Thursday, April 30, 2009

new law on cancellation of indebedness income

American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009. Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5), at the election of the taxpayer, discharge of indebtedness income resulting from the reacquisition after December 31, 2008, and before January 1, 2011, of a corporate or business debt instrument is includible in gross income ratably over a five-tax-year period ( Code Sec. 108(i), added by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5)).
Income from Discharge of Indebtedness: Deferral of discharge of indebtedness income from reacquisition of debt instruments

At the election of the taxpayer, income from the discharge of indebtedness in connection with the reacquisition after December 31, 2008, and before January 1, 2011, of an applicable debt instrument is includible in gross income ratably over the five-tax-year period beginning with:
 The fifth tax year following the tax year in which the reacquisition occurs for a reacquisition occurring in 2009; and

 The fourth tax year following the tax year in which the reacquisition occurs for a reacquisition occurring in 2010 ( Code Sec. 108(i)(1), as added by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5)).

Deferral of deduction for OID in debt-for-debt exchanges. If a debt instrument is issued for the applicable debt instrument being reacquired (or is treated as issued under Code Sec. 108(e)(4), which concerns acquisition of indebtedness by a person related to the debtor), and there is any original issue discount (OID) with respect to the debt instrument:
 no deduction otherwise allowable shall be allowed to the issuer with respect to the portion of such OID which (a) accrues before the first tax year in the five-tax-year period in which income from the discharge of indebtedness attributable to the reacquisition of the debt instrument is includible in gross income, and does not exceed the income from the discharge of indebtedness with respect to the debt instrument being reacquired; and

 the aggregate amount of deductions disallowed shall be allowed as a deduction ratably over the five-tax-year period.

If the amount of OID accruing before the first tax year in which the OID income is to be recognized exceeds the income from the discharge of indebtedness with respect to the applicable debt instrument being reacquired, the deductions are be disallowed in the order in which the OID is accrued ( Code Sec. 108(i)(2)(A), as added by P.L. 111-5).

Deemed debt-for-debt exchanges. If any debt instrument is issued by an issuer and the proceeds are used directly or indirectly by the issuer to reacquire an applicable debt instrument of the issuer, the newly issued debt instrument is treated as issued for the debt instrument being reacquired. If only a portion of the proceeds from a debt instrument are used for this purpose, the deferral rules apply to the portion of any OID on the newly issued debt instrument which is equal to the portion of the proceeds from such instrument used to reacquire the outstanding instrument ( Code Sec. 108(i)(2)(B), as added by P.L. 111-5). Thus, if a taxpayer makes the deferral election for a debt-for-debt exchange in which the newly issued debt instrument issued (or deemed issued, including by operation of Reg. §1.108-2(g)) in satisfaction of an outstanding debt instrument of the debtor has OID, then any otherwise allowable deduction for OID with respect to such newly issued debt instrument that (a) accrues before the first year of the five-tax-year period in which the related, deferred discharge of indebtedness income is included in the gross income of the taxpayer, and (b) does not exceed such related, deferred discharge of indebtedness income, is deferred and allowed as a deduction ratably over the same five-tax-year period in which the deferred discharge of indebtedness income is included in gross income (Conference Committee Report for American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).

This rule can apply in certain cases when a debtor reacquires its debt for cash. If the taxpayer issues a debt instrument and the proceeds of such issuance are used to reacquire a debt instrument of the taxpayer, the newly issued debt instrument is treated as if it were issued in satisfaction of the retired debt instrument. If the newly issued debt instrument has OID, this rule applies. Thus, all or a portion of the interest deductions with respect to OID on the newly issued debt instrument are deferred into the five-tax-year period in which the discharge of indebtedness income is recognized. Where only a portion of the proceeds of a new issuance are used to satisfy outstanding debt, the deferral rule applies to the portion of the OID on the newly issued debt instrument that is equal to the portion of the proceeds of such newly issued instrument used to retire outstanding debt of the taxpayer (Conference Committee Report for American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).

Applicable debt instrument. An applicable debt instrument is any debt instrument issued by: (i) a C corporation, or (ii) any other person in connection with the conduct of a trade or business by such person ( Code Sec. 108(i)(3)(A), as added by P.L. 111-5). A debt instrument for these purposes is broadly defined to include bonds, debentures, notes, certificates, or any other instrument or contractual arrangement constituting indebtedness within the meaning of Code Sec. 1275(a)(1) (which excludes certain annuity contracts) ( Code Sec. 108(i)(3)(B), as added by P.L. 111-5).

Reacquisition. Reacquisition for these purposes includes any acquisition of an applicable debt instrument by (i) the debtor which issued (or is otherwise the obligor under) the debt instrument, or (ii) a related person to such debtor ( Code Sec. 108(i)(4)(A), as added by P.L. 111-5). The determination of whether a person is related to another person is made in the same manner as Code Sec. 108(e)(4) concerning acquisition of indebtedness by a person related to the debtor ( Code Sec. 108(i)(5)(A), as added by P.L. 111-5.

Acquisition. Acquisition for these purposes includes an acquisition of an applicable debt instrument for cash, the exchange of the debt instrument for another debt instrument (including an exchange resulting from a modification of the debt instrument), the exchange of the debt instrument for corporate stock or a partnership interest, the contribution of the debt instrument to capital, and the complete forgiveness of the indebtedness by the holder of the debt instrument ( Code Sec. 108(i)(4)(B), as added by P.L. 111-5).

Election. The election to defer OID income is to be made on an instrument by instrument basis. Once made, the election is irrevocable. A taxpayer makes an election with respect to a debt instrument by including with its return for the tax year in which the reacquisition of the debt instrument occurs a statement that: (a) clearly identifies the debt instrument, and (b) includes the amount of deferred income under this provision, plus any other information that may be prescribed by the IRS. The IRS is authorized to require reporting of the election (and other information with respect to the reacquisition) for years subsequent to the year of the reacquisition. In the case of a pass-through entity, such as a partnership or S corporation, the election is made at the entity level ( Code Sec. 108(i)(5)(B), as added by P.L. 111-5; Conference Committee Report for American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).

Coordination with other exclusions. If a taxpayer elects to defer discharge of indebtedness income, the exclusions for discharge under a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, when the taxpayer is insolvent, qualified farm indebtedness, and qualified real property business indebtedness ( Code Sec. 108(a)(1)(A), (B), (C) and (D))) do not apply to the income from the discharge of indebtedness for the tax year of the election or any subsequent tax year ( Code Sec. 108(i)(5)(C), as added by P.L. 111-5). Thus, for example, an insolvent taxpayer may elect to defer income from the discharge of indebtedness rather than excluding the income and reducing tax attributes by a corresponding amount (Conference Committee Report for American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).

Acceleration of deferred items. In the case of the death of the taxpayer, the liquidation or sale of substantially all the assets of the taxpayer (including in a title 11 bankruptcy or similar case), the cessation of business by the taxpayer, or similar circumstances, any item of income or deduction which is deferred (and has not previously been taken into account) must be taken into account in the tax year in which such event occurs (or in the case of a title 11 bankruptcy or similar case, the day before the petition is filed). This rule applies in the case of the sale or exchange or redemption of an interest in a partnership, S corporation, or other pass-through entity by a partner, shareholder, or other person holding an ownership interest in such entity ( Code Sec. 108(i)(5)(D), as added by P.L. 111-5).

Special rule for partnerships. In the case of a partnership, any income deferred under this provision is to be allocated to the partners in the partnership immediately before the discharge in the manner such amounts would have been included in the distributive shares of the partners under Code Sec. 704 if the income were recognized at such time. Any decrease in a partner's share of partnership liabilities as a result of such discharge is not be taken into account for purposes of Code Sec. 752 (concerning the treatment of certain liabilities) at the time of the discharge to the extent it would cause the partner to recognize gain under Code Sec. 731. Thus, the deemed distribution under Code Sec. 752 is deferred with respect to a partner to the extent it exceeds such partner's basis. Amounts so deferred are taken into account at the same time, and to the extent remaining in the same amount, as income deferred under the provision is recognized by the partner ( Code Sec. 108(i)(6), as added by P.L. 111-5; Conference Committee Report for American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009).

The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe rules and regulations regarding the application of this provision, including: (a) extending the application of the rules regarding the acceleration of deferred items to other circumstances where appropriate, (b) requiring reporting of the election (and such other information as the Secretary may require) on returns of tax for subsequent tax years, and (c) rules for the application of the provision to partnerships, S corporations, and other pass-through entities including for the allocation of deferred deductions ( Code Sec. 108(i)(7), as added by P.L. 111-5).

Treasury Working on Guidance for New Law Deferring Cancellation of Debt Income
Treasury Associate Tax Legislative Counsel Michael Novey stated on April 29 that the Treasury is actively working on guidance projects on cancellation of debt (COD) income (Code Sec. 108(i)) and applicable high-yield discount obligations (AHYDO) (Code Sec. 163(e)(5)(7)). Both provisions were enacted in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5). Speaking at a D.C. Bar program on the taxation of distressed debt, Novey said that the Treasury may publish initial guidance that can be done most quickly and follow this up with later guidance on other issues.


108(i) DEFERRAL AND RATABLE INCLUSION OF INCOME ARISING FROM BUSINESS INDEBTEDNESS DISCHARGED BY THE REACQUISITION OF A DEBT INSTRUMENT. --

108(i)(1) IN GENERAL. --At the election of the taxpayer, income from the discharge of indebtedness in connection with the reacquisition after December 31, 2008, and before January 1, 2011, of an applicable debt instrument shall be includible in gross income ratably over the 5-taxable-year period beginning with --

108(i)(1)(A) in the case of a reacquisition occurring in 2009, the fifth taxable year following the taxable year in which the reacquisition occurs, and

108(i)(1)(B) in the case of a reacquisition occurring in 2010, the fourth taxable year following the taxable year in which the reacquisition occurs.

108(i)(2) DEFERRAL OF DEDUCTION FOR ORIGINAL ISSUE DISCOUNT IN DEBT FOR DEBT EXCHANGES. --

108(i)(2)(A) IN GENERAL. --If, as part of a reacquisition to which paragraph (1) applies, any debt instrument is issued for the applicable debt instrument being reacquired (or is treated as so issued under subsection (e)(4) and the regulations thereunder) and there is any original issue discount determined under subpart A of part V of subchapter P of this chapter with respect to the debt instrument so issued --

108(i)(2)(A)(i) except as provided in clause (ii), no deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed to the issuer of such debt instrument with respect to the portion of such original issue discount which --

108(i)(2)(A)(i)(I) accrues before the 1st taxable year in the 5-taxable-year period in which income from the discharge of indebtedness attributable to the reacquisition of the debt instrument is includible under paragraph (1), and

108(i)(2)(A)(i)(II) does not exceed the income from the discharge of indebtedness with respect to the debt instrument being reacquired, and

108(i)(2)(A)(ii) the aggregate amount of deductions disallowed under clause (i) shall be allowed as a deduction ratably over the 5-taxable-year period described in clause (i)(I).

If the amount of the original issue discount accruing before such 1st taxable year exceeds the income from the discharge of indebtedness with respect to the applicable debt instrument being reacquired, the deductions shall be disallowed in the order in which the original issue discount is accrued.

108(i)(2)(B) DEEMED DEBT FOR DEBT EXCHANGES. --For purposes of subparagraph (A), if any debt instrument is issued by an issuer and the proceeds of such debt instrument are used directly or indirectly by the issuer to reacquire an applicable debt instrument of the issuer, the debt instrument so issued shall be treated as issued for the debt instrument being reacquired. If only a portion of the proceeds from a debt instrument are so used, the rules of subparagraph (A) shall apply to the portion of any original issue discount on the newly issued debt instrument which is equal to the portion of the proceeds from such instrument used to reacquire the outstanding instrument.

108(i)(3) APPLICABLE DEBT INSTRUMENT. --For purposes of this subsection --

108(i)(3)(A) APPLICABLE DEBT INSTRUMENT. --The term "applicable debt instrument" means any debt instrument which was issued by --

108(i)(3)(A)(i) a C corporation, or

108(i)(3)(A)(ii) any other person in connection with the conduct of a trade or business by such person.

108(i)(3)(B) DEBT INSTRUMENT. --The term "debt instrument" means a bond, debenture, note, certificate, or any other instrument or contractual arrangement constituting indebtedness (within the meaning of section 1275(a)(1)).

108(i)(4) REACQUISITION. --For purposes of this subsection --

108(i)(4)(A) IN GENERAL. --The term "reacquisition" means, with respect to any applicable debt instrument, any acquisition of the debt instrument by --

108(i)(4)(A)(i) the debtor which issued (or is otherwise the obligor under) the debt instrument, or

108(i)(4)(A)(ii) a related person to such debtor.

108(i)(4)(B) ACQUISITION. --The term "acquisition" shall, with respect to any applicable debt instrument, include an acquisition of the debt instrument for cash, the exchange of the debt instrument for another debt instrument (including an exchange resulting from a modification of the debt instrument), the exchange of the debt instrument for corporate stock or a partnership interest, and the contribution of the debt instrument to capital. Such term shall also include the complete forgiveness of the indebtedness by the holder of the debt instrument.

108(i)(5) OTHER DEFINITIONS AND RULES. --For purposes of this subsection --

108(i)(5)(A) RELATED PERSON. --The determination of whether a person is related to another person shall be made in the same manner as under subsection (e)(4).

108(i)(5)(B) ELECTION. --

108(i)(5)(B)(i) IN GENERAL. --An election under this subsection with respect to any applicable debt instrument shall be made by including with the return of tax imposed by chapter 1 for the taxable year in which the reacquisition of the debt instrument occurs a statement which --

108(i)(5)(B)(i)(I) clearly identifies such instrument, and

108(i)(5)(B)(i)(II) includes the amount of income to which paragraph (1) applies and such other information as the Secretary may prescribe.

108(i)(5)(B)(ii) ELECTION IRREVOCABLE. --Such election, once made, is irrevocable.

108(i)(5)(B)(iii) PASS- THRU ENTITIES. --In the case of a partnership, S corporation, or other pass-thru entity, the election under this subsection shall be made by the partnership, the S corporation, or other entity involved.

108(i)(5)(C) COORDINATION WITH OTHER EXCLUSIONS. --If a taxpayer elects to have this subsection apply to an applicable debt instrument, subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) of subsection (a)(1) shall not apply to the income from the discharge of such indebtedness for the taxable year of the election or any subsequent taxable year.

108(i)(5)(D) ACCELERATION OF DEFERRED ITEMS. --

108(i)(5)(D)(i) IN GENERAL. --In the case of the death of the taxpayer, the liquidation or sale of substantially all the assets of the taxpayer (including in a title 11 or similar case), the cessation of business by the taxpayer, or similar circumstances, any item of income or deduction which is deferred under this subsection (and has not previously been taken into account) shall be taken into account in the taxable year in which such event occurs (or in the case of a title 11 or similar case, the day before the petition is filed).

108(i)(5)(D)(ii) SPECIAL RULE FOR PASSTHRU ENTITIES. --The rule of clause (i) shall also apply in the case of the sale or exchange or redemption of an interest in a partnership, S corporation, or other passthru entity by a partner, shareholder, or other person holding an ownership interest in such entity.

108(i)(6) SPECIAL RULE FOR PARTNERSHIPS. --In the case of a partnership, any income deferred under this subsection shall be allocated to the partners in the partnership immediately before the discharge in the manner such amounts would have been included in the distributive shares of such partners under section 704 if such income were recognized at such time. Any decrease in a partner's share of partnership liabilities as a result of such discharge shall not be taken into account for purposes of section 752 at the time of the discharge to the extent it would cause the partner to recognize gain under section 731. Any decrease in partnership liabilities deferred under the preceding sentence shall be taken into account by such partner at the same time, and to the extent remaining in the same amount, as income deferred under this subsection is recognized.

108(i)(7) SECRETARIAL AUTHORITY. --The Secretary may prescribe such regulations, rules, or other guidance as may be necessary or appropriate for purposes of applying this subsection, including --

108(i)(7)(A) extending the application of the rules of paragraph (5)(D) to other circumstances where appropriate,

108(i)(7)(B) requiring reporting of the election (and such other information as the Secretary may require) on returns of tax for subsequent taxable years, and

108(i)(7)(C) rules for the application of this subsection to partnerships, S corporations, and other pass-thru entities, including for the allocation of deferred deductions.

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Wednesday, April 29, 2009

6694 and the Cohan rule

The Berg case, attached below raises substantiation issues where records are lost or unavailable. It is my opinion that if the section 6694 issue were at issue (e.g., a 2008 or 2009 tax year), there would be substantial 6694(b) $5,000 penalties because return preparers will be charged with the basic knowledge of whether the records exist. It is an easy fact to disclose from a client. With that in mind, read the Berg case. Business expense deductions were denied due to lack of substantiation. The burden of proof did not shift to the IRS with respect to substantiation of the individual's business expense deductions. The individual failed to cooperate with the IRS, did not maintain all records required by the federal tax laws and introduced no credible evidence to support his deductions. He also failed to overcome the statutory presumption of correctness that attached to the IRS's determinations regarding the deductibility of business expenses under Code Sec. 162(a). Despite knowledge of the IRS's determinations, he did nothing to locate his business records either before the IRS's proof of claim was filed or after he objected to the proof of claim, made no effort to recreate the records, provide third party verification of the expenses paid or compare the deductions of the finances of his law practice for the tax year at issue with those of prior years. He failed to show any reasonable cause for his substantial underpayment or that he acted in good faith..






In re Philip Jay Berg, Debtor.

U.S. Bankruptcy Court, East. Dist. Pa.; 05-39380DWS, April 1, 2009.



[ Code Sec. 6662]

Bankruptcy: Business deductions: : Burden of proof: Penalties, civil: Substantial underpayment of tax: Accuracy-related penalty: Negligence: Reasonable cause and good faith. --


ORDER


SIGMUND, United States Bankruptcy Judge: AND NOW, this 1st day of April 2009, upon consideration of the Debtor's Objection to Proof of Claim (the "Objection") filed by Department of Treasury-Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS"), after notice and evidentiary hearing and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion;

It is hereby ORDERED that the Objection is DENIED. The IRS' claim is allowed in the amount of $72,512.27 plus interest and penalties to date is allowed.


MEMORANDUM OPINION


Before the Court is the Debtor's Objection to Proof of Claim (the "Objection") filed by Department of Treasury- Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS"). After an evidentiary hearing held on January 28, 2009 and consideration of the parties' briefs, the Objection will be denied for the reasons set forth below.



BACKGROUND

Following a series of short-lived stopovers by the Debtor in Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 proceedings, this bankruptcy case, which was commenced on November 29, 2005, is concluding as a liquidation under Chapter 7. Because the value of the estate exceeds the allowed claims to be paid by the Chapter 7 trustee, the benefit of any reduction in claims inures to Debtor. Not surprisingly then, Debtor filed objections to numerous proofs of claim. The resolution of this Objection, deferred for many months as discussed below, is the only remaining one pending and therefore the only impediment to the completion of the case with a full recovery to all claimants.

The Proof of Claim and the Objection. While the IRS filed three proofs of claim, at issue here is the proof of claim dated August 25, 2006 (the "POC") asserting a claim in the amount of $72,512.27 (the "Claim"). 1 The Claim includes taxes (income and wage), interest and penalties for the tax years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. Exhibit D-3. The Objection, dated July 9, 2008, was short and to the point:
"The Debtor believes that the sums reflected on the IRS' proof of claim are incorrect. Notably, the claim asserts an estimated income tax liability for 2004 while the Debtor's 2004 federal income tax return is attached as Exhibit "B" indicating that no amount is due."

Doc. No. 403.

Debtor seeks disallowance of the POC because he filed a tax return for 2004 and the POC states that the IRS claim is for estimated liability. 2 Exhibit D-1. However, Debtor acknowledged at the hearing that he had received a 90-day notice of deficiency (the "Notice") from the IRS in January 2007 based on his filed 2004 return of which the IRS was well aware. Exhibit US-1. The Notice stated an income tax deficiency for 2004 of $27,854 plus penalties under 26 U.S.C. § 6651(a)(1) in the amount of $6,963.50 for a late filed return and under § 6662(a) in the amount of $5,570.88 for substantial underpayment. The Notice attached an itemization of Income Tax Examination Changes which memorialized the IRS' disallowance of most of the business deductions taken by the Debtor on his 2004 return. Moreover, it explained his available options and the procedure to challenge the IRS's determination. Id. 3

Clearly the issue was not the IRS's failure to observe that Debtor had filed a return. Not unexpectedly at the hearing, the basis of the Objection changed from the one lodged in the filed Objection to a challenge to the disallowed deductions. What has not changed is that the disputed claim is the 2004 income tax of $27,840.00 plus interest and penalties. 4

The Adjournments and Document Production. The initial listing of the Objection was on August 12, 2008. At that hearing Debtor's counsel advised me that he was informed that an audit was ongoing and a continuance was requested and granted. 5 After a fruitless follow-up hearing on September 16, 2008 at which the IRS did not appear due to lack of notice by Debtor's counsel, a hearing was held on October 14, 2008. The IRS expressed a willingness to reconsider the POC upon submission by Debtor of documentary support for the deductions he had taken against his income in the 2004 tax return which were disallowed after the audit. Debtor contended he had not had an opportunity to look for his documents, that the movement of his law practice in late September complicated the search as files were in warehouse storage and that he needed more time. While he had reached an agreement with the IRS for a 90-day continuance to produce documents and have the IRS examine them for a possible resolution, I was not comfortable with the length of the adjournment given the prejudicial effect on creditors awaiting their distribution. The IRS stated that its agreement for the adjournment was based on Debtor's representation that he has documents that would be provided and they would substantiate the deductions. When queried about the necessity for that amount of time, Debtor responded that he was tied up in "heavy litigation" and would not be able to undertake the search for three weeks and then would need three to four more weeks to complete it. Finding that level of effort unacceptable, I gave Debtor 30 days to produce and verify that he produced all the documents he had. He then bargained for and was granted six weeks. I continued the hearing until November 25, 2008 to monitor the document production.

At the hearing on November 25, 2008, Debtor reported a new problem. No longer looking for his documents in the warehouse, he stated he had turned to his accountant for the tax year 2004 for copies of all his supporting documents. 6 To his surprise, he could not locate him and asked for an additional month to keep trying. 7

By this hearing Debtor's requests for more time to locate his documents, including his explanations for why he had not been successful to date, had worn thin. Because IRS counsel had traveled from Washington, D.C. each time to no productive end, I scheduled a conference call on December 17, 2008 for a final report on the production of documents. I was at that time advised by his counsel that Debtor was unable to obtain any documents as his accountant had them all and he could not locate the man. Given the pendency of the Objection, I scheduled a final hearing on January 28, 2008 at which the parties were directed to appear and put on their cases. They were advised that there would be no further continuances as the adjournments served no purpose anymore. 8

The Evidentiary Record. It is undisputed that Debtor operated his law practice in 2004. Thus, Debtor argues it was improper for the IRS to disallow many of his business deductions in full. However, he produced no evidence as to what those deductions should be. Rather Debtor's attorney led him through his tax return, identifying various deductions and asking him to opine on whether they were "all legitimate." Not surprisingly, he looked at his Schedules A and C and concluded they were "fair and accurate," and he could not state any reason they should be disallowed. Tr. at 23-24. His authentication of individual expenses produced nothing other than his unsubstantiated view that his deductions were "legitimate." 9 The only specific point he made was that his 2004 deductions were completely in line with those taken on his 2001, 2002 and 2003 returns. He did not, however, produce those returns, state what the deductions were or compare the operations of his law practice in 2004 to these other periods. 10 Thus, his observation as to prior years had no probative effect.

Debtor also raised a generalized and conclusory objection to the FICA and FUTA tax components of the claim. While reluctant to state that the disallowance of the 2004 tax deductions was his only objection, it appeared that he had not given any thought to what else might have been objectionable in the POC. Indeed nothing else was mentioned in the filed Objection nor in any of the prior hearings. However, when pressed, he proffered a lukewarm and vague challenge to these other taxes. 11

Documentation. While it appears that the IRS left open the possibility that Debtor could produce documentation at the hearing that would enable it to examine the acceptability of the deductions he took to his 2004 income, 12 the Debtor clearly testified that he had not produced any supporting documents either prior to the hearing nor was he prepared to do so at the hearing. When questioned on the record about his efforts to produce substantiating documents, it was apparent that his search for the warehoused records, the original basis of the request for continuance after continuance, was cursory and indeed had been abandoned for the easier route of having them supplied by the accountant. Tr. at 35. He sought to justify his failure to look for his warehoused documents more than a "little" by the fact that his office building had been sold and the contents were now packed into five storage bins. 13 Thus, the focus of failure to substantiate his deductions with records became the disappearance of Marc Raiken, the accountant whom Debtor claimed had retained them after doing his tax returns. The credibility of that justification was challenged by the IRS which noted that Raiken's name does not appear on the 2004 tax return as tax preparer. Exhibit D-1.

Taking a new tack on the eve of the hearing, his mother was now proffered to supply evidence of the legitimacy of his deductions. He testified that Nissenbaum, although 87 years old at the time, had recorded all his expenditures using double entry bookkeeping and had kept complete records of every transaction that took place in his law firm for over 20 years. He "thought" she had a ledger and he "thought' she had supporting files in which she kept the supporting documents, none of which he could find because of the "hasty" move out of the office building. Tr. at 43. In Nissenbaum's absence, 14 Debtor testified that she told him that some of the records would be with Raiken and the rest in storage somewhere.

Acknowledging the absence of documents to support his deduction of business expenses, Debtor nonetheless contends that it was improper for the IRS to allow no deduction where it is apparent that, as he was operating his law practice in 2004, he would have had some quantum of business expenses that would qualify. The IRS contends that absent substantiation of his expenses, there is no means for it to determine what his expenses were and therefore there is no basis for it to establish allowable deductions.



DISCUSSION


I.


The legal principles that govern this dispute are very well established. It is often stated that "an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that the burden of clearly showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer." Indopco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) ( quoting prior Supreme Court cases). Moreover, the Commissioner's rulings are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the determinations are erroneous. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Since the IRS has provided no evidence in support of its proof of claim, the allocation of burdens of proof are significant in determining the outcome of this contested matter.


A.


Before addressing the real issue at hand, I will dispose of the initial argument Debtor's counsel raises in his brief. Boldly stating that the "IRS failed to give proper notice to the Debtor regarding any '"supposed" deficiency and/or disallowance of his deductions." Debtor's Brief in Support of Objection ("Debtor's Brief") at 5, the Debtor's testimony to the contrary is surprisingly overlooked. The IRS has produced the Notice, Exhibit US-1, which the Debtor admits receiving. It also produced Patricia Taylor, a revenue agent for the IRS, who explained the policies, procedures and practices with respect to examining income tax returns. She identified the Notice as setting forth the amount of the deficiency and penalty and providing the 90-day notice for the taxpayer to petition the Tax Court if he doesn't agree with the deficiency. This notice follows a 30-day notice where the taxpayer is afforded the opportunity to appeal to a revenue agent's supervisor about the stated deficiency. Debtor responded to neither notice. His challenge to receipt of the Notice of Deficiency now is contrary to his testimony and in any event, too little, too late.

This erroneous claim is followed by the unequivocal statement that there has been no assessment of 2004 taxes, a claim not made in the Objection or at the hearing. 15 Id. Debtor refers to a number of cases that discuss the probative effect of a Form 4380, Certificate of Assessment when an assessment is being challenged. They are persuasive for the issues in those cases, i.e., whether a procedurally defective assessment is an impediment to the collection action being pursued by the IRS. 16 Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35 (2000) which entailed a review of an IRS determination to proceed with collection of unpaid tax liabilities, is illustrative of this point. The Court expressly noted that the underlying tax liability was not at issue since the taxpayer, like Debtor here, had received a statutory notice of tax deficiency. Id. at 39. Thus it could not review the matter de novo. However, as the Commissioner cannot proceed with collection of taxes by way of a levy on a taxpayer's property unless notice and opportunity for hearing has been provided, the hearing entailed, inter alia, a review of the validity of the assessment. The Court concluded that the levy was proper since the Form 4380 "Certificates of Assessment" provided presumptive evidence of a valid assessment and no contrary evidence had been elicited. Since the issue in the case before me is claim allowance, i.e., liability, not collection, these decisions do nothing to advance Debtor's position even had the assessment been challenged or this issue otherwise properly raised. Leaving this red herring behind, I turn now to the real question: has liability been established?


B.


While the general rule, as stated above, places the burden on the taxpayer of proving the IRS' determinations wrong, both parties acknowledge the applicability of 26 U.S.C. § 7491(a) which may in appropriate circumstances shift the burden of proof to the IRS to establish the basis for its determination, i.e., the disallowance of the deductions. That section provides in pertinent part:
1) General Rule. - If, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secretary shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue.

