in Part II of this document.

3. I am a qualified investor as defined in § 4.03 of Rev. Proc. 2009-20.

4. If I have determined the amount of my theft loss deduction under § 5.02(1)(a) of Rev. Proc. 2009-20, I declare that I have not pursued and do not intend to pursue any potential third-party recovery, as that term is defined in § 4.10 of Rev. Proc. 2009-20.

5. If I have already filed a return or amended return that does not satisfy the conditions in § 6.02 of Rev. Proc 2009-20, I agree to all adjustments or actions that are necessary to comply with those conditions. The tax year or years for which I filed the return(s) or amended return(s) and the date(s) on which they were filed are as follows:
________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________




Part IV. Signature

I make the following agreements and declarations:

1. I agree to comply with the conditions and agreements set forth in Rev. Proc. 2009-20 and this document.

2. Under penalties of perjury, I declare that the information provided in Parts I-III of this document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, true, correct and complete.

Your signature here ... Date signed: ...

Your spouse's signature here ... Date signed: ...

Corporate Name ...

Corporate Officer's signature ...

Title ...

Date signed ...

Entity Name ...
S-corporation, Partnership, Limited Liability Company, Trust

Entity Officer's signature ...

Date signed ...

Signature of executor ...

Date signed ...



Testimony of IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman


PREPARED TESTIMONY OF DOUG SHULMAN COMMISSIONER INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE BEFORE THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE TAX ISSUES RELATED TO PONZI SCHEMES AND AN UPDATE ON OFFSHORE TAX EVASION LEGISLATION



MARCH 17, 2009




INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Grassley and Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on tax issues related to Ponzi schemes and the Internal Revenue Service's ongoing efforts to detect and stop unlawful offshore tax avoidance.

It is unfortunate in these otherwise difficult economic times that we are here today to discuss a situation where thousands of taxpayers have been victimized by dozens of fraudulent investment schemes.

These too-good-to-be true investment ruses have often taken the form of so-called "Ponzi schemes." The perpetrator of the fraud promises returns, and sometimes even provides official-looking statements showing interest, dividends, or capital gains, some or all of which is fictitious.

According to news reports, the recent Madoff scandal has affected a very large and diverse pool of investors, some of whom are reported to have lost most of their life savings. Beyond the toll in human suffering - as entire life savings and retirements appear to have been wiped out - the Madoff case raises numerous tax and pension implications for the victims.

To help provide clarity in this very complicated and tangled matter and to assist taxpayers, the IRS is today issuing guidance articulating the tax rules that apply and providing "safe harbor" procedures for taxpayers who sustained losses in certain investment arrangements discovered to be criminally fraudulent. I will discuss each one separately. The IRS will provide a copy of the guidance for the hearing record.

Mr. Chairman, turning to the second subject of today's hearing, international issues are a major strategic focus of the IRS. It is of paramount importance to our system of voluntary compliance with the tax law that citizens of this country have confidence that the system is fair. We cannot allow an environment to develop where wealthy individuals can go offshore and avoid paying taxes with impunity. As you will hear from my testimony today, the IRS is aggressively pursuing these individuals and institutions that facilitate unlawful tax avoidance.

These issues are so important to the IRS that I have both increased the number of audits in this area over the last five months and prioritized stepped-up hiring of international experts and investigators. This occurred during a time when staffing levels were effectively frozen because of the Continuing Resolution.

While it is true that IRS agents and investigators will ultimately generate net enforcement revenues for the government, we view our international compliance strategy to date as much more focused on protecting approximately $2 trillion in revenue that the IRS collects than the incremental enforcement revenue that we collect from these specific activities. We cannot allow corrosive behavior to undermine the fundamental fairness of our tax system. Going forward, the administration will be outlining further initiatives to step up international tax enforcement and improve our revenue collection.

Moreover, seen through the prism of the current economic crisis, it is scandalous that wealthy individuals are hiding assets overseas and unlawfully avoiding US tax. It is an affront to the honest taxpayers of America, many of whom are struggling to pay their bills, who play by the rules and expect others to do the same.



PONZI SCHEME PUBLISHED GUIDANCE


Summary


The IRS is issuing two guidance items to assist taxpayers who are victims of losses from Ponzi-type investment schemes. While I recognize that the Committee is today focused on one specific case, the IRS guidance is not specific to this case. The first item is a revenue ruling that clarifies the income tax law governing the treatment of losses in such schemes. The second is a revenue procedure that provides a safe-harbor method of computing and reporting the losses.

The revenue ruling is important because determining the amount and timing of losses from these schemes is factually difficult and dependent on the prospect of recovering the lost money (which may not become known for several years). In addition, it clarifies the reach of older guidance on these losses that is somewhat obsolete.

The revenue procedure simplifies compliance for taxpayers (and administration for the IRS) by providing a safe-harbor means of determining the year in which the loss is deemed to occur and a simplified means of computing the amount of the loss.


Revenue Ruling


The revenue sets forth the formal legal position of the IRS and Treasury Department:
 The investor is entitled to a theft loss, which is not a capital loss. In other words, a theft loss from a Ponzi-type investment scheme is not subject to the normal limits on losses from investments, which typically limit the loss deduction to $3,000 per year when it exceeds capital gains from investments.

 The revenue ruling clarifies that "investment" theft losses are not subject to limitations that are applicable to "personal" casualty and theft losses. The loss is deductible as an itemized deduction, but is not subject to the 10 percent of AGI reduction or the $100 reduction that applies to many casualty and theft loss deductions.

 The theft loss is deductible in the year the fraud is discovered, except to the extent there is a claim with a reasonable prospect of recovery. Determining the year of discovery and applying the "reasonable prospect of recovery" test to any particular theft is highly fact-intensive and can be the source of controversy. The revenue procedure accompanying this revenue ruling provides a safe-harbor approach that the IRS will accept for reporting Ponzi-type theft losses.

 The amount of the theft loss includes the investor's unrecovered investment - including income as reported in past years. The ruling concludes that the investor generally can claim a theft loss deduction not only for the net amount invested, but also for the so-called "fictitious income" that the promoter of the scheme credited to the investor's account and on which the investor reported as income on his or her tax returns for years prior to discovery of the theft.


Some taxpayers have argued that they should be permitted to amend tax returns for years prior to the discovery of the theft to exclude the phantom income and receive a refund of tax in those years. The revenue ruling does not address this argument, and the safe-harbor revenue procedure is conditioned on taxpayers not amending prior year returns.

 A theft loss deduction that creates a net operating loss for the taxpayer can be carried back and forward according to the timeframes prescribed by law to generate a refund of taxes paid in other taxable years.


Revenue Procedure


In light of the number of investment arrangements recently discovered to be fraudulent and the number of taxpayers affected, the revenue procedure is intended to: (1) provide a uniform approach for determining the proper time and amount of the theft loss; (2) avoid difficult problems of proof in determining how much income reported from the scheme was fictitious, and how much was real; and (3) alleviate compliance burdens on taxpayers and administrative burdens on the IRS that would otherwise result.

The revenue procedure provides two simplifying assumptions that taxpayers may use to report their losses:
 Deemed theft loss. Although the law does not require a criminal conviction of the promoter to establish a theft loss, it often is difficult to determine how extensive the evidence of theft must be to justify a claimed theft loss.


The revenue procedure provides that the IRS will deem the loss to be the result of theft if: (1) the promoter was charged under state or federal law with the commission of fraud, embezzlement or a similar crime that would meet the definition of theft; or (2) the promoter was the subject of a state or federal criminal complaint alleging the commission of such a crime, and (3) either there was some evidence of an admission of guilt by the promoter or a trustee was appointed to freeze the assets of the scheme.

 Safe harbor prospect of recovery. Once theft is discovered, it often is difficult to establish the investor's prospect of recovery. Prospect of recovery is important because it limits the amount of the investor's theft loss deduction. Prospect of recovery is difficult to determine, particularly where litigation against the promoter and other potentially liable third parties extends into future taxable years.


The revenue procedure generally permits taxpayers to deduct in the year of discovery 95 percent of their net investment less the amount of any actual recovery in the year of discovery and the amount of any recovery expected from private or other insurance, such as that provided by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). A special rule applies to investors who are suing persons other than the promoter. These investors compute their deduction by substituting "75 percent" for "95 percent" in the formula above.



IRS Enforcement: Tightening the Net

Mr. Chairman, I am also pleased to be here today to describe the unprecedented focus that the Internal Revenue Service has placed on detecting and bringing to justice those who unlawfully hide assets overseas to avoid paying tax.

In today's economic environment, it is more important than ever that citizens feel confident that individuals and corporations are playing by the rules and paying the taxes that they owe.

When the American public is confronted with stories of financial institutions helping US citizens to maintain secret overseas accounts involving sham trusts to improperly avoid US tax, they should be outraged, as I am. But they should also know that the US government is taking new measures, and there is much more in the works.

In the wake of some recent well-publicized cases, the media has been full of speculation from those who are advising US taxpayers who have undeclared offshore accounts and income.

My advice to those taxpayers is very simple. The IRS has been steadily increasing the pressure on offshore financial institutions that facilitate concealment of taxable income by US citizens. That pressure will only increase under my watch. Those who are unlawfully hiding assets should come and get right with their government through our voluntary disclosure process


An Integrated Approach


Mr. Chairman, there is no "silver bullet" or one strategy that will alone solve the problems of offshore tax avoidance. Rather, an integrated approach is needed, made up of separate but complementary programs that will tighten the net around these tax cheats.

I am pleased to discuss several proposals that we are currently considering to improve our existing administrative programs.

First, I can also tell you that offshore issues are high priority to the President and his Administration. The President's budget committed to identifying $210 billion in savings over the next decade from international enforcement, reforming deferral and other tax reform policies. It also includes funding for a robust portfolio of IRS international tax compliance initiatives. The Administration will have more detailed and specific announcements in this area in the near future.

Second, the IRS is already devoting significant resources to international issues. As previously noted, I have both increased the number of audits in this area over the last five months and prioritized stepped-up hiring of international experts and investigators.

Third, the IRS is exploring how to improve information reporting and sharing. In this regard, the IRS is looking closely at how to continue to improve our Qualified Intermediary - or Q.I. - program. QI gives the IRS an important line of sight into the activities of US taxpayers at foreign banks and financial institutions that we previously did not have.

As with any large and complex program, we must strive to continuously improve the QI system, and address weaknesses as they become apparent. Accordingly, the IRS and Treasury Department are considering enhancements to strengthen the QI program, including:
 Expanding information reporting requirements to include more sources of income for US persons with accounts at QI banks

 Strengthening documentation rules to ensure that the program is delivering on its original intent

 Requiring withholding for accounts with documentation that is considered insufficient

Additionally, the IRS has already proposed changes that would shore up the independent review of the QI program in substantial ways. This proposal is currently out for comment, and the IRS looks forward to reviewing these comments.

As you can see, the IRS and Treasury are considering a wide range of measures to ensure that the QI program is working as intended. However, there will always be instances where the IRS discovers a potential violation of the tax law after the fact. In these cases, there are administrative and legislative changes that may be helpful to the IRS as we investigate potential wrongdoing.


Draft Legislation


Mr. Chairman, we understand that you are considering legislation designed to improve tax compliance with respect to offshore transactions.

My staff and I look forward to working with you and other members of this committee on such legislation.



Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for this opportunity to provide an update on IRS' efforts to clarify issues relating to issues involving Ponzi schemes and also our activities to combat illegal tax avoidance schemes relating to offshore accounts and transactions. I would be happy to respond to your questions.

* The authors thank Mark Heroux, JD and Otis Damron, EA, MBA of Virchow Krause & Company, LLP for their contributions to this White Paper.

1 Rev. Proc. 2009-20, to be published in I.R.B. 2009-14, dated April 6, 2009, and Rev. Rul. 2009-9, to be published in I.R.B. 2009-14, dated April 6, 2009. This White Paper will be updated to incorporate the new IRS guidance. The text of the Rev. Proc. and Rev. Rul. are included in the Appendix, along with the prepared testimony of IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman before the Senate Finance Committee on March 17, 2009.

2 A SIPC proceeding is initiated by the filing of an application by SIPC for a protective decree adjudicating the customers of a SIPC member in need of the protections provided under SIPA. An application is filed if SIPC determines that a member has failed or is in danger of failing to meet its customer obligations and finds that one or more conditions under the Act is satisfied. If the SIPC member fails to contest or consents to the application, or the court determines that one or more of the conditions enumerated in SIPA exists, the court must issue the protective decree. Upon the issuance of the protective decree, the court is required to appoint a trustee who will liquidate the business of the SIPC member and distribute Customer Property to Customers on a pro rata basis.

3 See In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp. (Alder Coleman II), 216 B.R. 719, 722 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998).

4 See New Times Secs. Servs., Inc. , 463 F3d 125, 127 (2d Cir. 2006)

5 SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, US Bankruptcy Court, SD NY, No. 08-01789 (BRL), Feb 24, 2009).

6 The Madoff SIPA liquidation presents unique challenges because of the theft of customer assets on an unprecedented scale and that the customer statements sent to investors bore little or no relation to reality. The records sent to customers were inaccurate when compared to the inventory of securities actually held by the brokerage firm. For that reason, it was not possible to transfer all or part of any customer's account to another solvent brokerage firm. Instead, pursuant to SIPA, the Trustee, Irving Picard, was authorized by the bankruptcy court to publish a notice to customers and creditors and to mail claim forms to them.

The Trustee has also requested information from each customer as to the sums given to the Madoff firm and sums withdrawn from the firm in order to assist in the analysis of what each customer is owed. There are some situations, particularly if the investors have not made withdrawals, where it will be relatively easy to determine exactly how much a claimant put into the scheme. In other situations, the extended time period of the deception, coupled with numerous deposits with, or withdrawals of, assets from the brokerage firm over time may make that reconstruction very difficult. SIPC and the Trustee are committed to using all available resources to resolve these issues quickly. See testimony of SIPC CEO Stephen Harbeck before the Senate Banking Committee, Jan. 27, 2009.

7 Code Sec. 165(a).

8 Reg. § 1.165-1(b).

9 Rev. Rul. 71-381, 1971-2 CB 126.

10 1972-1 CB 60.

11 Rev. Rul. 72-112, 1972-1 CB 60.

12 A.C. Bromberg, Exr., CA-5, 56-1 USTC ¶9448, 232 F2d 107, 110.

13 See, for example, R.A. DeFusco, 38TCM 920, Dec. 36,129(M), TC Memo. 1979-230; D. W. Crowell, 51 TCM 1556, Dec. 43,208(M), TC Memo. 1986-314 (California law); and H. Barry, 37 TCM 925, Dec. 35,205(M), TC Memo. 1978-215 (New York law).

14 L. Paine, 63 TC 736, 740, Dec. 33,113; H. Barry, 37 TCM 925, Dec. 35,205(M), TC Memo. 1978-215.

15 J. Bellis, 61 TC 354, Dec. 32,257.

16 Code Sec. 165(e) and Reg. § 1.165-8(a)(2).

17 Reg. §§ 1.165-8(a)(2) and 1.165-1(d); White Dental Mfg. Co. , SCt, 1 USTC ¶235, 274 US 398.

18 J.U. Elliot, 40 TC 304, Dec. 26,118(Acq.).

19 Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i).

20 Ramsay Scarlett & Co., Inc., 61 TC 795, Dec. 32,507, aff'd, CA-4,75-2 USTC ¶ 9634, 521 F2d 786.

21 Rev. Rul. 59-388, 1959-2 CB 76; Ramsay Scarlett & Co., Inc., 61 TC 795, Dec. 32,507, aff'd, CA-4, 75-2 USTC ¶ 9634, 521 F2d 786; Rev. Rul. 59-388, 1959-2 CB 76.

22 L. Boehm, SCt, 45-2 USTC ¶9448, 326 US 287.

23 L. Scofield Est., CA-6, 59-1 USTC ¶9363, 266 F2d 154, 159; E.C. Dawn, CA-9, 82-1 USTC ¶9373, 675 F2d 1077, 1078.

24 Parmelee Transportation Co., CtCls, 65-2 USTC ¶9683, 351 F2d 619, 628. The court noted that taxpayers may bring lawsuits even when the probability of recovery is quite low (e.g., 10 percent).