Id. Credible evidence for the purpose of interpreting and applying § 7941(a)(1) has been held to be "the quality of evidence which, after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the issue if no contrary evidence were submitted (without regard to the judicial presumption of IRS correctness)." Griffin v. Comm'r, 315 F.3d 1017,1021 (8th Cir. 2003). 17

Without regard to the credibility of the evidence, paragraph (2) provides certain limitations on the applicability of paragraph (1), two of which are relevant here. Paragraph (1) shall only apply where (A) the taxpayer has complied with the requirements under this title to substantiate any item; and (B) the taxpayer has maintained all records required under this title and has cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secretary for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews. 26 U.S.C. 7491(a)(2). Thus, to shift the burden to the IRS to prove that the deductions are not allowable, the Debtor must provide (1) credible evidence to support his deductions; (2) have complied with the requirement to substantiate his deductions; and (3) must have maintained all records required by the Tax Code and cooperated with the IRS. Id. See also Evan v. Comm'r, 2004 WL 1730295, at *3 (U.S. Tax Ct. Aug. 3, 2004). The IRS contends none of these requirements have been met by Debtor. I agree.

The IRS points to a case comparable to the facts I have before me. In Kolbeck v. Commissioner, 2005 WL 2848030 (U.S. Tax Ct. Oct. 31, 2005), the taxpayer was unable to retrieve the records he used to prepare his tax return from the premises of his former office. In lieu thereof, he submitted an affidavit declaring that the entries on his Schedule C were accurate and correct. The IRS proposed to disallow all the expenses for lack of substantiation. A notice of deficiency was issued after he failed to attend the conference on his appeal. The Tax Court found that the affidavit he submitted was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 7491(a) that petitioner introduce credible evidence, substantiate his deductions and cooperate with the IRS. Id. at *2.

While the Tax Court recognized the requirement that a taxpayer must keep records to substantiate the amount of his deductions, 26 U.S.C. § 6001, 26 C.F.R. § 1.6001-1, it nonetheless noted that where certain expenses cannot be substantiated, they may be estimated. Id. ( citing Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1930)). 18 However, the Kolbeck Court stated, "there must be a sufficient evidence in the record to provide a basis for the estimate." Id. The taxpayer's statement that his records were destroyed and his sworn declaration that his Schedule C expenses were accurate were not adequate substantiation. In particular, the taxpayer made no effort to reconstruct his records or submit any documentation that would assist the court in evaluating the credibility of his statements or provide a basis to estimate the expenses. His testimony at trial was very general regarding his various categories of expenses and he offered insufficient detail to estimate expenses in those categories. See also Onarati v. Comm'r, 2005 WL 1693671, at *2 (U.S. Tax Ct. July 21, 2005) ( § 7491 not applicable where petitioner has failed to substantiate deductions and provide evidence other than his own testimony); Evan, 2004 WL 1730295 at *3 (burden not shifted as no credible evidence where substantiation consisted only of petitioner's oral or written testimony and no compliance with the substantiation and record-keeping requirements of the Tax Code); Higbee, 116 T.C. at 443-44 (burden of proof not placed on IRS where petitioner's self-generated receipts and other documents not credible evidence to substantiate the deductions).

As the recitation of the record evidences, the Debtor's testimony about his expenses was general and conclusory. While he repeatedly affirmed the accuracy and fairness of the deductions he took, he gave me no basis to confirm that was so. He failed to corroborate any expense or attempt to reconstruct any of his expenses, indeed stating with respect to his employees that the IRS could verify those expenses through their own records. While he asked for and was given extra time to locate his records which he claimed were available in storage, he made only the most meager effort to find them. Although I have no reason to doubt the disappearance of the accountant, that justification for non-production came belatedly and was again used to delay the hearing on the Objection. Until the end, he was seeking to avoid the hearing, belatedly claiming that his mother was a necessary witness. To the extent that cooperation is relevant in the § 7491(a) analysis, Debtor has failed to demonstrate a willingness to assist the IRS in coming to some reasoned conclusion about his expenses. Indeed when IRS counsel asked him how the IRS could fix his deductions, he had no answer, presumably other than to simply accept his numbers.

In response to the foregoing cases, Debtor cites Griffin v. Comm'r, 315 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2003) where the Court of Appeals reversed a Tax Court ruling that the taxpayers had not produced sufficient credible evidence to shift the burden to the IRS. The Tax Court had found that the taxpayer's testimony that he made the real property tax payments on behalf of his subchapter S corporation to protect his own real estate and construction business was not credible evidence. The appellate court found the taxpayer's testimony credible as to his need to pay the corporate taxes to preserve the integrity, good will and banking relationship of his personal business. The issue in Griffin was the availability of a personal deduction for an expense paid for the benefit of a corporation, not, as here, whether the expenses were paid. The legal issue turned on whether there was a legitimate basis for allowability, not the amount of the deduction. The appellate court found there was credible evidence of allowability and remanded the case to the Tax Court to resolve the merits under the shifted burden of proof. 19


II.


Having concluded that Debtor has not shifted the burden of proof to the IRS, I must now consider whether he has overcome the presumption of correctness that attaches to the Commissioner's determinations regarding the deductibility of business expenses that are permitted under 26 U.S.C. § 162(a). For the same reasons discussed above, I find that he has failed to do so. His only evidence in support of the deductions is his vague and conclusory testimony that they were "very appropriate." 20 He has failed to keep records as required by the Tax Code and regulations and while estimation is permissible under appropriate circumstances where records are lost or unavailable, there is no foundation or basis for an estimation here.

The Debtor contends that since it is undisputed that he operated a business, it is undisputed that he had business expenses. The argument begs the questions. What and how much were the expenses? While Debtor in his brief recognizes that the court must have a basis upon which to make an estimate, his conclusion that his testimony provided that basis is misguided. There is simply no evidence on this record which would allow me to determine the allowed deductions. Nor am I persuaded that the decision of the Bankruptcy Court in In re Lester, 51 B.R. 289 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985), cited by Debtor, compels a different outcome. In Lester, the debtors had kept almost no business records until they were audited in 1982. Afterwards they kept a "log" of their expenses but no underlying documents until late 1983 when they began to pay their business expenses by check and retain related documents. They then hired a certified public accountant to prepare an unaudited financial statement for 1983 and, significantly, an estimated business expense schedule for 1980 and 1981, the tax years being challenged. The court concluded:
This Court agrees with the Cohan Court and finds that it is error to completely disallow expenses where it is evident that money has been spent in order to operate a business and generate taxable income. Therefore, the question in this case becomes whether the method of expense reconstruction offered by the Debtors to establish their tax liability for the years in question, represents a reasonable basis for estimating their 1980 and 1981 tax liability. This Court is satisfied that the estimated business expenses, net income and tax liability calculated and offered by William J. Forbes, C.P.A. are reasonable and will be accepted by this Court in light of the narrow facts of this case.

Id. at 291 (emphasis added). Debtor seizes upon the Lester Court's conclusion that wholesale disallowance is unwarranted where it is evident that money has been spent and fails to recognize that there must also be a reasonable basis to estimate the tax liability. In Lester, where the debtors proffered estimated expenses, net income and tax liability calculated by a certified public accountant, a reasonable basis was found. This is a far cry from the Debtor's testimony that his deductions were consistent with those taken in prior years. No reasonable basis is present here.


III.


As noted above, the IRS seeks penalties under both §§ 6651(a)(1) 21 and 6662(a). 22 While objecting to the imposition of any penalties, the Debtor only addresses the IRS's entitlement to penalties under § 6662(a), commonly referred to as the accuracy-related penalty. Debtor's Brief at 12-13. The IRS contends that this penalty is applicable due to Debtor's substantial underpayment of taxes resulting from negligence or disregard of the tax rules or regulations. 23 Citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3(b)(1), it avers that Debtor's failure to keep proper records or substantiate reported expenses was negligent. Negligence for the purpose of this statutory provision is defined to include "any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply" with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code; the term "'disregard' includes any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard." 26 U.S.C. § 6662(c).

Section 7491(c) places the burden on the IRS to establish the imposition of any penalty, i.e., the Commissioner must come forward with sufficient evidence that it is appropriate to impose a penalty. 24 The accuracy-related penalty will not apply as to any portion of the understatement as to which the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4. The determination of reasonable cause and good faith depends on all the pertinent facts and circumstances. Higbee, 116 T.C. at 448 ( citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664(b)(1)). The Higbee Court identified relevant factors to that determination to include "the taxpayer's efforts to assess his proper tax liability, including the taxpayer's reasonable good faith reliance on the advice of a professional such as an accountant." Id.

Significantly, the legislative history of § 7491(c), that imposes the initial burden of production on the IRS where penalties are imposed, recognizes that reasonable cause and good faith are defenses as to which the IRS need not produce evidence. Higbee, 116 T.C. at 446 ( quoting H.Conf.Rept. 105-599, at 241 (1998)). Rather once the IRS meets its burden of production, the burden shifts to the taxpayer to produce evidence to show that the IRS determination was incorrect or that reasonable cause or good faith should excuse the penalty. Against this statutory framework, I must consider the parties' respective positions.

Faced with the record as discussed above, the Debtor simply argues once again that he deducted all his reasonable expenses for the costs of running his law practice and the IRS produced no evidence to the contrary. The Debtor misunderstands the law in resting on the absence of IRS evidence to avoid the imposition of penalties. The IRS did not have, as he insists, a "burden of proof" but rather burden of production. I have already determined that on this record the IRS has established a $27,000 understatement of income taxes because the Debtor failed to meet his burden to overcome the statutory presumption of correctness that obtains to the Commissioner's rulings. I also found that the Debtor failed to maintain records of his expenses and failed to substantiate the deductions he has applied to his 2004 return. The IRS thus met its burden of production, and the burden then shifts to the Debtor to establish reasonable cause or good faith.

If the touchstone of negligence is whether the taxpayer has made a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, then Debtor's efforts to assess his proper tax liability by substantiating his deductions is the measure of reasonable cause. Debtor has been aware since the Notice was issued in January 2007 that the IRS was questioning his business expense deductions. He is a litigation attorney and is aware more than most of the need to support a position that is being challenged. He did nothing to locate his business records prior to the IRS's proof of claim being filed. He did nothing to segregate the records at the time he vacated his office space even though he knew of the IRS's determination. He continued to do nothing to locate his business records after he objected to the proof of claim and put the amount of those deductions at issue. Once the Claim Objection was scheduled for hearing, he made, by his own admission, little effort to locate the records in his storage bins. The only effort that the Debtor made was to secure continuances- first allegedly to search for documents in storage, then to find the missing accountant who he claimed had the records that he previously said were in storage, then to have his mother testify, even though she would only state that they were in storage or with the accountant. Even assuming this was a credible explanation for the absence of his supporting documentation, it does not explain why no other effort was made to recreate the records, provide third party verification of the expenses paid or at a minimum, testify about the finances of the practice in 2004 versus prior years and compare the deductions taken. The Debtor did nothing, inexplicably resting on the theory that an operating business has expenses so his deductions had to be accepted. This is not a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Tax Code and evidences at best a carelessness that equates to disregard. As Debtor has not established reasonable cause or that he acted in good faith with respect to the underpayment, the penalty will stand.



CONCLUSION

Since it is the Debtor's burden to prove the amount of his expenses in order to substantiate his deductions and since he has failed to provide anything other than generalized and self-serving testimony, I am compelled to overrule the Claim Objection. Moreover, I conclude that the IRS has met its burden to establish negligence and disregard in connection with the substantial underpayment so as to warrant the penalty imposed. An Order consistent with the foregoing Memorandum Opinion shall be entered.

1 The Claim was allocated as follows: secured - $19,433.85; priority-$37,108.90; and unsecured- $15,969.52. Since all creditors will be paid in full, the claim classification is irrelevant in this case.

Also not relevant is the first proof of claim dated January 19, 2006, Exhibit D-2, which was amended and superceded by the POC. The third proof of claim, Exhibit D-3, was filed on December 8, 2008 during the pendency of the Objection. It increased the amount sought by reason of increased interest and penalties for nonpayment and increased FICA and FUTA taxes for the period ending 12/31/05 following an assessment on 3/31/08 and 3/17/08 respectively. Debtor never filed an Objection to the third proof of claim.

2 At the time the POC was filed the audit had not been completed and reference was made to an "estimated liability." When the audit was completed and absent any substantiating documents to controvert the disallowances, the proof of claim only changed by $14. However, the IRS did not amend the POC to strike the "estimated liability" reference. The POC was finally amended in December as noted above and, inter alia, removed that reference.

3 While Debtor recalled receiving the Notice, he thought he probably just turned it over to his accountant or to his mother Rebecca Berg Nissenbaum ( "Nissenbaum") who has served as his bookkeeper for 28 years. He had no recollection of responding to it.

4 Although Debtor objects to the total amount of the penalty, his only basis for the challenge is that the § 6662(a) penalty is unwarranted. See p. 18-19 infra.

5 I have listened to the recordings of the proceedings in this contested matter on all the dates that they were scheduled. As it were, counsel's information was incorrect; the IRS audit was completed shortly after the POC was filed. Moreover, while his counsel was apparently not aware, Debtor had already been sent a Notice of Deficiency on January 9, 2007. See supra.

6 Since Debtor later testified that it was Nissenbaum who turned over the financial data necessary for preparation of his returns to the accountant, it would appear that Debtor would not know whether the documents were ever given to the accountant, if given, whether they were returned by him and if kept, whether he would have retained them for five years.

7 He stated that the accountant's phone was disconnected and Debtor sent him a certified letter to see if he was at his last known address. He said he would get the return receipt back in several weeks. I suggested that it might be quicker if he just drove over to his office which he later stated he did to no avail.

8 Notwithstanding this advice, on the day before the hearing, Debtor's counsel left a voice mail request to my deputy clerk for a continuance. He stated that he had just heard from Debtor who informed him that his brother, who was the person who took care of all his tax papers, died. His counsel was advised that there would be no continuance unless Debtor was in mourning. As it turned out, his brother died on December 6, 2007 and the death was not an impediment to Debtor's appearance. However, the adjournment request was repeated through a memo to Debtor's counsel from Debtor which was dropped off at the intake counter for my deputy the morning of the hearing. Court-1. The memo now reported that Nissenbaum, his 91 year old mother (whose name had never surfaced before as having any relevant knowledge or role in this matter), had been hospitalized and could not testify as to her knowledge as Debtor's bookkeeper since 1985. The adjournment request, which was denied again, was repeated at the commencement of the hearing and denied again. I did agree to keep the record open if based on the Debtor's testimony I concluded that Nissenbaum had relevant information to his cause. At the conclusion of the hearing, IRS counsel stated that she had no need to examine Nissenbaum and would accept Debtor's testimony as to Nissenbaum's bookkeeping skills and practices as true without corroboration, finding the testimony irrelevant. I asked Debtor whether if I assumed and therefore found that Nissenbaum would corroborate his testimony, he wished to compel his mother to testify. After conferring with counsel, he stated that the testimony would not be necessary, and the record was then closed.

9 For example, with respect to salaries for the people who worked for him, he stated that they were "very legit" and "are very traceable." He did not attempt to do so. Referring to his car and truck expenses, he confirmed that his law practice required him to drive throughout the southeastern Pennsylvania region and the driving expenses and automobile insurance would be "legitimate." He confirmed that he had office expenses, including the rental of "normal things to operate an office' where he probably had 10 people working. He stated he had a building and therefore had repairs and maintenance expenses. He stated that he had to buy supplies and concluded that $2,068 deduction was very reasonable. He also confirmed that he had travel and entertainment expenses, such as when he would go to court, would buy the lunch and would get reimbursed later. That would appear in a different spot. Finally he examined his deduction for utilities and once again concluded that these were very legitimate expenses. Tr. at 25-28.

10 On the contrary, he testified that after the events of 9/11 his law practice changed drastically since insurance companies had "tightened their grips" on all kinds of payments. After the year 2001, he shifted from a mainly personal injury practice which is based on contingent fee arrangements to a fee for service practice. Tr. at 24. How that impacted on his expenses and the scale of his practice which he acknowledged had resulted in a diminished income that compelled his bankruptcy filing in 2005 was not addressed.

11 I assume that this newly raised objection prompted the IRS to attach the Debtor's 941 forms to its brief in rebuttal to Debtor's contention that he had paid the taxes that were being levied. I agree with Debtor that the documents are not admissible as evidence as exhibits attached to briefs not admitted into evidence will not be considered. In re MacDonald, 222 B.R. 69, 72 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998); In the Matter of Holly's, Inc., 190 B.R. 297, 301 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1995). Had the IRS moved to open the record to rebut this testimony, I would have allowed it since the IRS had no notice that the 941 wage taxes were being challenged. However, to the extent the objection to the payroll taxes was properly before me, something I question, Debtor's testimony does not have sufficient substance to shift the burden to the IRS to require any evidentiary support.

12 In fact, IRS counsel advised that she was accompanied by a revenue agent in the event Debtor produced documents and it was prepared to examine them at that juncture. Tr. at 59.

13 Debtor appears to have lost sight of my judicial oversight of that sale and the accommodations that were provided to him for an orderly vacation of his office. See Stipulated Order dated April 19, 2007, Doc. No. 259. Moreover, when he moved out of the office, the IRS's Notice of Deficiency had already been issued so it can be no surprise that he would have to support his deductions and would need his documents which he was required by law to retain.

14 The questionable utility of Nissenbaum's testimony as an unbiased corroborating witness as compared to the delay inherent in waiting for her illness to resolve for a court appearance prompted my request to the IRS as to whether it would assume Debtor's account of Nissenbaum's role in the record keeping (which the IRS failed to object to as hearsay) would be the testimony she would actually give. IRS counsel stated she believed Nissenbaum's testimony was not relevant and would accept Debtor's proffer.

15 It is therefore not surprising that the IRS responded by stating it would file the Form 4380 that the Debtor notes conclusively establishes an assessment which is presumed correct and valid absent any credible evidence to the contrary. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Debtor ever requested a copy of the assessment.

16 For example, in Guthrie v. Sawyer, 970 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1992), the taxpayer contended that the tax liens against them were invalid because the IRS failed to establish procedurally proper assessments had been executed against them. In United States v. Tempelman, 111 F.Supp.2d 85 (D. N.H. 2000), the IRS sought to reduce to judgment federal tax assessments and to foreclose federal tax liens. The Court noted that a federal tax lien arises when three conditions are satisfied, the making of the assessment, the notice of the assessment and the failure to pay the amount demanded. Id. at 90. Both Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35 (2000) and United States of America v. Estabrook, 78 F.Supp.2d 558 (N.D. Tex. 1999) were collection cases.

17 The quoted language is derived from the legislative history of § 7491(a). Higbee v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 438, 442 (2001) ( quoting H.Conf.Rep. 105-599, at 240-241 (1998). As § 7491(a) was only added to the Tax Code in 1998, many of the cases cited by the parties do not apply this provision.

18 The Cohan rule does not apply to certain expenses, such as cell phones, automobiles and trucks, which are governed by the strict substantiation requirement of § 274(d). Certain, but not all, of Debtor's expenses belong to this category. However, as I find Debtor to have provided no basis to estimate his expenses at all, I need not distinguish this group.

19 Debtor also cited Gale v. Commissioner, 2002 WL 273164 (Tax Court Feb. 27. 2002) and Tanner v. Commissioner, 65 Fed.Appx. 508, 2003 WL 19922926 (5th Cir. March 23, 2003). Neither support his position. In Gale, the Court expressly found that the shifting burden of § 7491 did not apply since the examination commenced before its effective date of July 22, 1998, and placed the burden on the taxpayer. In Tanner, the notice of deficiency was based on unreported income from the exercise of stock options which was supported by a corporate filing. The appellate court affirmed the Tax Court's finding that the petitioner had not shifted the burden under § 7491 because the taxpayer did not provide any evidence to dispute the operative facts.

20 Thus the record bears no resemblance to the facts of Demkowicz v. Commissioner, 551 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1977). In Demkowicz, the Court held that the Tax Court was not bound to accept a taxpayer's uncontroverted testimony if it found the testimony to be improbable, unreasonable or questionable. The issue was unreported income, i.e., proceeds of a corporate loan diverted to the personal use of the principal. The Tax Court concluded that the testimony, in the absence of corroborative evidence, was insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness. The Third Circuit reversed finding the taxpayer's evidence, i.e., a bank statement showing the withdrawals and the taxpayer's testimony of the use of the funds and unequivocal denial of any personal benefit from the proceeds, to be sufficient to shift the burden. I agree with the appellate decisions that have construed Demkowicz to be limited to the issue of proof of receipt of funds determined to be income which could be established by such testimony and not explanation of the expediture of the funds which would require further evidence to shift the burden. Liddy v. Commissioner, 808 F.2d 312, 315 (5th Cir. 1986). See also Laney v. Commissioner, 674 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1982). In any event, I cannot conceive that uncorroborated taxpayer testimony of the reasonableness or accuracy of deductions would shift the burden to the IRS since it would swallow the statutory requirement that a taxpayer keep records to establish the amount of his deductions. 26 U.S.C. § 6001, 26 C.F.R. § 1.6001-1. Consistent with Demkowicz, I believe the Third Circuit would find Debtor's testimony, in the context of allowability of deductions, to be insufficient.

21 Section 6651(a)(1) provides:
(a) Addition to the tax. --In case of failure --

(1) to file any return required ..., on the date prescribed therefor (determined with regard to any extension of time for filing), unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount required to be shown as tax on such return 5 percent of the amount of such tax if the failure is for not more than 1 month, with an additional 5 percent for each additional month or fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate;

Debtor does not dispute the IRS's determination of a late filing. While Debtor failed to date his return, the time-stamped copy shows a date stamp of February 22, 2006. Exhibit D-1.

22 Section 6662(a) provides as follows:

(a) Imposition of penalty. --If this section applies to any portion of an underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return, there shall be added to the tax an amount equal to 20 percent of the portion of the underpayment to which this section applies.

(b) Portion of underpayment to which section applies. --This section shall apply to the portion of any underpayment which is attributable to 1 or more of the following:

(1) Negligence or disregard of rules or regulations.

(2) Any substantial understatement of income tax.

(3) Any substantial valuation misstatement under chapter 1.

(4) Any substantial overstatement of pension liabilities.

(5) Any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement.

Subparagraphs (b)(1) and (2) are relied upon by the IRS.

23 Substantiality of the underpayment is apparent from the record and in any event is not challenged.

24 That section provides with respect to penalties:

--Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the Secretary shall have the burden of production in any court proceeding with respect to the liability of any individual for any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount imposed by this title.

Labels:

Monday, April 27, 2009

New Statute - section 6676

A taxpayer filing a refund or credit claim for an "excessive amount" is subject to a penalty equal to 20 percent of such excessive amount ( Code Sec. 6676(a), added by the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-28). For this purpose, an excessive amount is the amount by which the refund or credit claim exceeds the amount allowable under the Code for the tax year ( Code Sec. 6676(b), added by P.L. 110-28).

The penalty is not imposed if the taxpayer can show that there is a reasonable basis for claiming the excessive refund or credit amount. In addition, the penalty does not apply to claims for refunds or credits related to the earned income credit since such claims are governed by a separate set of rules under Code Sec. 32 ( Code Sec. 6676(a), added by P.L. 110-28). Nor does the penalty apply to any portion of the excessive amount of the claim that is subject to the accuracy-related penalty under Code Sec. 6662 or 6662A, or the fraud penalty imposed under Code Sec. 6663 ( Code Sec. 6676(c), added by P.L. 110-28).

The penalty applies to claims for refunds or credits filed or submitted after May 25, 2007 (Act Sec. 8247(c) of P.L. 110-28).

ERRONEOUS CLAIM FOR REFUND OR CREDIT

6676(a) CIVIL PENALTY. --If a claim for refund or credit with respect to income tax (other than a claim for a refund or credit relating to the earned income credit under section 32) is made for an excessive amount, unless it is shown that the claim for such excessive amount has a reasonable basis, the person making such claim shall be liable for a penalty in an amount equal to 20 percent of the excessive amount.

6676(b) EXCESSIVE AMOUNT. --For purposes of this section, the term "excessive amount" means in the case of any person the amount by which the amount of the claim for refund or credit for any taxable year exceeds the amount of such claim allowable under this title for such taxable year.

6676(c) COORDINATION WITH OTHER PENALTIES. --This section shall not apply to any portion of the excessive amount of a claim for refund or credit which is subject to a penalty imposed under part II of subchapter A of chapter 68.

.01 Added by P.L. 110-28.



Joint Committee Summary of P.L. 110-28 (Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007)


.99 Penalty for filing erroneous claims for refunds or credits. --
Present Law


Present law imposes accuracy-related penalties on a taxpayer in cases involving a substantial valuation misstatement or gross valuation misstatement relating to an underpayment of income tax. 40 For this purpose, a substantial valuation misstatement generally means a value claimed that is at least twice (200 percent or more) the amount determined to be the correct value, and a gross valuation misstatement generally means a value claimed that is at least four times (400 percent or more) the amount determined to be the correct value.

The penalty is 20 percent of the underpayment of tax resulting from a substantial valuation misstatement and rises to 40 percent for a gross valuation misstatement. No penalty is imposed unless the portion of the underpayment attributable to the valuation misstatement exceeds $5,000 ($10,000 in the case of a corporation other than an S corporation or a personal holding company). Under present law, no penalty is imposed with respect to any portion of the understatement attributable to any item if (1) the treatment of the item on the return is or was supported by substantial authority, or (2) facts relevant to the tax treatment of the item were adequately disclosed on the return or on a statement attached to the return and there is a reasonable basis for the tax treatment. Special rules apply to tax shelters.
Explanation of Provision


The provision imposes a penalty on any taxpayer filing an erroneous claim for refund or credit. The penalty is equal to 20 percent of the disallowed portion of the claim for refund or credit for which there is no reasonable basis for the claimed tax treatment. The penalty does not apply to any portion of the disallowed portion of the claim for refund or credit relating to the earned income credit or any portion of the disallowed portion of the claim for refund or credit that is subject to accuracy-related or fraud penalties.
Effective Date


The provision is effective for claims for refund or credit filed after the date of enactment. --Joint Committee on Taxation, Technical Explanation of the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 May 25, 2007 (JCX-29-07).

40 Sec. 6662(b)(3) and (h).

Labels:

Failure to use Form 8886 for a listed transaction

IRS Letter Ruling 200917030

LTR Report Number 1678, April 29, 2009 IRS REF: Symbol: CC:PA:02:SBrown-POSTF-128329-08 [Code Sec. 6501]

December 2, 2008

DATE: December 2, 2008

TO: Associate Area Counsel (Kansas City) (Small Business/Self-Employed) CC:SB:9:KCY

FROM: Ashton P. Trice, Branch Chief, Branch 2 (Procedure & Administration) CC:PA:02

SUBJECT: Application of I.R.C. § 6501(c)(10)

ATTENTION: Robert M. Fowler, Senior Counsel

This Chief Counsel Advice responds to your request for assistance. This advice may not be used or cited as precedent.




ISSUES


Was the transaction at issue the same as or substantially similar to the transaction described in Notice 2004-8 requiring the taxpayers to disclose the transaction pursuant to I.R.C. § 6011? If yes, did the taxpayers at issue make an adequate disclosure of their participation in the transaction to prevent the period of limitations for assessment from being extended pursuant to section 6501(c)(10)?




CONCLUSION


Based on the facts submitted, representations made, and considering all the facts and circumstances of these transactions, under § 1.6011-4T(b)(2), as in effect when the taxpayers entered into the transactions, the transactions at issue are the same as, or substantially similar to, the listed transactions described in Notice 2004-8, making the transactions listed transactions. Participation in a listed transaction creates a duty for a taxpayer to disclose the transaction. I.R.C. § 6011. This duty of disclosure was satisfied by the Roth IRA Corporation through its filing of Form 8886. Unlike the Roth IRA Corporation, Taxpayers A and B (collectively, "Taxpayers") failed to disclose their involvement in the transaction as required by I.R.C. § 6011. For these reasons, section 6501(c)(10) applies to the assessment of tax with regard to the Taxpayers but is not extended for the Roth IRA Corporation.




FACTS


In December *****, Taxpayers A and B, husband and wife (collectively, "Taxpayers") set up a corporation, ("Roth IRA Corporation"), into which they would direct payments for consulting, accounting, and bookkeeping services they provided to other individuals and businesses. Also in December *****, the Taxpayers each opened a Roth IRA account at Bank C. After contributing $A to their respective Roth IRA accounts, Taxpayer A and Taxpayer B each directed their Roth IRA account to purchase 50% of the stock of the Roth IRA Corporation for $A. Consequently, following the transactions, the couple's two Roth IRA accounts were the sole shareholders of the Roth IRA Corporation.

Before the formation of the Roth IRA Corporation, Taxpayer A worked as general manager for and received consulting fees from Company X and possibly other clients and Taxpayer B received income for bookkeeping services she provided to unrelated clients. After the formation of the Roth IRA Corporation, the Taxpayers provided services to various clients, including Company X, through the Roth IRA Corporation as employees of the Roth IRA Corporation.

In each of its first two fiscal years, the Roth IRA Corporation made dividend distributions of $B to each of the Roth IRA accounts. As a result, the total amount of dividend distributions from the Roth IRA Corporation to Taxpayers' Roth IRA accounts was $C. When the Roth IRA Corporation filed its corporate income tax return for the taxable year ending Date A, it attached Form 8886, which disclosed the corporation's involvement in a transaction substantially similar to the transaction described in Notice 2004-8. Taxpayers A and B did not attach a Form 8886 to their ***** joint return. Instead, taxpayers A and B each attached a completed Form 5329 to their joint return. Although unsigned, each Form 5329 disclosed that the respective taxpayer had made an excess contribution in the amount of $A to their Roth IRA, but that they had also received a corresponding $A distribution, resulting in no excise tax imposed.




LAW AND ANALYSIS


In general, the limitations period for the assessment of tax is three years after the later of the due date for filing a tax return or the date on which the taxpayer files a return. I.R.C. § 6501(a). Section 6501(c) provides several exceptions to the general three-year period of limitations. Specifically, section 6501(c)(10) states that if a taxpayer engages in a listed transaction and fails to disclose that transaction, as required by section 6011, the limitations period for assessment shall not expire before one year after the earlier of: (a) the date on which the Secretary is furnished the information required under section 6011, or (b) the date that a material advisor meets the requirements of section 6112.

The term "listed transaction" is defined in section 6707A(c)(2) as "a reportable transaction which is the same as, or substantially similar to, a transaction specifically identified by the Secretary as a tax avoidance transaction for purposes of section 6011." The term "transaction" includes all of the factual elements necessary to support the tax benefits that are expected to be claimed with respect to any entity, plan, or arrangement, and includes any series of related steps carried out as part of a prearranged plan and any series of substantially similar transactions entered into in the same taxable year. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b)(1). The regulations also provide that while a listed transaction is a transaction that is the same as or substantially similar to one of the types of transactions that the Service has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction, it must also be identified by notice, regulation, or other form of published guidance as a listed transaction. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2).

Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b)(1)(i), as in effect on the relevant dates, provided for purposes of § 1.6011-4T, the term "substantially similar" includes any transaction that is expected to obtain the same or similar types of tax benefits and that is either factually similar or based on the same or similar tax strategy. Receipt of an opinion concluding that the tax benefits from the taxpayer's transaction are allowable is not relevant to the determination of whether the taxpayer's transaction is the same as or substantially similar to a listed transaction. Further, the term substantially similar must be broadly construed in favor of disclosure.

In Notice 2004-8, the Service identified transactions that are the same as, or substantially similar to, transactions described in the Notice as "listed transactions" effective December 31, 2003, the date the notice was released to the public. Transactions identified as "listed transactions" in Notice 2004-8 include arrangements in which an individual, related persons, or a business controlled by such individual or related persons, engage in one or more transactions with a corporation, including contributions of property to such corporation, substantially all the shares of which are owned by one or more Roth IRAs maintained for the benefit of the individual, related persons, or both. The transactions are listed transactions with respect to the individuals for whom the Roth IRAs are maintained, the business (if not a sole proprietorship) that is a party to the transaction, and the corporation substantially all the shares of which are owned by the Roth IRAs.

Transactions described in Notice 2004-8 are designed to avoid the statutory limits on contributions to a Roth IRA contained in § 408A and, in general, these transactions involve the following parties: (1) an individual who owns a pre-existing business such as a corporation or a sole proprietorship (the Business), (2) a Roth IRA within the meaning of § 408A that is maintained for such individual, and (3) a corporation, substantially all the shares of which are owned by the Roth IRA (the Roth IRA Corporation). At the direction of the individual, the Business and the Roth IRA Corporation enter into transactions designed to shift value into the Roth IRA Corporation. Because the individual owns the Business and is the beneficial owner of substantially all of the Roth IRA Corporation, such individual controls both entities and bears little or no economic disadvantage if transactions shift value between the two entities. Other examples include arrangements between the Roth IRA Corporation and the individual that have the effect of transferring value to the Roth IRA Corporation comparable to a contribution to the Roth IRA.

Section 1.6011-4(a) of the Income Tax Regulations provides that, in general, every taxpayer that has participated in a reportable transaction and who is required to file a tax return must attach a disclosure statement to its return for the taxable year. To satisfy this disclosure obligation the taxpayer is required to attach to its tax return Form 8886 as prescribed by Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(d) (2003) (see T.D. 9000).



Discussion

Congress enacted the IRA provisions (including the Roth IRA provisions) to provide an individual with retirement plan options that provide income tax deferral (income tax exemption in the case of a Roth IRA) to enable the individual to maintain his/her accustomed standard of living during retirement. However, Congress also placed limits on the amount that an individual is permitted to contribute to these tax-favored retirement accounts.

Generally, a Roth IRA is permitted to invest in stock of a corporation, and the Roth IRA will not be subject to tax on any appreciation in value of that stock. However, pursuant to Notice 2004-8, certain value-shifting transactions that are designed to avoid the statutory limits on contributions to a Roth IRA have been identified as listed transactions, and the purported tax benefits from such transactions will be challenged. 1 As set forth in Notice 2004-8, arrangements in which an individual or a business controlled by the individual engage in one or more transactions with a corporation, substantially all the shares of which are owned by one or more Roth IRAs maintained for the benefit of the individual are identified as listed transactions. The effect of arrangements described in Notice 2004-8 is to transfer value to the Roth IRA Corporation comparable to a contribution to the Roth IRA.

In determining whether a transaction is the same as or substantially similar to the transaction described in Notice 2004-8, we consider whether a transaction is expected to obtain the same or similar types of tax benefits and is either factually similar or based on the same or similar tax strategy as the Notice 2004-8 transaction. We construe the term substantially similar broadly in favor of disclosure.

In this case, like the transaction described in Notice 2004-8, the structure of the transaction at issue purportedly allows a taxpayer or multiple related taxpayers to create a Roth IRA investment that avoids the contribution limits by transferring value to the Roth IRA Corporation comparable to a contribution to the Roth IRA, thereby yielding tax benefits that are not contemplated by a reasonable interpretation of the language and purpose of § 408A. In this case, the value of the services provided was shifted from the Taxpayers or their business to the Roth IRA Corporation when the Taxpayers provided services through the Roth IRA Corporation as employees of the Roth IRA Corporation. Furthermore, the total value of services provided by the Taxpayers to clients of the Roth IRA Corporation was not received by the Taxpayers in the form of salary or other compensation from the Roth IRA Corporation. As in the Notice 2004-8 transaction, the Taxpayers shifted the value of income or property from the Taxpayers or a business of the Taxpayers to the Roth IRA Corporation, thereby purportedly avoiding the contribution limitations applicable to Roth IRAs. The Taxpayers or their business engaged in transactions with the Roth IRA Corporation by providing services to clients through the Roth IRA Corporation. Value was transferred from the Taxpayers or the Taxpayers' business to the Roth IRA Corporation comparable to a contribution to the Roth IRA whenever the Roth IRA Corporation received payment from clients as a result of the services provided by the Taxpayers.

Because the transaction is expected to obtain the same or similar types of tax benefits as the Notice 2004-8 transaction and is, in fact, both factually similar and based on the same or similar tax strategy as the Notice 2004-8 transaction, the transaction at issue is the same as or substantially similar to the Notice 2004-8 transaction and therefore a listed transaction.

The Taxpayers will argue that Company X corresponds to the pre-existing business (the Business) described in Notice 2004-8 and that, because they do not have an ownership interest in Company X, their transaction is not substantially similar to the transaction described in Notice 2004-8. Whether the Taxpayers control Company X is not dispositive in this case. As an initial matter, Company X is not the Business described in the general fact pattern in the Notice. Instead the Taxpayers' business whereby the Taxpayers provided services to other businesses and individuals is the Business described. As set forth in Notice 2004-8, the Business can be a sole proprietorship or other type of business and need not be a corporation. Notwithstanding this determination of what may constitute the Business described in the general fact pattern in the Notice, the Taxpayers' attempt to rely upon the general fact pattern in the Notice ignores the broader, express language in the Notice that identifies as listed transactions arrangements in which an individual or a business controlled by such individual engages in one or more transactions with a corporation, substantially all the shares of which are owned by one or more Roth IRAs maintained for the benefit of the individual. The fact that Taxpayers do not have an ownership interest in Company X is therefore irrelevant and the transaction is a listed transaction.

A taxpayer is required to disclose its participation in a listed transaction pursuant to section 1.6011-4(a) of the income tax regulations. For the year in question the regulations provided that the disclosure of the taxpayer was to be made on Form 8886 and include all the information required by the form. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(d) (2003). In conjunction with its tax return for its tax year ending Date A, the Roth IRA Corporation filed Form 8886. In this form the Roth IRA Corporation disclosed its participation in the listed transaction. This disclosure met the requirement section 1.6011-4(a) of the income tax regulations and thus limited the time in which the corporation could be assessed deficiencies related to the return to the general period of three years provided in section 6501(a).

Unlike the Roth IRA Corporation, Taxpayers A and B did not include Form 8886 with their ***** tax return. The Taxpayers did file Forms 5329 disclosing their excess contributions into their Roth IRAs of $A each along with their subsequent withdrawal of the same. The form did not identify a listed transaction in any manner nor did it provide the pertinent facts of the transactions or the tax benefits derived from engaging in the transactions as would be found on a properly completed Form 8886. The regulations provide that adequate disclosure can only be made on Form 8886. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(d) (2003). The taxpayers did not file this form and thus did not adequately disclose their participation in a listed transaction leaving the statute of limitations open until one year from the date they provided the information required under section 6011. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(10)




CASE DEVELOPMENT, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS


*****

*****

*****

This writing may contain privileged information. Any unauthorized disclosure of this writing may undermine our ability to protect the privileged information. If disclosure is determined to be necessary, please contact this office for our views.

Please call (202) 622-4940 if you have any further questions.

1 For purposes of this memorandum, the issue of whether a prohibited transaction under section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code has occurred in this case is not addressed.

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Sunday, April 26, 2009

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THE AGENDA • TAXESTHE AGENDA
Civil Rights

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Homeland Security

Immigration

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Additional Issues
TAXES
President Obama and Vice President Biden’s tax plan delivers broad-based tax relief to middle class families and cuts taxes for small businesses and companies that create jobs in America, while restoring fairness to our tax code and returning to fiscal responsibility. Coupled with President Obama and Vice President Biden's commitment to invest in key areas like health, clean energy, innovation, and education, their tax plan will help restore bottom-up economic growth that creates good jobs in America and empowers all families to achieve the American dream.

Obama’s Comprehensive Tax Policy Plan for America will:
Cut taxes for 95 percent of workers and their families with a tax cut of $500 for workers or $1,000 for working couples.
Provide generous tax cuts for low- and middle-income seniors, homeowners, the uninsured, and families sending a child to college or looking to save and accumulate wealth.
Eliminate capital gains taxes for small businesses, cut corporate taxes for firms that invest and create jobs in the United States, and provide tax credits to reduce the cost of healthcare and to reward investments in innovation.
Dramatically simplify taxes by consolidating existing tax credits, eliminating the need for millions of senior citizens to file tax forms, and enabling as many as 40 million middle-class Americans to do their own taxes in less than five minutes without an accountant.
Under the Obama-Biden Plan:
Middle class families will see their taxes cut -- and no family making less than $250,000 will see their taxes increase. The typical middle class family will receive well over $1,000 in tax relief under the Obama-Biden plan, and will pay tax rates that are 20 percent lower than they faced under President Reagan.
Families making more than $250,000 will pay either the same or lower tax rates than they paid in the 1990s. Obama will ask the wealthiest two percent of families to give back a portion of the tax cuts they have received over the past eight years to ensure we are restoring fairness and returning to fiscal responsibility. But no family will pay higher tax rates than they would have paid in the 1990s.
The Obama-Biden plan will cut taxes overall, reducing revenues to below the levels that prevailed under Ronald Reagan (less than 18.2 percent of GDP). The plan is a net tax cut -- his tax relief for middle class families is larger than the revenue raised by his tax changes for families over $250,000. Coupled with his commitment to cut unnecessary spending, Obama will pay for this tax relief while bringing down the budget deficit.
Impact of the Obama Tax Plan
WHO TAX CUT
Married couple making $75,000 with two children, one of whom is in college $3,700
[includes $1,000 Making Work Pay; $500 universal mortgage credit; and $4,000 college credit net of current college credits]
Married couple making $90,000 $1,000
[$1,000 Making Work Pay tax credit]
Single parent making $40,000 with two young children and childcare expenses $2,100
[includes $500 Making Work Pay; $500 universal mortgage credit; and $1,100 from expansion of the child care tax credit]
70-year-old widow making $35,000 $1,900
[reflects elimination of income taxes for seniors earning under $50,000]

Source: Calculations based on IRS Statistics of Income. Tax savings is conservative; does not account for up to $500 in savings from expanded Savers Credit and the $2,500 in savings per family from the Obama healthcare plan

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Friday, April 24, 2009

The Holman case reported below represents an "innocent spouse" victory for the Taxpayer. When preparing tax returns it is important to remember that if the non-working spouse does not sign the tax return, that non-working spouse will not have any tax liability issue. For this reason, when a tax return is prepared with a problematical position, it may be wise to consider having the working spouse file a tax return as married but filing separately.



Suzanne L. Porter a.k.a. Suzanne L. Holman v. Commissioner.

Dkt. No. 13558-06 , 132 TC --, No. 11, April 23, 2009.




P applied for relief from joint and several liability for additional tax under sec. 72(t), I.R.C., related to a distribution her husband received from his individual retirement account. R denied P's application for relief. P petitioned this Court to seek our determination whether she is entitled to relief under sec. 6015(f), I.R.C.



Held: In determining whether P is entitled to equitable relief under sec. 6015(f), I.R.C., we apply a de novo standard of review, not an abuse of discretion standard of review.



Held, further: P is entitled to equitable relief under sec. 6015(f), I.R.C.



HAINES, Judge: Respondent determined that petitioner is not entitled to relief from joint and several income tax liability for 2003 with respect to an early distribution from her ex-husband's individual retirement account (IRA). 1 In Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 117 (2008), we held that in determining whether petitioner is entitled to relief under section 6015(f), we conduct a trial de novo and we may consider evidence introduced at trial which was not included in the administrative record. We then denied respondent's motion in limine seeking to limit petitioner's right to introduce evidence outside the administrative record. The issues remaining for decision are: (1) Whether in determining petitioner's eligibility for relief under section 6015(f) we use a de novo standard of review or review for abuse of discretion; and (2) whether petitioner is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f).





FINDINGS OF FACT



Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts, the exhibits attached thereto, and the stipulation of settled issues are incorporated herein by this reference. At the time she filed her petition, petitioner resided in Maryland.



Petitioner holds a bachelor of science degree in business administration from the University of Maryland. In 1994 she married John S. Porter. Together, they had two children. Sometime in 2002 petitioner was wrongfully discharged from her job with the Federal Government. Before returning to Government employment petitioner was employed as a bus driver.



Petitioner was not aware of Mr. Porter's finances during 2003. They maintained separate checking accounts and credit cards. Petitioner did not review the monthly bank statements, nor did she pick up the daily mail. Mr. Porter was responsible for the home mortgage and car insurance payments. Petitioner was responsible for paying all other home expenses, including groceries, which she paid for with her credit cards.



During 2003 petitioner received $24,285 in wages and unemployment compensation. During 2003 Mr. Porter earned $12,765 in nonemployee compensation. He also received a $10,700 distribution from his IRA. Petitioner did not know of the distribution at the time it was made because Mr. Porter refused to tell petitioner about his income for 2003.



Before 2003 Mr. Porter was responsible for filing the couple's tax returns. He also prepared the couple's 2003 joint Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return. The return reported Mr. Porter's IRA distribution and petitioner's wages and unemployment compensation. Mr. Porter's nonemployee compensation was not reported on the return. He gave the return to petitioner to sign on April 15, 2004, the day it was due. Because Mr. Porter was pressuring her to sign the return quickly so he could get it to the post office, petitioner reviewed the return in haste, ensuring that her own income was properly reported. Six days after petitioner signed the return, on April 21, 2004, she and Mr. Porter legally separated. 2



On June 20, 2005, respondent issued petitioner and Mr. Porter statutory notices of deficiency for 2003. Respondent adjusted their 2003 income to include $12,765 in nonemployee compensation attributable to Mr. Porter. Respondent also adjusted their 2003 income tax to include 10-percent additional tax of $1,070 with respect to Mr. Porter's IRA distribution pursuant to section 72(t)(1). Neither petitioner nor Mr. Porter petitioned this Court for redetermination of the deficiency.



In subsequent years petitioner has complied with all income tax laws. After their separation petitioner discovered that Mr. Porter had not filed their joint Federal income tax return for 2002. Petitioner promptly filed her own return for 2002, choosing married-filing-separately status.



On December 1, 2005, petitioner filed a Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief. On June 14, 2006, respondent's Appeals officer issued a final determination regarding petitioner's request for relief. The Appeals officer determined that pursuant to section 6015(c) petitioner was entitled to relief from joint and several liability with respect to the $12,765 in unreported nonemployee compensation. However, petitioner was denied relief under section 6015(b), (c), and (f) from the 10-percent additional tax of $1,070 on Mr. Porter's IRA distribution. The Appeals officer determined that petitioner knew or had reason to know the 10-percent additional tax was not reported on the couple's return. On January 31, 2007, as a result of debt from her marriage, petitioner filed for bankruptcy. 3



Mr. Porter did not intervene in this case, though he was given the opportunity to do so under section 6015(e)(4). See Van Arsdalen v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 135, 143 (2004). Rather, respondent called him as a witness at trial. He had not previously participated in petitioner's administrative hearing.





OPINION




I. Section 6015(f)


Petitioner contends that under section 6015(f) she qualifies for relief from joint and several liability for the 10-percent additional tax on Mr. Porter's early distribution from his IRA. When a husband and wife file a joint Federal income tax return, they generally are jointly and severally liable for the tax due. Sec. 6013(d)(3); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 282 (2000). However, a spouse may qualify for relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(b), (c), or (f) if various requirements are met. The parties stipulated that petitioner does not qualify for relief from joint and several liability on the 10-percent additional tax under section 6015(b) or (c).



A taxpayer qualifies for relief under section 6015(f) if relief is not available under section 6015(b) or (c) and, in the light of the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the taxpayer liable for the tax or deficiency. This Court has jurisdiction to determine whether a taxpayer is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f). Sec. 6015(e)(1)(A). Our determination is made in a trial de novo. Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. at 117. Therefore, we may consider evidence introduced at trial which was not included in the administrative record. Both parties submitted evidence at trial which was not available to respondent's Appeals officer.




II. The Standard of Review


We have generally reviewed the Commissioner's denial of relief under section 6015(f) for abuse of discretion. 4 See Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 125 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003); Butler v. Commissioner, supra; cf. Wiener v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-230 (abuse of discretion standard not applied where notice of determination did not recite any analysis or factual determinations to review). In their concurring opinions in Porter v. Commissioner, supra at 142-146, Judges Goeke and Wherry contended that our existing precedent with respect to the standard of review in section 6015(f) cases is no longer applicable in the light of the 2006 amendments to section 6015. Judge Wherry urged the Court to adopt a de novo standard of review when the merits of this case would be decided. 5 Id. at 144.



Congress enacted section 6015 as part of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3201, 112 Stat. 734. 6 Section 6015(f) provides that the Commissioner "may" grant relief under certain circumstances, suggesting a grant of relief is discretionary. In its original form section 6015(e) granted us jurisdiction to determine appropriate relief under section 6015(b) and (c) but was silent as to our jurisdiction under section 6015(f). In Butler v. Commissioner, supra, we considered whether we had jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's denial of equitable relief under section 6015(f) or whether the granting of relief was committed solely to agency discretion.



In the absence of any clear guidance from Congress, we held that we had jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's determinations but should review for abuse of discretion because of the discretionary language in section 6015(f). Butler v. Commissioner, supra; see Porter v. Commissioner, supra at 143 (Goeke, J. concurring). Under the statutory framework provided by Congress at the time, our adoption of an abuse of discretion standard was appropriate. Porter v. Commissioner, supra at 143 (Goeke, J. concurring).



Our assertion of jurisdiction over cases brought under section 6015(e) and (f) by individuals against whom no deficiency had been asserted was reversed by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and for the Ninth Circuit. See Bartman v. Commissioner, 446 F.3d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 2006), affg. in part and vacating in part T.C. Memo. 2004-93; Commissioner v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006), revg. 118 T.C. 494 (2002) and vacating 112 T.C. 32 (2004); see also Billings v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 7 (2006). However, in 2006 Congress amended section 6015(e)(1) to confirm our jurisdiction to determine the appropriate relief available under section 6015(f). Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, div. C, sec. 408(a), 120 Stat. 3061. Given Congress's confirmation of our jurisdiction, reconsideration of the standard of review in section 6015(f) cases is warranted.



Amended section 6015(e)(1) provides that "In the case of an individual against whom a deficiency has been asserted and who elects to have subsection (b) or (c) apply, or in the case of an individual who requests equitable relief under subsection (f)", the Court has jurisdiction "to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual under this section". (Emphasis added.) The use of the word "determine" suggests that Congress intended us to use a de novo standard of review as well as scope of review. In other instances where the word "determine" or "redetermine" is used, as in sections 6213 and 6512(b), we apply a de novo scope of review and standard of review. See Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. at 118-119.



Nothing in amended section 6015(e) suggests that Congress intended us to review for abuse of discretion. In similar circumstances, Congress expressly provided that we review the Commissioner's determinations for abuse of discretion. Before 1996 the Commissioner was granted the authority to abate assessments of interest in certain circumstances. Sec. 6404(e) (as in effect for tax years beginning on or before July 30, 1996). Under that statutory framework, we lacked jurisdiction to determine whether interest abatement was warranted. See Beall v. United States, 336 F.3d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 2003); 508 Clinton St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 352, 354 (1987). Congress then amended section 6404 by expressly granting us jurisdiction "to determine whether the Secretary's failure to abate interest * * * was an abuse of discretion". (Emphasis added.) Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. 104-168, sec. 302, 110 Stat. 1457 (1996); see Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501 (2007) (holding that this Court is the exclusive forum for judicial review of the Commissioner's refusal to abate interest, abrogating Beall v. United States, supra).



Section 6015(e) was amended in a similar historical context. Sections 6015(f) and 6404(e) are taxpayer relief provisions. Under each provision the decision whether to grant relief (in the form of an interest abatement or relief from joint and several liability) was committed largely to agency discretion, and it had been determined that we lacked jurisdiction over a claim brought by a taxpayer under each provision. See Commissioner v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006) (Court of Appeals determined that this Court lacked jurisdiction over cases brought under section 6015(f)); 508 Clinton St. Corp. v. Commissioner, supra (this Court lacked jurisdiction over interest abatement claim).



In amending section 6404, Congress provided us jurisdiction over interest abatement cases but expressly limited our jurisdiction to reviewing whether the Commissioner's failure to abate interest was an abuse of discretion. Sec. 6404(h). In amending section 6015(e), Congress provided us jurisdiction over cases brought under section 6015(f). But unlike the amendment to section 6404, the amendment to section 6015(e) gives no indication that we should review the Commissioner's determination for abuse of discretion. Congress's failure to include any such limitation in section 6015(e) when it had previously included the limitation in a similar situation indicates that our jurisdiction is not limited to reviewing the Commissioner's determination for abuse of discretion. See Franklin Natl. Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 378 (1954) ("We find no indication that Congress intended to make this phase of national banking subject to local restrictions, as it has done by express language in several other instances.").



An abuse of discretion standard of review is also at odds with our decision to decline to remand section 6015(f) cases for reconsideration. Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220, 222 (2005). Section 6330 is analogous to section 6015(f) insofar as both sections consider economic hardship as a factor in determining whether relief is appropriate. In section 6330(d)(2) Congress provided that the Internal Revenue Service Office of Appeals would retain jurisdiction over collection cases to allow it to consider changes in the taxpayers' circumstances. That Congress did not include a similar provision in section 6015 is consistent with the requirement that we determine whether relief for taxpayers under section 6015(f) is appropriate. See Friday v. Commissioner, supra at 222 ("There is in section 6015 no analog to section 6330 granting the Court jurisdiction after a hearing at the Commissioner's Appeals Office.").



We have always applied a de novo scope and standard of review in determining whether relief is warranted under subsections (b) and (c) of section 6015. See, e.g., Alt v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 306, 313-316 (2002), affd. 101 Fed. Appx. 34 (6th Cir. 2004). We believe that cases in which taxpayers seek relief under section 6015(f) should receive similar treatment and thus the same standard of review. Given Congress's direction that we determine the appropriate relief available under subsections (b), (c), and (f), there is no longer any reason to apply a different standard of review under subsection (f) than under subsections (b) and (c), and we shall no longer do so.



Accordingly, in cases brought under section 6015(f) we now apply a de novo standard of review as well as a de novo scope of review. Petitioner bears the burden of proving that she is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f). See Rule 142(a). The Commissioner analyzes petitions for section 6015(f) relief using the procedures set forth in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. See Banderas v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-129. The parties have not disputed application of the conditions and factors listed in the revenue procedure.



The Commissioner generally will not grant relief unless the taxpayer meets seven threshold conditions. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297. Respondent concedes that petitioner meets these conditions. If a taxpayer meets the threshold conditions, the Commissioner considers several factors to determine whether a requesting spouse is entitled to relief under section 6015(f). Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03, 2003-2 C.B. at 298. We consider all relevant facts and circumstances in determining whether the taxpayer is entitled to relief. Sec. 6015(e) and (f)(1). The following factors are relevant to our inquiry.




III. Factors Relating to Petitioner's Claim for Relief


A. Petitioner and Mr. Porter Are Divorced



Petitioner and Mr. Porter legally separated on April 21, 2004, 6 days after she signed the couple's 2003 return. They divorced on May 16, 2006. This factor favors relief. 7



B. Petitioner Would Suffer Economic Hardship If Relief Were Not Granted



Economic hardship is present if payment of tax would prevent the taxpayer from paying her reasonable basic living expenses. Sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4)(i) and (ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs. The determination varies according to the unique circumstances of the taxpayer. Id.



Petitioner earns a modest income. She is the mother of two children. She has a bachelor of science degree in business administration, and presumably she will be able to be employed for many more years. Because of debts she was left with after her separation and divorce from Mr. Porter, petitioner has been unable to meet her monthly expenses. Consequently, she was forced to file for bankruptcy. If relief were not granted, petitioner would be jointly liable for paying $1,070 plus related interest.



Under these circumstances, we conclude that petitioner would suffer economic hardship if relief were not granted. This factor favors relief.



C. Petitioner Had Reason To Know of the Item Giving Rise to the Deficiency



In the case of an income tax liability resulting from a deficiency, we are less likely to grant relief under section 6015(f) if the requesting spouse knew or had reason to know of the item giving rise to the deficiency. If the requesting spouse did not know or have reason to know, we are more likely to grant relief.



A taxpayer who signs a return is generally charged with constructive knowledge of its contents. Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256, 1262 (2d Cir. 1993), affg. T.C. Memo. 1992-228. In establishing that a taxpayer had no reason to know, the taxpayer must show that she was unaware of the circumstances that gave rise to the error and not merely unaware of the tax consequences. Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126, 145-146 (1990), affd. 992 F.2d 1132 (11th Cir. 1993); Purcell v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 228, 237-238 (1986), affd. 826 F.2d 470, 473-474 (6th Cir. 1987). Section 6015 does not protect a spouse who turns a blind eye to facts readily available to her. Charlton v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 333, 340 (2000); Bokum v. Commissioner, supra. In such instances, we may impute the requisite knowledge to the putative innocent spouse unless she satisfies her duty of inquiry. Hayman v. Commissioner, supra at 1262; Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300, 303 (1973).



Mr. Porter presented the couple's income tax return to petitioner to sign on April 15, 2004, the day it was due. Petitioner scanned the contents of the return only to ensure that her own income was reported correctly, which it was. Petitioner relied on Mr. Porter to prepare the return properly with respect to his own income. Petitioner's reliance was misplaced. Nevertheless, petitioner signed a return which clearly shows that Mr. Porter received an IRA distribution during 2003. Despite Mr. Porter's reluctance to discuss his finances with petitioner, we presume she knew that Mr. Porter had not reached the age of 591/2, so as to except the distribution from the section 72(t) additional tax.



Accordingly, petitioner had reason to know of Mr. Porter's IRA distribution. This factor favors not granting petitioner relief.



D. Petitioner Did Not Receive a Significant Benefit Beyond Normal Support From the Item Giving Rise to the Deficiency



Receipt by the requesting spouse, either directly or indirectly, of a significant benefit in excess of normal support from the unpaid liability or the item giving rise to the deficiency weighs against relief. Lack of a significant benefit beyond normal support weighs in favor of relief. Normal support is measured by the circumstances of the particular parties. Estate of Krock v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 672, 678-679 (1989).



Mr. Porter testified that he used the proceeds from his IRA distribution to pay petitioner's credit card debt. Petitioner testified that she does not know how Mr. Porter spent the distribution from his IRA but that he did not use the proceeds to pay her credit card debt. We evaluated petitioner's and Mr. Porter's testimonies by observing their candor, sincerity, and demeanor. Mr. Porter was not credible. Petitioner was, and we accept her testimony.