25 H. Jeppsen, 70 TCM 199, Dec. 50,781(M), TC Memo. 1995-342.

26 L. Gale, 41 TC 269, Dec. 26, 405.

27 L. Gale, 41 TC 249, Dec. 26,405.

28 Rainbow Inn, Inc., CA-3, 70-2 USTC ¶9671, 2d 640. The U.S. Supreme Court has also suggested that the likelihood of recovery must be fairly significant, stating that the prospects for recovery need not be viewed through the eyes of the "incorrigible optimist" ( White Dental Mfg. Co., SCt, 1 USTC ¶235, 274 US 398, 403.

29 Ramsay Scarlett & Co., Inc., 61 TC 795, Dec. 32,507.

30 See Kaplan v. Commissioner, 100 AFTR 2d 5674 (2007, MD Fla).

31 Reg. § 1.165-8(c). Given that the property stolen in a Ponzi scheme is presumably the flat basis cash invested, basis and FMV should be the same.

32 Reg. § 1.165-8(c).

33 Code Sec. 165(h)(1).

34 Code Secs. 165(c)(3) and 165(h)(2).

35 If Tom had both personal casualty gains and personal casualty losses, the gains and losses for the year would be aggregated and any excess of losses over gains would be deductible subject to the $100 and 10-percent-of-AGI limitations.

36 Code Secs. 165(c)(2), 165(c)(3) and 165(h)

37 Rev. Rul. 71-381, 1971-2 CB 126.

38 Z. Premji, 72 TCM 16, Dec. 51, 431(M), TC Memo. 1996-304.

39 P.L. 98-369, §711(c)(2)(A)(i).

40 1971-2 CB 126

41 Notice 2008-13, I.R.B. 2008-3, 282. Reasonable basis has generally been interpreted to mean a 20-percent chance of success and substantial authority a 40-percent chance of success.

42 If the taxpayer takes a position contrary to a regulation, disclosure would be required regardless of the taxpayer's confidence level in the position taken.

43 CCA 200811016, June 22, 2007.

44 Burnet v. Logan , SCt, 2 USTC ¶736, 283 US 404.

45 M. Greenberg , 71 TCM 3191, Dec. 51, 407(M), TC Memo. 1996-281; D. Taylor , DC Tenn., 98-1 USTC ¶ 50,354; O. Kooyers , 88 TCM 605, Dec. 55, 826(M), TC Memo. 2004-281.

46 D. Parrish , 74 TCM 964, Dec. 52,311(M), TC Memo.1997-474, aff'd CA-8, 99-1 USTC ¶50,293, 168 F3d 1098; Z. Premji, 72 TCM 16, Dec. 51, 431(M), TC Memo. 1996-304, aff'd CA-10, in an unpublished order, 98-1 USTC ¶50,218, 139 F3d 912; M. Wright, 58 TCM 369, Dec. 46, 087(M), TC Memo. 1989-557, affd. CA-9, unpublished opinion 931 F2d 61; B. Murphy, 40 TCM 524, Dec. 37, 027(M), TC Memo. 1980-218, affd. per curiam, CA-4, 81-2 USTC ¶9556, 661 F2d 299; R. Harris, DC-VA, 77-1 USTC ¶9414, 431 FSupp 1173.

47 CCA 200451030, September 30, 2004 and CCA 200811016, June 22, 2007.

48 M. Wright, 58 TCM 369, Dec. 46, 087(M), TC Memo. 1989-557, affd. CA-9, unpublished opinion 931 F2d 61; B. Murphy, 40 TCM 524, Dec. 37, 027(M), TC Memo. 1980-218, affd. per curiam, CA-4, 81-2 USTC ¶9556, 661 F2d 299; Z. Premji, 72 TCM 16, Dec. 51, 431(M), TC Memo. 1996-304, aff'd CA-10, in an unpublished order, 98-1 USTC ¶50,218, 139 F3d 912.

49 CCA 200305028, December 27, 2002. See also, D. Parrish, 74 TCM 964, Dec. 52,311(M), TC Memo.1997-474, aff'd CA-8, 99-1 USTC ¶50,293, 168 F3d 1098.

50 Deputy v. Du Pont, SCt, 40-1 USTC ¶9161, 308 US 488, 498 (1940).

51 M. Greenberg, 71 TCM 3191, Dec. 51, 407(M), TC Memo. 1996-281; D. Taylor, DC Tenn., 98-1 USTC ¶ 50,354; O. Kooyers, 88 TCM 605, Dec. 55, 826(M), TC Memo. 2004-281.

52 This assumes that a refund is otherwise available.

53 Code Sec. 1341 is basically a codification of the claim of right doctrine.

54 Note that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 extended this period to five years for qualified small business (including pass through entities.

55 P.L. 111-5.

56 Rev. Proc. 2009-20, to be published in I.R.B. 2009-14, dated April 6, 2009, and Rev. Rul. 2009-9, to be published in I.R.B. 2009-14, dated April 6, 2009.

57 Reg. § 1.165-8(b).

58 Reg. § 20.2054-1.

59 Code Secs. 165(h)(4)(D) and 2054 and Reg. §20.2054-1.

60 Reg. §1.642(g)-1.

61 J.Darby Est., CA-10, 63-2 USTC¶12,186, 323 F2d 793.

62 Reg.§20.2054-1.

63 Code Sec. 165(c). and Reg. § 20.2054-1.

64 Code Sec. 172(b)(1)(A). Note again the special five-year rule created by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5).

65 Code Sec. 172(b)(1)(F).

66 P.L. 111-5, February 17, 2009.

67 Reg. § 20.2032-1(g).

68 Versions of this article were originally printed in Steve Leimberg's LISI Estate Planning Newsletter # 1412 (February 4, 2009) and LISI Estate Planning Newsletter # 1420 (February 18, 2009) at http://www.leimbergservices.com; and in Trusts and Estates.

69 Code Sec. 408(d)(2)(A).

70 Notice 89-25, 1989-1 CB 662.

71 IRS Pub. 590, Individual Retirement Arrangements (2008), p. 41.

72 IRS Pub. 590, Individual Retirement Arrangements (2008), p. 42.

73 IRS Pub. 590, Individual Retirement Arrangements (2008), p. 42.

74 Code Sec. 56; IRS Pub. 590, Individual Retirement Arrangements (2008), p. 42.

75 Natalie Choate, Life and Death Planning for Retirement Benefits §2.1.04 (6 th ed).

76 88 Stat. 829, P.L. 93-406.

77 Reg. § 1.415(c)-1(b)(2)(ii)(C) regarding limitations for defined contribution plans.

78 Id.

79 Rev. Rul. 2002-45, 2002-2 CB 116.

80 Code Sec. 408A(d)(6), Reg. § 1.408A-5.

81 Announcement 99-57, 1999-1 CB 1256.

82 Reg. §301.9100-3(a).

83 Reg. § 301.9100-3(b).

84 Reg. § 301.9100-3(c)(1)(ii).

85 Reg. § 301.9100-3(b)(3).

86 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5).

87 M. Greenberg., 71 TCM 3191, Dec. 51, 407(M), TC Memo. 1996-281.

88 D. Taylor, DC Tenn., 98-1 USTC ¶ 50,354

89 The IRS has received a number of requests from such guidance from well known tax practitioners. One such letter was from former N.Y. Governor George Pataki.

90 The trust would be treated as owned by the Madoff victim under Code Sec. 678(a).

Labels:

The IRS has identified the categories of tax returns and refund claims for purposes of the Code Sec. 6694 tax return preparer penalty. Solely for purposes of Code Sec. 6694, a return or claim for refund includes any of the tax returns listed in Section 3.02, or a claim for refund with respect to any such return. Definitions of return preparer and return are provided. Certain listed forms that include information that is or may be reported on a taxpayer's tax return or claim for refund will not subject the preparer to the Code Sec. 6694(a) penalty, but may subject the preparer to a willful or reckless conduct penalty under Code Sec. 6694(b) if the reported information constitutes a substantial portion of the tax return or claim for refund and is prepared willfully in any manner to understate the tax liability, or in reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations. The procedure is effective January 1, 2009, for all forms, tax returns, amended tax returns, and claims for refund filed on or after that date. Notice 2008-12, I.R.B. 2008-3, 280 and Notice 2008-46, I.R.B. 2008-18, 868, are obsoleted, and the list of forms in Notice 2008-13, I.R.B. 2008-3, 282, is modified and superseded.





Rev. Proc. 2009-11 , I.R.B. 2009-3, December 15, 2008.







SECTION 1. PURPOSE

This revenue procedure identifies the relevant categories of tax returns and claims for refund for purposes of the tax return preparer penalty under section 6694 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), and identifies the returns and claims for refund required to be signed by a tax return preparer under regulations published by the Treasury Department and the IRS in order to avoid a penalty under Code section 6695(b). For other penalties that may be imposed on tax return preparers, see, for example, the regulations issued under section 6695.



SECTION 2. BACKGROUND

The Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 190 (the 2007 Act), was enacted on May 25, 2007. Section 8246 of the Act amended several sections of the Code by extending the application of the income tax return preparer penalties to all tax return preparers. The 2007 Act heightened the standards that must be met by preparers to avoid a penalty under section 6694(a) for understatements due to unreasonable positions from nonfrivolous to reasonable basis (if the position is disclosed), and from realistic possibility of success on the merits to reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits (if the position is not disclosed). The 2007 Act also increased the section 6694(a) penalty for understatements due to unreasonable positions from $250 to the greater of $1,000 or 50 percent of the income derived by the preparer, and increased the section 6694(b) penalty for willful or reckless conduct from $1,000 to the greater of $5,000 or 50% of the income derived by the preparer.

By extending the application of the income tax return preparer penalties to all tax return preparers, the 2007 Act amended section 6695(b) to impose a penalty on all tax return preparers of any return or claim for refund who fails to sign a return or claim for refund when required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary, unless it is shown that the failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect. The penalty under section 6695(b) is $50 for each failure to sign, with a maximum of $25,000 per person imposed with respect to each calendar year. The amendments to section 6695(b) are effective for tax returns and claims for refund prepared after May 25, 2007.

The Department of Treasury and the IRS released Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 282, on December 31, 2007 to provide interim guidance under section 6694. Additional guidance was provided in Notice 2008-12, 2008-3 I.R.B. 280, also released on December 31, 2007, with respect to the implementation of the tax return preparer signature requirement of section 6695(b). Notice 2008-46, 2008-18 I.R.B. 868, was released on April 16, 2008 and added certain returns and documents to Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 of Notice 2008-13. On June 17, 2008, the Treasury Department and the IRS published REG-129243-07, in the Federal Register, 73 F.R. 34560, which provides proposed amendments to the regulations reflecting amendments made by the 2007 Act.

Section 506 of the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, Div. C of Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (October 3, 2008) (the 2008 Act), amended the standards that must be met by preparers to avoid a penalty under section 6694(a) for understatements due to unreasonable positions from reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits to substantial authority for the position (for undisclosed positions). The 2008 Act did not change the standard in the 2007 Act applicable to disclosed positions. The 2008 Act also provided a special rule for tax shelters (as defined in § 6662(d)(1)(C)(ii)) and reportable transactions to which § 6662A applies, under which a position is treated as unreasonable unless it is reasonable to believe that the positions would more likely than not be sustained on the merits.

With this revenue procedure, the Treasury Department and the IRS are simultaneously issuing final regulations that revise the definitions of "return" and "claim for refund" in § 301.7701-15(b)(4) to only include tax return preparers of returns and claims for refund that are specifically identified in published guidance in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.



SECTION 3. RETURNS AND CLAIMS FOR REFUND SUBJECT TO THE SECTION 6694 PENALTY

.01 This Section identifies categories of returns to which the penalty under section 6694 could apply. The Treasury Department and the IRS may choose to add or remove documents from any of the categories in this revenue procedure in future guidance as they gain experience in implementing the provisions of the 2008 Act and the final regulations.



.02 Tax Returns Reporting Tax Liability

Solely for purposes of section 6694, a return or claim for refund includes the tax returns listed in this subsection enumerated below, or a claim for refund with respect to any such return. A claim for refund of tax includes a claim for credit against any tax and a request for abatement. A person who for compensation prepares all or a substantial portion of a tax return listed in this subsection, or a claim for refund with respect to any such tax return, is a tax return preparer who is subject to section 6694.



(1) Income Tax Returns - Subtitle A

Form 990T, Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return;

Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return;

Form 1040A, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return;

Form 1040-C, U.S. Departing Alien Income Tax Return;

Form 1040-EZ, Income Tax Return for Single Filers and Joint Filers With No Dependents;

Form 1040EZ-T, Claim for Refund of Federal Telephone Excise Tax;

Form 1040NR, U.S. Nonresident Alien Income Tax Return;

Form 1040NR-EZ, U.S. Income Tax Return for Certain Nonresident Aliens With No Dependents;

Form 1040-PR, Planilla para la Declaración de la Contribución Federal sobre el Trabajo por Cuenta Propia (Incluyendo el Crédito Tributario Adicional por Hijos para Residentes Bona fide de Puerto Rico);

Form 1040-SS, U.S. Self-Employment Tax Return (Including the Additional Child Tax Credit for Bona Fide Residents of Puerto Rico);

Form 1040X, Amended U.S. Individual Income Tax Return;

Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax Return for Estates and Trusts;

Form 1041-N, U.S. Income Tax Return for Electing Alaska Native Settlement Trusts;

Form 1041-QFT, U.S. Income Tax Return for Qualified Funeral Trusts;

Form 1042, Annual Withholding Tax Return for U.S. Source Income of Foreign Persons;

Form 1066, U.S. Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) Income Tax Return;

Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return;

Friday, March 20, 2009

credit and dependency issuesw

The issues in the Eubanks case arise frequently for return preparers. A taxpayer was not entitled to the child tax credit or the additional child tax credit where the child for whom the credit was claimed was not a qualifying child with respect to the taxpayer and the earned income tax credit where the child that lived with him was not a qualifying child with respect to the taxpayer as well as the a dependency exemption deduction for his girlfriend's son. The taxpayer was neither the adoptive parent of, nor biologically related to, the child, so the child was not his qualifying child. The taxpayer did not present any evidence as to the amount of support provided to the child received from any source, so it was impossible to determine that the child was a qualifying relative of the taxpayer. He was also not entitled to file as head of household where the child that lived with him was neither his dependent for purposes of the dependency exemption deduction, nor his qualifying child. The child was not related to or adopted by the taxpayer and the taxpayer failed to prove the amount of support he provided to the child for the year at issue.

This case involved the a dependency exemption deduction under section 151(a) for his girlfriend's child the head of household filing status under section 2(b), the child credit under section 24(a), the additional child tax credit under section 24(d), or the earned income tax credit under section 32(a).

Terrell Michael Eubanks v. Commisioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-36, Docket No. 22717-07S . Filed March 19, 2009.


[--CHIECHI, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. 1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.

Background

Some of the facts in this case have been stipulated by the parties and are so found.

At the time petitioner filed the petition in this case, he resided in Pennsylvania.

MB is the son of Christa Barfield (Ms. Barfield), petitioner's girlfriend. Petitioner is not biologically related to MB, and he is not MB's adoptive father.

Petitioner filed a timely Form 1040A, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (tax return), for his taxable year 2006. In that tax return, petitioner claimed (1) head of household filing status, (2) a dependency exemption deduction for MB, (3) the child tax credit, (4) the additional child tax credit, and (5) the earned income tax credit.

Respondent issued to petitioner a notice of deficiency (notice) for his taxable year 2006. In that notice, respondent, inter alia, disallowed petitioner's claimed (1) head of household filing status, (2) dependency exemption deduction for MB, (3) child tax credit, (4) additional child tax credit, and (5) earned income tax credit.


Discussion

Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the determinations in the notice are wrong. See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).