However, even if we were to accept Mr. Porter's testimony that he used the proceeds of the IRA distribution to pay petitioner's credit card debt, he admitted that a portion of the credit card charges related to grocery shopping; i.e. normal support. Petitioner earned a very modest income during 2003 after being wrongfully discharged from her job. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that petitioner used her credit cards for necessary services and supplies in addition to groceries.



We conclude that petitioner did not receive a significant benefit beyond normal support from Mr. Porter's IRA distribution. This factor favors relief.



E. Petitioner Complied With All Income Tax Laws in Subsequent Tax Years



Petitioner has complied with income tax laws in all subsequent years. Furthermore, upon discovering that her husband had neglected to file the couple's joint Federal income tax return for 2002, she promptly filed her own return, choosing married-filing-separately status. This factor favors relief.




IV. Conclusion


Factors favoring relief are that petitioner and Mr. Porter are divorced, that she would suffer hardship if relief were not granted, that she did not receive a significant benefit beyond normal support from the IRA distribution, and that she diligently complied with income tax laws in subsequent years. That petitioner had reason to know of the distribution because it appears on the face of the return favors not granting relief.



Under an abuse of discretion standard, this Court has upheld the Commissioner's denial of relief under section 6015(f) where the taxpayer knew or had reason to know of the item giving rise to the deficiency or that the tax would not be paid. See, e.g., Magee v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-263; Simon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-220; Sjodin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-205, vacated 174 Fed. Appx. 359 (8th Cir. 2006); Demirjian v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-22. However, we are no longer restricted to determining whether the Commissioner's determination was an abuse of discretion. Under a de novo standard of review, we take into account all the facts and circumstances and determine whether it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for the unpaid tax or deficiency.



We recognize that petitioner had reason to know of the IRA distribution because she signed the return and did not inquire into its contents. However, this factor is tempered by the fact that petitioner regularly inquired into Mr. Porter's finances during the preceding year and he refused to answer or answered evasively.



The other factors discussed above which favor relief outweigh petitioner's reason to know of her husband's IRA distribution. Accordingly, petitioner has met her burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that it would be inequitable to hold her liable for the section 72(t) additional tax on Mr. Porter's IRA distribution.



To reflect the foregoing,



Decision will be entered for petitioner.



Reviewed by the Court.



COLVIN, VASQUEZ, GALE, MARVEL, GOEKE, WHERRY, KROUPA, and PARIS, JJ., agree with this majority opinion.



GALE, J., concurring: I agree with the position taken in the majority opinion that de novo review is the appropriate standard of review in determining entitlement to relief under section 6015(f). 1 I write separately to highlight certain other factors that support that position.



First, the statute is unclear in prescribing a standard of review. While, as the majority acknowledges, the articulation in section 6015(f) that under certain conditions the Secretary "may" relieve an individual of liability is suggestive that review should be for abuse of discretion, the use of "may" in section 6015(f) is not dispositive. Internal Revenue Code sections providing that the Secretary "may" take an action have sometimes been interpreted as mandating review for abuse of discretion, see, e.g., sec. 482; Ballentine Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 796, 800 (4th Cir. 1963), affg. 39 T.C. 348 (1962); Dolese v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 830, 838 (1984), affd. 811 F.2d 543, 546 (10th Cir. 1987); Foster v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 34, 142-143 (1983), affd. in part and vacated in part on another issue 756 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1985); Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114, 125-126 (1964), affd. 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966), and sometimes de novo review, see, e.g., sec. 269(a); 2 VGS Corp. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 563, 595-598 (1977); Capri, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 162, 178 (1975); D'Arcy-MacManus & Masius, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 440, 449 (1975); Indus. Suppliers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 635, 645-646 (1968); Inductotherm Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-281, affd. without published opinion 770 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir. 1985).



Moreover, our grant of jurisdiction to review the Secretary's (or Commissioner's) decisions concerning equitable relief is contained not in section 6015(f) but in section 6015(e)(1)(A), which provides that the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction "to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual under this section". This broad phrasing 3 must be compared, as the majority notes, to another discrete grant of jurisdiction to the Court, a mere 2 years earlier, to review the Secretary's decisions not to abate interest. That grant, now codified in section 6404(h)(1), 4 is explicit with respect to the standard of review: "The Tax Court shall have jurisdiction * * * to determine whether the Secretary's failure to abate interest under this section was an abuse of discretion". When the general terms of section 6015(e)(1)(A) are compared with the specificity of the standard enunciated in section 6404(h)(1), Congress's intention regarding the review standard in the former becomes less clear. 5 To suggest that the "may" in section 6015(f) settles the matter in this context puts more freight on that word than it can carry. 6



Second, given the statute's lack of clarity regarding the standard of review, consideration of the legislative history is appropriate. The history of amendments to the joint and several liability relief provisions since the original enactment in 1971 evidences congressional dissatisfaction with the adequacy of relief afforded taxpayers. The 1971 version of "innocent spouse" relief provided relief only in the case of omitted income. See Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. 91-679, sec. 1, 84 Stat. 2063. Amendments in 1984 extended relief in the case of erroneous deductions, though the deductions needed to be "grossly erroneous" and the deductions and/or the income omission had to have resulted in a "substantial" understatement of tax on the return. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, sec. 424(a), 98 Stat. 801. Finding the level of relief afforded by the statute still inadequate, Congress in the 1998 amendments removed the requirement that the deductions claimed be "grossly" erroneous or that the understatement of tax be "substantial" and added provisions allowing elections to allocate liability and establishing equitable relief. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3201(a), 112 Stat. 734.



The pattern of legislative changes designed to make innocent spouse relief more readily available also reflected congressional dissatisfaction with the administration of the statute by the Commissioner. This dissatisfaction reached the apex in 1998, when section 6015(f) was enacted as part of RRA 1998. In a February 11, 1998, Senate Finance Committee hearing on "Innocent Spouse Tax Rules" presaging that legislation, Chairman William V. Roth, Jr., diagnosed the problem with the "innocent spouse" rules as due in significant part to unsatisfactory administration by the IRS.



[T]he agency [IRS] is all too often electing to go after those who would be considered innocent spouses because they are easier to locate, as well as less inclined and able to fight.



Part of these problems reside with the IRS, part of them are the fault of Congress. Though the agency officially acknowledges the status of innocent spouses under current law and has the ability to clear such an individual from his or her tax liability, it rarely does. [IRS Restructuring (Innocent Spouse Tax Rules): Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1998) (S. Hrg. 105-529, Fourth Hearing); emphasis added.]



At a February 24, 1998, hearing 7 before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means concerning a Treasury Department Report on Innocent Spouse Relief, 8 Chairman Johnson stated:



As the Congress develops legislation to restructure and reform the Internal Revenue Service, we have learned of a number of disturbing cases in which taxpayers have been grossly mistreated by the IRS. Out of all the horror stories that have surfaced in recent months, none have been more heartbreaking than those involving innocent spouses --taxpayers who in many cases have been left to rear children as single parents, often without child support, only to find that their former spouses have saddled them with a crushing debt. Many of these horror stories have been going on for years without the IRS helping the spouses who are seeking relief from mounting tax liabilities, interest, and penalties. [U.S. Treasury Department Report on Innocent Spouse Relief: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1998).]



Testifying on behalf of the Treasury Department at the hearing, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Donald C. Lubick conceded a problem in the Internal Revenue Service's administration of the statute:



Mr. Lubick. I think you've put your finger on what I think is the most disturbing part of this whole problem [inadequacy of current arrangements for innocent spouse relief], which is that --and I think it's produced the most dramatic of the examples; that there have been some particular agents who are hard-nosed and unsympathetic * * *. [ Id. at 28.]



One of the solutions proposed in the Treasury Department report, as described in Assistant Secretary Lubick's testimony, was to "significantly expand taxpayers' procedural opportunities to claim substantive relief under the innocent spouse provisions, by making access to Tax Court routinely available". Id. at 19. Chairman Johnson endorsed the expansion of Tax Court jurisdiction as an important part of the solution to the unsatisfactory results that had been experienced under the statute.



I am particularly pleased to note that the innocent spouse legislative recommendations discussed in the [Treasury and General Accounting Office] reports are included in our House-passed * * * legislation * * *. To summarize, the bill expands the availability of innocent spouse relief by, No. 1, eliminating the various dollar thresholds; No. 2, broadening the definition of eligible tax understatements, and three, providing partial innocent spouse relief in certain situations, and No. 4, providing tax court jurisdiction over denials of innocent spouse relief. [ Id. at 7; emphasis added.]



Given the evidence of congressional dissatisfaction with the IRS's track record in administering the "innocent spouse" rules and of the congressional perception that one solution to the problem was expanded Tax Court jurisdiction, it appears unlikely that Congress intended that a significant portion of the Court's review of the IRS's disposition of innocent spouse claims be circumscribed under the deferential standard inherent in review for abuse of discretion. To conclude otherwise is to turn a tin ear to the strong critique of the Commissioner's record in administering "innocent spouse" relief evidenced in congressional hearings on the subject.



Third, another specific feature of section 6015 countervails the claim that abuse of discretion review was intended for section 6015(f) claims; namely, the provision in section 6015(e)(4) for intervention in a Tax Court proceeding by the spouse not seeking relief. As originally enacted, section 6015(e)(4) provided as follows:



(4) Notice to other spouse. --The Tax Court shall establish rules which provide the individual filing a joint return but not making the election under subsection (b) or (c) with adequate notice and an opportunity to become a party to a proceeding under either such subsection. [RRA 1998 sec. 3201(a).]



Congress therefore contemplated that in Tax Court proceedings for review of section 6015 claims --or, more specifically, claims under subsection (b) or (c) --there would be interventions by nonrequesting spouses resulting in new evidence or argument in the Tax Court proceeding that was not available to the Commissioner as part of the administrative determination.



The 2006 amendments by the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, div. C, sec. 408, 120 Stat. 3061, to clarify the Tax Court's jurisdiction over section 6015(f) cases did not merely modify section 6015(e)(1)(A), as discussed in the majority and dissenting opinions. The 2006 amendments also modified section 6015(e)(4) to read as follows:



(4) Notice to other spouse. --The Tax Court shall establish rules which provide the individual filing a joint return but not making the election under subsection (b) or (c) or the request for equitable relief under subsection (f) with adequate notice and an opportunity to become a party to a proceeding under either such subsection. [Emphasis added.]



Thus, in connection with clarifying the Tax Court's jurisdiction over section 6015(f) cases not involving a deficiency, Congress simultaneously added spousal intervention rights for such cases as part of the 2006 amendments. 9 The conclusion is inescapable that Congress considered intervention rights to be an important component of this Court's review of section 6015 cases, including those under section 6015(f). Intervention rights entail the distinct likelihood that new evidence will surface in the Tax Court proceeding. Yet to review the Commissioner's administrative determination for abuse of discretion on the basis of evidence not available to him would be, at best, anomalous. The Supreme Court has instructed that, in applying an abuse of discretion standard of review, "the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court." Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). By expressly providing for intervenors in section 6015(f) review cases in the Tax Court, Congress contemplated a "new record made initially in the reviewing court" in those cases. Application of an abuse of discretion standard of review is not appropriate in such circumstances.



In addition to the intervenor issue, we must bear in mind problems with the administrative record, our inability to remand, and the fact that a stand-alone nondeficiency petition can bring a section 6015(f) case before us even where there has been no administrative decision. 10



This case is appealable, absent stipulation to the contrary, to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Under the rule laid down in Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), we abide by that court's precedent. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disapproves of the odd pairing of a de novo scope of review with an abuse of discretion standard of review. See Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Thus, although it may be appropriate for a court conducting a de novo review of a plan administrator's action to consider evidence that was not taken into account by the administrator, the contrary approach should be followed when conducting a review under either an arbitrary and capricious standard or under the abuse of discretion standard."). 11 That is reason enough to reject that mismatched standard and scope of review in this case.



Given the statute's failure to specifically address the standard of review, Congress's expressed dissatisfaction with the Commissioner's history of administering the "innocent spouse" rules, and the anomalous results of the employment of an abuse of discretion standard of review in section 6015(f) cases, I believe the better interpretation of section 6015 is that it provides for a de novo standard of review in all section 6015 cases, whether under subsection (b), (c), or (f).



COLVIN, MARVEL, GOEKE, WHERRY, KROUPA, and PARIS, JJ., agree with this concurring opinion.



HALPERN and HOLMES, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part.




I. Concurrence


We concur in so much of the majority opinion as holds the appropriate standard of review to be de novo. We do so notwithstanding our dissent in the Court's prior report in this case, Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 146-147 (2008), holding that the appropriate scope of review is de novo. That holding is now binding on us, and for that reason alone we concur that "it would be incongruous to hold that review is limited to determining whether an appeals officer 'abused his discretion,' but also to conclude that the appeals officer committed such an 'abuse' by failing to weigh information that was never even presented to him." Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 2006) (addressing the scope and standard of review appropriate to judicial review of an Appeals officer's decision under section 6330), revg. 123 T.C. 85 (2004).




II. Dissent


We dissent from the majority's conclusion that petitioner is entitled to equitable relief. In particular we fail to see how the majority can conclude that petitioner would suffer economic hardship if relief were not granted. First, the majority states that economic hardship is present if payment of the tax would prevent the taxpayer from paying her reasonable basic living expenses. Majority op. p. 14. Second, the majority holds that the hardship determination (and certain other determinations) are made with respect to the taxpayer's status "at the time of trial." Majority op. p. 14, note 7. Third, the majority fails to find (and the record contains no evidence of) petitioner's reasonable basic living expenses. Fourth, and most importantly, at the time of trial, petitioner was in bankruptcy, and she was not discharged until almost 7 weeks after the trial concluded, when we assume her solvency and the hardship (if any) resulting from her joint liability to pay $1,070 would be determinable. We fail to see how the majority could determine that payment of that liability would work a hardship before it knew the disposition of her petition in bankruptcy (of which, like her reasonable basic living expenses, the record contains no evidence).



WELLS, J., dissenting: I agree with and have joined Judge Gustafson's thorough and well-reasoned dissent. I respectfully write separately to address an issue that Judge Gustafson does not address in his dissent but is raised by concurring Judges and to point to additional reasons for not abandoning the abuse of discretion standard of review in section 6015(f) cases.



Judges Halpern and Holmes indicate that it would be incongruous to apply the abuse of discretion standard of review on the basis of trial evidence that the "Appeals officer" had never seen. 1 They apparently believe that the Commissioner's exercise of discretion is complete and final before trial. However, in section 6015(f) cases and in other cases where the abuse of discretion standard of review is applied after a trial de novo, I believe that the exercise of discretion that is under review is the Commissioner's position after all of the evidence is in. The final exercise of discretion by the Commissioner typically is a posttrial brief containing the Commissioner's reasons and arguments. Indeed, our experience is that the Commissioner often will grant partial or full relief after considering all of the evidence adduced at trial. When, however, the Commissioner finally argues that relief should be denied after all of the trial evidence is considered, it is that position (i.e., the Commissioner's exercise of discretion at that point) that we review for abuse of discretion.



Additionally, I am concerned that today the Court, on the pretext that a 2006 amendment to section 6015(e) provides an occasion to reconsider our prior rulings, 2 essentially overrules our longstanding precedent that this Court reviews the Commissioner's denial of section 6015(f) relief for abuse of discretion. That precedent originated with our Opinion in Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276 (2000), and was subsequently reaffirmed in three Court-reviewed Opinions, the latest of which was rendered in this very case less than a year ago. Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115 (2008) (Porter I); Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32 (2004), vacated 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006); Cheshire v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 183 (2000), affd. 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002).



In overruling this precedent, the majority fails to recognize the opinions of six Courts of Appeals that have affirmed our practice of holding a trial de novo in section 6015(f) relief cases and then applying the abuse of discretion standard of review. Commissioner v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, (11th Cir. 2009), affg. T.C. Memo. 2005-201; Capehart v. Commissioner, 204 Fed. Appx. 618 (9th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-268; Alt v. Commissioner, 101 Fed. Appx. 34 (6th Cir. 2004), affg. 119 T.C. 306 (2002); Doyle v. Commissioner, 94 Fed. Appx. 949 (3d Cir. 2004), affg. T.C. Memo. 2003-96; Mitchell v. Commissioner, 292 F.3d 800 (D.C. Cir. 2002), affg. T.C. Memo. 2000-332; Cheshire v. Commissioner, 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002). The most recent of these opinions was issued on February 11, 2009, and affirmed what it described as:



the Tax Court's longstanding rule and practice * * * to hold trials de novo in situations where it makes determination and redeterminations, including § 6015(f) cases. To prevail in the trial de novo, the taxpayer petitioner must show that the Commissioner's denial of equitable relief was an abuse of discretion. [ Commissioner v. Neal, supra at 1268; citations omitted.]



These Courts of Appeals do not appear to have any disagreement with the abuse of discretion standard of review in a trial where evidence is taken de novo.



I also would like to address Judge Gale's argument in his concurring opinion that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit would reject a "mismatched standard and scope of review" in section 6015(f) cases, pursuant to its opinion in Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1994), and that we are bound to follow that outcome under the rule of Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). I believe that Sheppard is not squarely in point and is distinguishable.



As noted by Judge Gale, Sheppard holds that where an abuse of discretion standard of review is applicable to a plan administrator's action under ERISA, 3 the scope of review is limited to the evidence that was taken into account by the plan administrator at the time it acted. Id. at 25. The Court of Appeals did not hold that it disapproves of any pairing of a de novo scope of review with an abuse of discretion standard of review (a holding that would run headlong into Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532 (1979)), and it made no holding whatsoever about section 6015(f) cases under the Internal Revenue Code. Moreover, under section 6015(f) we are reviewing, pursuant to the statute, the exercise of discretion of a Government agency's administrator who, as mentioned above, appears as the respondent in every case before us, as opposed to a District Court in an ERISA case reviewing a private entity's exercise of discretion conferred in a plan document. 4 Consequently, I believe that the Golsen rule has no bearing on the case before us.



Our review of section 6015(f) cases differs from a District Court's review of a plan administrator's exercise of discretion in another material respect. Under our precedent in Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220, 222 (2005), we have no authority to remand section 6015(f) cases to the Commissioner, whereas in a case arising under ERISA like Sheppard, a district court has the authority to remand the case to the plan administrator. Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra at 125. In response to the criticism that a limited record can hide an abuse of discretion that results from a plan administrator's failure to consider or admit into the record all of the relevant facts, the Court of Appeals specifies remand as the "proper course" to bring in additional evidence when the record is otherwise lacking: "'If the court [believes] the administrator lacked adequate evidence, the proper course [is] to remand to the trustees for a new determination ... not to bring additional evidence before the district court.'" Id. at 125 (quoting Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985)).



In a section 6015(f) case, however, if this Court finds the factual underpinnings of the Commissioner's determination to be lacking, we have no authority, pursuant to Friday, to remand the case to the Commissioner to bring in additional evidence to allow us to review a sufficient record to test the Commissioner's exercise of discretion which, as mentioned above, continues throughout the case until all of the evidence is in. Accordingly, in a section 6015(f) case, a de novo scope of review, as we held in Porter I, is the only means by which we can supplement an insufficient record.



Finally, I would like to address the venerable principle of stare decisis. For the reasons cited by Judge Gustafson in his dissent and others discussed here, I think that the correct standard to use in reviewing section 6015(f) cases in this Court is abuse of discretion. Consequently, I do not think it is necessary to rely on stare decisis alone as the reason for continuing to review section 6015(f) cases for abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, stare decisis is additional support for not abandoning the abuse of discretion standard. The majority makes no mention of and gives no consideration to that principle or why it should not apply.



Stare decisis should apply in the instant case for reasons stated in the recent opinion of the Supreme Court in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 750, 756-757 (2008)(citations and quotation marks omitted):



stare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has special force, for Congress remains free to alter what we have done. * * *



* * * Justice Brandeis once observed that in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. To overturn a decision settling one such matter simply because we might believe that decision is no longer right would inevitably reflect a willingness to reconsider others. And that willingness could itself threaten to substitute disruption, confusion, and uncertainty for necessary legal stability. * * *



In sum, the use of an abuse of discretion standard of review in a de novo trial is consistent with this Court's precedent, the opinions of the Courts of Appeals I have cited above, the Supreme Court's holding in Thor Power, and stare decisis.



For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.



COHEN, THORNTON, and GUSTAFSON, JJ., agree with this dissenting opinion.



GUSTAFSON, J., dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which abandons the abuse-of-discretion standard for the Court's review of the IRS's denial of relief under section 6015(f) and adopts in its place a "de novo" standard of review. In so doing, the majority departs from the better reading of the statute and from very substantial precedent.




I. By Conferring Discretion on the Secretary, Section 6015(f) Calls for the Court To Review the Secretary's Actions for Abuse of That Discretion.


A. Section 6015(f) Confers Discretion On the Secretary.



Section 6015(f) provides that "the Secretary may relieve such individual of such liability". (Emphasis added.) Four features of section 6015 show that this language confers discretion on the Secretary: First, "The word 'may' customarily connotes discretion". 1 Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 346 (2005). Second, section 6015(f), rather than simply providing a rule, expressly names an official ("the Secretary") to apply its rule. Most provisions in the Internal Revenue Code simply state a rule and do not repeat in each instance the truism 2 that it will be the Commissioner who applies that rule on behalf of the Government. It is therefore a departure from the norm when a statutory provision does name an official to apply the rule --e.g., by stating that "the Secretary may" impose a given treatment, 3 or that "[t]he Secretary may waive" a certain provision, 4 or that a given treatment shall obtain when it is appropriate "in the opinion of the Secretary", 5 or that a determination of an issue will be made by some specified subordinate of the Secretary. 6 When a statute thus explicitly names the agency decision-maker, this is a further indication 7 that the matter is committed to his or her discretion. This ought to be considered a particularly strong indication where, as with section 6015(f), that feature of the statute contrasts with its neighboring provisions, i.e., subsections (b) and (c). 8 If we level these distinctions and find that all the forms of relief under section 6015 have the same standard of review, notwithstanding their different vocabulary, then we ignore the Congress's use of distinctive language in the various subsections.



Third, section 6015(e) contrasts the discretionary character of section 6015(f) (under which one is said to "request" relief) with the nondiscretionary character of subsections (b) and (c) (under which one is said to "elect" relief). 9 A benefit that may be "elected" is one's right; but a benefit that must be "requested" invokes the discretion of one who may or may not grant the benefit. 10



Fourth, the pertinent language in section 6015(f) is identical to discretionary language in a companion provision, section 66(c) (which grants analogous relief for liability from tax on community income). The same 1998 amendment that created section 6015(f) also added an "equitable relief" provision as the last sentence of section 66(c) (emphasis added):



Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of either) attributable to any item for which relief is not available under the preceding sentence, the Secretary may relieve such individual of such liability.



The language emphasized above is identical to language added by the same amendment to section 6015(f). 11 When reviewing IRS action under this provision in section 66(c), we have reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Bernal v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 102, 107 (2003); Morris v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-17; Beck v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-198. If this language in section 66(c) granted discretion to the IRS, then the identical language in section 6015(f), enacted at the same time, must have done the same.



B. When a Statute Confers Discretion on an Agency, a Court Reviewing Agency Action Must Defer to That Discretion and Review It Only for Abuse.



The majority acknowledges that section 6015(f) confers discretion on the Secretary, 12 but it then denies that we review the IRS's action for abuse of that discretion, insisting rather that we review "de novo", without enhanced deference to the agency's decision-making. This conception denudes that "discretion" of any effect and contradicts the essence of discretion being granted to an agency. If a Code provision that grants no discretion yields de novo review of an agency's determination, and a Code provision that does grant discretion yields the same de novo review, then the discretion is illusory. The majority's approach effectively relegates the agency's discretion to being relevant only to the agency that exercises it and overlooks that discretion when the agency's action is being reviewed.



Contrary to that approach, it is when agency action is being judicially reviewed that a grant of discretion has its significance. Of course, this Court can properly employ an abuse-of-discretion standard to review IRS action only where the Code has conferred discretion on the IRS. By the same token, where discretion has in fact been conferred, the only proper review is for abuse of that discretion. 13 The majority pays lip service to the grant of discretion in section 6015(f) but then overlooks that discretion with its de novo review.




II. Abandoning the Abuse-of-Discretion Standard Contradicts Uniform Precedent.


The majority acknowledges, majority op. p. 7, that "[w]e have generally reviewed the Commissioner's denial of relief under section 6015(f) for abuse of discretion", majority op. p. 7-8, and it appropriately cites Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276 (2000), in which we held that this Court had jurisdiction over section 6015(f) and that the standard of review in a section 6015(f) case is for abuse of discretion. Butler so held (as the majority states, majority op. p. 8) "because of the discretionary language in section 6015(f)" (i.e., "the Secretary may relieve" (emphasis added)).



The abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing denial of relief under section 6015(f) was employed again in Cheshire v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 183, 197-198 (2000), affd. 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002), which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, stating:



Section 6015(f) confers power upon the Secretary and his delegate, the Commissioner, to grant equitable relief where a taxpayer is not entitled to relief under § 6015(b) or (c), but "taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of either)." In this case, Appellant argues that the Commissioner improperly denied her equitable relief with respect to the retirement distributions and the interest income. This court reviews the Commissioner's decision to deny equitable relief for abuse of discretion. [282 F.3d at 338; emphasis added; fn. refs. omitted.]



Similarly, in Mitchell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-332, affd. 292 F.3d 800 (D.C. Cir. 2002), we held, and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, that the Commissioner had not abused discretion in denying section 6015(f) relief. In affirming the use of the abuse-of-discretion standard, the Court of Appeals relied on the language of section 6015(f) and stated:



As the decision whether to grant this equitable relief is committed by its terms to the discretion of the Secretary, the Tax Court and this Court review such a decision for abuse of discretion. See Flores v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 49, 51 & n. 1 (2001); Butler, 114 T.C. at 291-92. We conclude that there was no such abuse, for the reasons given by the Tax Court in its decision * * *. [292 F.3d at 807; emphasis added.]



In Mitchell the Court of Appeals thus cites, inter alia, Flores v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 49, 51 & n.1 (2001), in which the Court of Federal Claims stated that it "has jurisdiction to review whether the Commissioner has abused his discretion under section 6015(f)". Again, in Neal v. Commissioner, 557 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009), affg. T.C. Memo. 2005-201, where "[b]oth parties agree[d] that the Tax Court appropriately used an abuse of discretion standard of review", the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed our holding that section 6015(f) calls for an abuse-of-discretion standard of review and a de novo scope of review. In unpublished opinions, the Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have also affirmed the Tax Court's use of the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing section 6015(f) cases. See Capehart v. Commissioner, 204 Fed. Appx. 618 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Mitchell v. Commissioner, 292 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2000-332), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-268; Doyle v. Commissioner, 94 Fed. Appx. 949 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Mitchell), affg. T.C. Memo. 2003-96; Alt v. Commissioner, 101 Fed. Appx. 34 (6th Cir. 2004), affg. 119 T.C. 306 (2002).



This Court's above-cited opinions in Butler, Cheshire, Mitchell, and Neal were decided before 2006 amendments to which the majority attaches importance and which are discussed below; but for the current point it is sufficient to observe that even after that amendment, this Court has consistently used the abuse of discretion standard. 14 See Stolkin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-211; Alioto v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-185; Nihiser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-135; Dunne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-63; Gonce v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-328; Dowell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-326; Golden v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-299, affd. 548 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2008); Billings v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-234; Beatty v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-167; Butner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-136; Banderas v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-129; Ware v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-112; Farmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-74; Van Arsdalen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-48.



Thus not only this Court but also the Courts of Appeals and the Court of Federal Claims have uniformly applied the abuse-of-discretion standard to review the Commissioner's exercise of the discretion granted to him by the terms of section 6015(f), and until today no court has held otherwise. Indeed, today's majority opinion is at odds with this Court's prior opinion issued less than a year ago in this very case, Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 122-123 (2008) (Porter I), in which we defended the use of an abuse-of-discretion standard of review with a de novo record scope of review. The Court did state in a footnote that "we need not decide any issue relating to the standard of review", id. at 122, but the opinion concludes with these words, id. at 125:



The measure of deference provided by the abuse of discretion standard is a proper response to the fact that section 6015(f) authorizes the Secretary to provide procedures under which, on the basis of all the facts and circumstances, the Secretary may relieve a taxpayer from joint liability. That approach (de novo review, applying an abuse of discretion standard) properly implements the statutory provisions at issue here and has a long history in numerous other areas of Tax Court jurisprudence.



In making its about-face, the majority does not state today that this Court erred in its original holding in Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276 (2000), but says rather that in Butler "our adoption of an abuse of discretion standard was appropriate." Majority op. p. 9. 15 However, the majority has undertaken a "reconsideration" that was prompted by the 2006 amendments, to which we now turn.




III. The 2006 Amendment to Section 6015(e) Does Not Implicate the Abuse-of-Discretion Standard.


A. The Background to the 2006 Amendment



Before 2006, requests for section 6015(f) relief could arise in the Tax Court in various procedural contexts. Three of these --i.e.,



[1] as an affirmative defense in deficiency redetermination cases because of section 6213(a),



[2] as a remedy on review of collection due process determinations because of section 6330(d)(1)(A), and



[3] as relief in stand-alone petitions when the Commissioner has asserted a deficiency against a petitioner 16



--were not implicated in the jurisdiction controversy that arose in 2006. However, a fourth procedure is the so-called "nondeficiency stand-alone petition". Where a joint tax return reports a tax liability that the joint taxpayers have not fully paid, and the IRS has not asserted a deficiency, one of the spouses might request relief from that joint liability and, if the relief is denied, might file a petition under section 6015(e)(1). Such nondeficiency stand-alone petitions became a subject of controversy because of language in the first sentence of section 6015(e)(1): "In the case of an individual against whom a deficiency has been asserted". (Emphasis added.) This emphasized language had been added to section 6015(e)(1) in December 2000; and for any petitioner seeking section 6015(f) relief whose jurisdictional basis was section 6015(e), this 2000 amendment raised an obvious question whether the case could proceed in the absence of a deficiency's having been asserted.



As is noted above, it was in Butler that we held that we would use an abuse-of-discretion standard to review the IRS's denial of such relief. Butler itself was a deficiency suit brought pursuant to section 6213(a) by a claimant against whom a deficiency had been asserted, but its reasoning would apply to review of section 6015(f) relief however it arose. Butler was brought and decided before the 2000 amendment that provoked the particular controversy that produced the 2006 amendment on which the majority relies. In any event, cases like Butler --a deficiency suit under section 6213(a) brought by a petitioner who sought relief under section 6015(f) and against whom a deficiency had been asserted --were not implicated in this jurisdictional problem involving section 6015(e)(1).



On the basis of the language added to section 6015(e)(1) in 2000 ("against whom a deficiency has been asserted"), first the Ninth Circuit, in Commissioner v. Ewing, 439 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 2006), revg. 118 T.C. 494 (2002) and vacating 122 T.C. 32 (2004), and then the Eight Circuit, in Bartman v. Commissioner, 446 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2006), revg. in part T.C. Memo. 2004-93, held that we lacked jurisdiction under section 6015(e)(1) where no deficiency had been asserted against the taxpayer. The Tax Court accepted this analysis in Billings v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 7 (2006) ( Billings I), 17 and implied that Congress should "identif[y] this as a problem and fix[] it legislatively".



B. The Nature of the 2006 Amendment



Congress did identify and fix the problem. On June 15, 2006, Senators Feinstein and Kyl proposed an amendment that Senator Feinstein characterized as "only minor legislative modifications * * * [to] clarif[y] the statute's original intent" and to "provide a straightforward and uncontroversial solution to the unfair treatment of innocent spouses under current law" that resulted after "[r]ecent decisions of the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals" ( i.e., Ewing and Bartman). 152 Cong. Rec. S5962-5963 (daily ed. June 15, 2006). Senator Kyl similarly explained that he sought "to clarify the jurisdiction of the U.S. Tax Court in cases involving 'equitable relief' for innocent spouse claims." Id. at S5963. Congress adopted their proposal and amended section 6015(e)(1) to read as follows, by adding the language that is emphasized here: 18



SEC. 6015(e). Petition for Review by Tax Court. --



(1) In general. --In the case of an individual against whom a deficiency has been asserted and who elects to have subsection (b) or (c) apply , or in the case of an individual who requests equitable relief under subsection (f) --



(A) In general. --In addition to any other remedy provided by law, the individual may petition the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual under this section * * *.



(It should be noted that, apart from the language emphasized, all the language quoted above was in the statute before 2006. In particular, the pre-2006 statute gave the Tax Court jurisdiction "to determine the appropriate relief" (emphasis added), and the 2006 amendments made no change to that terminology.)



C. The Inapplicability of the 2006 Amendment to This Case



The gist of the 2006 amendment was to add subsection (f) relief to the provision in section 6015(e) giving jurisdiction to the Tax Court. The amendment responded to court opinions holding that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction over one category of section 6015(f) cases (nondeficiency stand-alone petitions). The express purpose of the 2006 amendment was to clarify Congress's intent that the Tax Court should have jurisdiction to review all types of section 6015(f) cases. To do this, the 2006 amendment simply added a phrase to the existing provision of section 6015(e). It had no effect on the other types of section 6015(f) cases. It made no change to the discretionary language in section 6015(f).



The language and history of the 2006 amendment show that the amendment had nothing to do with the abuse-of-discretion standard. There is no hint in the legislative history that Congress intended to modify the long line of cases that had previously applied the abuse-of-discretion standard. Thus, after the amendment, we explained its purpose and effect in Billings v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-234 ( Billings II), and stated: "We are mindful that our review of that decision [to deny section 6015(f) relief] is for abuse of discretion. See Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 287-92 (2000)." The 2006 amendment was simply a straightforward clarification of our jurisdiction.



In fact, the majority does not actually argue that the 2006 amendment made any change that drives their conclusion. Rather, the majority simply states that a "reconsideration" of our standard of review that is "warranted" because of "Congress's confirmation of our jurisdiction" in the 2006 amendments. Majority op. p. 9. The 2006 amendments thus appear to be not a justification but an occasion for the majority's decision, and the specific arguments in support of that decision do not actually turn on any statutory language that was changed in 2006. We now turn to those specific arguments.




IV. Abandonment of the Abuse-of-Discretion Standard of Review for Section 6015(f) Cases Is Not Warranted by Any Feature of the Statute.


A. The Word "Determine" in Section 6015(e)



The majority opinion places great importance on the fact that amended section 6015(e) provides the Tax Court with jurisdiction "to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual under this section" (emphasis added) --language that existed before the 2006 amendment and that had been considered in Butler and all the cases after it that applied the abuse-of-discretion standard. The majority now asserts:



The use of the word "determine" suggests that Congress intended us to use a de novo standard of review as well as scope of review. In other instances where the word "determine" or "redetermine" is used, as in sections 6213 and 6512(b), we apply a de novo scope of review and standard of review. See Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. at 118-119. [Majority op. p. 10.]



The cited passage in Porter I does discuss the significance of the word "determine" --albeit for its implications on the scope of review. However, when Porter I came to address the standard of review, it correctly argued at some length, see 130 T.C. at 122-123, for the compatibility of a de novo trial and a review for abuse of discretion. And it could hardly have done otherwise. Anyone who would argue that an abuse-of-discretion standard of review cannot be employed after a de novo trial will promptly confront the Supreme Court's contrary holding in Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 533 (1979) (cited, of course, in Porter I), which approved precisely that regime. See also Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. at 40-41.



In fact, the word "determine" cannot have the significance that the majority infers for the issue of standard of review. The preeminent appearance of a form of the term "determine" is in our principal jurisdictional statute, which authorizes us to give a "redetermination of the deficiency." Sec. 6213(a). In a deficiency suit, however, the standard of review may vary. See Rule 142. It may be that in most deficiency cases we do both conduct the trial de novo and decide the case "de novo", imposing on the taxpayer only a normal burden of proof by the preponderance of the evidence and entertaining only a normal presumption that the Commissioner's determination was correct. However, in some deficiency cases, we do review the Commissioner's determination for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, supra. On the other hand, in some deficiency cases, the burden of proof is on the Commissioner, who must, for example, prove fraud by "clear and convincing evidence." Rule 142(b). In our "redetermination" of a deficiency, we apply the burden of proof and the standard of review called for by the law applicable to the given case.



That the word "determine" does not at all preclude abuse-of-discretion review is made explicit in a statute on which, for a different point, the majority opinion expressly relies: Section 6404(h) explicitly provides, "The Tax Court shall have jurisdiction * * * to determine whether the Secretary's failure to abate interest under this section was an abuse of discretion". (Emphasis added.) As it is used in the Internal Revenue Code, the word "determine" does not imply that an abuse-of-discretion standard of review should be abandoned in favor of "de novo" review.



B. The Comparison to Section 6404



The point that the majority derives from section 6404(h) is that, when Congress wants to impose an abuse-of-discretion standard, it knows how to do so. The majority observes, majority op. pp. 10-11, that when Congress granted jurisdiction for review of the IRS's denial of interest abatement (suggested by the majority as analogous to Congress's confirming jurisdiction in section 6015(e)(1)), 19 it made explicit that we are to determine whether there "was an abuse of discretion". Sec. 6404(h)(1). Clearly, section 6404(h)(1) is the high-water mark of congressional clarity on this issue of standard of review. However, there is a substantial body of case law calling for abuse-of-discretion review in instances where the statute does not include the phrase "abuse of discretion". 20 Manifestly, when Congress wants to impose an abuse-of-discretion standard, it has more than one way to do so. One way it may do so is to refer (as in section 6404(h)(1)) to "abuse of discretion"; but another is to provide (as in section 6015(f)) that "the Secretary may relieve such individual of such liability." (Emphasis added.)



C. The Absence of the Possibility of Remand



The majority states that "[a]n abuse of discretion standard of review is also at odds with our decision to decline to remand section 6015(f) cases for reconsideration. Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220, 222 (2005)." Majority op. p. 12. Tax jurisprudence would be simpler, and preferable to some, if each tax case called for either abuse-of-discretion review of an agency-level record with a possibility of remand to the agency, or else de novo decision based on a new trial record with no option of agency remand. This neat paradigm is compromised when our system calls for a decision to be based on an agency record but for the court to review the matter de novo, 21 or when our system calls for a decision to be based on a trial de novo but for the court to review for an abuse of discretion 22 --but that is what our system sometimes calls for. If the system would be improved by allowing the Tax Court to remand section 6015(f) cases to the IRS, then Congress will have to enact a "statutory provision[] reserv[ing] jurisdiction to the Commissioner". Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220, 221 (2005) (denying remand of section 6015 cases).



D. The Comparison to Section 6015(b) and (c)



The majority opines that, since our jurisdiction to decide section 6015(f) cases has now been settled by the 2006 amendments, "there is no longer any reason to apply a different standard of review under subsection (f) than under subsections (b) and (c)". Majority op. p. 13. In fact, as we have already shown, the relief provided in subsection (f) is materially different from the relief provided in subsections (b) and (c) --both in the language of those subsections (see supra note 8) and in the characterization of those forms of relief in section 6015(e) and its amendments made in 2006 (see supra note 9). The Court currently recognizes in Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op. at 23), that Congress "intended that taxpayers have two kinds of remedies" --"traditional" and "equitable". If indeed Congress intended subsection (f) to provide a distinct regime, with an equitable remedy to be "requested" rather than "elected", it is perfectly consistent with that intention that it also intended us to review agency action for an abuse of discretion.



Under section 6015(f), "the Secretary may relieve" from joint liability; but when the Secretary denies such relief, and we review that decision under section 6015(e)(1)(A), we should review for an abuse of discretion. I would so hold.



COHEN, WELLS, FOLEY, THORNTON, and MORRISON, JJ., agree with this dissenting opinion.


1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.

2 A judgment of absolute divorce was entered on May 16, 2006.

3 A final decree in petitioner's bankruptcy case was issued on May 8, 2007, lifting the automatic stay imposed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8). Trial was held on Mar. 27, 2007, before the automatic stay was lifted. Respondent was not aware and the Court was not otherwise notified of petitioner's bankruptcy petition. The parties subsequently filed a joint motion for relief from the automatic stay, nunc pro tunc, with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. The bankruptcy court granted the joint motion and ordered "that the automatic stay be lifted in order that * * * [petitioner] may seek innocent spouse relief from the United States Tax Court, nunc pro tunc; and * * * that * * * [petitioner's] innocent spouse Tax Court proceedings and any orders and opinions issued therewith are not void as violating the automatic stay."

4 To prevail under this standard of review, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the Commissioner's determination was arbitrary, capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 113, 125 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 291-292 (2000).

5 In Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 122 n.10 (2008), we expressly reserved any determination regarding the appropriate standard of review in sec. 6015(f) cases because our determination of the proper scope of review was not dependent on the standard of review.

6 Sec. 6015 replaced sec. 6013(e), which provided for a spouse to be relieved from joint and several liability under certain limited circumstances.

7 In analyzing such factors as the taxpayer's marital status, whether the taxpayer would suffer hardship, and whether the taxpayer has complied with income tax laws in subsequent years, our inquiry is directed to the taxpayer's status at the time of trial.

1 It is worth noting that, while 9 Judges have voted "yes" and 8 have voted "no" in this case, two of the "no" votes agree with the majority with respect to the standard of review. Thus, the number of Judges supporting the application of a de novo standard of review is 11 and the number opposing it is 6.

2 The standard of review applied with respect to the "may" language in sec. 269(a) is noteworthy in that the "may" language in the statute had previously been "shall". See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-272, sec. 235(c)(2), 78 Stat. 126.

3 I emphasize here the entire quoted phrase from sec. 6015(e)(1)(A), not just the verb "determine", on which the majority places singular emphasis.

4 The grant of Tax Court jurisdiction was originally codified as sec. 6404(g)(1). Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 (TBOR 2), Pub. L. 104-168, sec. 302(a), 110 Stat. 1457 (1996).

5 A similar contrast emerges in the legislative history of secs. 6320 and 6330 as compared to the legislative history of sec. 6015(e)(1)(A). These Code sections were all enacted as part of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, secs. 3401 and 3201, 112 Stat. 734, 746. The legislative history underlying secs. 6320 and 6330 specifies that courts are to apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing IRS collection determinations and a de novo standard in reviewing determinations of tax liability. H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 266 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 755, 1020; see Giamelli v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 107, 111 (2007). Thus, the legislative history of sec. 6330 makes clear that, to the extent specified therein, we must apply a deferential standard of review. See Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000). In contrast, the legislative history underlying sec. 6015(e)(1)(A) does not specify the standard of review. See H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, supra at 250-251, 1998-3 C.B. at 1004-1005.

6 In describing the Secretary's authority to grant equitable relief, the legislative history puts no emphasis on administrative discretion:

The conferees do not intend to limit the use of the Secretary's authority to provide equitable relief to situations where tax is shown on a return but not paid. The conferees intend that such authority be used where, taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold an individual liable for all or part of any unpaid tax or deficiency arising from a joint return. * * * [H. Conf. Rept. 105-599, supra at 254, 1998-3 C.B. at 1008.]

7 The Oversight Subcommittee hearing was held after the House had passed its version of RRA 1998 (H.R. 2676, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997)) on Nov. 5, 1997. However, neither the Senate nor the conference version of H.R. 2676 had been considered or passed, and the essential form of sec. 6015(f) as finally enacted did not emerge until the conference version of the legislation.

8 The report had been mandated by Congress in 1996 legislation. See TBOR 2 sec. 401, 110 Stat. 1459.

9 Because of the more expansive retooling of sec. 6015(f) review procedures effected by the 2006 amendments of sec. 6015(e)(4), I agree with the majority's conclusion that the 2006 amendments are cause for the Court to reconsider the standard of review in sec. 6015(f) cases.

The Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit recently upheld this Court's position in Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32 (2004), vacated on other grounds 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006), and Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115 (2008), that the scope of review in a sec. 6015(f) review proceeding should not be limited to the administrative record. Commissioner v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2009), affg. T.C. Memo. 2005-201. The standard of review was not in issue in Neal, as the parties had agreed that the standard was abuse of discretion.

10 In fact, we have recently applied a de novo standard of review in a sec. 6015(f) case. See Wiener v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-230 ("Because we cannot ascertain what analysis was made by the Appeals officer in reaching his or her determination that petitioner is not entitled to relief under section 6015(f), we cannot review the determination for abuse of discretion. [Fn. ref. omitted.] Instead, we shall examine the trial record de novo to decide whether respondent properly concluded that petitioner is not entitled to relief.").

11 In the sec. 6015(f) context, we have recognized the conceptual difficulty of conducting a trial de novo while at the same time deferring to an administrative determination. See Nihiser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-135 ("Although rarely employed by district courts in reviewing administrative agency action, a trial de novo typically consists of independent fact-finding and legal analysis unmarked by deference to the original factfinder."); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1544 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "trial de novo" as "A new trial on the entire case * * * conducted as if there had been no trial in the first instance.").

1 Unlike sec. 6330, sec. 6015 does not require a "hearing" before an "Appeals officer" or that a "determination" against the taxpayer be made before filing a petition requesting relief under sec. 6015(f). As noted by Judge Gustafson in his dissent, it is the Secretary, through his delegate the Commissioner, who is vested with the discretion under sec. 6015(f), and it is the Commissioner who appears as the respondent in every case before the Tax Court.

2 As Judge Gustafson's dissent explains, the 2006 amendment had nothing to do with changing the standard of review in sec. 6015(f) cases.

3 ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, codified as amended not in the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.) but in 29 U.S.C. secs. 1001-1461 (2006).

4 Under the Supreme Court's holding in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989), quoted in Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 32 F.3d 120, 123 (4th Cir. 1994), the plan administrator's action is reviewed under a de novo standard of review unless the plan document vests the administrator with discretion, in which case, the action is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

1 The majority so acknowledges. Majority op. p. 8 ("Section 6015(f) provides that the Commissioner 'may' grant relief under certain circumstances, suggesting a grant of relief is discretionary"). See also Kirkendall v. Dept. of the Army, 479 F.3d 830, 870 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op. at 26) ("section 6015(f), uses the discretionary term 'may'").

2 See sec. 7801(a)(1) ("the administration and enforcement of this title shall be performed by or under the supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury"); sec. 7803(a)(2) ("The Commissioner shall have such duties and powers as the Secretary may prescribe, including the power to * * * administer, manage, conduct, direct, and supervise the execution and application of the internal revenue laws").

3 See sec. 482; Dolese v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 830, 838 (1984), affd. 811 F.2d 543, 546 (10th Cir. 1987).

4 See former sec. 6659(e); Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132, 179 (1992), affd. sub nom. Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 28 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 1994).

5 See secs. 446(b), 471(a); Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532 (1979); see also Hernandez-Cordero v. U.S. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 566 & nn.18-24, 570 (5th Cir. 1987) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (appendix listing 169 sections in the United States Code "placing discretion in the opinion of the President, the Attorney General, or a Cabinet Secretary" with the language "in the opinion of").

6 See sec. 6330(c)(3); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000).

7 Admittedly, the naming of the official who makes that decision is not, by itself, an infallible marker that discretion has been granted to that official. Rather, for example, section 269(a) provides that "the Secretary may disallow" losses acquired in tax-motivated transactions, but the case law under section 269 does not indicate a special grant of discretion. Cf. United States v. Jefferson Elec. Manufacturing Co., 291 U.S. 386, 397-398 (1934) (the phrase "to the satisfaction of the Secretary" does not "invest the Commissioner with absolute authority or discretion" (emphasis added) but "means that the additional element is not lightly to be inferred but to be established by proof which convinces in the sense of inducing belief"); R.E. Dietz Corp. v. United States, 66 AFTR 2d 5772, 5779, 90-2 USTC par. 50,447, at 85,439 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (the phrase "'to the satisfaction of the Secretary' * * * may very well indicate that the instant action should have been stylized and litigated as one * * * challenging that determination as arbitrary or capricious or as an abuse of discretion"), affd. 939 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1991).

8 Section 6015(b)(1) provides that "the other individual shall be relieved of liability"; section 6015(b)(2) provides that "such individual shall be relieved of liability"; and section 6015(c) provides that "the individual's liability * * * shall not exceed" his or her allocable portion; but section 6015(f) departs from the pattern to provide that "the Secretary may relieve". (Emphasis added.) As is discussed infra part IV.D, we recognize the difference of these forms of relief in our opinion in Lantz v. Commissioner, supra at ___ (slip op. at 23).

9 To the existing provision of section 6015(e)(1) granting jurisdiction to the Tax Court "[i]n the case of an individual * * * who elects to have subsection (b) or (c) apply", the 2006 amendment (discussed in greater detail below) added "or in the case of an individual who requests equitable relief under subsection (f)". (Emphasis added.) In addition, where existing language in subsection (e)(1)(A)(i)(II) and (B)(i) referred to "elect[ing]" relief under subsections (b) and (c), equivalent amendments were made to add reference to "request[ing]" relief under subsection (f). The majority ignores the difference between "electing" and "requesting" when they state, "Nothing in amended section 6015(e) suggests that Congress intended us to review for abuse of discretion." Majority op. p. 10.

10 To "request" is "to ask * * * to do something" or "to ask * * * for something", whereas to "elect" is "to make a selection of" or "to choose". Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986). This Court has similarly "defined the legal term 'election'" as the "choice of one of two rights or things". Boardwalk Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 937, 945 (1960) (quoting Weis v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 478, 488 (1934) ("The term 'election' in its legal sense means the choice of one of two rights or things, to each of which the party choosing has an equal right, but both of which he can not have, * * * as when a man is left to his own free will to take or do one thing or another, which he pleases, * * * a choice between different things, * * * the act of electing or choosing'")); see also Snow v. Alley, 30 N.E. 691, 692 (Mass. 1892) ("Election exists when a party has two alternative and inconsistent rights, and it is determined by a manifestation of a choice"); Black's Law Dictionary 557 (8th ed. 2004) (describing an "election" as "The exercise of choice; esp., the act of choosing from several possible rights or remedies").

11 See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec. 3201(a), (b), 112 Stat. 734, 739. We observe in Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. at ___ (slip op. at 19-23), that section 6015(f) and the final sentence of section 66(c) are "companion statute[s]".

12 See majority op. p. 11 (under section 6015(f), "the decision whether to grant relief * * * was committed largely to agency discretion"); majority op. p. 8 (the word "may" in section 6015(f) "suggest[s that] a grant of relief is discretionary"). If those statements by the majority are equivocal (qualified as they are by "largely" and "suggest[s]"), then this Court has removed all doubt by lately holding that "a commonsense reading of section 6015 is that the Secretary has discretion to grant relief under section 6015(f)". Lantz v. Commissioner, supra at ___ (slip op. at 28).

13 See Estate of Roski v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 113, 128 (2007) (noting the Commissioner's concession that "'a discretionary act * * * could only be subject to an abuse of discretion review'").

14 Cf. Wiener v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-230 ("Because we cannot ascertain what analysis was made by the Appeals officer in reaching his or her determination that petitioner is not entitled to relief under section 6015(f), we cannot review the determination for abuse of discretion. Instead, we shall examine the trial record de novo to decide whether respondent properly concluded that petitioner is not entitled to relief" (fn. ref. omitted)).

15 See Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 143 (2008) (Goeke, J., concurring) ("it was logical for the Court in Butler * * * to find that the standard of review was abuse of discretion because of the discretionary language in section 6015(f)"). As we argue below, nothing material has changed since Butler was decided in 2000; and if the abuse-of-discretion standard was "logical" and "appropriate" then, it remains so today.

16 Billings v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 7, 18 (2006) ( Billings I).

17 The Tax Court observed in Billings I, 127 T.C. at 17, that this analysis did not deprive the Tax Court of jurisdiction over all section 6015(f) cases, but only over those raised in so-called "nondeficiency stand-alone petitions". . It observed that "innocent spouse relief under all subsections of 6015" ( i.e., including section 6015(f) relief) remained available in deficiency cases under section 6213(a) and in collection due process cases under section 6330(d)(1)(A), as well as in "standalone petitions when the Commissioner has asserted a deficiency against a petitioner." Id. at 18.

18 The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, div. C, sec. 408(a), 120 Stat. 3061. As is discussed supra p. 4 & note 9, these 2006 amendments also added, to the existing references in section 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(II) and (B)(i) to a taxpayer's "elect[ing]" relief under subsections (b) and (c), new references to a taxpayer "request[ing]" subsection (f) relief. Id. sec. 408(b), 120 Stat. 3062.

19 In this regard, section 6404 is not, in fact, a particularly close analogue to section 6015(e) but is different in two significant respects: First, the 1996 amendment of section 6404 gave the Tax Court jurisdiction where before it had none; but the 2006 amendment of section 6015(e) clarified the Tax Court's jurisdiction as to only one form of section 6015(f) relief, leaving unaffected the Court's preexisting jurisdiction as to other forms. Second, the 1996 amendment of section 6404 created a new review regime; but the 2006 amendment of section 6015(e) presupposed the existence of a body of case law that had consistently recognized an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.

20 See supra notes 3-6.

21 "[T]he standard * * * of review to be employed by the District Court [under section 7428] in examining the determination of the Secretary [as to initial qualification for tax-exempt status] * * * is to be de novo. * * * Normally, the Court's decision will be based on the facts as represented in the administrative record." Inc. Trustees of the Gospel Worker Soc. v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 374, 377 n.6 (D.D.C. 1981), affd. without published opinion 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

22 See Porter I, 130 T.C. at 122-123 ("Review for abuse of discretion does not * * * preclude us from conducting a de novo trial. Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. [32] at 40 [(2004)]" (citing, e.g., cases under secs. 446, 482, and 6404). Remand is not possible in a refund case, see D'Avanzo v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 183, 187 (2002), or in a deficiency case; and when these abuse-of-discretion issues arise (as they do) in refund and deficiency cases, remand is not an option.


NON: TCR02 132TCNO11 http://tax.cchgroup.com/network&JA=LK&fNoSplash=Y&&LKQ=GUID%3A00c5a086-0180-37f1-b00e-d018abdb685f&KT=L&fNoLFN=TRUE& TCR02 #2 [CASES ]

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Thursday, April 23, 2009

Energy Conservation Tax Benefits

IRS Reminds Taxpayers of Tax Savings from Implementing Energy Conservation Measures and Creating New Energy Sources (IR-2009-44; FS-2009-10; Notice 2009-41; TDNR TG-99)
The IRS has released three pieces of guidance regarding energy credits that are available to both individuals and businesses.

IR-2009-44
The IRS has reminded taxpayers of new tax benefits, enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), that are available to individuals and businesses that reduce energy use or to producers that create new energy sources. Taxpayers are encouraged to examine the new tax benefits and determine whether they qualify to claim the energy credit.

Tax credits for energy-efficient improvements or installing alternative energy equipment have been increased and are available to homeowners. Homeowners seeking to claim these credits may rely, temporarily, on existing manufacturer certifications or Energy Star labels in determining which products are qualified until updated certification guidelines are announced within the next several months.

In addition, under provisions relevant to energy producers, taxpayers who place in service facilities that produce electricity from wind or other renewable resources can choose either the energy investment tax credit, the renewable electricity production tax credit, or a grant from the Treasury Department.

FS-2009-10
The IRS has issued a fact sheet summarizing the provisions of the Act that provide new, extended, or increased incentives for taxpayers' efforts to increase energy efficiency. The most in-depth discussion focuses on the residential energy property credit under Code Sec. 25C(a)(2). The credit is available for improvements including the addition of insulation, energy-efficient exterior windows, and energy-efficient heating and air conditioning systems.

While a similar credit was available in 2007, some of the requirements for qualifying improvements have been made more stringent. Some property that qualified for the old credit will not qualify for the new one.

Other credits discussed in the fact sheet include the residential energy efficient property credit (Code Sec. 25D), the plug-in electric drive vehicle credit (Code Sec. 30D), the plug-in electric vehicle credit for smaller vehicles (Code Sec. 30), the credit for plug-in electric drive conversion kits (Code Sec. 30B(a)(5)), the alternative motor vehicle credit (Code Sec. 30B), the renewable energy production tax credit (Code Sec. 45), the energy investment credit (Code Sec. 48), and the credit for alternative fuel vehicle refueling property (Code Sec. 30C).

The fact sheet also notes the increases in the volume limits on new clean renewable energy bonds (Code Sec. 54C), and on qualified energy conservation tax credit bonds (Code Sec. 54D), and the opportunity for businesses to obtain renewable energy grants in place of the energy investment credit or the renewable energy production credit (Code Sec. 48(d)).

Notice 2009-41
The IRS has provided interim guidance relating to the credit provided for residential energy-efficient property under Code Sec. 25D placed in service for tax years beginning after December 31, 2008, and before January 1, 2017.

The P.L. 111-5 amended Code Sec. 25D to set the applicable amount of a taxpayer's credit for expenditures on qualified solar electric property, qualified solar water-heating property; qualified fuel cell property; qualified small wind energy property; and qualified geothermal heat pump property. The credit extends to labor costs for site preparation, assembly, original installation and piping or wiring to connect the property to the dwelling.

Manufacturers may certify to purchasers that the property meets the requirements necessary for claiming the credit under Code Sec. 25D. A certification statement may be packaged with the property, provided in a printable form on the manufacturer's website or in any other manner that permits the taxpayer to retain the certification statement for recordkeeping purposes. Certification statements must contain the name and address of the manufacturer, identification of the property as qualified property mentioned above, and appropriate identifiers of the property.

Additionally, a certification statement must contain a declaration, signed by an individual currently authorized to bind the manufacturer. The guidance identifies the information that must be provided in the certification statement. The manufacturer may provide optional information including descriptions of the property and energy savings capacity. Specifically, for geothermal heat pump property, the manufacturer can state that the property meets the requirements of the Energy Star program.