In support of his position with respect to each of the issues presented in this case, petitioner relies on his own testimony and the testimony of his girlfriend, Ms. Barfield. We found petitioner's testimony to be in certain material respects conclusory, vague, uncorroborated, and self-serving. We found the testimony of Ms. Barfield to be in certain material respects conclusory, vague, uncorroborated, and serving the interest of her boyfriend, petitioner. We are not required to, and we shall not, rely on the respective testimonies of petitioner and Ms. Barfield in order to establish petitioner's respective positions with respect to the issues presented. See, e.g., Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986).



Dependency Exemption Deduction
Section 151(a) provides that "the exemptions provided by this section shall be allowed as deductions" to a taxpayer. Section 151(c) provides an exemption for each dependent of the taxpayer as defined in section 152. Section 152(a) defines the term "dependent" to mean either a qualifying child or a qualifying relative.

We turn first to whether for petitioner's taxable year 2006 MB is petitioner's qualifying child and therefore is his dependent under section 152(a)(1). Section 152(c) defines the term "qualifying child" as follows:

SEC. 152. DEPENDENT DEFINED.

(c) Qualifying Child. --For purposes of this section --

(1) In general. --The term "qualifying child" means, with respect to any taxpayer for any taxable year, an individual --

(A) who bears a relationship to the taxpayer described in paragraph (2),

(B) who has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of such taxable year,

(C) who meets the age requirements of paragraph (3), and

(D) who has not provided over one-half of such individual's own support for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins.

For purposes of section 152(c)(1)(C), an individual meets the age requirements if that individual is under age 19. Sec. 152(c)(3)(A)(i).

Section 152(c)(2) provides that a person bears a relationship to the taxpayer for purposes of section 152(c)(1)(A) "if such individual is --(A) a child of the taxpayer or a descendant of such child, or (B) a brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the taxpayer or a descendant of any such relative."

Section 152(f)(1) defines the term "child" for purposes of section 152 to mean either "a son, daughter, stepson, or stepdaughter of the taxpayer," sec. 152(f)(1)(A)(i), or "an eligible foster child of the taxpayer", 2 sec. 152(f)(1)(A)(ii). An individual (1) legally adopted by the taxpayer or (2) placed with the taxpayer for adoption by the taxpayer is treated as a child of the taxpayer by blood. 3 Sec. 152(f)(1)(B).

The term "stepson" in section 152(f)(1)(A) is not defined in the Code. "Where, as is the case here, the statute does not define the word, we generally interpret it by using its ordinary and common meaning." Carlson v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 87, 93 (2001) (fn. ref. omitted). Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1223 (11th ed. 2007), defines the word "stepson" to mean "a son of one's wife or husband by a former partner". Ms. Barfield testified that she is petitioner's girlfriend and did not claim that she married petitioner at any time before or during 2006. On the record before us, we find that during that year MB was not petitioner's stepson under section 152(f)(1)(A)(i).

We have found that petitioner is not biologically related to MB and that he is not MB's adoptive father. See sec. 152(f)(1)(A)(i) and (B). On the record before us, we find that during 2006 MB was not a child of petitioner as defined in section 152(f)(1). On that record, we further find that for petitioner's taxable year 2006 MB is not his qualifying child as defined in section 152(c) and therefore is not his dependent under section 152(a)(1).

We turn now to whether for petitioner's taxable year 2006 MB is petitioner's qualifying relative and therefore is his dependent under section 152(a)(2). Section 152(d) defines the term "qualifying relative" as follows:

SEC. 152. DEPENDENT DEFINED.

(d) Qualifying Relative. --For purposes of this section --

(1) In general. --The term "qualifying relative" means, with respect to any taxpayer for any taxable year, an individual --

(A) who bears a relationship to the taxpayer described in paragraph (2),

(B) whose gross income for the calendar year in which such taxable year begins is less than the exemption amount (as defined in section 151(d)),

(C) with respect to whom the taxpayer provides over one-half of the individual's support for the calendar year in which such taxable year begins, and

(D) who is not a qualifying child of such taxpayer or of any other taxpayer for any taxable year beginning in the calendar year in which such taxable year begins.

In order for petitioner to establish that he provided more than one-half of MB's total support during 2006, see sec. 152(d)(1)(C), petitioner must establish (1) the total amount of support from all sources provided to MB during 2006 and (2) that petitioner provided over one-half of that total amount during that year. See Archer v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 963, 967 (1980); Blanco v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 512, 514-515 (1971); sec. 1.152-1(a)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs.

The term "support" includes food, shelter, clothing, medical and dental care, education, and the like. Sec. 1.152-1(a)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs. The total amount of support for each claimed dependent provided by all sources during the year in question must be shown by competent evidence. Blanco v. Commissioner, supra at 514. Where the total amount of support provided to a child during the year in question is not shown, and may not reasonably be inferred from competent evidence, it is not possible to find that the taxpayer contributed more than one-half of that child's total support. Id. at 514-515; Fitzner v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 1252, 1255 (1959).

Petitioner did not proffer any evidence establishing the amount of support he provided to MB during 2006, nor did he proffer any evidence establishing the total amount of support from all sources provided to MB during that year. Petitioner also failed to proffer any evidence from which the Court might infer the total amount of support provided to MB during 2006. On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that during 2006 he provided more than one-half of MB's total support. On that record, we further find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that for his taxable year 2006 MB is his qualifying relative as defined in section 152(d) and therefore is his dependent under section 152(a)(2).

Based upon our examination of the entire record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that he is entitled for his taxable year 2006 to a dependency exemption deduction under section 151(a) for MB.



Head of Household Filing Status
Section 1(b) provides a special tax rate for an individual who qualifies as a head of household. As pertinent here, section 2(b)(1) provides that an unmarried individual "shall be considered a head of a household" if that individual "maintains as his home a household which constitutes for more than one-half of such taxable year the principal place of abode" of "a qualifying child of the individual (as defined in section 152(c) * * *)", sec. 2(b)(1)(A)(i), or "any other person who is a dependent of the taxpayer, if the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for the taxable year for such person under section 151", sec. 2(b)(1)(A)(ii).

We have found that for petitioner's taxable year 2006 MB is not his qualifying child as defined in section 152(c). We have also found that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that he is entitled for his taxable year 2006 to a dependency exemption deduction under section 151(a) for MB.

On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to carry his burden of establishing that he is entitled for his taxable year 2006 to head of household filing status under section 2(b).



Child Tax Credit
Section 24(a) provides a credit with respect to each qualifying child of the taxpayer. Section 24(c)(1) defines the term "qualifying child" as "a qualifying child of the taxpayer (as defined in section 152(c)) who has not attained age 17." 4

We have found that for petitioner's taxable year 2006 MB is not his qualifying child as defined in section 152(c). On the record before us, we find that for that year MB is not petitioner's qualifying child as defined in section 24(c). On that record, we further find that petitioner is not entitled for his taxable year 2006 to the child tax credit under section 24(a).



Additional Child Tax Credit
The child tax credit provided by section 24(a) may not exceed the taxpayer's regular tax liability. Sec. 24(b)(3). Where a taxpayer is eligible for the child tax credit, but the taxpayer's regular tax liability is less than the amount of the child tax credit potentially available under section 24(a), section 24(d) makes a portion of the credit, known as the additional child tax credit, refundable.

We have found that petitioner is not entitled for his taxable year 2006 to the child tax credit under section 24(a). On the record before us, we find that petitioner is not entitled for his taxable year 2006 to the additional child tax credit under section 24(d).



Earned Income Tax Credit
Section 32(a)(1) permits an eligible individual an earned income credit against that individual's tax liability. 5 As pertinent here, the term "eligible individual" is defined to mean "any individual who has a qualifying child for the taxable year". Sec. 32(c)(1)(A)(i). Section 32(c)(3)(A) defines the term "qualifying child" to mean "a qualifying child of the taxpayer (as defined in section 152(c) * * *)."

We have found that for petitioner's taxable year 2006 MB is not his qualifying child as defined in section 152(c). On the record before us, we find that for that year MB is not petitioner's qualifying child as defined in section 32(c)(3)(A). On that record, we further find that for that year petitioner is not an eligible individual as defined in section 32(c)(1)(A)(i). On the record before us, we find that petitioner is not entitled for his taxable year 2006 to the earned income tax credit under section 32(a). 6

We have considered all of petitioner's contentions and arguments that are not discussed herein, and we find them to be without merit, irrelevant, and/or moot.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered for respondent.

1 Hereinafter, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) for the year at issue. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 Petitioner does not contend that MB is an eligible foster child under sec. 152(f)(1)(A)(ii).

3 Petitioner does not contend that MB was placed with him for adoption before or during 2006.

4 The parties do not dispute that MB was under age 17 at the close of petitioner's taxable year 2006 and that therefore he satisfies the age restriction in sec. 24(c)(1).

5 The amount of the credit is determined based on percentages that vary depending on whether the taxpayer has one qualifying child, two or more qualifying children, or no qualifying children. Sec. 32(b). The credit is also subject to a limitation based on adjusted gross income. Sec. 32(a)(2). See infra note 6.

6 Assuming arguendo that petitioner were an eligible individual as defined in sec. 32(c)(1)(A)(ii) for his taxable year 2006, he nonetheless would not be entitled to the earned income tax credit for that year. That is because petitioner reported adjusted gross income for his taxable year 2006 of $16,213. Sec. 32(a)(2) completely phases out the earned income tax credit for an eligible individual with no qualifying children where the taxpayer has adjusted gross income in excess of $12,120 for the taxable year 2006. See Rev. Proc. 2005-70, sec. 3.06(1), 2005-2 C.B. 979, 982.

Labels:

Thursday, March 19, 2009

head of household case

The head-of-houselhold case was decided on statutory law. It is my opinion that any misapplication of the plain language of a statute can be viewed by the IRS as a "reckless" error under 6694(b) and therefore subject to the $5,000 penalty.
I believe return preparers need to screen clients for this issue when preparing tax returns


Lawrence J. Willoughby, Petitioner v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 27969-07 , TC Memo. 2009-58, March 18, 2009.

An individual did not qualify for head of household filing status, the child tax credit, the child care credit, or the earned income credit, even though he provided more than one-half of the total support for two children. The children qualified as dependents because they were members of the individual's household. However, they were neither his biological nor adoptive children nor were they disabled. Therefore, the children were not qualifying children or relatives for purposes of these tax benefits. -



MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

CHIECHI, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of $6,195 in petitioner's Federal income tax (tax) for his taxable year 2006.

The issues remaining for decision for petitioner's taxable year 2006 are:

(1) Is petitioner entitled to head of household filing status under section 2(b)? 1 We hold that he is not.

(2) Is petitioner entitled to the child care credit under section 21(a)? We hold that he is not.

(3) Is petitioner entitled to the additional child tax credit under section 24? We hold that he is not.

(4) Is petitioner entitled to the earned income tax credit under section 32(a)? We hold that he is not.


FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts in this case have been stipulated by the parties and are so found.

At the time petitioner filed the petition, he resided in Nebraska.

Throughout 2006, petitioner resided with a woman to whom he was not married and that woman's two daughters, JP and KP, who were not his biological or adoptive daughters. During that year, petitioner provided more than one-half of the total support of each of those children. Neither JP nor KP suffered from any physical or mental impairment in 2006.

Petitioner timely filed Form 1040A, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for his taxable year 2006 (2006 tax return). In the 2006 tax return, petitioner claimed (1) head of household filing status, (2) dependency exemption deductions for JP and KP, (3) the child care credit, (4) the additional child tax credit, and (5) the earned income tax credit. In that return, petitioner claimed the additional child tax credit because he reported in that return a total tax liability of zero.

Respondent issued to petitioner a notice of deficiency (notice) for his taxable year 2006. In that notice, respondent, inter alia, disallowed petitioner's claimed (1) head of household filing status, (2) dependency exemption deductions for JP and KP, (3) child care credit, (4) additional child tax credit, and (5) earned income tax credit.


OPINION

It is petitioner's position that, because respondent concedes that he is entitled for his taxable year 2006 to dependency exemption deductions for JP and KP, he is entitled for that year to head of household filing status, the child care credit, the additional child tax credit, and the earned income tax credit that he claimed in his 2006 tax return.



Head of Household Filing Status
Section 1(b) provides a special tax rate for an individual who qualifies as a head of household. As pertinent here, section 2(b)(1) provides that an unmarried individual "shall be considered a head of a household" if that individual "maintains as his home a household which constitutes for more than one-half of such taxable year the principal place of abode" of "a qualifying child of the individual (as defined in section 152(c) * * *)", sec. 2(b)(1)(A)(i), or "any other person who is a dependent of the taxpayer, if the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for the taxable year for such person under section 151", sec. 2(b)(1)(A)(ii). As pertinent here, however, section 2(b)(3)(B)(i) provides that "a taxpayer shall not be considered to be a head of a household * * * by reason of an individual who would not be a dependent for the taxable year but for * * * subparagraph (H) of section 152(d)(2)".

Respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled for his taxable year 2006 to dependency exemption deductions for JP and KP. According to respondent, petitioner is entitled to those deductions only because JP and KP are his dependents under section 152(a)(2) by reason of their being his qualifying relatives under section 152(d)(2)(H). We must determine whether respondent is correct. If we find that respondent is correct, petitioner is not entitled for his taxable year 2006 to head of household filing status. See sec. 2(b)(3)(B)(i).

Section 151(a) provides that "the exemptions provided by this section shall be allowed as deductions" to a taxpayer. Section 151(c) provides for an exemption for each dependent of the taxpayer as defined in section 152. Section 152(a) defines the term "dependent" to mean either "(1) a qualifying child, or (2) a qualifying relative."

We turn first to whether JP and KP are petitioner's qualifying children as defined in section 152(c) and therefore are his dependents under section 152(a)(1). Section 152(c) defines the term "qualifying child" as follows:

SEC. 152. DEPENDENT DEFINED.

(c) Qualifying Child. --For purposes of this section --

(1) In general. --The term "qualifying child" means, with respect to any taxpayer for any taxable year, an individual --

(A) who bears a relationship to the taxpayer described in paragraph (2),

(B) who has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of such taxable year,

(C) who meets the age requirements of paragraph (3), and

(D) who has not provided over one-half of such individual's own support for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins.

A person under age 19 at the close of the taxpayer's taxable year meets the age requirements of section 152(c)(1)(C). See sec. 152(c)(3)(A)(i).

Section 152(c)(2) provides that a person bears a relationship to the taxpayer for purposes of section 152(c)(1)(A) "if such individual is --(A) a child of the taxpayer or a descendant of such a child, or (B) a brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the taxpayer or a descendant of any such relative."

Section 152(f)(1) defines the term "child" for purposes of section 152 to mean either "a son, daughter, stepson, or stepdaughter of the taxpayer," sec. 152(f)(1)(A)(i), or "an eligible foster child of the taxpayer", 2 sec. 152(f)(1)(A)(ii). An individual (1) legally adopted by the taxpayer or (2) placed with the taxpayer for adoption by the taxpayer is treated as a child of the taxpayer by blood. 3 Sec. 152(f)(1)(B).

The term "stepdaughter" in section 152(f)(1)(A) is not defined in the Code. "Where, as is the case here, the statute does not define the word, we generally interpret it by using its ordinary and common meaning." Carlson v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 87, 93 (2001) (fn. ref. omitted). Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1223 (11th ed. 2007), defines the word "stepdaughter" to mean "a daughter of one's wife or husband by a former partner". We have found that during 2006 petitioner was not married to the mother of JP and KP. On the record before us, we find that during that year neither JP nor KP was petitioner's stepdaughter under section 152(f)(1)(A)(i).

We have found that during 2006 JP and KP were not petitioner's biological or adoptive daughters. See sec. 152(f)(1)(A)(i) and (B). On the record before us, we find that during 2006 neither JP nor KP was a child of petitioner as defined in section 152(f)(1). On that record, we further find that for his taxable year 2006 neither JP nor KP is a qualifying child of petitioner as defined in section 152(c) and that therefore neither is his dependent under section 152(a)(1).

We turn next to whether for petitioner's taxable year 2006 JP and KP are his qualifying relatives and therefore are his dependents because they are described in a subparagraph of section 152(d)(2) other than section 152(d)(2)(H). 4 Section 152(d) defines the term "qualifying relative" as follows:

SEC. 152. DEPENDENT DEFINED.