IR-2009-44
The IRS has reminded taxpayers of new tax benefits, enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5), that are available to individuals and businesses that reduce energy use or to producers that create new energy sources. Taxpayers are encouraged to examine the new tax benefits and determine whether they qualify to claim the energy credit.

Tax credits for energy-efficient improvements or installing alternative energy equipment have been increased and are available to homeowners. Homeowners seeking to claim these credits may rely, temporarily, on existing manufacturer certifications or Energy Star labels in determining which products are qualified until updated certification guidelines are announced within the next several months.

In addition, under provisions relevant to energy producers, taxpayers who place in service facilities that produce electricity from wind or other renewable resources can choose either the energy investment tax credit, the renewable electricity production tax credit, or a grant from the Treasury Department.

FS-2009-10
The IRS has issued a fact sheet summarizing the provisions of the Act that provide new, extended, or increased incentives for taxpayers' efforts to increase energy efficiency. The most in-depth discussion focuses on the residential energy property credit under Code Sec. 25C(a)(2). The credit is available for improvements including the addition of insulation, energy-efficient exterior windows, and energy-efficient heating and air conditioning systems.

While a similar credit was available in 2007, some of the requirements for qualifying improvements have been made more stringent. Some property that qualified for the old credit will not qualify for the new one.

Other credits discussed in the fact sheet include the residential energy efficient property credit (Code Sec. 25D), the plug-in electric drive vehicle credit (Code Sec. 30D), the plug-in electric vehicle credit for smaller vehicles (Code Sec. 30), the credit for plug-in electric drive conversion kits (Code Sec. 30B(a)(5)), the alternative motor vehicle credit (Code Sec. 30B), the renewable energy production tax credit (Code Sec. 45), the energy investment credit (Code Sec. 48), and the credit for alternative fuel vehicle refueling property (Code Sec. 30C).

The fact sheet also notes the increases in the volume limits on new clean renewable energy bonds (Code Sec. 54C), and on qualified energy conservation tax credit bonds (Code Sec. 54D), and the opportunity for businesses to obtain renewable energy grants in place of the energy investment credit or the renewable energy production credit (Code Sec. 48(d)).

Notice 2009-41
The IRS has provided interim guidance relating to the credit provided for residential energy-efficient property under Code Sec. 25D placed in service for tax years beginning after December 31, 2008, and before January 1, 2017.

The P.L. 111-5 amended Code Sec. 25D to set the applicable amount of a taxpayer's credit for expenditures on qualified solar electric property, qualified solar water-heating property; qualified fuel cell property; qualified small wind energy property; and qualified geothermal heat pump property. The credit extends to labor costs for site preparation, assembly, original installation and piping or wiring to connect the property to the dwelling.

Manufacturers may certify to purchasers that the property meets the requirements necessary for claiming the credit under Code Sec. 25D. A certification statement may be packaged with the property, provided in a printable form on the manufacturer's website or in any other manner that permits the taxpayer to retain the certification statement for recordkeeping purposes. Certification statements must contain the name and address of the manufacturer, identification of the property as qualified property mentioned above, and appropriate identifiers of the property.

Additionally, a certification statement must contain a declaration, signed by an individual currently authorized to bind the manufacturer. The guidance identifies the information that must be provided in the certification statement. The manufacturer may provide optional information including descriptions of the property and energy savings capacity. Specifically, for geothermal heat pump property, the manufacturer can state that the property meets the requirements of the Energy Star program.

IR-2009-44 April 23, 2009


Tax credits : Energy credit : Qualification for credit .


Energy-Saving Steps This Year May Result in Tax Savings Next Year




IR-2009-44, April 22, 2009

WASHINGTON --The Internal Revenue Service today reminded individual and business taxpayers that many energy-saving steps taken this year may result in bigger tax savings next year.

The recently enacted American Recovery and Reinvestment (ARRA) of 2009 contained a number of either new or expanded tax benefits on expenditures to reduce energy use or create new energy sources.

The IRS encouraged individuals and businesses to explore whether they are eligible for any of the new energy tax provisions. More information on the wide range of energy items is available on the special Recovery section of IRS.gov. For a larger listing of ARRA's energy-related tax benefits, see Fact Sheet 2009-10 .



Tax Credits for Home Energy Efficiency Improvements Increase

Homeowners can get bigger tax credits for making energy efficiency improvements or installing alternative energy equipment.

The IRS also announced homeowners seeking these tax credits can temporarily rely on existing manufacturer certifications or appropriate Energy Star labels for purchasing qualifying products until updated certification guidelines are announced later this spring.

"These new, expanded credits encourage homeowners to make improvements that will make their homes more energy efficient," said IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman. "People can improve their homes and save money over the long run."

ARRA provides for a uniform credit of 30 percent of the cost of qualifying improvements up to $1,500, such as adding insulation, energy-efficient exterior windows, and energy-efficient heating and air conditioning systems. The new law replaces the old law combination available in 2007 of a 10-percent credit for certain property and a credit equal to cost up to a specified amount for other property.

The new law also raised the limit on the amount that can be claimed for improvements placed in service during 2009 and 2010 to $1,500, instead of the $500 lifetime limit under the old law.

In addition, the new law has increased the energy efficiency standards for building insulation, exterior windows, doors, and skylights, certain central air conditioners, and natural gas, propane or oil water heaters placed in service after Feb. 17, 2009.

IRS guidance issued before the enactment of ARRA will be modified in the near future to reflect the new energy efficiency standards. In the meantime, homeowners may continue to rely on manufacturers' certifications that were provided under the old guidance and on Energy Star labels for exterior windows and skylights in determining whether property purchased before June 1, 2009, qualifies for the credit. Manufacturers should not continue to provide certifications for property that fails to meet the new standards.

The new law also eliminates the cap on the 30 percent tax credit for alternative energy equipment, such as solar water heaters, geothermal heat pumps and small wind turbines, installed in a home. The cap generally has been eliminated for these improvements beginning in the 2009 tax year. The IRS today issued Notice 2009-41 , which explains the effects of this change.



Funding Options for Renewable Energy Power Plants

Business taxpayers who place in service facilities that produce electricity from wind and some other renewable resources can choose one of three options to fund the project: a tax credit based on the amount invested, a tax credit based on the energy produced or a grant.

The flexibility to choose among these options was enacted as part of ARRA.

Taxpayers may opt to claim the energy investment tax credit, which generally provides a 30 percent tax credit for investments in energy projects, instead of the production tax credit, which can provide a credit of up to 2.1 cents per kilowatt-hour for electricity produced from renewable sources.

Taxpayers making qualified investments that are placed in service after 2008 and before 2014 (or 2013 for wind facilities) can make an irrevocable election to claim the energy investment tax credit instead of the renewable electricity production tax credit. IRS will issue guidance explaining how to make the election.

Taxpayers also can claim a grant once the property is placed in service instead of claiming either the energy investment tax credit or the renewable energy production tax credit. For qualified renewable energy facilities, the grant is 30 percent of the investment in the facility as long as construction begins in 2009 or 2010 and the property is placed in service before 2014 (2013 for wind facilities). The Treasury Department will issue guidance explaining how the grant works and how to apply.

Taxpayers electing to receive the grant, created by the ARRA, will not be eligible for either of the tax credits. Proceeds from the grants are not includible in the taxpayer's gross income, but the grant amount is subject to recapture if the property is disposed of or otherwise ceases to qualify.

For more information on the renewable electricity production tax credit under Section 45 see Notice 2008-60 and Notice 2008-48 , and for more information on the energy investment tax credit under Section 48 see Notice 2008-68 .


FS-2009-10 April 23, 2009


Credits : Residential energy property credit : Residential energy efficient property credit : Plug-in electric drive vehicle credit : Plug-in electric vehicle credit : Plug-in electric drive conversion kits : Alternative motor vehicle credit : New clean renewable energy bonds : Qualified energy conservation bonds : Renewable energy production tax credit : Investment credit : Renewable energy property credit : Renewable energy grants : Alternative fuel vehicle refueling property credit : Fact sheet .


Energy Provisions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)




FS-2009-10, April 2009

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) provides energy incentives for both individuals and businesses.

Here are some of the key energy provisions in ARRA that may impact taxpayers:

Residential Energy Property Credit ( Section 1121 ): The new law increases the energy tax credit for homeowners who make energy efficient improvements to their existing homes. The new law increases the credit rate to 30 percent of the cost of all qualifying improvements and raises the maximum credit limit to $1,500 for improvements placed in service in 2009 and 2010.

The credit applies to improvements such as adding insulation, energy efficient exterior windows and energy-efficient heating and air conditioning systems.

A similar credit was available for 2007, but was not available in 2008. Homeowners should be aware that the standards in the new law are higher than the standards for the credit that was available in 2007 for products that qualify as "energy efficient" for purposes of this tax credit. The IRS will issue guidance that will allow manufacturers to certify that their products meet these new standards.

Until the guidance is released, homeowners generally may continue to rely on manufacturers' certifications that were provided under the old guidance. For exterior windows and skylights, homeowners may continue to rely on Energy Star labels in determining whether property purchased before June 1, 2009, qualifies for the credit. Manufacturers should not continue to provide certifications for property that fails to meet the new standards.

Residential Energy Efficient Property Credit ( Section 1122 ): This nonrefundable energy tax credit will help individual taxpayers pay for qualified residential alternative energy equipment, such as solar hot water heaters, geothermal heat pumps and wind turbines. The new law removes some of the previously imposed maximum amounts and allows for a credit equal to 30 percent of the cost of qualified property. See Notice 09-41 .

Plug-in Electric Drive Vehicle Credit ( Section 1141 ): The new law modifies the credit for qualified plug-in electric drive vehicles purchased after Dec. 31, 2009. To qualify, vehicles must be newly purchased, have four or more wheels, have a gross vehicle weight rating of less than 14,000 pounds, and draw propulsion using a battery with at least four kilowatt hours that can be recharged from an external source of electricity. The minimum amount of the credit for qualified plug-in electric drive vehicles is $2,500 and the credit tops out at $7,500, depending on the battery capacity. The full amount of the credit will be reduced with respect to a manufacturer's vehicles after the manufacturer has sold at least 200,000 vehicles.

Plug-In Electric Vehicle Credit ( Section 1142 ): The new law also creates a special tax credit for certain low-speed electric vehicles (including those with two and three wheels). The amount of the credit is 10 percent of the cost of the vehicle, up to a maximum credit of $2,500 for purchases made after Feb. 17, 2009, and before Jan. 1, 2012. To qualify, a vehicle must be either a low speed vehicle propelled by an electric motor that draws electricity from a battery with a capacity of 4 kilowatt hours or more or be a two- or three-wheeled vehicle propelled by an electric motor that draws electricity from a battery with the capacity of 2.5 kilowatt hours. A taxpayer may not claim this credit if the plug-in electric drive vehicle credit is allowable.

Conversion Kits ( Section 1143 ): The new law also provided a tax credit for plug-in electric drive conversion kits. The credit is equal to 10 percent of the cost of converting a vehicle to a qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicle and placed in service after Feb. 17, 2009. The maximum amount of the credit is $4,000. The credit does not apply to conversions made after Dec. 31, 2011. A taxpayer may claim this credit even if the taxpayer claimed a hybrid vehicle credit for the same vehicle in an earlier year.

Treatment of Alternative Motor Vehicle Credit as a Personal Credit Allowed Against AMT ( Section 1144 ): Starting in 2009, the new law allows the Alternative Motor Vehicle Credit, including the tax credit for purchasing hybrid vehicles, to be applied against the Alternative Minimum Tax. Prior to the new law, the Alternative Motor Vehicle Credit could not be used to offset the AMT. This means the credit could not be taken if a taxpayer owed AMT or was reduced for some taxpayers who did not owe AMT.

New Clean Renewable Energy Bonds ( Section 1111 ): The new law increases the amount of funds available to issue new clean renewable energy bonds from the one-time national limit of $800 million to $2.4 billion. These qualified tax credit bonds can be issued to finance certain types of facilities that generate electricity from renewable sources (for example, wind and solar).

Qualified Energy Conservation Bonds ( Section 1112 ): The new law increases the amount of funds available to issue qualified energy conservation bonds from the one-time national limit of $800 million to $3.2 billion. These qualified tax credit bonds can be issued to finance governmental programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other conservation purposes.

Extension of Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit ( Section 1101 ): The new law generally extends the "eligibility dates" of a tax credit for facilities producing electricity from wind, closed-loop biomass, open-loop biomass, geothermal energy, municipal solid waste, qualified hydropower and marine and hydrokinetic renewable energy. The new law extends the "placed in service date" for wind facilities to Dec. 31, 2012. For the other facilities, the placed-in-service date was extended from December 31, 2010 (December 31, 2011 in the case of marine and hydrokinetic renewable energy facilities) to Dec. 31, 2013.

Election of Investment Credit in Lieu of Production Credit ( Section 1102 ): Businesses who place in service facilities that produce electricity from wind and some other renewable resources after Dec 31, 2008 can choose either the energy investment tax credit, which generally provides a 30 percent tax credit for investments in energy projects or the production tax credit, which can provide a credit of up to 2.1 cents per kilowatt-hour for electricity produced from renewable sources. A business may not claim both credits for the same facility.

Repeal of Certain Limits on Business Credits for Renewable Energy Property ( Section 1103 ): The new law repeals the $4,000 limit on the 30 percent tax credit for small wind energy property and the limitation on property financed by subsidized energy financing. The repeal applies to property placed in service after Dec. 31, 2008.

Coordination With Renewable Energy Grants ( Section 1104 ): Business taxpayers also can apply for a grant instead of claiming either the energy investment tax credit or the renewable energy production tax credit for property placed in service in 2009 or 2010. In some cases, if construction begins in 2009 or 2010, the grant can be claimed for energy investment credit property placed in service through 2016, and for qualified renewable energy facilities, the grant is 30 percent of the investment in the facility and the property must be placed in service before 2014 (2013 for wind facilities).

Temporary Increase in Credit for Alternative Fuel Vehicle Refueling Property ( Section 1123 ): The new law modifies the credit rate and limit amounts for property placed in service in 2009 and 2010. Qualified property (other than property relating to hydrogen) is now eligible for a 50 percent credit, and the per-location limit increases to $50,000 for business property (increases to $2,000 for other/residential locations). Property relating to hydrogen keeps the 30 percent rate as before, but the per-business location limit rises to $200,000.

Notice 2009-41

April 23, 2009

Code Sec. 25D

Credits : Residential property : Alternative energy property .

Part III - Administrative, Procedural, and Miscellaneous

Credit for Residential Energy Efficient Property

Notice 2009-41



SECTION 1. PURPOSE

This notice sets forth interim guidance, pending the issuance of regulations, relating to the credit for residential energy efficient property under §25D of the Internal Revenue Code for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008. Specifically, this notice provides procedures that manufacturers may follow to certify that property satisfies certain conditions of §25D , as well as guidance regarding the conditions under which taxpayers seeking to claim the §25D credit may rely on a manufacturer's certification. The Internal Revenue Service (Service) and the Treasury Department expect that the regulations will incorporate the rules set forth in this notice.



SECTION 2. BACKGROUND

.01 Section 25D provides a tax credit to individuals for residential energy efficient property. Section 1122 of Division B of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, amended section 25D for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008. The amount of a taxpayer's section 25D credit for a taxable year beginning after December 31, 2008, is equal to the sum of the following:

(1) 30 percent of the qualified solar electric property expenditures made by the taxpayer during the taxable year;

(2) 30 percent of the qualified solar water heating property expenditures made by the taxpayer during the taxable year;

(3) The lesser of --

(i) 30 percent of the qualified fuel cell property expenditures made by the taxpayer during the taxable year; or

(ii) $500 for each half kilowatt of capacity of the qualified fuel cell property to which the expenditures relate;

(4) 30 percent of the qualified small wind energy property expenditures made by the taxpayer during the taxable year; and

(5) 30 percent of the qualified geothermal heat pump property expenditures made by the taxpayer during the taxable year.

.02 Section 25D(g) provides that the credit applies to residential energy efficient property placed in service before January 1, 2017.



SECTION 3. RESIDENTIAL ENERGY EFFICIENT PROPERTY

.01 Meaning of Terms .

(1) Qualified Expenditures . The expenditures for which the credit for residential energy efficient property is allowed (qualified expenditures) are defined as follows:

(a) Qualified solar electric property expenditures are expenditures for property which uses solar energy to generate electricity for use in a qualifying dwelling unit.

(b) Qualified solar water heating property expenditures are expenditures for property which heats water for use in a qualifying dwelling unit if at least half of the energy used by the property for such purpose is derived from the sun, and which is certified for performance by the non-profit Solar Rating Certification Corporation or a comparable entity endorsed by the government of the State in which such property is installed.

(c) Qualified fuel cell property expenditures are expenditures for a fuel cell power plant which has a nameplate capacity of at least 0.5 kilowatt of electricity using an electrochemical process, has an electricity-only generation efficiency greater than 30 percent, and is installed on or in connection with a qualifying dwelling unit.

(d) Qualified small wind energy property expenditures are expenditures for property which uses a wind turbine to generate electricity for use in connection with a qualifying dwelling unit.

(e) Qualified geothermal heat pump property expenditures are expenditures for equipment which uses the ground or ground water as a thermal energy source to heat the dwelling unit or as a thermal energy sink to cool the dwelling unit, meets the requirements of the Energy Star program which are in effect at the time that the expenditure for such equipment is actually made (even if under §25D(e)(8) the expenditure is deemed made at a later time for purposes of determining the taxable year for which a taxpayer may claim the credit), and is installed on or in connection with a qualifying dwelling unit.

(2) Qualifying Dwelling Unit .

(a) Except as provided in section 3.01(2)(b) of this notice, a qualifying dwelling unit is a dwelling unit that is located in the United States and is used as a residence by the taxpayer.

(b) For purposes of section 3.01(1)(c) of this notice (relating to qualified fuel cell property expenditures), a qualifying dwelling unit is a dwelling unit that is located in the United States and is used as a principal residence (within the meaning of section 121 ) by the taxpayer.

.02 Manufacturer's Certification

(1) In General . The manufacturer of property may certify to a taxpayer that the property meets certain requirements that must be satisfied to claim the credit under §25D by providing the taxpayer with a certification statement that satisfies the requirements of section 3.02(3) , (4) and (5) of this notice. The manufacturer may provide the certification statement by including a written copy of the statement with the packaging of the property, in printable form on the manufacturer's website, or in any other manner that will permit the taxpayer to retain the certification statement for tax recordkeeping purposes.

(2) Taxpayer Reliance . Except as provided in section 3.02(7) of this notice, a taxpayer may rely on a manufacturer's certification in determining whether property is eligible for the credit under §25D . A taxpayer is not required to attach the certification statement to the return on which the credit is claimed. However, §1.6001-1(a) of the Income Tax Regulations requires that taxpayers maintain such books and records as are sufficient to establish the entitlement to, and amount of, any credit claimed by the taxpayer. Accordingly, a taxpayer claiming a credit for residential energy efficient property should retain the certification statement as part of the taxpayer's records for purposes of §1.6001-1(a) .

(3) Content of Manufacturer's Certification; Required Information . A manufacturer's certification statement must contain the following:

(a) The name and address of the manufacturer.

(b) Identification of the property as a solar electric property, solar water heating property, fuel cell property, small wind energy property, or geothermal heat pump property.

(c) The make, model number, and any other appropriate identifiers of the property.

(4) Content of Manufacturer's Certification; Optional Information . A manufacturer's certification statement may contain any of the following statements that are applicable:

(a) A statement that the property is made by the manufacturer.

(b) In the case of a solar water heating property, a statement describing the circumstances in which at least half the energy used by the property to heat water for use in a dwelling unit is derived from the sun.

(c) In the case of a solar water heating property, a statement that the property is certified for performance by the non-profit Solar Rating Certification Corporation or a comparable entity endorsed by the government of the State in which such property is installed.

(d) In the case of a fuel cell property, a statement that the property is a fuel cell power plant that has a nameplate capacity of at least 0.5 kilowatt of electricity using an electrochemical process.

(e) In the case of a fuel cell property, a statement that the property is a fuel cell power plant that has an electricity-only generation efficiency greater than 30 percent.

(f) In the case of a fuel cell property, a statement specifying the capacity of the property in half kilowatts.

(g) In the case of a small wind energy property, a statement specifying the capacity of the wind turbine in half kilowatts.

(h) In the case of a geothermal heat pump property, a statement that the property meets the requirements of the Energy Star program that are in effect at the time that the expenditure for such equipment is actually made.

(5) Content of Manufacturer's Certification; Required Declaration . A manufacturer's certification statement must contain a declaration, signed by a person currently authorized to bind the manufacturer in these matters, in the following form:

"Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this certification statement, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, the facts presented are true, correct, and complete."

(6) Manufacturer's Records . A manufacturer that certifies to a taxpayer that a property meets a requirement that must be satisfied to claim the credit under §25D must retain in its records documentation establishing that the property meets the requirement. The manufacturer must, upon request, make such documentation available for inspection by the Service.

(7) Effect of Erroneous Certification or Failure to Satisfy Documentation Requirements . The Service may, upon examination (and after any appropriate consultation with the Department of Energy or the Environmental Protection Agency), determine that a manufacturer's certification that property meets a requirement that must be satisfied to claim the credit under §25D is erroneous. In that event, or if the property's manufacturer fails to satisfy the requirements relating to documentation in section 3.02(6) of this notice, the manufacturer's right to provide a certification on which future purchasers of the property can rely will be withdrawn, and taxpayers purchasing the property after the date on which the Service publishes an announcement of the withdrawal may not rely on the manufacturer's certification. Taxpayers may continue to rely on the certification for properties purchased on or before the date on which the announcement of the withdrawal is published (including in cases in which the property is not installed or the credit is not claimed before the announcement of the withdrawal is published). Manufacturers are reminded that an erroneous certification may result in the imposition of penalties --

(a) Under §7206 for fraud and making false statements; and

(b) Under §6701 for aiding and abetting an understatement of tax liability (in the amount of $1,000 per return on which a credit is claimed in reliance on the certification).

(8) Availability of Certification Information . The Service encourages manufacturers to provide a listing of applicable certification information with respect to their products on their websites to assist taxpayers in determining whether their purchases qualify for the credit for residential energy efficient property.

.03 Additional Requirements . A taxpayer claiming a credit with respect to an expenditure is responsible for determining whether the expenditure appropriately relates to a qualifying dwelling unit (within the meaning of section 3.01(2) of this notice) and cannot rely on a manufacturer's certification for that purpose.

.04 Labor Costs . Section 25D allows the credit for expenditures for labor costs properly allocable to the onsite preparation, assembly, or original installation of residential energy efficient property described in section 3.01 of this notice and for piping or wiring to interconnect such property to the dwelling unit.



SECTION 4. SPECIAL RULES FOR JOINT OCCUPANCY

.01 If a dwelling unit is jointly occupied and used during any calendar year as a residence by two or more individuals, then the maximum amount of qualified fuel cell expenditures which may be taken into account for purposes of §25D(a) by all individuals with respect to the dwelling unit during the calendar year is $1,667 for each half kilowatt of capacity of the fuel cell power plant to which such expenditures relate.

.02 The amount of expenditures taken into account under section 4.01 of this notice by any individual for a taxable year is equal to the lesser of --

(1) The amount of expenditures made by the individual with respect to the dwelling during the calendar year, or

(2) The maximum amount of expenditures that may be taken into account by all individuals under section 4.01 of this notice multiplied by a fraction --

(a) The numerator of which is the amount of expenditures made by the individual with respect to the dwelling during the calendar year, and

(b) The denominator of which is the total expenditures made by all individuals with respect to the dwelling during the calendar year.



SECTION 5. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT

The collection of information contained in this notice has been reviewed and approved by the Office of Management and Budget in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3507) under control number 1545-2134.

An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB control number.

The collection of information in this notice is in section 3 . This information is required to be collected and retained in order to ensure that property meets the requirements for the residential energy efficient property credit under §25D . This information will be used to determine whether the property for which manufacturers provide certifications is property that qualifies for the credit. The collection of information is required to obtain a benefit from manufacturers' certification statements that property meets certain requirements that must be satisfied to qualify for the credit. The likely respondents are corporations, partnerships, and individuals.

The estimated total annual reporting burden is 350 hours.

The estimated annual burden per respondent varies from 2 hours to 3 hours, depending on individual circumstances, with an estimated average burden of 2.5 hours to complete the requests for certification required under this notice. The estimated number of respondents is 140.

The estimated annual frequency of responses is on occasion.

Books or records relating to a collection of information must be retained as long as their contents may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law. Generally, tax returns and tax return information are confidential, as required by 26 U.S.C. 6103.



SECTION 6. DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this notice is Martha S. McRee of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs & Special Industries). For further information regarding this notice contact Martha S. McRee at (202) 622-3110 (not a toll-free call).

Treasury Department News Release, Treasury Celebrates Earth Day with 13 Energy Tax Credits, Bonds and a New Grant Program, TDNR TG-99

April 23, 2009


Treasury Department news release : Earth Day 2009 : Energy tax credits : Grants . --



April 22, 2009



TG-99


Treasury Celebrates Earth Day with 13 Energy Tax Credits, Bonds and a New Grant Program



Increased Tax Credits for Making Energy Efficiency Home Improvements


WASHINGTON - In confronting the most severe financial crisis in generations, the Obama Administration has focused simultaneously on helping Americans save money while investing in our nation's economic future. To that end and in celebration of Earth Day, the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) are highlighting today 13 new or expanded energy incentives under the Administration's American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that provide innovative ways for businesses and consumers to save money while greening America. Also today, Treasury and the IRS are providing a transition safe harbor for consumers and businesses, necessary because of the Recovery Act's increase in energy efficiency standards for home energy saving improvements.

Due to the Recovery Act, homeowners can now claim larger tax credits for installing alternative energy equipment, as the new law eliminates limits on the credits that can be claimed for solar water heaters, wind turbines, and geothermal heat pumps. The Act also provides for a credit of 30 percent of the cost of certain home energy-saving improvements, such as adding insulation, energy-efficient exterior windows, and energy-efficient heating and air conditioning systems. Homeowners can now claim up to $1,500 of these credits during 2009 and 2010, instead of the $500 lifetime limit under the old law.

"These new or expanded energy incentives do two critical things: they increase savings for Americans and they help protect the environment," said Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner. "From day one, this Administration has pursued every option to help ordinary Americans. The 13 energy incentives in the Recovery Act provide $12.7 billion in renewable energy and energy efficiency incentives. These incentives will lead to an increase in jobs at energy-specific businesses, investment in our long-term energy needs, and protect our environment. Those are results we should applaud on Earth Day and throughout the calendar year."

Importantly, through the safe harbor, homeowners can rely on existing manufacturer certifications or appropriate Energy Star labels when seeking to take advantage of the Recovery Act tax credit by purchasing qualifying products until June 1, 2009, and businesses can thus continue to move existing inventory off their shelves.

Andersen Windows of Bayport, Minnesota has now recalled nearly half - 250 of the 560 - workers it laid off in January - a move made possible in part by the tax credit for energy efficient home improvements. Andersen Windows also cites the first-time homebuyer credit as another factor, as this tax credit helps to get existing homes off the market so that builders can start building again.

The 13 energy incentives highlighted today focus on areas as diverse as electric car plug-ins and incentives for businesses to produce electricity from wind energy projects. For more information on these provisions click here or visit IRS.gov.

Credit for Installation of Alternative Fueling Stations: Administrative guidance

The IRS issued interim guidance in Notice 2007-43 with respect to the new qualified alternative fuel vehicle (QAFV) refueling property credit. The credit was added by the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). The guidance is effective for the period that the credit is effective, that is for property placed in service as QAFV refueling property after December 31, 2005, and on or before December 31, 2009 (December 31, 2014, in the case of property relating to hydrogen). The guidance provides a set of definitions for terms used in Code Sec. 30C, as well as cross-references to existing regulations for defining concepts, such as placed in service. The guidance also provides rules for the computation of the credit and for the treatment of converted and dual-use property, as well as examples to illustrate the rules.
[Full Text --Notice 2007-43]




SECTION 1. PURPOSE

This notice sets forth interim guidance, pending the issuance of regulations, relating to the new qualified alternative fuel vehicle (QAFV) refueling property credit ("Refueling Property Credit") under §30C of the Internal Revenue Code. The Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department expect that the regulations will incorporate the rules set forth in this notice.



SECTION 2. BACKGROUND

Section 30C provides a credit for QAFV refueling property. Section 30C(c)(1) provides that QAFV refueling property has the same meaning as under §179A(d) (relating to the deduction allowed for qualified clean-fuel vehicle refueling property placed in service before January 1, 2006) but only with respect to the alternative fuels listed in §30C(c)(1). The credit is available for property that the taxpayer places in service as QAFV refueling property after December 31, 2005, and on or before December 31, 2009 (December 31, 2014, in the case of property relating to hydrogen).