(d) Qualifying Relative. --For purposes of this section --

(1) In general. --The term "qualifying relative" means, with respect to any taxpayer for any taxable year, an individual --

(A) who bears a relationship to the taxpayer described in paragraph (2),

(B) whose gross income for the calendar year in which such taxable year begins is less than the exemption amount (as defined in section 151(d)),

(C) with respect to whom the taxpayer provides over one-half of the individual's support for the calendar year in which such taxable year begins, and

(D) who is not a qualifying child of such taxpayer or of any other taxpayer for any taxable year beginning in the calendar year in which such taxable year begins.

As pertinent here, section 152(d)(2) provides that an individual bears a relationship to the taxpayer for purposes of section 152(d)(1)(A) if the individual is:

(A) A child or a descendant of a child.

* * * * * * *

(H) An individual (other than * * * the spouse * * * of the taxpayer) who, for the taxable year of the taxpayer, has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer and is a member of the taxpayer's household.

We have found that during 2006 neither JP nor KP was a child of petitioner as defined in section 152(f)(1). 5 On the record before us, we find that for petitioner's taxable year 2006 neither JP nor KP is petitioner's qualifying relative by reason of section 152(d)(2)(A).

Petitioner does not claim, and the record does not establish, that JP or KP is (1) petitioner's sister or stepsister, (2) his mother or an ancestor of his mother, (3) his stepmother, (4) a daughter of petitioner's brother or sister, (5) a sister of petitioner's father or mother, or (6) petitioner's daughter-in-law, sister-in-law, or mother-in-law. See sec. 152(d)(2)(B)-(G).

Based upon our findings and respondent's concession that for petitioner's taxable year 2006 JP and KP are his qualifying relatives under section 152(d)(2)(H), we find that for that year neither JP nor KP would be petitioner's dependent but for section 152(d)(2)(H). We further find that pursuant to section 2(b)(3)(B)(i) petitioner is not entitled for that year to head of household filing status under section 2(b).



Child Care Credit
Section 21(a) allows a taxpayer a credit for a certain percentage of employment-related expenses incurred to enable the taxpayer to be employed gainfully, including expenses for the care of a qualifying individual. See sec. 21(a) and (b)(2). As pertinent here, section 21(b)(1) defines the term "qualifying individual" to mean:

SEC. 21. EXPENSES FOR HOUSEHOLD AND DEPENDENT CARE SERVICES NECESSARY FOR GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT.

(b) Definitions of Qualifying Individual and Employment-Related Expenses. --For purposes of this section --

(1) Qualifying individual. --The term "qualifying individual" means --

(A) a dependent of the taxpayer (as defined in section 152(a)(1)) who has not attained age 13, [or]

(B) a dependent of the taxpayer (as defined in section 152, determined without regard to subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (d)(1)(B)) who is physically or mentally incapable of caring for himself or herself and who has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of such taxable year * * *

We have found that for his taxable year 2006 neither JP nor KP is a qualifying child of petitioner as defined in section 152(c) and that therefore neither is his dependent under section 152(a)(1). On the record before us, we find that for petitioner's taxable year 2006 neither JP nor KP is a qualifying individual as defined in section 21(b)(1)(A) with respect to petitioner.

Although respondent concedes that for petitioner's taxable year 2006 JP and KP are petitioner's dependents under section 152(a)(2), we have found that neither JP nor KP suffered from any physical or mental impairment during that year. In addition, the record does not establish that JP or KP was physically or mentally incapable of caring for herself. On the record before us, we find that for petitioner's taxable year 2006 neither JP nor KP is a qualifying individual as defined in section 21(b)(1)(B) with respect to petitioner.

On the record before us, we find that petitioner is not entitled for his taxable year 2006 to the child care credit under section 21(a).



Additional Child Tax Credit
Section 24(a) provides a credit with respect to each qualifying child of the taxpayer. Section 24(c)(1) defines the term "qualifying child" as "a qualifying child of the taxpayer (as defined in section 152(c)) who has not attained age 17." 6

The child tax credit may not exceed the taxpayer's regular tax liability. Sec. 24(b)(3). Where a taxpayer is eligible for the child tax credit, but the taxpayer's regular tax liability is less than the amount of the child tax credit potentially available under section 24(a), section 24(d) makes a portion of the credit, known as the additional child tax credit, refundable.

We have found that for his taxable year 2006 neither JP nor KP is a qualifying child of petitioner as defined in section 152(c). On the record before us, we find that for that year neither JP nor KP is a qualifying child of petitioner as defined in section 24(c). On that record, we further find that petitioner is not entitled for his taxable year 2006 to the child tax credit under section 24(a) 7 and that therefore he is not entitled for that year to the additional child tax credit under section 24(d).



Earned Income Tax Credit
Section 32(a)(1) permits an eligible individual an earned income credit against that individual's tax liability. 8 As pertinent here, the term "eligible individual" is defined to mean "any individual who has a qualifying child for the taxable year". Sec. 32(c)(1)(A)(i). Section 32(c)(3)(A) defines the term "qualifying child" to mean "a qualifying child of the taxpayer (as defined in section 152(c) * * *)."

We have found that for his taxable year 2006 neither JP nor KP is a qualifying child of petitioner as defined in section 152(c). On the record before us, we find that for that year neither JP nor KP is a qualifying child of petitioner as defined in section 32(c)(3)(A). On that record, we further find that for his taxable year 2006 petitioner is not an eligible individual as defined in section 32(c)(1)(A)(i). On the record before us, we find that petitioner is not entitled for his taxable year 2006 to the earned income tax credit under section 32(a). 9

We have considered all of petitioner's contentions and arguments that are not discussed herein, and we find them to be without merit, irrelevant, and/or moot.

To reflect the foregoing and the concession of respondent,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

1 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the year at issue. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 Petitioner does not contend that JP and KP are eligible foster children under sec. 152(f)(1)(A)(ii).

3 Petitioner does not contend that JP and KP were placed with him for adoption before or during 2006.

4 It is sec. 152(d)(2)(H) on which respondent bases respondent's concession that JP and KP are petitioner's qualifying relatives and therefore are his dependents.

5 As discussed above, sec. 152(f)(1) defines the term "child" for purposes of sec. 152.

6 The parties do not dispute that JP and KP were both under age 17 at the close of petitioner's taxable year 2006 and that therefore each satisfies the age restriction in sec. 24(c)(1).

7 In the 2006 tax return, petitioner did not claim the child tax credit; he claimed only the additional child tax credit because he reported in that return a total tax liability of zero.

8 The amount of the credit is determined based on percentages that vary depending on whether the taxpayer has one qualifying child, two or more qualifying children, or no qualifying children. Sec. 32(b). The credit is also subject to a limitation based on adjusted gross income. Sec. 32(a)(2). See infra note 9.

9 Assuming arguendo that petitioner were an eligible individual as defined in sec. 32(c)(1)(A)(ii) for his taxable year 2006, he nonetheless would not be entitled to the earned income tax credit for that year. That is because petitioner reported adjusted gross income for his taxable year 2006 of $21,025. Sec. 32(a)(2) completely phases out the earned income tax credit for an eligible individual with no qualifying children where the taxpayer has adjusted gross income in excess of $12,120 for the taxable year 2006. See Rev. Proc. 2005-70, sec. 3.06(1), 2005-2 C.B. 979, 982.


A.E. Jalifi, 37 TCM 815, Dec. 35,168(M), TC Memo. 1978-188.

Similarly.

V.R. Cinnamon, 37 TCM 533, Dec. 35,062(M), TC Memo. 1978-118.

H.E. Daniel, 40 TCM 1273, Dec. 37,256(M), TC Memo. 1980-397.

C.V. Adams, 73 TCM 1913, Dec. 51,866(M), TC Memo. 1997-63.

Similarly, where the taxpayer had no dependency exemptions.

D.L. Angstadt, 27 TCM 693, Dec. 29,035(M), TC Memo. 1968-140.

J.S. Graff, 32 TCM 494, Dec. 31,972(M), TC Memo. 1973-110.

P.M. Cherry, 76 TCM 627, Dec. 52,906(M), TC Memo. 1998-360.

J.S. Turay, 78 TCM 480, Dec. 53,555(M), TC Memo. 1999-315.

R.M. Daniels, 95 TCM 1623 Dec. 57,476(M), TC Memo. 2008-160.

Similarly, where the taxpayer did not support anyone other than himself.

J.M. Klawa, 27 TCM 403, Dec. 28,955(M), TC Memo. 1968-85.

M.D. Benham, 36 TCM 62, Dec. 34,218(M), TC Memo. 1977-11.

C.H. Lee, 40 TCM 433, Dec. 36,996(M), TC Memo. 1980-195.

E. Otmishi, 41 TCM 237, Dec. 37,356(M), TC Memo. 1980-472.

R.B. Rodenbaugh, 42 TCM 1408, Dec. 38,343(M), TC Memo. 1981-593.

R. Hilliard, 49 TCM 504, Dec. 41,820(M), TC Memo. 1985-18.

R.J. Barnes, 52 TCM 1170, Dec. 43,541(M), TC Memo. 1986-585.

J. Vega, 82 TCM 415, Dec. 54,449(M), TC Memo. 2001-214.

G. Mares, 82 TCM 424, Dec. 54,451(M), TC Memo. 2001-216.

A dependent foster child will qualify a taxpayer for head of household status under Code Sec. 2(b)(1)(A)(ii). However, if the foster child is not a dependent of the taxpayer, the taxpayer will not qualify for head of household status under Code Sec. 2(b)(1)(A)(i).

Rev. Rul. 84-89, 1984-1 CB 5.

A taxpayer's prior criminal conviction for willfully and knowingly subscribing to false returns precluded him from relitigating in a deficiency action the issues of whether he was entitled to file joint returns, use joint rates and claim dependency exemptions for the three years to which the conviction pertained. The jury's findings in the criminal case that the taxpayer did not have a wife or children were binding in the civil action because they were essential to the taxpayer's conviction. While the taxpayer was not estopped from offering proof of his entitlement to joint filing status, joint rates and exemptions for another year for which there was no conviction, he failed to support his burden of proof on those issues. The taxpayer did not prove that he was legally married or that he provided over half of the support for his common-law wife or her children, who were also not shown to be members of his household for the entire year at issue.

G.W. Ochs, 52 TCM 1218, Dec. 43,553(M), TC Memo. 1986-595.

A taxpayer was not entitled to file a return as a head of household because he was not entitled to a dependency exemption for his former foster parent. Because the taxpayer was never adopted by his foster parent prior to his age of emancipation (18), his relationship with his foster father was not one described in Code Sec. 152(a)(1)-(8). Furthermore, the taxpayer did not prove that he provided more than one-half of his former foster parent's support within the meaning of Code Sec. 152(a)(9).

O.V. Bentley, 56 TCM 215-3, Dec. 45,068(M), TC Memo. 1988-444. Aff'd, CA-9 (unpublished opinion 6/13/90).

A waiter could not file his tax return as an unmarried head of household because he was not entitled to claim dependency exemptions for his children for lack of evidence that he paid more than one-half of their support.

J. Brown, 61 TCM 2832, Dec. 47,391(M), TC Memo. 1991-255.

A taxpayer's testimony that she provided the majority of financial support for her niece and nephew, by itself, failed to establish her claim for head of household filing status.

V. Lee, 62 TCM 213, Dec. 47,485(M), TC Memo. 1991-337.

General testimony that the decedent had provided financial support for a dependent was insufficient to establish that an estate was entitled to claim a dependency exemption. Accordingly, the estate was not entitled to use head of household filing status in computing the decedent's income tax liability.

L.H. DesFosses Est., 63 TCM 2637, Dec. 48,124(M), TC Memo. 1992-196.

An individual qualified to file as a head of household due to her entitlement to a dependency exemption for her granddaughter. She failed to qualify for surviving spouse filing status, however, because her daughter had filed a joint return with her husband, and thus could not be claimed as the taxpayer's dependent.

R.M. Cardosi, 69 TCM 2305, Dec. 50,565(M), TC Memo. 1995-145.

An individual was not entitled to a dependency exemption for his son because the son did not live with him during the applicable tax year and the taxpayer did not establish the total amount of his son's support or that he provided over half of the son's support. The individual's mother had income in excess of the exemption amount, which prevented his claim for a dependency exemption for her. Although the taxpayer provided total support to a life-long friend, who had no income at the time, a dependency exemption could not be claimed for the friend because he did not live in the taxpayer's home for the entire tax year. The disallowed dependency exemptions prohibited the taxpayer from filing his tax return as a head of household.

C. Douglas, 68 TCM 963, Dec. 50,184(M), TC Memo. 1994-519. Aff'd, CA-9 (unpublished opinion), 96-2 USTC ¶50,375.

A taxpayer was entitled to a dependency exemption for his brother, who resided in the U.S. during the years in question, but not for other family members. No evidence was shown to prove the taxpayer's father, mother, sister or niece had resided in the U.S. during the years in question. The taxpayer provided one-half of the support for the brother during one of the years in question. Thus, the taxpayer could claim head of household status for the tax year in which his brother lived with him for more than six months.

E. Auceda, 69 TCM 2510, Dec. 50,619(M), TC Memo. 1995-193.

A married taxpayer who lived apart from her husband was denied dependency exemptions for her nieces and nephews because the evidence did not establish that she had provided more than half of their support during the tax year at issue. She failed to prove that the children were not supported by public assistance payments made to their mother or by funds received from their father. Because the taxpayer was ineligible to take the dependency exemptions, she could not claim head-of-household filing status; she did not maintain a household that constituted the principal place of abode of a qualifying individual for more than half of the tax year.

C. Anderson, 74 TCM 1248, Dec. 52,364(M), TC Memo. 1997-523.

Similarly.

A. Gaylord, 86 TCM 385, Dec. 55,300(M), TC Memo. 2003-273.

An individual was not entitled to dependency exemptions for his two children because his wife was the custodial parent and she had not released her claim to the exemptions.

R.A. Condello, 76 TCM 460, Dec. 52,878(M), TC Memo. 1998-333.

An individual was entitled to claim a dependency exemption because he provided over half of the support for his minor child for the tax year at issue.

D.C. Sylvester, 77 TCM 1346, Dec. 53,239(M), TC Memo. 1999-35.

An individual was not entitled to head-of-household filing status because he was denied dependency exemptions for his fiancee and her daughters. Moreover, even if the individual was entitled to the dependency exemptions, the limitation set forth in Code Sec. 2(b)(3)(B)(i) precluded him from qualifying as a head of household for one of the tax years at issue.

R.J. Beale, 79 TCM 2001, Dec. 53,881(M), TC Memo. 2000-158.

A taxpayer could not properly claim head of household status because the children at issue were not qualifying children. A dependency exemption could only be claimed for one of them under the household test of Code Sec. 152(d)(2)(H), which did not qualify the child for purposes of head of household filing status.

L. Felix, 95 TCM 1374, Dec. 57,401(M), TC Memo. 2008-96.

The IRS could proceed with collection against a taxpayer who improperly claimed head of household filing status, dependent exemptions and an earned income credit. Although the taxpayer was allowed to challenge the underlying deficiencies, she failed to establish her entitlement to the items claimed. The taxpayer testified that she received support from the father of the children claimed on her return, but she did not establish that the children were hers or that they resided with her. Finally, the taxpayer failed to establish specific amounts she contributed for the children's support, or the cost to maintain the household.

M. Smith, Dec. 57,554(M), TC Memo. 2008-229.

Labels:

Wednesday, March 18, 2009

New rulesw for Ponzi theft losses

The IRS has provided guidance for claimin theft losses from any Ponzi Scheme (Rev. Rul. 2009-9; Rev. Proc. 2009-20. In the case of the Madoff losses, I have asked clients to consider not filing any claim against the bankruptcy estate because the recovery is likely to be small, and more can be gained from the net operating loss carrybacks that will get large refunds for the last two years. In shore, there is a larger financial benefit by getting refunds for the past two years. Note that the statute of limitations for refunds is two years. That money is lost if you wait for recovery from the bankruptcy estate. There appears to be lots of people caught up in Ponzi schemes. The IRS will always audit the investors in Ponzi schemes since their tax returns are invariably wrong. Unfortunately, there are still ongoing Ponzi schemes that have surfaced, other than the Madoff ripoff.


The IRS has issued guidance addressing the tax treatment of losses criminally fraudulent investment arrangements in the form of "Ponzi" schemes. The guidance provides that investors in such schemes will be entitled to claim a theft loss under Code Sec. 165, rather than a capital loss, because the perpetrators of such fraudulent schemes actually deprive investors of money by criminal acts. The loss is deductible under Code Sec. 165(c)(2) as a loss on a transaction entered into for profit, and it is not subject to the personal loss limitations under Code Sec. 165(h), or the limits on itemized deductions under Code Secs. 67 and 68.

Rev. Rul. 2009-9
The theft loss is deductible in the year it is discovered, provided that it is not covered by a claim for reimbursement, or other recovery as to which the investor has a reasonable prospect of recovery. To the extent that an investor's deduction is reduced by such a claim, recoveries in later tax years are not includible in the investor's income. However, if the investor recovers a greater amount in a later year, or an amount that initially was not covered by a claim to which there was a reasonable prospect of recovery, the recovery is includible in the investor's gross income in the later tax year, to the extent that the initial deduction reduced the investor's tax liability.

The amount of the theft loss deduction includes the amount invested in the scheme, less any amounts withdrawn, reimbursements, and claims as to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery. The deductible amount also includes any fictitious income that was reported to the investor in years prior to the discovery of the theft that was included in the investor's gross income, and reinvested in the scheme.

To the extent an investor's theft loss deduction creates or increases a net operating loss in the year the loss is deducted, the investor may carry back up to three years and forward up to 20 years the portion of the net operating loss attributable to the theft loss. If the loss is an applicable 2008 net operating loss, an eligible small business can elect either a three-, four-, or five-year net operating loss carryback under Code Sec. 172(b)(1)(H).

The theft loss deduction does not qualify for the alternative computation of tax under Code Sec. 1341 for the restoration of an amount held under a claim of right because the deduction does not arise from the investor's obligation to restore income. Further, the theft loss does not qualify for the application of the mitigation provisions under Code Secs. 1311 through 1314 to adjust tax liability in years that are otherwise barred by the period of limitations from filing a claim for refund under Code Sec. 6511.

The theft loss deduction for losses on an investment in a Ponzi scheme is not taken into account in determining whether a transaction is a loss transaction for which there would be a disclosure obligation under Reg. §1.6011-4.

Rev. Proc. 2009-20
The IRS has provided a safe harbor for taxpayers to enable them to deduct losses from fraudulent investment schemes as theft losses. The new procedure also provides guidance for taxpayers choosing not to use the safe harbor, but who plan to deduct investment fraud losses under the theft loss provisions of Code Sec. 165. The procedure applies to investment fraud losses discovered in tax years after 2007.

Background. Since Ponzi schemes produce no real gains, when a large number of investors try to withdraw funds at the same time (e.g., when the economy takes a downturn), the Ponzi scheme falls apart because there is not enough new money being paid in by new investors to cover the withdrawals of existing investors. Taxpayers may not be aware of a fraudulent investment loss during the year in which the loss occurred, and it may be difficult for taxpayers to prove how much income reported from the fraudulent arrangement in prior years was in fact fictitious. The safe harbor is intended to help cheated investors gain some relief by providing a relatively straightforward method to calculate and deduct losses from investment fraud.

Requirements. Taxpayers can rely on the safe harbor to deduct losses from fraudulent investment schemes as theft losses only if certain requirements and circumstances are satisfied:

Specified fraudulent arrangement. The loss must be from a "specified fraudulent arrangement," which generally is a Ponzi scheme that takes cash or other assets from investors, purports to earn income for investors, reports fictitious income, makes any payments from funds contributed by other investors and not from bona fide earnings, and appropriates investors' cash or other assets.

Qualified loss. The loss must be a "qualified loss" resulting from a specified fraudulent arrangement of which the "lead figure" in charge of the scheme was charged under state or federal law with committing fraud, embezzlement, or other similar crime, that, if proven, would meet the definition of theft under Code Sec. 165; or the lead figure was the subject of a state or federal criminal complaint for fraud, embezzlement, or other similar crime, and either he admitted guilt, or the assets held by the fraudulent arrangement were frozen or placed under the authority of a receiver or trustee.

Qualified investor. The taxpayer must be a "qualified investor," in that he or she must be generally qualified to deduct theft losses under Code Sec. 165 and Reg. §1.165-8, did not have actual knowledge that the arrangement was fraudulent before it was publicly disclosed, and invested cash or other assets in the arrangement.

Investment through intermediary. A taxpayer is not considered to be a qualified investor if he or she did not invest directly in the specified fraudulent arrangement but, instead, invested through an intermediary investment fund or advisor. Thus, investors who unknowingly invest in a Ponzi scheme, such as the Madoff investment fund, through an intermediary fund or investment advisor are not covered by the safe harbor. However, the intermediary investment fund may itself qualify to claim the loss deduction under the safe harbor.

Amount of deduction. Up to 95% of qualified losses from a specified fraudulent arrangement, calculated through detailed definitions and formulas, may be deducted by a qualified investor as a theft loss. However, the amount of deductible losses cannot take into account any funds that were borrowed from the fraudulent arrangement or any of its principals or agents and invested in the arrangement, investment fees paid and deducted, amounts the fraudulent arrangement reported as income but that the qualified investor did not include in his gross income, funds that were not invested directly but, rather, were invested through an intermediary investment fund or advisor, any amount paid to the taxpayer for reimbursement or recovery, and other amounts paid or payable through insurance, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), and other similar potential claims or recovery payments.

Statement required. To take advantage of the safe harbor, the taxpayer must complete the statement provided as "Appendix A" to Rev. Proc. 2009-20 and file it with the tax return, amended return or claim for refund. The statement requires the taxpayer to provide specified information and computations. The taxpayer must also comply with all conditions set forth in the statement and in Rev. Proc. 2009-20, including that:

(1) The taxpayer will not deduct any amount of the theft loss in excess of the amount permitted by Rev. Proc. 2009-20.

(2) The taxpayer will not file returns or amended returns to exclude or recharacterize income from the fraudulent arrangement for previous tax years.

(3) The taxpayer will not later apply the alternative computation under Code Sec. 1341 regarding the theft loss deduction.

(4) The taxpayer will not apply the doctrine of equitable recoupment or mitigation provisions to income from the fraudulent arrangement reported in prior tax years, which would otherwise be subject to the time limits for filing refund claims under Code Sec. 6511.

Other tax treatment. Taxpayers electing not to use the safe harbor must satisfy the requirements of Code Sec. 165 in order to deduct investment fraud losses as theft losses. If the taxpayer can establish the amount of income reported and included in gross income for tax years for which the statute of limitations on refunds has expired, the IRS will not challenge the inclusion of that amount in basis for purposes of calculating the theft loss.

Shulman Comments
"The Madoff case is tragic," IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman told reporters in a telephone press conference. "The victims are devastated." The case also "raises a staggering array of issues for the victims," Shulman noted. "We've worked hard to provide a straightforward approach" to these issues. The new guidance "assist[s] taxpayers who are victims of losses from Ponzi-type investment schemes; the guidance is not specific to the Madoff case," he indicated. The guidance allows taxpayers to deduct the principal amount of their investment and the earnings they have reported but left in the scheme (thus addressing phantom income), Shulman explained.

"The revenue ruling is important because determining the amount and timing of losses from these schemes is factually difficult and dependent on the prospect of recovering the lost money (which may not become known for several years)," Shulman said in his testimony to Congress. "The revenue procedure simplifies compliance for taxpayers (and administration for the IRS) by providing a [uniform approach for] determining the year in which the loss is deemed to occur and a simplified means of computing the amount of the loss," Shulman testified. It also avoids difficult problems of proving how much income reported from the scheme was fictitious, and how much was real, he stated.

Lawrence Hill, a partner with Dewey LeBoeuf in New York, told CCH that "the commissioner's guidance reduces a tremendous amount of the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the reporting of theft losses on taxpayers' 2008 returns. It will significantly reduce the cost of tax compliance for taxpayers and, in the long run, save enormous resources for the IRS."

Hill pointed out that "Perhaps most significantly, Rev. Rul. 2009-9 indicates, as Issue 5, that an individual is a "sole proprietorship," so that the individual, as long as he or she does not have gross revenues in 2008 of $15,000,000 or more, may elect the five-year carryback that was provided in the Stimulus Act for "small businesses", rather than only the three-year carryback that individuals would normally have. This could significantly mitigate the losses of many of the investors."

IRS officials elaborated on the guidance in comments to reporters:

- Investors suing Madoff are in the 95 percent category for claiming losses; investors suing third parties are in the 75 percent category.

- Taxpayers who recognized phantom income as capital gains would still be entitled to a deduction, regardless of the manner in which the initial income was reported.

- Taxpayers using the safe harbor in Rev. Proc. 2009-20 cannot go back to prior-year returns to remove phantom income. The entire loss must be claimed in the year of discovery.

- If a taxpayer has filed an amended return and was to use the safe harbor, he or she must refile for the year of the loss and file Appendix A to identify the amended returns.

- Investors that participated in a Ponzi scheme through a "feeder fund" cannot use the safe harbor directly. The fund can use the safe harbor to determine its total losses. If the fund is a partnership, it will report a share of the losses to each investor on Schedule K-1.

- Investors who do not use the safe harbor may claim a loss under the "standard rules," applied on a case-by-case basis. These rules are less clear than the safe harbor.

The officials would not comment when the year of discovery occurred (for claiming the loss) for Madoff investors or for any other scheme. They said it depends on the particular facts and that they had not examined these issues.

Rev. Rul. 71-381, 1971-2 CB 126, is obsoleted in part.
Rev. Proc. 2009-20

March 18, 2009

Code Sec. 165

Losses : Investment fraud : Ponzi scheme : Theft losses .



Part III Administrative, Procedural, and Miscellaneous

26 CFR 601.105 Examination of returns and claims for refund, credit or abatement; determination of correct tax liability.

(Also Part I, §§ 165 ; 1.165-8(c))

Rev. Proc. 2009-20



SECTION 1. PURPOSE

This revenue procedure provides an optional safe harbor treatment for taxpayers that experienced losses in certain investment arrangements discovered to be criminally fraudulent. This revenue procedure also describes how the Internal Revenue Service will treat a return that claims a deduction for such a loss and does not use the safe harbor treatment described in this revenue procedure.



SECTION 2. BACKGROUND

.01 The Service and Treasury Department are aware of investment arrangements that have been discovered to be fraudulent, resulting in significant losses to taxpayers. These arrangements often take the form of so-called "Ponzi" schemes, in which the party perpetrating the fraud receives cash or property from investors, purports to earn income for the investors, and reports to the investors income amounts that are wholly or partially fictitious. Payments, if any, of purported income or principal to investors are made from cash or property that other investors invested in the fraudulent arrangement. The party perpetrating the fraud criminally appropriates some or all of the investors' cash or property.

.02 Rev. Rul. 2009-9 , 2009 I.R.B (April 6, 2009), describes the proper income tax treatment for losses resulting from these Ponzi schemes.

.03 The Service and Treasury Department recognize that whether and when investors meet the requirements for claiming a theft loss for an investment in a Ponzi scheme are highly factual determinations that often cannot be made by taxpayers with certainty in the year the loss is discovered.

.04 In view of the number of investment arrangements recently discovered to be fraudulent and the extent of the potential losses, this revenue procedure provides an optional safe harbor under which qualified investors (as defined in § 4.03 of this revenue procedure) may treat a loss as a theft loss deduction when certain conditions are met. This treatment provides qualified investors with a uniform manner for determining their theft losses. In addition, this treatment avoids potentially difficult problems of proof in determining how much income reported in prior years was fictitious or a return of capital, and alleviates compliance and administrative burdens on both taxpayers and the Service.



SECTION 3. SCOPE

The safe harbor procedures of this revenue procedure apply to taxpayers that are qualified investors within the meaning of section 4.03 of this revenue procedure.



SECTION 4. DEFINITIONS

The following definitions apply solely for purposes of this revenue procedure.

.01 Specified fraudulent arrangement . A specified fraudulent arrangement is an arrangement in which a party (the lead figure) receives cash or property from investors; purports to earn income for the investors; reports income amounts to the investors that are partially or wholly fictitious; makes payments, if any, of purported income or principal to some investors from amounts that other investors invested in the fraudulent arrangement; and appropriates some or all of the investors' cash or property. For example, the fraudulent investment arrangement described in Rev. Rul. 2009-9 is a specified fraudulent arrangement.

.02 Qualified loss . A qualified loss is a loss resulting from a specified fraudulent arrangement in which, as a result of the conduct that caused the loss --

(1) The lead figure (or one of the lead figures, if more than one) was charged by indictment or information (not withdrawn or dismissed) under state or federal law with the commission of fraud, embezzlement or a similar crime that, if proven, would meet the definition of theft for purposes of § 165 of the Internal Revenue Code and § 1.165-8(d) of the Income Tax Regulations, under the law of the jurisdiction in which the theft occurred; or

(2) The lead figure was the subject of a state or federal criminal complaint (not withdrawn or dismissed) alleging the commission of a crime described in section 4.02(1) of this revenue procedure, and either -

(a) The complaint alleged an admission by the lead figure, or the execution of an affidavit by that person admitting the crime; or

(b) A receiver or trustee was appointed with respect to the arrangement or assets of the arrangement were frozen.

.03 Qualified investor . A qualified investor means a United States person, as defined in § 7701(a)(30) --

(1) That generally qualifies to deduct theft losses under § 165 and § 1.165-8 ;

(2) That did not have actual knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the investment arrangement prior to it becoming known to the general public;

(3) With respect to which the specified fraudulent arrangement is not a tax shelter, as defined in § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) ; and

(4) That transferred cash or property to a specified fraudulent arrangement. A qualified investor does not include a person that invested solely in a fund or other entity (separate from the investor for federal income tax purposes) that invested in the specified fraudulent arrangement. However, the fund or entity itself may be a qualified investor within the scope of this revenue procedure.

.04 Discovery year . A qualified investor's discovery year is the taxable year of the investor in which the indictment, information, or complaint described in section 4.02 of this revenue procedure is filed.

.05 Responsible group . Responsible group means, for any specified fraudulent arrangement, one or more of the following:

(1) The individual or individuals (including the lead figure) who conducted the specified fraudulent arrangement;

(2) Any investment vehicle or other entity that conducted the specified fraudulent arrangement, and employees, officers, or directors of that entity or entities;

(3) A liquidation, receivership, bankruptcy or similar estate established with respect to individuals or entities who conducted the specified fraudulent arrangement, in order to recover assets for the benefit of investors and creditors; or

(4) Parties that are subject to claims brought by a trustee, receiver, or other fiduciary on behalf of the liquidation, receivership, bankruptcy or similar estate described in section 4.05(3) of this revenue procedure.

.06 Qualified investment .

(1) Qualified investment means the excess, if any, of --

(a) The sum of --

(i) The total amount of cash, or the basis of property, that the qualified investor invested in the arrangement in all years; plus

(ii) The total amount of net income with respect to the specified fraudulent arrangement that, consistent with information received from the specified fraudulent arrangement, the qualified investor included in income for federal tax purposes for all taxable years prior to the discovery year, including taxable years for which a refund is barred by the statute of limitations; over

(b) The total amount of cash or property that the qualified investor withdrew in all years from the specified fraudulent arrangement (whether designated as income or principal).

(2) Qualified investment does not include any of the following --

(a) Amounts borrowed from the responsible group and invested in the specified fraudulent arrangement, to the extent the borrowed amounts were not repaid at the time the theft was discovered;

(b) Amounts such as fees that were paid to the responsible group and deducted for federal income tax purposes;

(c) Amounts reported to the qualified investor as taxable income that were not included in gross income on the investor's federal income tax returns; or

(d) Cash or property that the qualified investor invested in a fund or other entity (separate from the qualified investor for federal income tax purposes) that invested in a specified fraudulent arrangement.