SECTION 3. SCOPE

This notice provides guidance relating to the computation of the Refueling Property Credit and the treatment for purposes of the credit of converted and dual-use refueling property. This notice does not address: (1) the rule under §30C(d)(2) preventing the credit from being used to reduce alternative minimum tax liability; or (2) the rule under §30C(e)(5) requiring recapture of the credit under certain circumstances. The Internal Revenue Service and Treasury Department expect to issue separate guidance relating to these, and other, issues under §30C.



SECTION 4. DEFINITIONS AND CROSS REFERENCES TO APPLICABLE REGULATIONS

.01 Definitions. The following definitions apply for purposes of this notice:

(1) QAFV refueling property. QAFV refueling property is any property (other than a building or its structural components) that meets the following requirements:

(i) The property is not used predominantly outside the United States (or, in the case of property described in §168(g)(4)(G), is property used predominantly in a U.S. possession).

(ii) The property is of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation or is installed on property that is used as the taxpayer's principal residence (within the meaning of §121)).

(iii) The original use of the property begins with the taxpayer.

(iv) The property is used for --

(a) Storing alternative fuel at the point where the fuel is delivered into the fuel tank of a motor vehicle that is propelled by such fuel; or

(b) Dispensing alternative fuel at such point into the fuel tank of a motor vehicle that is propelled by such fuel.

(2) Dual-use property. Dual-use property is refueling property that is used --

(a) To store and/or dispense both alternative fuel and conventional fuel; or

(b) Both to store alternative fuel that is dispensed into the fuel tanks of motor vehicles at the location of the storage facility and to store alternative fuel that is transported to other locations.

(3) Alternative fuel. A fuel is an alternative fuel if --

(i) At least 85 percent of its volume consists of one or more of the following: ethanol, natural gas, compressed natural gas, liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, or hydrogen; or

(ii) It is a qualifying biodiesel mixture.

(4) Qualifying biodiesel mixture. A fuel is a qualifying biodiesel mixture if it is a mixture of biodiesel (as defined in §40A(d)(1)) and diesel fuel (as defined in §4083(a)(3)) and the mixture contains at least 20 percent biodiesel. For this purpose, any kerosene in a mixture --

(i) Is disregarded in determining whether the mixture is a mixture of biodiesel and diesel fuel; and

(ii) Is taken into account in determining whether the mixture contains at least 20 percent biodiesel.

(5) Conventional fuel. Conventional fuel is any fuel that is not an alternative fuel. Conventional fuel includes diesel fuel that is not in a qualifying biodiesel mixture and gasoline.

(6) Conventional refueling property. Conventional refueling property is property that is used to dispense or store only conventional fuel.

(7) Fuel tank. The fuel tank of a motor vehicle that is propelled by alternative fuel includes only the tank that supplies fuel to the propulsion engine of the vehicle.

.02 Cross References to Applicable Regulations. The following provisions of the Income Tax Regulations (26 CFR Part 1) apply for purposes of this notice:

(1) Building and structural components. Whether property is a building or a structural component of a building is determined under the principles of §1.48-1(e).

(2) Original use. Whether the original use of property begins with the taxpayer is determined under the principles of §1.48-2.

(3) Placed in service. The year in which property is placed in service and whether the property is placed in service as QAFV refueling property are determined under the principles of §1.46-3(d).

(4) Subject to allowance for depreciation. Whether property is of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation is determined under the principles of §1.48-1(b).

(5) Use outside the United States. Whether property is used predominantly outside the United States is determined under the principles of §1.48-1(g).



SECTION 5. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT

.01 In General. The Refueling Property Credit is equal to 30 percent of the cost of any property that the taxpayer places in service as QAFV refueling property during the taxable year. The credit is limited to $30,000 per property for property of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation and $1,000 per property for other property. (A proposed technical correction would retroactively change this rule so that a single limitation of $30,000 or $1,000 (depending on whether the property is of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation) applies to all QAFV refueling property placed in service at a location during a taxable year.)

.02 Cost of QAFV Refueling Property. The cost of QAFV refueling property is determined under the principles of §1.46-3(a) and (c) and the following rules:

(1) The cost of QAFV refueling property includes all costs that are required under federal tax principles to be capitalized as a cost of the QAFV refueling property. These costs include the cost of acquiring or constructing the QAFV refueling property or of converting conventional refueling property into QAFV refueling property.

(2) The cost of QAFV refueling property does not include costs that are properly allocable to land or to a building and its structural components. Costs properly allocable to land include, but are not limited to, costs related to the acquisition of land on which the QAFV refueling property is located and expenses for permits, legal fees, project management, or engineering to the extent such expenses are related to the land.

(3) The cost of QAFV refueling property does not include any amount that is taken into account under §179 (relating to the election to expense certain depreciable business assets).



SECTION 6. CONVERTED AND DUAL-USE PROPERTY

.01 Converted Refueling Property.

(1) In general. The rules in this section 6.01 apply solely with respect to converted QAFV refueling property. For this purpose, converted QAFV refueling property is QAFV refueling property that was converted from property (including conventional refueling property) that is not QAFV refueling property (non-QAFV property).

(2) Reconditioned or rebuilt property. If converted QAFV refueling property is treated under the principles of §1.48-2 as reconditioned or rebuilt property, the cost of the QAFV refueling property includes the cost of reconditioning or rebuilding the non-QAFV property, but does not include the basis of the non-QAFV property.

(3) Use as QAFV refueling property treated as original use. If converted QAFV refueling property, including any parts that were non-QAFV property before the conversion, is treated under the principles of §1.48-2 as being put to original use when first used as QAFV refueling property, the cost of the QAFV refueling property includes both the adjusted basis of the non-QAFV property immediately before the conversion and the cost of the conversion.

.02 Dual-Use Property.

(1) In general. In the case of dual-use property that is used to store and/or dispense both alternative fuel and conventional fuel, the cost of the dual-use property is taken into account in computing the Refueling Property Credit only to the extent such cost exceeds the cost of equivalent conventional refueling property. For this purpose, equivalent conventional refueling property is conventional refueling property that is not used to store and/or dispense alternative fuel, but is otherwise comparable to the dual-use property and can store and/or dispense the same amount of conventional fuel as the dual-use property.

(2) Storage facilities. In the case of dual-use property that is used both to store alternative fuel that is dispensed into the fuel tanks of motor vehicles at the location of the storage facility and to store fuel that is transported to other locations, the cost of the dual-use property is taken into account in computing the Refueling Property Credit only to the extent such cost exceeds the cost of a storage facility that is equivalent to the dual-use property except that it is used for the sole purpose of storing alternative fuel that is transported to other locations and can store the same amount of alternative fuel as the dual-use property stores for transport to other locations.



SECTION 7. EXAMPLES

.01 Example 1. (i) X, a fuel wholesaler, acquires an additional storage tank to store alternative fuel at its principal place of business and a fuel tanker truck to transport the alternative fuel from its principal place of business to the retail service stations of X 's customers. The fuel tanker truck dispenses alternative fuel into storage tanks at the retail service stations but is not used to dispense the alternative fuel into the fuel tanks of motor vehicles that are propelled by the alternative fuel.

(ii) Neither the storage tank nor the fuel tanker truck is QAFV refueling property within the meaning of section 4.01(1) of this notice. The storage tank is used to store alternative fuel, but it does not store the fuel at the point where the fuel is delivered into the fuel tank of a motor vehicle that is propelled by alternative fuel within the meaning of section 4.01(7) of this notice. Similarly, the fuel tanker truck is used to dispense alternative fuel, but it does not dispense the fuel into the fuel tank of a motor vehicle that is propelled by alternative fuel.

.02 Example 2. (i) The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that X also acquires a pump that is used to dispense alternative fuel from the storage tank into the fuel tanks of X 's fuel tanker trucks. The storage tank has the same capacity as the tank that would have been used for the sole purpose of storing the alternative fuel that is supplied to X 's customers.

(ii) The pump is QAFV refueling property within the meaning of section 4.01(1) of this notice because it is used to dispense alternative fuel into the fuel tanks of X 's fuel tanker trucks. Accordingly, the cost of the pump is taken into account in determining X 's Refueling Property Credit.

(iii) The storage tank is also QAFV refueling property because it is used to store alternative fuel at the point where the fuel is delivered into the fuel tanks of the fuel tanker trucks. In addition, however, the storage tank is dual-use property described in section 6.02(2). Under section 6.02, the cost of the storage tank is taken into account in computing the Refueling Property Credit only to the extent that cost exceeds the cost of the storage tank that would have been used for the sole purpose of storing the alternative fuel that is supplied to X 's customers. Because no increase in the capacity of the storage tank is needed, none of the storage tank's cost is taken into account in computing the amount of the Refueling Property Credit.

.03 Example 3. (i) Y is a retail seller of gasoline. In Year 1, Y acquires and places in service conventional refueling property consisting of a gasoline storage tank. Y claims the allowable depreciation deduction with respect to the gasoline storage tank on its Federal income tax return for Year 1. In Year 2, Y incurs costs of $10,000 to convert the gasoline storage tank into an alternative fuel storage tank and begins using the converted property as QAFV refueling property.

(ii) If, under the principles of §1.48-2, the storage tank is treated as reconditioned or rebuilt property, only the $10,000 incurred to convert the gasoline tank into QAFV refueling property is taken into account for purposes of determining Y 's Refueling Property Credit for Year 2. If, on the other hand, the converted storage tank is treated, under the principles of §1.48-2, as being put to original use when first used as QAFV refueling property, the adjusted basis of the storage tank immediately before its conversion into QAFV refueling property also is taken into account for purposes of determining the credit.



SECTION 8. RECORDKEEPING

Section 6001 provides that every person liable for any tax imposed by the Code, or for the collection thereof, must keep such records, render such statements, make such returns, and comply with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe. The books and records required by §6001 must be kept at all times available for inspection by authorized internal revenue officers or employees, and must be retained so long as the contents thereof may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law. Section 1.6001-1(e) of the Procedure and Administration Regulations. In order to satisfy the recordkeeping requirements of §6001 and the regulations thereunder, a taxpayer that claims the Refueling Property Credit must retain adequate books and records so that, for any taxable year, it can be verified from those books and records that the fuel that is dispensed and/or stored meets the definition of alternative fuel contained in §30C(c)(1)(A) or (B) and section 4.01(2) of this notice, and that the refueling property otherwise meets the requirements of §30C and this notice.



SECTION 9. EFFECTIVE DATE

This notice is effective for QAFV refueling property placed in service after December 31, 2005, and on or before December 31, 2009 (December 31, 2014, in the case of property relating to hydrogen).



SECTION 10. DRAFTING INFORMATION

The principal author of this notice is Nicole R. Cimino of the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Passthroughs and Special Industries). For further information regarding this notice, contact Ms. Cimino at (202) 622-3120 (not a toll-free call).

IRS Notice 2007-43, I.R.B. 2007-22.

Plug-in Electric Vehicle Credit: Synopsis - plug-in electric vehicle credit

A new credit against tax applies for qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicles placed in service in 2009. The credit is equal to the applicable amount for each new qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicle placed in service by the taxpayer during 2009 ( Code Sec. 30D(a), as added by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-343)). The applicable amount is the sum of $2,500, plus an additional $417 for each kilowatt hour of traction battery capacity in excess of four kilowatt hours ( Code Sec. 30D(a)(2), as added by P.L. 110-343). This credit was scheduled to terminate after 2014, however, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5) overhauls the qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicle credit, effective for vehicles placed in service after 2009, and makes the credit permanent ( Code Sec. 30D, as amended by P.L. 111-5). The credit for each new qualified plug-in electric drive motor vehicle placed in service by the taxpayer in the tax year after 2009 is equal to the sum of $2,500, and $417 for a vehicle drawing propulsion energy from a battery with at least 5 kilowatt hours of capacity plus $417 for each additional kilowatt hour of capacity in excess of 5 kilowatt hours, up to a maximum aggregate of $5,000 based on kilowatt hour capacity ( Code Sec. 30D(a) and (b), as amended by P.L. 111-5

Generally, the plug-in electric vehicle credit rules are very similar to the rules that apply to the Code Sec. 30B alternative motor vehicle credit. There are credit limits, a credit phaseout, specific requirements applicable to the vehicle, as well as special rules for basis reduction and to prevent a double tax benefit.

This new credit may be claimed by both business and individual taxpayers. The use of placed-in-service language may again cause some confusion for individual taxpayers. When the alternative motor vehicle credit was established, the issue arose as to what date the IRS would consider the placed-in-service date for individuals. Although no pronouncement was every made, the language used in other official announcements led practitioners to conclude that the date of purchase was the placed-in-service date for individuals. It seems that the same placed-in-service date would apply for the new credit.

Electricity Produced from Certain Renewable Resources: Wind energy

A safe harbor is established under which the IRS will respect the allocation of the Code Sec. 45 wind energy production tax credits by partnerships in accordance with Code Sec. 704(b). The IRS intends for the Safe Harbor to simplify the application of Code Sec. 45 to partners and partnerships that own and produce electricity from qualified wind energy facilities.

Rev. Proc. 2007-65, I.R.B. 2007-50, November 21, 2007, as revised by Announcement 2007-112, I.R.B. 2007-50, 1175, December 7, 2007.

Energy Credit: Energy Credit: Performance standards

If no quality and performance standards are in effect at the time of acquisition of business energy property, the property will not have to meet any such standards issued at a later date.

IR-2134, June 8, 1979, 79(10)
Qualifying Advanced Energy Project Credit: Synopsis - credit for qualifying advanced energy projects

A tax credit is allowed for investment in qualifying advanced energy projects. The credit is equal to 30 percent of a taxpayer's qualified investment for the tax year with respect to any qualifying advanced energy project ( Code Sec. 48C(a), added by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5)).

The credit is part of the investment credit (see ¶4580.01 et seq.) and the basis of any property that is part of a qualifying advanced energy project is included in the credit base for purposes of applying the investment credit at-risk limitation rules under Code Sec. 49 (see ¶4751.01 et seq.) ( Code Secs. 46(5) and 49(a)(1)(C)(v), added by P.L. 111-5).

The credit is not allowed for any qualified investment for which any of the following credits are allowed: (1) the Code Sec. 48 energy credit (see ¶4671.01 et seq.),(2) the qualifying advanced coal project credit under Code Sec. 48A ( ¶4675.01 et seq.), or (3) the Code Sec. 48B qualifying gasification project credit (see ¶4680.01 et seq.) ( Code Sec. 48C(e), added by P.L. 111-5).

For purposes of the credit, a qualified investment for any tax year is the basis of any eligible property placed in service during that tax year that is part of a qualifying advanced energy project ( Code Sec. 48C(b), added by P.L. 111-5). A qualifying advanced energy project is a project that reequips, expands, or establishes a manufacturing facility for the production of certain types of advanced energy property ( Code Sec. 48C(c), added by P.L. 111-5). See ¶4695.021 for a discussion of a qualified investment and a qualifying advanced energy project.

The credit is available only for qualifying projects certified by the IRS under a qualifying advanced energy project program established in consultation with the Secretary of Energy ( Code Sec. 48C(d), as added by P.L. 111-5). See ¶4695.03 for a discussion of the certification procedure under the qualifying advanced energy project program.

The credit applies to periods after February 17, 2009, under rules similar to the transitional rules of Code Sec. 48(m) (as in effect on the day before October 30, 1990, the date of enactment of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-508)) (Act Sec. 1302(d) of P.L. 111-5). See ¶4695.06 for a further discussion of the effective date and transitional rules.
New CREBs: Taxpayers affected

New clean renewable energy bonds (New CREBs) can be issued by public power providers, cooperative electric companies, governmental bodies, clean renewable energy bond lenders, and not-for-profit electric utilities that have received a loan or loan guarantee under the Rural Electrification Act ( Code Sec. 54C(d)(6)).


Energy Conservation Bonds: Synopsis - credit for qualified energy conservation bonds

The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-343) authorized the issuance of $800 million worth of a new type of tax credit bond called qualified energy conservation bonds. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5) increased the $800-million limit by $2.4 billion to $3.2 billion ( Code Sec. 54D(d), as amended by P.L. 111-5). These tax credit bonds provide a federal subsidy to assist state and local governments in financing the expenses of a laundry list of energy conservation projects, including capital expenditures, research expenditures, expenses for mass commuting facilities, demonstration projects and public education campaigns.

In general, holders of tax credit bonds are entitled to an annual tax credit calculated by multiplying the outstanding face amount of the bonds held by the applicable credit rate, which is set by the IRS. The credit rate is set so that the bonds can be issued at face value with no interest. For qualified energy conservation bonds, however, the annual tax credit is limited to 70 percent of the face amount times the applicable credit rate ( Code Sec. 54D(b)).

The provisions of Code Sec. 54A, which provide mechanical rules for multiple types of tax credit bonds, apply to qualified energy conservation bonds ( Code Sec. 54A(d)(1) and (d)(2)(C)). See ¶4888.01 et seq.

For a discussion of the requirements for qualified bonds, see ¶4908.021. For a discussion of issuers, see ¶4908.03. Allocations of the bond volume cap are discussed at ¶4908.033. Qualified conservation purposes are discussed at ¶4908.035.

Labels:

Wednesday, April 22, 2009

The attached ATG for child care providers has an analysis relevant to other isssues such as the home office deduction abd other issues dealing with personal versus business property.

Child Care Provider Audit Technique Guide (3/30/2009)

April 21, 2009

Internal Revenue Service : Audit Technique Guide : Child care providers .



Child Care Provider Audit Technique Guide

NOTE: This guide is current through the publication date. Since changes may have occurred after the publication date that would affect the accuracy of this document, no guarantees are made concerning the technical accuracy after the publication date.



Purpose

This Audit Techniques Guide (ATG) will provide information to enable examiners to effectively audit issues pertaining to child care providers. The ATG will:


Ÿ Provide background information



Ÿ Identify frequent and/or unique issues



Ÿ Provide examination techniques



Ÿ Supply applicable law




Definitions: Types of Child Care Providers

"Kith and Kin" (Care Provided by Relatives, Friends and Neighbors): These caregivers are generally the most informal type of child care providers. It is often called "Kith and Kin" care and can take place in the caregiver's home or in the child's home. In some instances, the provider will be a spouse caring for his/her own children and also taking care of one or two additional children for the extra income. Others can be grandparents or other relatives, friends, or neighbors who welcome the extra money or are not paid, but are willing to look after the children. This type of care is generally not under much regulatory control and in some states may be exempt from licensing requirements. These providers often believe that this income is not taxable and, therefore, need not be reported. However, this could result in both taxable income and self- employment tax. Child care provided in the child's home by a household employee, which is discussed under In-Home Care, is also a concern.

Family Day Care: This type of child care is provided in the home of the provider, is nonmedical and is usually for less than 24 hours. Regulations differ from state to state; however, most states regulate facilities that care for more than four children. Most states require family care providers to have criminal background checks, preservice and/or ongoing training as well as state inspection on an annual or random basis. All states set minimum health, safety, and nutrition standards for providers. Where there are government regulatory requirements, the provider is required to be approved, certified, registered or licensed under the applicable state or local law. [Compliance with regulatory requirements may be important as it could affect the deduction for the business use of the home (discussed later) under Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") Section 280A(c)(4).] Contact the applicable state or local agency for their regulations, which can be found via the link cited below.

Child Care Centers: This type of child care is usually provided in separate facilities apart from the owner's residence. Many child care centers are organized as corporations (Form 1120), S corporations (Form 1120S) or partnerships (Form 1065). There may be more than one facility operated by a corporation or partnership. There may be one or more shareholders or partners involved in several facilities, each of which may be organized as a separate corporation or partnership. All states require child care centers to be licensed, although the specifics of each will differ. Contact the applicable state or local agency for their regulations using the link below. These centers may be required to report attendance records or other similar information. They may have large commercial kitchens, playground equipment, swimming pools, and large quantities of toys

In-Home Care: Some children are cared for in their own homes by a paid housekeeper, maid, governess, au pair or nanny. The home caregiver is generally paid as a household employee. The parents show the wages on Schedule H attached to their Form 1040. This situation is not a child care provider business. The nanny, housekeeper, etc. receives wages but does not incur expenses as a child care provider. For more information on Employment Taxes for Household Employees, see Topic 756 at http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc756.html . Most states do not regulate in-home caregivers, but some states regulate nanny-placement agencies

Babysitters: Lastly, babysitters provide child care in the child's home on an irregular basis, such as when the parents go out to an event leaving the children under the care of a college student. The income of a babysitter is taxable income.

Others: There may be other types of child care providers, such as after-school programs, church programs, or other tax-exempt entities. These are not specifically addressed in this document

Link to Find State or Local Regulations: The applicable state or local agency and its regulations can be found using the following link: http://www.irs.gov/app/scripts/exit.jsp?dest=http%3A%2F%2Fnrckids.org%2FSTATES%2Fstates.htm



Status

This guide will focus on the income and expenses of a child care provider. Examination of these returns may result in the following determinations:


Ÿ Income is frequently understated and may be paid in cash.



Ÿ Expenses are often overstated and may be paid in cash



Ÿ Record keeping is often inadequate.



Ÿ Issues most often adjusted include:




o Gross receipts



o Food reimbursement



o Food expense (may include personal expenses)



o Business use of home



o Unusually large expenses



o Supplies and miscellaneous expenses (may include personal expenses).




Income Issues



Introduction

Whether the child care provider is a babysitter, "Kith & Kin" type provider, a family day care operator or a child care center, the income from the activity is taxable income. The net income is subject to self-employment tax, if applicable, with the exception of a provider who is organized as a separate entity, such as a corporation. The income and expenses of sole proprietors should be reported on Form 1040, Schedule C (or C-EZ), with the net income reported on Schedule SE to compute self-employment tax, if applicable. Partnerships report their income and expenses on Forms 1065 with the net income passing to the partners on Forms K-1 and reported on their Forms 1040, Schedule E, and Form SE, if applicable. Similarly, S corporations report their income and expenses on Forms 1120S and pass through the net income to their shareholders to be reported on their Forms 1040. C corporations report their income and expenses on Forms 1120. [Note: Some providers may be doing business as limited liability companies (LLCs). LLCs may be taxed as Schedule C businesses, as partnerships, or as corporations, depending on the circumstances. [See IRC Regulations 301.7701-1, 301.7701-2, and 301.7701-3]

The records available will range from nonexistent to a very sophisticated electronic set of books and records depending on the size of the provider and the bookkeeping and tax knowledge of the provider. Income may be received from the parents, business entities, government subsidies, food program reimbursements including the Child & Adult Care Food Program ("CACFP") discussed below, and nonprofit organizations. The audit techniques used will be based on the facts and circumstances of each case.



Income Audit Techniques

Audit techniques required are in IRM 4.10.4 and summarized on the Examiner's Mandatory Lead Sheet Work Paper #400 "Minimum Income Probe Lead Sheet". The following provides information specific to this industry to assist in performing the various income analyses.



Interview

The answers to the questions below will provide you with the information that is available to verify that income is correctly reported and what sources are available to do an indirect method if necessary:


Ÿ Ask how the provider determined the income for the business.



Ÿ Does the provider maintain any records of the income received? What kind of records?



Ÿ Does the provider have a contract with the children's parents? If yes, ask for the contract.



Ÿ Does the provider have a rate schedule? Is the same schedule used for all children or do some have a special rate? Determine which children have a different rate and the amount. If the provider does not have the rate schedule for the year in question, ask for the current rate schedule and then ask how it differed in the tax year under exam.



Ÿ What is the policy for payment when the child is absent due to illness, vacation, etc.?



Ÿ Does the provider get paid vacation? (Are the fees due for the period the provider takes agreed upon vacation?)



Ÿ Does the provider have a fee policy for when the parents drop their children off early or are late picking up the children?



Ÿ Does the provider have a special charge when the child is left beyond the normal business hours on certain days or occasions in which the provider agrees to keep them longer?



Ÿ Does the provider ever keep children overnight?



Ÿ Does the provider furnish transportation to and from school, field trips, etc.? Is it part of the contract price or is there extra charge for either service?



Ÿ For infants and toddlers who wear diapers, does the provider furnish diapers? Is there an extra charge? If the parents provide diapers, does the provider charge for diapers used above what was provided, if needed? How does the provider keep track of extra charges for diapers?



Ÿ Does the provider charge holding fees? (fees to hold a position for a child prior to the child coming to the facility)



Ÿ Does the provider charge a registration fee? A fee to cover the cost of the provider's time to interview the parents, prepare contracts, collecting enrollment information, etc.? If yes, ask if the state ever paid the registration fee, which is done in some states.



Ÿ Does the provider have a sign-in, sign-out sheet for the parents?



Ÿ Does the provider have attendance sheets?



Ÿ Does the provider have emergency contact information?



Ÿ Does the provider have permission for medical treatment forms for the children in the program?



Ÿ Does the provider have parent permission slips for field trips?



Ÿ Does the provider receive payments from sources other than the parents, such as food program reimbursements (CACFP), payments from the parent's employer, grant payments from a nonprofit organization, etc.? If yes, then inquire how the provider records the payments or keep track of what was received and if the provider needs to submit any records to get the payments, such as reports to get the CACFP payments. Do the payments include any amounts for the provider's own children?



Ÿ If there is a bad weather day and the child does not come, does the parent still have to pay?



Ÿ Does the provider furnish year-end statements to the parents as to how much they paid in the tax year?



Ÿ Does the provider furnish meals and snacks or do parents send food with the children? If meals and snacks are provided, ask for details of what kind of meals (breakfast, lunch, dinner) and how many snacks.



Ÿ For providers who have facilities not in their home, ask if they rent out the facilities during nonbusiness hours. Some providers do this especially on weekends.



Ÿ Ask if the provider was granted a loan to purchase business equipment whose principal was forgiven. If yes, then ask what the terms of the forgiveness were and if the loan was forgiven during the year under examination, then the amount forgiven is taxable income.


Note: For all yes answers, use follow-up questions to get details.



Income from Records

If the provider maintains records, tie the records to the return. Test the completeness of the records against other sources you discover in the interview, such as sign-in and sign-out sheets, contracts, attendance records, year-end receipts, emergency contact information, etc. Verify that all the children that are cared for are accounted for in the records. Check for the reporting of extra charges, such as late fees, trip fees, etc. Question any significant fluctuations in the weekly/monthly income.



Reconstruction Methods to Verify Income or Reconstruct Income

The method to be used will be determined on a case-by-case basis depending on the amount of records and source documents available. Some small providers, such as the "Kith and Kin" types, might have minimal records or documents. The bank deposit method is a good method since many parents pay by check to have proof of payment for the child care credit. However, for "Kith and Kin" type, it may not be the best method to test or reconstruct income since there might be a lot of cash transactions in this business. The Cash-T might not be helpful since the income from the provider business may not be the main source of support. Bank account deposit details can provide information, such as the parent's name and payments amounts, and provide a source for making third- party contacts. Third-party contacts may or may not be effective in "Kith and Kin" type businesses because there might be a close personal relationship with the provider. Be sure to follow third-party contact procedures (IRM 4.10.1.6.12).

Various methods to reconstruct income can be created using the information from the rate schedules, contracts, attendance records, sign-in and sign-out sheets, year-end statements, food program statements, etc. (Note: Under IRC Section 7602(e), the Service may not use indirect methods to reconstruct income unless it "has a reasonable indication that there is a likelihood of...unreported income." See IRM 4.10.4 for the techniques that should be employed to determine whether there is a likelihood of unreported income.)



Examples of using this information:



"Kith and Kin" type where no records exist

In the interview, the provider responded that she/he took care of two children from the same family and was paid $200 per week. The children were in the home 50 weeks of the year. No payment was received when the taxpayer took off two weeks for vacation and no extra fees were charged for any other services, such as diapers, field trips, etc. A review of several of the bank deposits showed recurring $200.00 deposits most weeks. Other deposits, except for immaterial ones, could be traced to other sources of income. Income can be computed by multiplying $200.00 times 50 weeks, which equals $10,000.00 gross receipts. Compare the result to the tax return, and if it is significantly different than the amount reported, follow up with additional questions. Absent any reasonable justification, you may base the adjustment on the indirect method.



Using sign-in/out sheets, rate schedules, etc. to verify income sample

Facts:

A family day care provider reported income using the bank deposit information from the account maintained for the business. The sign-in/out sheets were used to create a client list with the appropriate period of time the child was a client. Emergency contact information sheets were used to verify that all children being cared for had been accounted for. The provider stated in the interview that all children were charged the same rate of $250.00 per week. The business was open 50 weeks during the tax year, and the provider did not charge for their two-week vacation. The sign-in/out sheets showed there were a few changes in the children cared for during the tax year. The policy of the business was that parents had to pay the provider for absences and vacations of the children. No extra fees were charged except for early drop-off and/or late pick-up. The sign-in/out sheets showed this was not a meaningful occurrence, hence it should be disregarded in the computation based on materiality.