.07 Actual recovery . Actual recovery means any amount a qualified investor actually receives in the discovery year from any source as reimbursement or recovery for the qualified loss.

.08 Potential insurance/SIPC recovery . Potential insurance/SIPC recovery means the sum of the amounts of all actual or potential claims for reimbursement for a qualified loss that, as of the last day of the discovery year, are attributable to --

(1) Insurance policies in the name of the qualified investor;

(2) Contractual arrangements other than insurance that guaranteed or otherwise protected against loss of the qualified investment; or

(3) Amounts payable from the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), as advances for customer claims under 15 U.S.C. § 78f ff-3(a) (the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 ), or by a similar entity under a similar provision.

.09 Potential direct recovery . Potential direct recovery means the amount of all actual or potential claims for recovery for a qualified loss, as of the last day of the discovery year, against the responsible group.

.10 Potential third-party recovery . Potential third-party recovery means the amount of all actual or potential claims for recovery for a qualified loss, as of the last day of the discovery year, that are not described in section 4.08 or 4.09 of this revenue procedure.



SECTION 5. APPLICATION

.01 In general . If a qualified investor follows the procedures described in section 6 of this revenue procedure, the Service will not challenge the following treatment by the qualified investor of a qualified loss --

(1) The loss is deducted as a theft loss;

(2) The taxable year in which the theft was discovered within the meaning of § 165(e) is the discovery year described in section 4.04 of this revenue procedure; and

(3) The amount of the deduction is the amount specified in section 5.02 of this revenue procedure.

.02 Amount to be deducted . The amount specified in this section 5.02 is calculated as follows --

(1) Multiply the amount of the qualified investment by --

(a) 95 percent, for a qualified investor that does not pursue any potential third-party recovery; or

(b) 75 percent, for a qualified investor that is pursuing or intends to pursue any potential third-party recovery; and

(2) Subtract from this product the sum of any actual recovery and any potential insurance/SIPC recovery.

The amount of the deduction calculated under this section 5.02 is not further reduced by potential direct recovery or potential third-party recovery.

.03 Future recoveries . The qualified investor may have income or an additional deduction in a year subsequent to the discovery year depending on the actual amount of the loss that is eventually recovered. See § 1.165-1(d) ; Rev. Rul. 2009-9 .



SECTION 6. PROCEDURE

.01 A qualified investor that uses the safe harbor treatment described in section 5 of this revenue procedure must -

(1) Mark "Revenue Procedure 2009-20 " at the top of the Form 4684, Casualties and Thefts, for the federal income tax return for the discovery year. The taxpayer must enter the "deductible theft loss" amount from line 10 in Part II of Appendix A of this revenue procedure on line 34, section B, Part I, of the Form 4684 and should not complete the remainder of section B, Part I, of the Form 4684;

(2) Complete and sign the statement provided in Appendix A of this revenue procedure; and

(3) Attach the executed statement provided in Appendix A of this revenue procedure to the qualified investor's timely filed (including extensions) federal income tax return for the discovery year. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, if, before April 17, 2009, the taxpayer has filed a return for the discovery year or an amended return for a prior year that is inconsistent with the safe harbor treatment provided by this revenue procedure, the taxpayer must indicate this fact on the executed statement and must attach the statement to the return (or amended return) for the discovery year that is consistent with the safe harbor treatment provided by this revenue procedure and that is filed on or before May 15, 2009.

.02 By executing the statement provided in Appendix A of this revenue procedure, the taxpayer agrees --

(1) Not to deduct in the discovery year any amount of the theft loss in excess of the deduction permitted by section 5 of this revenue procedure;

(2) Not to file returns or amended returns to exclude or recharacterize income reported with respect to the investment arrangement in taxable years preceding the discovery year;

(3) Not to apply the alternative computation in § 1341 with respect to the theft loss deduction allowed by this revenue procedure; and

(4) Not to apply the doctrine of equitable recoupment or the mitigation provisions in §§ 1311 -1314 with respect to income from the investment arrangement that was reported in taxable years that are otherwise barred by the period of limitations on filing a claim for refund under § 6511 .



SECTION 7. EFFECTIVE DATE

This revenue procedure applies to losses for which the discovery year is a taxable year beginning after December 31, 2007.



SECTION 8. TAXPAYERS THAT DO NOT USE THE SAFE HARBOR TREATMENT PROVIDED BY THIS REVENUE PROCEDURE

.01 A taxpayer that chooses not to apply the safe harbor treatment provided by this revenue procedure to a claimed theft loss is subject to all of the generally applicable provisions governing the deductibility of losses under § 165 . For example, a taxpayer seeking a theft loss deduction must establish that the loss was from theft and that the theft was discovered in the year the taxpayer claims the deduction. The taxpayer must also establish, through sufficient documentation, the amount of the claimed loss and must establish that no claim for reimbursement of any portion of the loss exists with respect to which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery in the taxable year in which the taxpayer claims the loss.

.02 A taxpayer that chooses not to apply the safe harbor treatment of this revenue procedure to a claimed theft loss and that files or amends federal income tax returns for years prior to the discovery year to exclude amounts reported as income to the taxpayer from the investment arrangement must establish that the amounts sought to be excluded in fact were not income that was actually or constructively received by the taxpayer (or accrued by the taxpayer, in the case of a taxpayer using an accrual method of accounting). However, provided a taxpayer can establish the amount of net income from the investment arrangement that was reported and included in the taxpayer's gross income consistent with information received from the specified fraudulent arrangement in taxable years for which the period of limitation on filing a claim for refund under § 6511 has expired, the Service will not challenge the taxpayer's inclusion of that amount in basis for determining the amount of any allowable theft loss, whether or not the income was genuine.

.03 Returns claiming theft loss deductions from fraudulent investment arrangements are subject to examination by the Service.



SECTION 9. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT

The collection of information contained in this revenue procedure has been reviewed and approved by the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3507) under control number 1545-0074. Please refer to the Paperwork Reduction Act statement accompanying Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for further information.



DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this revenue procedure is Norma Rotunno of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Income Tax & Accounting). For further information regarding this revenue procedure, contact Ms. Rotunno at (202) 622-7900.



APPENDIX A


Statement by Taxpayer Using the Procedures in Rev. Proc. 2009-20 to Determine a Theft Loss Deduction Related to a Fraudulent Investment Arrangement




Part 1. Identification

1. Name of Taxpayer ...

2. Taxpayer Identification Number ...



Part II. Computation of deduction

(See Rev. Proc. 2009-20 for the definitions of the terms used in this worksheet.)


____________________________________________________________________________________
Line Computation of Deductible Theft Loss Pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2009-20

____________________________________________________________________________________
1 Initial investment

____________________________________________________________________________________
2 Plus: Subsequent investments

____________________________________________________________________________________
3 Plus: Income reported in prior years

____________________________________________________________________________________
4 Less: Withdrawals ( )

____________________________________________________________________________________
5 Total qualified investment (combine lines 1 through 4)

____________________________________________________________________________________
6 Percentage of qualified investment (95% of line 5 for
investors with no potential third-party recovery; 75% of
line 5 for investors with potential third-party recovery)

____________________________________________________________________________________
7 Actual recovery

____________________________________________________________________________________
8 Potential insurance/SIPC recovery

____________________________________________________________________________________
9 Total recoveries (add lines 7 and 8) ( )

____________________________________________________________________________________
10 Deductible theft loss (line 6 minus line 9)

____________________________________________________________________________________




Part III. Required statements and declarations

1. I am claiming a theft loss deduction pursuant to Rev. Proc. 2009-20 from a specified fraudulent arrangement conducted by the following individual or entity (provide the name, address, and taxpayer identification number (if known)).
________________________________________


2 I have written documentation to support the amounts reported in Part II of this document.

3. I am a qualified investor as defined in § 4.03 of Rev. Proc. 2009-20 .

4. If I have determined the amount of my theft loss deduction under § 5.02(1)(a) of Rev. Proc. 2009-20 , I declare that I have not pursued and do not intend to pursue any potential third-party recovery, as that term is defined in § 4.10 of Rev. Proc. 2009-20 .

5. If I have already filed a return or amended return that does not satisfy the conditions in § 6.02 of Rev. Proc 2009-20 , I agree to all adjustments or actions that are necessary to comply with those conditions. The tax year or years for which I filed the return(s) or amended return(s) and the date(s) on which they were filed are as follows: ... ... ... ...



Part IV. Signature

I make the following agreements and declarations:

1. I agree to comply with the conditions and agreements set forth in Rev. Proc. 2009-20 and this document.

2. Under penalties of perjury, I declare that the information provided in Parts I-III of this document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, true, correct and complete.

Your signature here ... Date signed: ...

Your spouse's signature here ... Date signed: ...

Corporate Name ...

Corporate Officer's signature ...

Title ...

Date signed ...

Entity Name ...

S-corporation, Partnership, Limited Liability Company, Trust

Entity Officer's signature ...

Date signed ...

Signature of executor ...

Date signed ...

Labels:

Tuesday, March 17, 2009

excess compensation or dividend

The Menard case, uploaded below, [Menard, Inc., CA-7, 2009-1 USTC ¶50,270] U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit; 08-2125, March 10, 2009.
deals with when excess compensation is treated as a dividend. This is an issue that arises mostly in examinations of tax returns. Nevertheless, return preparers should be familiar with the issues. In appealing a Tax Court decision, the 7the Circuit determined that the Tax Court committed clear error when it determined that the compensation paid by a corporation to its Chief Executive Officer, who was also its controlling shareholder, was excessive, and that the compensation was a disguised dividend. The Tax Court acknowledged that the CEO's compensation was presumed reasonable, but ruled that the presumption was rebutted because the CEO's compensation greatly exceeded the compensation of the CEOs of other corporations involved in the same business. However, the Tax Court failed to consider the severance packages, retirement plans or perks of the other executives, especially where such considerations made an enormous difference to an executive's compensation. Undisputed evidence was presented that the CEO in this case did work that was delegated to staff in the other companies. He micromanaged his business, his board of directors was dependent on him and the amount of work he did was normally devolved upon two or more directors in publicly held companies.
Further, the Tax Court incorrectly regarded the CEO's compensation as a disguised dividend. The payment of a year-end bonus was not indicative of a "concealed" dividend because it was paid before the determination of the corporation's net income for the year, it was paid annually, not quarterly, and it was a percentage of net income, rather than a set dollar amount. Since there was an almost complete fusion of management and ownership in the corporation, the fact that no formal dividend was paid to the CEO could not result in treating any portion of the compensation as dividend. Finally, the Tax Court's opinion that a one-man corporation could not pay its CEO any salary and that owners did not need or deserve salaries because they would receive the profits of the business was rejected. For compensation purposes, a shareholder-employee should be treated like any other employee.




Reversing the Tax Court, 88 TCM 229, Dec. 55,746(M), TC Memo. 2004-207. Related decisions at 89 TCM 656, Dec. 55,904(M), TC Memo. 2005-3 and 130 TC 54, Dec. 57,336.




POSNER, Circuit Judge: The Internal Revenue Code allows a business to deduct from its taxable income a "reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered," 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1), or, as Treas. Reg. §1.162-7(a) adds, for "payments purely for services." Occasionally the Internal Revenue Service challenges the deduction of a corporate salary on the ground that it's really a dividend. A dividend, like salary, is taxable to the recipient, but unlike salary is not deductible from the corporation's taxable income. So by treating a dividend as salary, a corporation can reduce its income tax liability without increasing the income tax of the recipient. At least that was true in 1998, the tax year at issue in this case. As a result of a change in law in 2003, dividends are now taxed at a lower maximum rate than salaries --15 percent, versus 35 percent for salary. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11). This makes the tradeoff more complex; although the corporation avoids tax by treating the dividend as a salary, which is deductible, the employee pays a higher tax.

But depending on its tax bracket, the corporation may still save more in tax than the employee pays, and in that event, if the employee owns stock in the corporation, he may, depending on how much of the stock he owns, prefer dividends to be treated as salary. Menards' tax bracket in 1998 was, its brief tells us without contradiction, 35 percent. Had the new law been in effect then, the corporation, if unable to deduct the $17.5 million bonus, would have paid $6.1 million in additional income tax, while Mr. Menard, had he received the bonus as a dividend and thus paid 15 percent rather than 35 percent of it in tax, would have saved only $3.5 million.

Even before the change in the Internal Revenue Code, treating a dividend as salary was less likely to be attempted in a publicly held corporation, because if the CEO or other officers or employees receive dividends called salary beyond what they are entitled to by virtue of owning stock in the corporation, the other shareholders suffer. But in a closely held corporation, the owners might decide to take their dividends in the form of salary in order to beat the corporate income tax, and there would be no one to complain --except the Internal Revenue Service.

The usual case for forbidding the reclassification (for tax purposes) of dividends as salary is thus that "of a corporation having few shareholders, practically all of whom draw salaries," Treas. Reg. §1.162-7(b)(1), especially if the corporation does not pay dividends (as such) and some of the shareholders do no work for the corporation but merely cash a "salary" check. A difficult case --which is this case --is thus that of a corporation that pays a high salary to its CEO who works full time but is also the controlling shareholder. The Treasury regulation defines a "reasonable" salary as the amount that "would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises under like circumstances," § 1.162-7(b)(3), but that is not an operational standard. No two enterprises are alike and no two chief executive officers are alike, and anyway the comparison should be between the total compensation package of the CEOs being compared, and that requires consideration of deferred compensation, including severance packages, the amount of risk in the executives' compensation, and perks.

Courts have attempted to operationalize the Treasury's standard by considering multiple factors that relate to optimal compensation. E.g., Haffner's Service Stations, Inc. v. Commissioner, 326 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2003); Eberl's Claim Service, Inc. v. Commissioner, 249 F.3d 994, 999 (10th Cir. 2001); LabelGraphics, Inc. v. Commissioner, 221 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000); Alpha Medical, Inc. v. Commissioner, 172 F.3d 942, 946 (6th Cir. 1999); Rutter v. Commissioner, 853 F.2d 1267, 1271 (5th Cir. 1988). ( Alpha and Rutter each list nine factors.) We reviewed a number of these attempts in Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999), and concluded that they were too vague, and too difficult to operationalize, to be of much utility. Multifactor tests with no weight assigned to any factor are bad enough from the standpoint of providing an objective basis for a judicial decision, Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1993); Prussner v. United States, 896 F.2d 218, 224 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Palmer v. Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Borer, 412 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2005); multifactor tests when none of the factors is concrete are worse, and that is the character of most of the multifactor tests of excessive compensation. They include such semantic vapors as "the type and extent of the services rendered," "the scarcity of qualified employees," "the qualifications ... of the employee," his "contributions to the business venture," and "the peculiar characteristics of the employer's business."

All businesses are different, all CEOs are different, and all compensation packages for CEOs are different. In Exacto, in an effort to bring a modicum of objectivity to the determination of whether a corporate owner/employee's compensation is "reasonable," we created the presumption that "when ... the investors in his company are obtaining a far higher return than they had any reason to expect, [the owner/employee's] salary is presumptively reasonable." But we added that the presumption could be rebutted by evidence that the company's success was the result of extraneous factors, such as an unexpected discovery of oil under the company's land, or that the company intended to pay the owner/employee a disguised dividend rather than salary. 196 F.3d at 839. The strongest ground for rebuttal, which brings us back to the basic purpose of disallowing "unreasonable" compensation, is that the employee does no work for the corporation; he is merely a shareholder. See id.; cf. General Roofing & Insulation Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1981-667, 15-17 (1981). Other types of evidence that might rebut the Exacto presumption include evidence of a conflict of interest, though we'll see that such evidence is not always decisive. Also relevant is the relation between the executive's compensation that is challenged and the compensation of other executives in the company; for useful discussions see Rapco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 85 F.3d 950, 954-55 (2d Cir. 1996), and Elliots, Inc. v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983).

Comparison with the compensation of executives of other companies can be helpful if --but it is a big if --the comparison takes into account the details of the compensation package of each of the compared executives, and not just the bottom-line salary. This qualification will turn out to be critical in this case. For the Tax Court acknowledged that the presumption of reasonableness had been established but thought it rebutted by evidence that corporations in the same business as Menards paid their CEOs substantially less than Menards paid its CEO.

Menard, Inc. is a Wisconsin firm that under the name "Menards" sells hardware, building supplies, and related products through retail stores scattered throughout the Midwest. It had 138 stores in 1998 and was the third largest retail home improvement chain in the United States; only Home Depot and Lowe's were larger. It was founded by John Menard in 1962, and, at least through 1998, the tax year at issue in this case, he was the company's chief executive. (All the evidence in the record concerns his activities in that year.) Uncontradicted evidence depicts him as working 12 to 16 hours a day 6 or 7 days a week, taking only 7 days of vacation a year, working even while spending "personal time" with his family, involving himself in every detail of his firm's operations, and fixing everyone's compensation. Under his management Menards' revenues grew from $788 million in 1991 to $3.4 billion in 1998 and the company's taxable income from $59 million to $315 million. The company's rate of return on shareholders' equity that year was, according to the Internal Revenue Service's expert, 18.8 percent --higher than that of either Home Depot or Lowe's.

Menard owns all the voting shares in the company and 56 percent of the nonvoting shares, the rest being owned by members of his family, two of whom have senior positions in the company. Like the other executives of Menards, he is paid a modest base salary but participates along with them in a profit-sharing plan. In 1998, his salary was $157,500 and he received a profit-sharing bonus of $3,017,100, and the Tax Court did not suggest that there was anything amiss with these amounts. But the bulk of his compensation was in the form of a "5% bonus" that yielded him $17,467,800, as a result of which his total compensation for the year exceeded $20 million.

The 5% bonus program (5 percent of the company's net income before income taxes) was adopted in 1973 by the company's board of directors at the suggestion of the company's accounting firm, though there is no indication that the firm suggested a number rather than just advising the board that Mr. Menard should have his own bonus plan because of his commanding role in the management of the company. The board at the time included a shareholder who was not a member of Menard's family and he voted for the plan, which was still in force in 1998 and so far as we know had not been reexamined in the interim. That shareholder departed and the board in 1998 consisted of Menard, a younger brother of his who works for the company, and the company's treasurer.

There is no suggestion that any of the shareholders were disappointed that the company obtained a rate of return of "only" 18.8 percent or that the company's success in that year or any year has been due to windfall factors, such as the discovery of oil under the company's headquarters. But besides thinking Menard's compensation excessive, the Tax Court thought it was intended as a dividend. It thought this because Menard's entitlement to his 5 percent bonus was conditioned on his agreeing to reimburse the corporation should the deduction of the bonus from the corporation's taxable income be disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service or its Wisconsin counterpart and because 5 percent of corporate earnings year in and year out "looked" more like a dividend than like salary.

These are flimsy grounds. Given the fondness of the IRS and the Tax Court for a "totality of the circumstances" approach to determining excessive compensation, it was prudent (and incidentally not in Menard's personal financial interest) for the company to require him to reimburse it should the IRS successfully challenge the deduction. Nor does 5 percent of net corporate income look at all like a dividend. Dividends generally are specified dollar amounts --so many dollars per share --rather than a percentage of earnings. E.g., William L. Megginson, Scott B. Smart & Brian M. Lucey, Introduction to Corporate Finance 436-37 (2008); Harold Bierman, Jr. & Seymour Smidt, Financial Management for Decision Making 489 (2003); Angela Schneeman, The Law of Corporations and Other Business Organizations 320-21 (3d ed. 2002); Erich A. Helfert, Financial Analysis Tools and Techniques: A Guide for Managers 122 (2001); Jae K. Shim & Joel G. Siegel, Financial Management 285 (2000). When earnings fall, dividends may be cut, but they are cut from one fixed amount to another rather than made to vary continuously, as a percentage of earnings would do.

Paying a fixed (though occasionally altered) dividend provides the shareholder with a more predictable cash flow than if the dividend varied directly with corporate earnings, which fluctuate from year to year. It thus reduces the risk (variance) associated with ownership of common stock. Moreover, the reason for varying a manager's compensation with the company's profits is to increase his incentive to work intelligently and hard in order to increase those profits, and that reason has no application to a passive owner. Although tying compensation to the market value of the company's stock is criticized by some economists because of the many factors besides managerial effort and ability that influence the price of a publicly traded stock, stock in Menards is not publicly traded; probably it is not traded at all.

The most insignificant factor that the Tax Court thought indicative of a "concealed" dividend was that Menard's 5 percent bonus is paid at the end of each year. Well, it would have to be paid either at the end of the year, when the earnings for the year are known, or in installments throughout the year. Bonuses are usually paid in a lump, once a year, often at Christmas, but that would not be a feasible course for Menards to follow unless it closed for the following week, because its net income for the year wouldn't be determinable until the close of the last day of the year on which the store was open. Bonuses are more likely to be paid in single payments at or near the end of the year than dividends are; dividends usually are paid quarterly. William A. Rini, Fundamentals of the Securities Industry 13 (2003).

The court thought it suspicious that the board of directors that approved the 5 percent bonus in 1998 was controlled by Menard. But it could not be otherwise, since he is the only shareholder who is entitled to vote for members of the board of directors, as he owns all the voting shares in the company. The logic of the Tax Court's position is that a one-man corporation cannot pay its CEO (if he is that one man) any salary! The Tax Court has flirted with that strange logic, as we shall see.

A slightly better candidate for suspicion is that the board of directors had not sought outside advice on what appropriate compensation for Menard would be. But the only point of doing that would have been to provide some window dressing in the event of a challenge by the IRS. Menard doubtless has a strong opinion of what he is worth to his company and would not pay a compensation consultant to disagree.

It might seem that since Menards paid no formal dividend at all, some of Mr. Menard's compensation (and perhaps that of other executives as well) must be a dividend. But that is incorrect, as noted in the Elliots case that we cited earlier. 716 F.2d at 1244. Many corporations do not pay dividends but instead retain all their earnings in order to have more capital. One reason that publicly held corporations --that is, corporations in which ownership is diffuse, which may enable managers to pursue personal goals at the expense of shareholder welfare --usually do pay dividends is that it helps to discipline management by making it go outside the company for money for new ventures, thus forcing it to convince the capital markets that the ventures are likely to succeed. That reason for paying dividends has no application to a corporation like Menards in which there is an almost complete fusion of management and owner-ship.

The main focus of the Tax Court's decision was not on the issue of "concealed dividend" (that is, whether the company was acting in good faith in paying $17.5 million as a bonus rather than as a dividend); it was on whether Menard's compensation exceeded that of comparable CEOs in 1998 --that is, whether it was objectively excessive, and hence (in part) functionally if not intentionally a dividend rather than a bonus.

The CEO of Home Depot was paid that year only $2.8 million, though it is a much larger company than Menards; and the CEO of Lowe's, also a larger company, was paid $6.1 million. But salary is just the beginning of a meaningful comparison, because it is only one element of a compensation package. Of particular importance to this case is the amount of risk in the compensation structure. Risk in corporate compensation is significant in two respects. First, most people are risk averse, and the scholarly literature on corporate compensation suggests that risk aversion is actually an obstacle to efficient corporate management because managers tend to be more risk averse than shareholders. Shareholders can diversify the risk of a particular company by owning a diversified portfolio, but a manager tends to have most of his financial, reputational, and "specific human" capital tied up in his job. Robert Yalden et al., Business Organizations: Principles, Policies and Practice 698-99 (2008); Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation 19 (2006); Lance A. Berger & Dorothy R. Berger, The Compensation Handbook: A State-of-the-Art Guide to Compensation Strategy and Design 386-87 (4th ed. 2000); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 99-100 (1991). (By "specific human capital" economists mean the earnings that a worker obtains by virtue of skills, training, or experience specialized to the specific firm that he is working for.) So the riskier the compensation structure, other things being equal, the higher the executive's salary must be to compensate him for bearing the additional risk.

That is not a critical consideration in this case because, as we said, management and ownership in Menards are not divorced. But a second significance of risk in a compensation structure is fully applicable to this case. A risky compensation structure implies that the executive's salary is likely to vary substantially from year to year --high when the company has a good year, low when it has a bad one. Mr. Menard's average annual income may thus have been considerably less than $20 million --a possibility the Tax Court ignored. Had the corporation lost money in 1998, Menard's total compensation would have been only $157,500 --less than the salary of a federal judge --even if the loss had not been his fault. The 5 percent bonus plan was in effect for a quarter of a century before the IRS pounced; was it just waiting for Menard to have such a great year that the IRS would have a great-looking case?

Nor did the Tax Court consider the severance packages, retirement plans, or perks of the CEOs with whom it compared Menard (although it did take account of their stock options), even though such extras can make an enormous difference to an executive's compensation. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, "Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits," 1 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 291 (2004); Phred Dvorak, "Companies Cut Holes in CEOs' Golden Parachutes --New Disclosure Rules Prompt More Criticism of Guaranteed Payouts," Wall St. J., Sept. 15, 2008, p. B4. Just two years after Menard received his questioned $20 million, Robert Nardelli became CEO of Home Depot. In his slightly more than six years in that post he was paid $124 million in salary, exclusive of stock options; and when fired in 2007 (he was unpopular, and during his tenure the market capitalization of Home Depot increased negligibly --only to jump when his firing was announced), he received a much-criticized severance payment of $210 million (including the value of his stock options). He went on to become the CEO of Chrysler, where he is being paid $1 a year, thought by some observers to be generous. We wonder whether the IRS plans to challenge Menard's compensation for the years 2001 to 2006, using Nardelli's compensation package as a basis for comparison.

The Tax Court ruled that any compensation paid Menard in 1998 in excess of $7.1 million was excessive. The $7.1 million figure was arrived at by the following steps: (1) Divide Home Depot's return on investment (16.1 percent) by the compensation of Home Depot's CEO ($2,841,307). (2) Divide Menards' return on investment (18.8 percent) by the result of step (1). (3) Multiply the result of step (2) ($3,317,799) by 2.13, that being the ratio of the compensation of Lowe's' CEO to that of Home Depot's CEO. In words, the court allowed Menard to treat as salary slightly more than twice the salary he supposedly would have had if he had been Home Depot's CEO and if Home Depot had had as high a return on investment as Menards did. The judge's assumption was that rate of return drives CEO compensation except for random factors assumed to have the same effect on Menard's compensation as it did on that of Lowe's' CEO; for Lowe's paid its CEO more than twice as much as Home Depot paid its CEO even though Lowe's was a smaller company and its rate of return was lower.

This was an arbitrary as well as dizzying adjustment. It disregarded differences in the full compensation packages of the three executives being compared, differences in whatever challenges faced the companies in 1998, and differences in the responsibilities and performance of the three CEOs.

We have discussed risk; with regard to responsibilities there is incomplete information about the compensation paid other senior management of Menards besides Mr. Menard himself, and no information about the compensation paid the senior managements of Home Depot or Lowe's other than those companies' CEOs. The relevance of such information is that it might show that Menard was doing work that in other companies is delegated to staff, or conversely that staff was doing all the work and Menard was, in substance though not in form, clipping coupons. The former inference is far more likely, given the undisputed evidence of Menard's workaholic, micromanaging ways and the fact that Menards' board of directors is a tiny dependency of Mr. Menard. He does the work that in publicly held companies like Home Depot or Lowe's is done by boards that have more than two directors besides the CEO. Of course they are larger companies --Home Depot's revenues were seven times as great as Menards' in 1998 --so we would expect them to have more staff. But we are given no information on how much more staff they had.

We know that besides Menard himself, Menards --already a $3.4 billion company in 1998 --had only three corporate officers. The Tax Court thought it suspicious that they were modestly compensated --their total compensation in 1998 was only $350,000, and the highest-paid employee in the company after Menard himself --the senior merchandise manager --received total compensation of only $468,000. The Tax Court did not consider the possibility, which the evidence supports, that Menard really does do it all himself.

The Tax Court's opinion strangely remarks that because Mr. Menard owns the company he has all the incentive he needs to work hard, without the spur of a salary. In other words, reasonable compensation for Mr. Menard might be zero. How generous of the Tax Court nevertheless to allow Menards to deduct $7.1 million from its 1998 income for salary for Menard!

The Fifth Circuit has commented sensibly on the Tax Court's belief that owners don't need or deserve salaries: "the Tax Court questioned whether an incentive bonus tied to company performance is needed for an employee who is also a shareholder. Apparently, the argument is that such an employee already has sufficient incentive to make the business successful because as a shareholder he will receive the profits of the business anyway. This argument, however, misses the economic realities of the corporate form as taxed under the internal revenue code. For compensation purposes, the shareholder-employee should be treated like all other employees. If an incentive bonus would be appropriate for a nonshareholder-employee, there is no reason why a shareholder-employee should not be allowed to participate in the same manner. In essence, the shareholder-employee is treated as two distinct individuals for tax purposes: an independent investor and an employee." Owensby & Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1315, 1328 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, 716 F.2d at 1248.

The Tenth Circuit, it is true, remarked in Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 176, 182 (10th Cir. 1975), that "due to the identity between the predominant shareholder and the employee in our case we cannot accept the applicability of the 'incentive compensation' reasoning. Mrs. Joscelyn did not have a lack of such incentive. As owner of 248 of 250 shares she would profit from her hard work even without salary compensation. A bonus contract that might be reasonable if executed with an executive who is not a controlling shareholder may be viewed as unreasonable if made with a controlling shareholder, since incentive to the stockholder to call forth his best effort would not be needed." We do not agree, but we note that the court based its decision on a comparison between Mrs. Joscelyn's compensation and that of executives of other companies, rather than holding that a controlling shareholder may never receive a bonus. That would not make good sense. After all, bonuses do not only, or even primarily, reward motivation; they reward performance.

We conclude that in ruling that Menard's compensation was excessive in 1998, the Tax Court committed clear error, and its decision is therefore

REVERSED.
What Is Reasonable Compensation?: Each case decided on its own facts

Perhaps the most important single consideration in determining whether a deduction for compensation for personal services meets the statutory test of reasonableness is the rule that reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined for each case. Illustrative of the extent to which this is true is a comment that has frequently appeared at the beginning of the Tax Court's opinions: "The question is one of fact. The finding [as to the amount which constitutes reasonable compensation] which has been made is dispositive of the sole issue. It would serve no useful purpose to review the evidence or attempt to rationalize the conclusion reached."

Factors considered by the courts. The cases do provide a substantial amount of guidance, especially in connection with the factors most likely to be considered by the courts, and the weight given those factors in varying circumstances. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated in Mayson Manufacturing Co. ( 49-2 USTC ¶9467, ¶8637.744), "... it is well settled that several basic factors should be considered by the Court in reaching its decision in any particular case. Such factors include the employee's qualifications; the nature, extent and scope of the employee's work; the size and complexities of the business; a comparison of salaries paid with the gross income and the net income; the prevailing general economic conditions; comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders; the prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable concerns; the salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees; and, in the case of small corporations with a limited number of officers, the amount of compensation paid to the particular employee in previous years."

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Elliotts, Inc. ( 83-2 USTC ¶9610), ¶8637.241, divided the nine factors in Mayson Manufacturing ( ¶8637.744) into the following five broader categories: (1) employee's role in the company, (2) external comparison with other companies, (3) character and condition of the company, (4) potential conflicts of interest, and (5) internal consistency in compensation.

In Elliotts, the court also stated that when examining the reasonableness of compensation paid to a shareholder-employee, it is particularly helpful to examine the issue from the perspective of a hypothetical independent investor. For example, would a hypothetical independent investor be willing to compensate the employee as he was compensated? In RAPCO, Inc. ( 96-1 USTC ¶50,297, ¶8637.742), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted the Elliotts factors, examined from the perspective of an independent investor, as the appropriate standard to evaluate the reasonableness of employee compensation. In Dexsil Corp. ( 98-1 USTC ¶50,471), the Second Circuit vacated and remanded a Tax Court decision determining the reasonable compensation of an employee shareholder. The Tax Court's failure to assess the reasonableness of the employee's compensation from the perspective of a hypothetical or independent investor was found erroneous as a matter of law.

The independent investor test, as adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Exacto Spring Corporation ( 99-2 USTC ¶50,964, at ¶8637.227), completely replaces the multi-factor approach. The Seventh Circuit criticized the Tax Court's use of the seven-factor test to determine the reasonableness of compensation paid to the president and shareholder of an engineering corporation that designed and manufactured springs. According to the Seventh Circuit, the seven-factor test was flawed, in part, because it did not indicate the relative weight of the factors and invited the making of arbitrary decisions that resulted in unpredictability for corporations determining compensation levels. According to the Seventh Circuit, if a hypothetical independent investor would consider the rate of return on his investment in the taxpayer corporation higher than he would reasonably expect to receive, the compensation paid to the corporation's CEO is presumptively reasonable. The presumption is rebuttable if an extraordinary event is responsible for the company's profitability or the executive's position was merely titular. In a case appealable to the Seventh Circuit, the Tax Court held that the presumption could be rebutted, in accordance with Reg. §1.162-7, based on evidence of comparable publicly traded companies ( Menard, Inc., Dec. 55,746(M), at ¶8637.57).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applies the multifactor test set forth in Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Salina, Inc., CA-10, 76-1 USTC ¶9107, ¶8637.143, which looks to the following nine factors, with no one factor being decisive: (1) employee's qualifications, (2) nature, extent and scope of employee's work, (3) the size and complexities of the business, (4) the comparison of salaries with gross income and net income, (5) the prevailing economic conditions, (6) a comparison of salaries with distributions to shareholders, (8) the salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees, and (9) in the case of a small corporation with few employees, the amount of compensation paid to the particular employee in previous years. See also Eberle's Claim Service, Inc., CA-10, 2001-1 USTC ¶50,396, ¶8637.321. In applying the multifactor test of the Tenth Circuit, the Tax Court stated that the company's financial performance should be evaluated using elements of the independent investor test ( B & D Foundations, Inc., Dec. 54,505(M), ¶8637.171).

When the Tax Court is not required to follow the independent investor test, it will apply a multifactor test, through the lens of an independent investor ( Haffner's Service Stations, Inc., Dec. 54,644(M), ¶8637.28). On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit discussed the independent investor test in Exacto Spring Corporation, CA-7, 99-2 USTC ¶50,964, but stated that it felt multiple factors are often relevant. The factors the court found nominally most helpful were the general performance of the company and return on equity ( Haffner's Service Stations, Inc., CA-1, 2003-1 USTC¶50,333).

Evidence of salaries paid for similar services by comparable businesses is one of the most satisfactory tests, but is not essential. Thus, in Faucetten Co., Inc., Dec. 18,459, ( ¶8637.744), reasonableness of the compensation paid to three principal officers was established by evidence as to gross sales, net profits, capital investment, dividends paid, experience and ability of the officers, and the time devoted by them to the business.

One of the fundamental questions in a great many cases is whether or not the taxpayer has established a compensation level or formula designed to absorb most or all of the corporate income, with the objective of minimizing or eliminating any income tax liability of the corporation and avoiding the so-called double tax on corporate income. (The term "double tax" refers to the fact that corporate income is first taxed as income to the corporation and again as income to the stockholders when distributed to them.) This question arises in connection with closely held corporations in which the employee is also a stockholder.

As corporate income tax rates increase, the burden of paying additional compensation decreases because the higher tax rates reduce the portion of each additional compensation dollar that the corporation would have been able to retain for its own use.

Other factors. Some of the other factors presented by taxpayers or the IRS as appropriate for consideration in determining the reasonableness of a deduction have included the following (see ¶8637.744 and ¶8637.748).
Aggregate amounts deducted (not a basis for determining reasonableness of an individual salary). Gaestel Motor Co., Ltd., Dec. 15,590(M), Thompson Wire Co., Dec. 14,399(M)

Alternative basis of computation (fact that amount claimed could have been justified by another method, such as percentage of profits, is not conclusive if the method chosen is not designed as a proper method of computation). Pearl Royalty Co. Dec. 14,373(M)

Expert testimony (should be heard, and would include taxpayer's own employees, as well as those of other firms familiar with the operations of taxpayer). Builders' Steel Co., 52-1 USTC ¶9360

Gross profit (not an adequate measure of compensation properly payable). Bluefries-New York, Inc., Dec. 14,977(M)

Net income increase (not an adequate justification, where this is the only factor not already used in justification of a prior increase). Glenshaw Glass Co., Inc., Dec. 17,179, John Harsch Bronze & Foundry Co., Dec. 23,080(M), Lewis Food Co., 64-1 USTC ¶9386, Watertown Abattoir Co., Dec. 25,989(M). In each of the cases cited, the compensation payees were stockholders in addition to being corporate executives.

Predecessor's compensation (proper justification, including situation where one officer retires from business, and functions and compensation are allocated among remaining employees). Commerce Photo-Print Corp., Dec. 15,732(M)

Prior employment (not conclusive as to value to taxpayer, but pertinent). F.J. Ross Co., Inc., Dec. 2510

Ratio to rental receipts of predecessor partnership (did not indicate reasonableness of compensation). Amco Investment Co., Dec. 14,451(M)

Ratio to sales (low ratio is a "potent" argument for reasonableness, where compensation is paid to person largely responsible for product and volume). Pabst Air Conditioning Corp., Dec. 16,563(M)

Return on investment (reasonable return is a factor properly considered in connection with non-personal service business). Brooks Packing Co., Dec. 15,823(M), Schaberg-Dietrich Hardware Co., Dec. 15,670(M)

Royalties (fact that officer received no royalties on his patents for their use by corporation was noteworthy in allowance of 15% commission on officer's sales of patented machines manufactured by corporation). Overton Machine Co., Dec. 18,506(M)

Services as director (properly considered, where not compensated separately). Express Publishing Co. Dec. 14,329(M)

Factors that were held to have no bearing on reasonableness of compensation were the officer's procurement of financial aid from his own firm on behalf of the taxpayer and his firm's promotion of the taxpayer's products ( Texagon Mills, Inc., Dec. 18,299(M) ¶8587.2821).

Presumption. In most decisions, it is apparently assumed that a salary voted by the directors of a corporation is presumptively reasonable, although the rule is rarely referred to directly. Also, unless the compensation is unreasonable on other grounds, it is not important that the officer is also a stockholder. Both these rules are somewhat restricted in their applicability to close-held corporations, but it has been held that a taxpayer could deduct the full amount of compensation claimed as to four officers (three of whom held about 80 percent of its stock), even though there had been substantial increases in a two-year period, when large earnings remained after the deduction, the recipients were responsible for taxpayer's successful operations, and the compensation was not in effect a distribution of earnings as such ( Danly Machine Specialties, Inc., Dec. 14,827(M), ¶8637.709).

Each case stands upon its own facts, and each tax year stands upon the facts existing in that year. Findings made on the question of reasonableness of salaries in one year do not make res judicata the question of reasonableness of salaries in a subsequent year.

A more exhaustive compilation of the foregoing and other factors considered by the courts, the weight given them and their inter-relationship appears in the decisions on reasonableness of compensation, beginning at ¶8637.028.

Labels:

Monday, March 16, 2009

6694 regulations amended

Announcement 2009-15, I.R.B. 2009-11, 687

March 16, 2009

Code Sec. 6060

Code Sec. 6107

Code Sec. 6109

Code Sec. 6694

Code Sec. 6695

Code Sec. 6696

Code Sec. 7701

Tax return preparers : Definitions : Penalties : Standards : Calculation : Disclosure requirements : T.D. 9436, correction .



Tax Return Preparer Penalties Under Sections 6694 and 6695; Correction



Announcement 2009-15

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Correcting amendment.

SUMMARY: This document contains corrections to final regulations ( T.D. 9436 , 2009-3 I.R.B. 268) that were published in the Federal Register on Monday, December 22, 2008 (73 FR 78430) implementing amendments to the tax return preparer penalties under sections 6694 and 6695 of the Internal Revenue Code and related provisions under sections 6060 , 6107, 6109, 6696, and 7701(a)(36) reflecting amendments to the Code made by section 8246 of the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 and section 506 of the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008. The final regulations affect tax return preparers and provide guidance regarding the amended provisions.

DATES: This correction is effective January 29, 2009, and is applicable on December 22, 2008.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael E. Hara, (202) 622-4910, and Matthew S. Cooper, (202) 622-4940 (not toll-free numbers).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:



Background

The final regulations that are the subject of this document are under sections 6060 , 6107, 6109, 6694, 6695, 6696, and 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code.



Need for Correction

As published, final regulations ( T.D. 9436 ) contains errors that may prove to be misleading and are in need of clarification.

* * * * *



Correction of Publication

Accordingly, 26 CFR parts 1, 20, 25, 26, 31, 40, 41, 44, 53, 54, 55, 56, 156, 157, and 301 are corrected by making the following correcting amendments:



PART 1 --INCOME TAXES

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 2. Section 1.6107-1 is amended by revising paragraphs (d) (1) and (2) to read as follows:

§1.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return or claim for refund to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record.

* * * * *

(d) * * *

(1) For the civil penalty for failure to furnish a copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayers (or nontaxable entity) as required under paragraph (a) of this section, see section 6695(a) and § 1.6695-1(a) .

(2) For the civil penalty for failure to retain a copy of the return or claim for refund, or to retain a record as required under paragraph (b) of this section, see section 6695(d) and §1.6695-1(d) .

* * * * *

Par. 3. Section 1.6694-1 is amended as follows:

1. The first sentence of paragraph (b)(2) is revised.

2. The second sentence of paragraph (f)(4) Example 1. is revised.

3. The eighth sentence of paragraph (f)(4) Example 2. is revised.



§ 1.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparers.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(2) * * * If there is a signing tax return preparer within the meaning of §301.7701-15(b)(1) of this chapter within a firm, the signing tax return preparer generally will be considered the person who is primarily responsible for all of the positions on the return or claim for refund giving rise to an understatement unless, based upon credible information from any source, it is concluded that the signing tax return preparer is not primarily responsible for the position(s) on the return or claim for refund giving rise to an understatement. * * *

* * * * *

(f) * * *

(4) * * *

Example 1. * * * Of this amount, $20,000 relates to research and consultation regarding a transaction that is later reported on a return, and $1,000 is for the activities relating to the preparation of the return. * * *

Example 2. * * * Because K's signature as the signing tax return preparer is on the return, the IRS advises K that K may be subject to the section 6694(a) penalty. * * *

* * * * *

Par. 4. Section 1.6694-2 is amended by revising the last sentence of each paragraph (d)(1), (d)(2), and (d)(3)(ii) to read as follows:



§1.6694-2 Penalty for understatement due to an unreasonable position.

* * * * *

(d) * * *

(1) * * * For an exception to the section 6694(a) penalty for reasonable cause and good faith, see paragraph (e) of this section.

(2) * * * For purposes of determining whether the tax return preparer has a reasonable basis for a position, a tax return preparer may rely in good faith without verification upon information furnished by the taxpayer and information and advice furnished by another advisor, another tax return preparer, or other party (including another advisor or tax return preparer at the tax return preparer's firm), as provided in §§1.6694-1(e) and 1.6694-2(e)(5).

(3) * * *

(ii) * * * In addition, disclosure of a position is adequate in the case of a nonsigning tax return preparer if, with respect to that position, the tax return preparer complies with the provisions of paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(A) or (B) of this section, whichever is applicable.

* * * * *

Par. 5. Section 1.6694-3 is amended by revising the first two sentences of paragraph (c)(2) to read as follows:



§1.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct.

* * * * *

(c) * * *

(2) A tax return preparer is not considered to have recklessly or intentionally disregarded a rule or regulation if the position contrary to the rule or regulation has a reasonable basis as defined in §1.6694-2(d)(2) and is adequately disclosed in accordance with §§1.6694-2(d)(3)(i)(A) or (C) or 1.6694-2(d)(3)(ii). In the case of a position contrary to a regulation, the position must represent a good faith challenge to the validity of the regulation and, when disclosed in accordance with §§1.6694-2(d)(3)(i)(A) or (C) or 1.6694-2(d)(3)(ii), the tax return preparer must identify the regulation being challenged. * * *

* * * * *

Par. 6. Section 1.6695-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(2)(ii) to read as follows:



§1.6695-1 Other assessable penalties with respect to the preparation of tax returns for other persons.

(a) * * *

(2) * * *

(ii) In order faithfully to carry out their official duties, have so arranged their affairs that they have less than full knowledge of the property that they hold or of the debts for which they are responsible, if information is deleted from the copy in order to preserve or maintain this arrangement.

* * * * *

Par. 7. Section 1.6696-1 is amended by revising the introductory text of paragraph (g)(1)(i) to read as follows:



§1.6696-1 Claims for credit or refund by tax return preparers or appraisers.

* * * * *

(g) Time for filing claim. (1)(i) Except as provided in section 6694(c)(1) and § 1.6694-4(a)(4)(ii) and (5), and in section 6694(d) and §1.6694-1(d) :

* * * * *



PART 20 --ESTATE TAX; ESTATES OF DECEDENTS DYING AFTER AUGUST 16, 1954

Par. 8. The authority citation for part 20 is amended by revising an entry for Section 20.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 20.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 20.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Par. 9. Section 20.6694-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§20.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer.

(a) In general. For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of estate tax returns or claims for refund, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *



PART 25 --GIFT TAX; GIFTS MADE AFTER DECEMBER 31, 1954

Par. 10. The authority citation for part 25 is amended by revising an entry for Section 25.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 25.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 25.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Par. 11. Section 25.6694-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§25.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general. For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of gift tax returns or claims for refund, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *



PART 26 --GENERATION-SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX REGULATIONS UNDER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986

Par. 12. The authority citation for part 26 is amended by revising an entry for Section 26.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 26.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 26.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Par. 13. Section 26.6694-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§26.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general. For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of generation-skipping transfer tax returns or claims for refund, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *



PART 31 --EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND COLLECTION OF INCOME TAX AT THE SOURCE

Par. 14. The authority citation for part 31 is amended by removing an entry for Section 31.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Par. 15. Section 31.6694-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§31.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general. For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of employment tax returns or claims for refund of employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 16. Section 31.6694-3 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§31.6694-3 Penalty for understatement due to willful, reckless, or intentional conduct.

(a) In general. A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of employment tax under chapters 21 through 25 of subtitle C of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(b) of the Code in the manner stated in § 1.6694-3 of this chapter.

* * * * *



PART 40 --EXCISE TAX PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS

Par. 17. The authority citation for part 40 is amended by revising an entry for Section 40.6109-1 and removing an entry for Section 40.6695-2 in numerical order to read as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805 * * *

Section 40.6109-1 also issued under 26 U.S.C. 6109(a). * * *

Par. 18. Section 40.6060-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6060-1 Reporting requirements for tax return preparers.

(a) In general. A person that employs one or more tax return preparers to prepare a return or claim for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies other than for the person, at any time during a return period, shall satisfy the recordkeeping and inspection requirements in the manner stated in §1.6060-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 19. Section 40.6107-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6107-1 Tax return preparer must furnish copy of return to taxpayer and must retain a copy or record.

(a) In general. A person who is a signing tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies shall furnish a completed copy of the return or claim for refund to the taxpayer and retain a completed copy or record in the manner stated in §1.6107-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 20. Section 40.6109-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6109-1 Tax return preparers furnishing identifying numbers for returns or claims for refund.

(a) In general. Each return or claim for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies prepared by one or more signing tax return preparers must include the identifying number of the preparer required by §1.6695-1(b) of this chapter to sign the return or claim for refund in the manner stated in §1.6109-2 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 21. Section 40.6694-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6694-1 Section 6694 penalties applicable to tax return preparer .

(a) In general. For general definitions regarding section 6694 penalties applicable to preparers of returns or claims for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies, see §1.6694-1 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 22. Section 40.6694-2 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:



§40.6694-2 Penalties for understatement due to an unreasonable position.

(a) In general. A person who is a tax return preparer of any return or claim for refund of any tax to which this part 40 applies shall be subject to penalties under section 6694(a) in the manner stated in §1.6694-2 of this chapter.

* * * * *

Par. 23. Section 40.6694-3 is amended by revising paragrap