Computation and Adjustment:

Income was reconstructed using the records as follows:

Child 1 50 weeks times 250.00 equal $12,500

Child 2 30 weeks times 250.00 equal $ 7,500

Child 3 50 weeks times 250.00 equal $12,500

Child 4 50 weeks times 250.00 equal $12,500

Child 5 20 weeks times 250.00 equal $ 5,000

Child 6 45 weeks times 250.00 equal $11,250

The total reconstructed income came to a grand total of $61,250. The reported income was $38,400 based on the bank deposit records. Hence it appears income was understated by $22,850. Remember to discuss the methodology and results with the provider to determine if there were other factors you did not consider. Adjust your computation as needed and make the appropriate income adjustment.



Reconstruction of gross receipts using a food reimbursement formula

Facts:

The taxpayer received food reimbursement from a local government agency of $6,501 for the year under Tier 1. (The difference between a Tier 1 & 2 rates is explained in the following section.)

The taxpayer provided lunch and two snacks per day, per child.

Note: Be sure to ask the taxpayer how many meals and snacks are provided per child and, of these, how many are subject to a reimbursement program as well as if they are reimbursed under Tier I or II and if any of the taxpayer's children are covered by the program. Also, request a copy of the reimbursement application (or other submissions), which should show the number of child days that were used to determine the amount of the subsidy.

The reimbursement meal rates are $1.97 for lunch and $ .58 per snack, totaling $3.13 per day for Tier I (see sample rates below).

Note: because the reimbursement rate changes mid-year for any exam year use the 2nd half of the year's rate which is usually higher. The difference is not material and is in the advantage of the taxpayer hence more conservative for a reconstruction method. (i.e. for the exam year 2007 use the 2007/2008 rate.

The average fee per child per five day week is $200.

The computation, using the facts above is as follows:

Step 1: Divide the annual reimbursement amount ($6,501) by the daily reimbursement rate ($3.13) to arrive at the number of "child days" (2,077).

Step 2: Divide the number of "child days" (2,077) by the days of the operating week (5) to arrive at "child weeks" (415).

Step 3: Multiply the "child weeks" (415) by the weekly fee ($200) to arrive at the tentative gross receipts ($83,000).

Use this formula as a guide to determine if gross receipts appear reasonable. You should modify the computation methodology if the weekly fee changes during the year or if the fee charged is not uniformed for each child under the care of the provider to get a more realistic average weekly fee rate to use. Discuss with the taxpayer other factors that may make this method result in any significant discrepancy and modify the methodology base on those factors. If the taxpayer's own children are enrolled in the food program, reduce the gross receipts by the appropriate amount. This formula may be used for any number of children. If some of the children do not qualify for a reimbursement program, add the annualized fee for these children to the reconstructed gross receipts.

Note: The reimbursements from the food program are usually received in the month following the expenditure.


Tier I





____________________________________________________________________________________
Meal Type 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008

____________________________________________________________________________________
Breakfast (meal) $1.06 $1.06 $1.11

____________________________________________________________________________________
Lunch (meal) $1.96 $1.97 $2.06

____________________________________________________________________________________
Dinner (meal) $1.96 $1.97 $2.06

____________________________________________________________________________________
Supplement (snack) $0.58 $0.58 $0.61

____________________________________________________________________________________




Tier II





____________________________________________________________________________________
Meal Type 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008

____________________________________________________________________________________
Breakfast (meal) $0.39 $0.39 $0.41

____________________________________________________________________________________
Lunch (meal) $1.18 $1.19 $1.24

____________________________________________________________________________________
Dinner (meal) $1.18 $1.19 $1.24

____________________________________________________________________________________
Supplement (snack) $0.16 $0.16 $0.17

____________________________________________________________________________________



Reimbursement rates are for July through June from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), for Tier 1 and Tier 2. Reimbursement rates should be obtained from the applicable state agency, which will also provide the guidelines for making a Tier I or Tier II reimbursement determination. You can get the rates at the United States Department of Agriculture Web site .



Food Program Reimbursements (CACFP)

The United State Department of Agriculture provides reimbursement to day care providers through the CACFP. The CACFP is authorized by Section 17 of the National School Lunch Act (42 U.S.C. 1766). The USDA administers the CACFP through grants to the states. The actual agency involved can vary by state. Independent centers and sponsoring organizations can enter into agreements with the individual states to administer the program.

The day care provider must sign an agreement with the state or sponsoring organization to participate in the CACFP. The provider must be licensed or approved to provide day care services in order to participate. Reimbursement for meals served in day care homes is based upon eligibility for Tier I rates (which targets higher levels of reimbursement to low-income areas, providers, or children) or the lower Tier II rates. Tier I day care homes are those that are located in low-income areas, or those in which the provider's household income is at or below 185 percent of the federal income poverty guidelines. Sponsoring organizations may use elementary school free and reduced price enrollment data or census block group data to determine which areas are low-income. Tier II homes are those family day care homes which do not meet the location, parent income, or provider income criteria for a Tier I home.

Program payments for day care homes are based on the number of meals served to enrolled children, multiplied by the appropriate reimbursement rate for each breakfast, lunch, supper, or snack they are approved to serve. Reports showing the meals provided to the children are submitted to the administering agency and can be useful in verifying income, discussed in detail under techniques.



How to Report Food Reimbursement Payments

Food reimbursement payments are sometimes reported on a Form 1099. If a provider received a Form 1099, the best way for the provider to report those payments is under the "Other Income" section of the Schedule C and writing in "CACFP Income." The provider should not include the amount of the payments for his/her own children because it is not taxable. Clearly reporting the CACFP payments in this manner will assist the IRS in the selection of returns for examination. If no 1099 is received, the provider can report it under other income or as an alternative method net the payments against the food expense.



Other Income

Other income may come from interest bearing accounts, dividends from investments, rental fees, or from the sale of assets.

Child care centers which have facilities separate from the home may rent out the facilities during nonbusiness hours to others for a fee. Some examples are weekly meetings of religious organizations, social clubs, investment clubs, kids clubs, etc., as well as one time events, such as fundraising activities of charitable or social club organizations or for family events (weddings).

Some child care providers might be granted a loan to purchase business equipment whose principal is forgiven after the passage of a certain amount of time. If this situation exists, then the loan forgiveness is taxable income reportable on Schedule C.



Expense Issues:



Introduction to Expenses - Determining the deductible amount under IRC Section 162 and the business usage percentage in child care provider businesses

The examination of expenses of the child care provider can be a challenge to the examiner because many of the items being expensed are used for both business and personal purposes. Because of this unique feature of the provider, Congress passed a special provision of the IRC to provide the method to compute the business use of the home deduction, which is discussed below.

Other deductions, such as depreciation of fixed assets, amounts spent for toys, supplies, appliances, vehicle expenses, etc. may pose the same problem to the examiner. The provider is entitled to a deduction of the business use portion, subject to the limitation of the law for some deductions, such as vehicle depreciation (IRC Section 280F). In some cases, the property might be substantially used in the business, while in other cases it might be minimally used.

The examiner needs to evaluate in a fair and objective manner whether the expense is deductible under IRC Section 162 as an ordinary and necessary expense and then determine what percentage constitutes business usage based on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is important to stress the fact that having a personal usage element present does not disqualify the property from being a deductible IRC Section 162 expense. A few examples of this are:


Ÿ Lawn expenses: If the children play outside in the yard on a regular and ongoing basis, then the expense of maintaining the yard, such as the amount charged by a lawn mowing service, has a business usage element and should be partially allowed. An appropriate business usage percentage could be the business use of the home percentage.



Ÿ Laundry facilities and soap to wash towels, blankets, etc. used by the children: This is a necessary business expense for which the business usage of the home percentage would be appropriate based on materiality.


There are many such examples in this industry of expenses incurred for both business and personal purposes, and the examiner must be careful to first apply the IRC Section 162 criteria and then the facts and circumstances of the case to determine the deductible business portion of the expense.

Another area that must be kept in mind is the substantiation rules of IRC Section 274 (d), discussed below, which requires specific information to be maintained in the provider's records for certain types of expenses to be allowed.



Substantiation Requirements of IRC Section 274(d) and IRC Regulation 1.274-5T

The law basically states that for certain expenses listed in the below cited regulations, no deduction of any of these expenses will be allowed unless the taxpayer (provider) does "substantiate by adequate records or by sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer's own statement" the expense elements that are clearly defined in the IRC and the regulations.

IRC Regulation § 1.274-5T, Substantiation requirements (temporary), states:


(a) In general. For taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1986, no deduction or credit shall be allowed with respect to --




1. Traveling away from home (including meals and lodging),



2. Any activity which is of a type generally considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation or with respect to a facility used in connection with such an activity, including the items specified in section 274(e),



3. Gifts defined in section 274(b), or



4. Any listed property (as defined in section 280F(d)(4)and § 1.280F-6T(b)),


unless the taxpayer substantiates each element of the expenditure or use (as described in paragraph (b) of this section) in the manner provided in paragraph (c) of this section. This limitation supersedes the doctrine found in Cohan v. Commissioner , 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). The decision held that, where the evidence indicated a taxpayer incurred deductible travel or entertainment expenses but the exact amount could not be determined, the court should make a close approximation and not disallow the deduction entirely. Section 274(d) contemplates that no deduction or credit shall be allowed a taxpayer on the basis of such approximations or unsupported testimony of the taxpayer.

As the House and Senate Committee Reports indicate, it was the intent of Congress to have the IRC Section 274 provisions supersede the doctrine found in Cohan case with respect to certain types of expenses. This fact has been cited in numerous court cases as the basis for disallowing expenses that fall under Section 274 that were allowed in cases decided prior to the regulation being issued.

IRC Regulation 1.275-5T explains the elements in detail with examples for the four categories of expenses covered by the regulations. Publication 463 (Travel, Entertainment, Gifts and Car Expenses ) and Publication 946 (Depreciation (section on Listed Property)) summarize the key elements of the law in plain English.

Listed Property is defined in IRC Section 280F and IRC Regulation 1.280F-6(b) to include vehicles, computers, cell phones and property used for entertainment, such as photographic (cameras), phonographic, communications and video recording equipment (camcorders). (Note: Computers and property used for entertainment are not Listed Property if they are used exclusively at the taxpayer's business establishment or exclusively in connection with his principal trade or business.) There are additional requirements for depreciated Listed Property, which is discussed in the next section.



Depreciation

Depreciation (IRC Sections 167, 168 and 179) may be available for computers, vehicles, office equipment, kitchen equipment, playground equipment, furniture, appliances, etc., and any fixed asset that has a useful life over one year.

Challenges: An Examiner is faced with two main concerns in addition to whether the expense is ordinary and necessary under IRC Section 162:


Ÿ The Business Use Percentage: The facts and circumstances of each case should be used to determine the business use percentage. For Listed Property, discussed below, the provider is required to keep records as to usage. It is recommended that some records of business usage and total usage be kept for other items also. For furniture and furnishing, the business use of the home percentage may be appropriate.



Ÿ The basis to be depreciated: If the provider purchased the item in the year it was placed in service in the business, the basis is the cost. For many providers, when they start their business many items which were personal use only are used in the business. They are entitled to depreciate the business use portion of those assets. For assets purchased prior to being placed into service, the basis for depreciation is the lower of the cost or the fair market value at the time the asset is placed in service. Determining fair market value has been an area of controversy and must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. A good starting point for determining the fair market value is to go to some of the sites which provide valuations of those items for charitable donations purposes, such as:



Salvation Army donation valuation site: The Salvation Army: Donation Receipts - Valuation Guide


The fact that the asset was only used for personal purposes prior to being placed in service does not disqualify it from being converted to use in the business. You would still need to value it as described above and apply the appropriate business use percentage, which does not need to be 100% business use and usually is not.

IRC Section 179 allows some qualifying assets to be expensed in the year they are purchased and put into service up to the limit set by the law, which can change from year-to-year.

Special depreciation allowances in addition to the normal depreciation deduction can be granted by Congress for periods of time or for special locations, such as federally declared disaster areas.

Check the law or Publication 946 for the year the asset is purchased and placed in service to determine the amount of the depreciation deduction allowed and the criteria to take the additional deduction as well as the Section 179 amount and limits.

Listed Property , which includes vehicles, computers, entertainment equipment, such as camcorders, VCRs, televisions, stereos, pianos, etc., have special substantiation rules of Section 274(d) as well as limitations on usage and the amount of the deduction (discussed below).

Less than 50% Business Usage of Listed Property (IRC Section 280F): If the business usage of listed property is less than 50%, the asset does not qualify for an IRC Section 179 deduction, and the taxpayer must use the Alternative Depreciation System under IRC Section 168(g) since the asset cannot be depreciated using MACRS. If the business usage falls to under 50% in a subsequent year, then the provider is required to "recapture" the amount of depreciation previously claimed that exceeds the amount that would have been allowed had the business usage been less than 50% the whole time.

Passenger Automobiles (limitation of IRC Section 280F): For passenger automobiles, there is an additional limitation for the total amount of depreciation allowable for each year, which is adjusted each year for inflation. Refer to Publication 463 for details on the limits and other related sections on car expenses.

Elements Required to Be Substantiated under IRC Section 274(d) for Listed Property: IRC Section 274(d), discussed above, requires the taxpayer (provider) to "substantiate by adequate records or by sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer's own statement" the expenses listed in that section.

Under IRC Regulation 1.274-5T(b)(6), the taxpayer must substantiate the following items to be allowed a deduction for Listed Property:


Ÿ The amount of each separate expenditure, such as the cost of acquiring the item, maintenance and repair costs, capital improvement costs, lease payments, and any other expenses;



Ÿ The amount of each business use (based on an appropriate measure, such as mileage for vehicles and time for other Listed Property), and the total use of the property for the tax year;



Ÿ The date of the expenditure or use; and



Ÿ The business purpose for the expenditure or use.


The records should be made at or near the time of the expenditure or use.

For more details and information on Listed Property and what records must be kept, refer to Publication 946 and IRC Regulations 1.280F-6, 1.274-5T, and 1.274-6T.

Note to Examiner: Use RGS Lead Sheets for audit steps



Vehicle (Car and Truck) Expense

Child care providers generally will incur expenses related to a vehicle, which is Listed Property as defined in IRC Section 280F. The extent of the vehicle usage for business will depend on the type of provider, the age of the children, and the type of activities they offer in the regular course of their business. Some typical expenses relate to taking children to and from school, field trips, medical facilities, and trips to buy business-related supplies, etc.

The provider is allowed to deduct either the business use percentage of actual vehicle expenses incurred primarily for business or the standard mileage rate for the business miles, depending on the facts and circumstances. However, since vehicles are Listed Property, the provider is subject to the substantiation rules under IRC Section 274(d) and the related regulations, especially IRC Regulations 1.274-5T and 1.274-6T, for Listed Property or no deduction will be allowed. Section 274 substantiation is discussed above and the elements are listed in the Depreciation section above. Examiners need to review the documentation to verify that it conforms to the legal requirements. In child care centers, it is not uncommon to maintain vans for transporting children, which are substantially used for business, hence the substantiation requirements would be different.

Primarily for Business: Some trips are obviously primarily for business, while others might be personal or a combination of both. If a taxpayer travels to a single destination and engages in both personal and business activities, the expense is deductible only if the trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade or business. If the trip is primarily personal in nature, the expense is not deductible even though the taxpayer engages in business while at such destination. Whether a trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade or business or is primarily personal in nature depends on the facts and circumstances in each case. The amount of time during the period of the trip spent on personal activities compared to the amount of time spent on activities directly relating to the taxpayer's trade or business is an important factor in determining whether the trip is primarily personal. If a trip involves multiple locations, then the examiner needs to determine for each location whether it was primarily for business and allow as deductible only the mileage to/from the business purpose location. For example: A provider went 6 miles to destination A (primarily business purpose), then 5 miles to destination B (primarily personal purpose) and then 9 miles home, the provider could deduct 12 miles as a business expense (roundtrip home to destination A).

For an activity to be classified as a "trade or business," there must be a profit motive present, and the expense must be ordinary and necessary. If the examiner finds that expenses or trips being claimed seem unreasonable for any trade or business expecting to make a profit, a probe of additional factors should be made. Are there additional fees being collected for the field trips or other trips that were not reported as income? Was the trip during the normal time for the operation of the business? Who participated in the trip? Did most of the children participate? Is there a family or other special relationship with the children which might move the expense from being an ordinary or necessary expense of a trade or business to a personal one? This issue may more commonly be found in the "Kith and Kin" type businesses. Use the facts and circumstances of each case to determine the issues that may exist.

References: See IRC Section 274 and related regulations, Publication 463, Travel Entertainment, Gift and Car Expenses , for more details on the standard mileage rate versus the deduction of actual expenses, the recordkeeping requirements, and other valuable information.

Note to Examiner: Use the RGS lead sheet for the audit steps. Be careful to verify the substantiation in accordance with IRC Section 274.



Travel, Meals, Entertainment

Most providers are licensed and are required to take courses to maintain their license. In addition, there are numerous child care organizations that sponsor conventions and seminars which providers attend. There might be local classes being offered or gatherings of child care providers in an area that will help the provider in providing a better product to the children. The provider may also meet with clients or employees. Some activities require travel away from home and others might be local but include meal expenses.

Travel, meals and entertainment are covered under IRC Section 274 and the related regulations including IRC Regulation 1.274-5T, which deals specifically with the substantiation requirements. See the section above entitled "Substantiation Requirements of IRC Section 274(d) and IRC Regulation 1.274-5T" and IRC Regulations 1.274-5A and 1.274-5T. Under Section 274(n), meal expense is subject to a 50% limitation, except meals (food) and entertainment expense provided to the children under the provider's paid care is fully deductible. See the "Food Expense" section below. Meal expenses are not deductible unless incurred while traveling away from home or serve a business purpose, such as entertaining clients.

In addition to the IRC Section 274 requirements, for the provider to be able to deduct the expense, the provider must be a "trade or business" and the expense must be an ordinary and necessary expense. To be a trade or business, there must be a profit motive present. While following the normal audit steps, for each expense the examiner should review the business purpose, the business relationship for meals and entertainment, and the actual expenses to determine if the expense is an ordinary and necessary expense. He/she might find that some persons who the provider has a business relationship with also have a close personal or family relationship with the provider. This should not be the sole reason to disqualify the expense. The examiner needs to look at all the facts and circumstances together before deciding whether it is an ordinary and necessary expense.

Note to Examiner: Use the RGS lead sheet for the audit steps



Food Expense

Providers deduct the cost of food in several different places on their returns including, but not limited to, the "Cost of Goods Sold" line, the "Supplies" line, or the "Other Expenses" line.

IRC Section 162 allows a deduction for food provided to the day care recipients. This amount is not limited by the 50% reduction imposed under IRC Section 274(n).

Under IRC Section 262, no portion of the cost of food provided to the provider's family, including food consumed by the provider or the provider's own children, is allowed as a deduction.

If the provider receives reimbursement for food costs through the CACFP (discussed above) or any other program, the provider can report all the reimbursements under the income section of Part I of the Schedule C and then deduct the food expenses in full, which is the recommended method especially when the provider receives a Form 1099 from the program, or the provider can net the amount reimbursed against the food expense. If the provider uses the netting method and the food expense is greater than the reimbursement, then the provider may deduct the excess as a food expense. If the reimbursements exceed the total food expenses, then the provider should report the excess income in Part I on the Schedule C. The netting method is not a preferred method since an Examiner will always be looking for the food reimbursement amounts. When you report the amount separately, the Examiner will more easily be able to account for the payments.

Note to Examiner: Food reimbursement payments from the sponsors are received approximately one month after the expense is incurred.

For food provided to employees, generally only 50% of the cost of food consumed is deductible. However, providers can deduct 100% of the cost of food consumed by their employees if its value can be excluded from their wages as a de minimis fringe benefit. For more information on meals that meet these requirements, see Meals in chapter 2 of Publication 15-B, Employer's Tax Guide to Fringe Benefits .

Food may be bought in large quantities in larger child care operations. Freight charges may be included in the food account. Some centers might have special occasion activities for the children in which the parents are invited, such as Christmas, where meals are provided. Such special occasion costs are deductible as a special activity cost.

Substantiation Requirement: IRC Section 6001 and IRC Regulation 1.6001-1(a) provide that every person must keep records to substantiate the amount of any deduction. If the provider deducts the actual food expense incurred, they must maintain receipts which clearly identify the cost of the food allowed as an IRC Section 162 trade of business expense from those costs that are nondeductible personal expenses under IRC Section 262.

Revenue Procedure 2003-22 was issued 2-24-2003 to simplify recordkeeping requirements by providing an optional standard meal and snack rates that "family day care providers" may use in computing the deductible cost of food provided to eligible children in the day care in lieu of actual costs. The rate is based on the Tier I rate under the CACFP. The provider may use the standard meal and snack rate for a maximum of one breakfast, one lunch, one dinner, and three snacks per eligible child per day. There is still a recordkeeping requirement, which includes the name of each eligible child, dates and hours of attendance in the family day care, and the type and quantity of meals and snacks served. More information on this method, including which providers qualify and who is an eligible child, can be found in Publication 587 under the chapter Daycare Facilities specifically the section entitled "Standard Meal and Snack Rates." A sample log can be found in Exhibit A, which is at the end of the Publication.

If the provider chooses to use the standard meal and snack rates, he/she must do so for the complete tax year. The provider cannot use the actual method during that tax year but can switch methods in a subsequent tax year if he/she wishes.

Caution to Examiners: The standard meal and snack rate method in Revenue Procedure 2003-22 is available to a trade or business which provides child care to eligible children in the home of the provider that is (1) nonmedical, (2) does not involve a transfer of legal custody, and (3) generally lasts for less than 24 hours each day. The revenue procedure applies to any "family day care provider" whether or not the provider received reimbursements under the CACFP or is registered, licensed, or regulated by the state in which it operates.



Business Use of the Home:



Introduction

Child care providers are allowed a deduction for expenses associated with the business use of their homes. The requirements for the deduction are different than those for other businesses since qualifying usage does not require exclusive use for business. Regular usage is generally qualifying. A provider may have a combination of exclusively used rooms and regular used rooms, which is discussed in the instructions of Form 8829 . See IRC Section 280A(c)(4).

If the child care provider meets the requirements to qualify to take the deduction (discussed below), it is computed on Form 8829, Expenses for Business Use of Your Home .



Requirements to Qualify for Business Use of Home Deduction for Day Care Facilities (Regulatory)

In order to claim the business-use-of-the-home deduction, the taxpayer must meet the following two requirements:


1. The provider must be in the trade or business of providing day care for children, persons age 65 or older, or persons who are physically or mentally unable to care for themselves. (IRC Section 280A(c)(4)(A)).



2. The provider must have applied for, been granted, or be exempt from having, a license, certification, registration, or approval as a day care center or as a family or group day care home under state law. The provider does not meet this requirement if their application was rejected or the license or other authorization was revoked. (IRC Section 280A (c)(4)(B)).


The examiner should check the requirements of the state in cases where the provider claims exemption from the state licensing requirement. The website at http://www.irs.gov/app/scripts/exit.jsp?dest=http%3A%2F%2Fnrc.uchsc.edu%2FSTATES%2Fstates.htm can direct you to the State Agency that regulates child care providers.

Note to Examiners: The licensing requirement applies only to the deduction for business use of the home. An unlicensed provider may still deduct other business expenses, such as food, toys, supplies, etc.



Limitation on Deduction (Regulatory)

IRC Section 280A(c)(5) limits the deduction if the taxpayer's expenses exceed gross income from the child care activity. See IRC Proposed Regulation 1.280A-2(i) attached as Exhibit B for more details.



Regular Use Versus Exclusive Use

The qualifications for business-use-of-the-home expenses are different for child care providers than for other businesses. Unlike most businesses, qualifying usage does not require exclusive use; however, Congress did impose a regular basis usage test in IRC Section 280A(c)(4) for the child care providers. In Uphus v Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1994-71, the issue of regular use was addressed. This case discussed the regular basis usage test imposed by Congress in the law. The court stated: "Consistent with the Senate report, we have found that regular basis test is met where the taxpayer is able to establish that the business use is continuous, ongoing or recurring. ...However, where the business use of the area is merely an incidental or occasional business use, expenses incurred for that area are not deductible."

Revenue Ruling 92-3 provides specific guidance for the calculation of the deduction for the business use of a home by day care providers. In determining whether a space in the home passes the "regular use" test in computing business use of the home, Revenue Ruling 92-3 outlines the following:


If a room is available for day care use throughout each business day and is regularly used as part of A's routine provision of day care (including a bathroom, an eating area for meals or a bedroom used for naps), the square footage of that room will be considered as used for day care throughout each business day. A day care provider is not required to keep records of the specific hours of usage of such a room during business hours. Also, the occasional non-use of such a room for a business day will not disqualify the room from being considered regularly used. However, the occasional use of a room that is ordinarily not available as part of the routine provision of day care (e.g., a bedroom ordinarily restricted from day care use but used occasionally for naps) will not be considered as used for day care throughout each business day.




Determining Business Percentage

The business percentage consists of two elements: the space percentage and the time percentage discussed in detail below. The two percentages are multiplied by each other to get the business percentage. Part I of Form 8829, Expenses for Business Use of Your Home, walks you through the actual computation. The Form 8829 instructions provide detailed computation directions for the cases where the provider's business usage consists of a combination of exclusively-used rooms and regularly-used rooms.

Note to Examiner: Since there are no set norms, the examiner must establish the facts and circumstances in each case to determine the elements that go into making up the business-use-of-the-home percentage, discussed in more detail below, including the total square footage of the house and the business-use portion. The initial interview is essential to gather the facts, especially the room(s) that are used regularly or exclusively or both.



Space Percentage (Form 8829 Part I lines 1-3)

The space percentage consists of the area regularly used for business (the numerator) divided by the area of the complete home (the denominator). Square footage is a common measurement tool; however, any other reasonable method can be used if it accurately reflects the business percentage.

The examiner should ask the provider how each room included in the business area was used. Evaluate whether each room included was regularly used, as discussed above. Use follow-up questions as needed. If the regularly used test is met, that area is included in the numerator. Many times we tend to be judgmental in our analysis. Be careful to stick to the facts to determine whether a particular room was regularly used for business purposes. For example, the taxpayer has three children in his/her care and three bedrooms which are used for naps. The provider explains that the children are put down for naps separately since they sleep better. While the provider could put all three children down for naps in the same room, the examiner should not limit the deduction to the use of one bedroom. On the other hand, if the taxpayer is claiming the square footage of a formal dining room in the business usage and your interview indicates that the children have their meals in the kitchen, you will need to probe to determine exactly how the dining room is used on a continuous, ongoing, or recurring basis.

The examiner will need to determine the total square footage of the home. This can be done in several ways, such as reviewing house plans, blueprints, escrow papers, or any other documents that substantiate the square footage. A common error made by taxpayers is to include only one floor in the total square footage. For example, the taxpayer operates a day care facility on the main floor of her 1800 square foot home. She used 1800 as the total square footage. However, her home has a full basement. The basement square footage must be added to the total square footage. Another common error occurs in cases where the taxpayer is using the garage in the business. You must be sure that the square footage of the garage is added to the denominator (total home space) as well as the numerator (business usage space).



Time Percentage (Form 8829 Part I lines 4-6)

The time percentage is the total number of hours the facility was used for the child care business during the year (the numerator) divided by the total hours in the year (8,760 hours). The provider should record how the total hours the facility was used, was computed. Hours spent cooking, cleaning, and preparing activities for the business of child care could be included in the calculation of the numerator of the time percentage if the tests for deduction under IRC Section 162 (ordinary and necessary expenses) are otherwise met under the facts of the particular case. As illustrated in Revenue Ruling 92-3, one hour is added to the 11 hours of actual day care operation for the 1/2 hour before and 1/2 hour after regular hours spent preparing for and cleaning up after the children.

Note to Examiners: The Revenue Ruling example is not an absolute rule. The time outside of the regular hours to be added can be more or less depending on the facts and circumstances in each case, which need to be evaluated in line with Section 162 (ordinary and necessary expenses). Some providers, because of the type of service provided and/or ages of the children, might spend more time preparing activities for the children than others and vice versa. In addition, some preparation work might be done on the weekends. Recordkeeping time can also be included. Often a provider will keep a detailed log of his/her activities for a significant part of the year. This detailed record keeping of the time spent and tasks performed is essential to provide the details needed by the examiner to make an informed determination under Section 162, so it is highly recommended that all providers keep such logs. Ultimately, examiners should make a decision based on the facts and circumstances of each case.



Figuring the Allowable Deduction:

Continuing on Form 8829, you will need to determine which expenses are direct and which are indirect. Direct expenses are those that are incurred exclusively for the business and provide no personal benefit. Indirect expenses are those that are not incurred exclusively for the business (i.e., expenses which benefit both the business and the home). Indirect expenses must be allocated using the business use percentage. The portion of mortgage interest and property taxes not deductible on Form 8829 should then be reported on Schedule A. Verify any necessary entries to the source documents, especially the total mortgage interest and taxes claimed on Form 8829 and Schedule A, since it is a common error that these expenses are either duplicated or that more than 100% is deducted between the two schedules.



Tax Exempt Income Used for Payment of Housing Used in Day Care:

In some cases, providers may operate their day care businesses in housing that is provided by an employer as a nontaxable benefit. The most common instances involve military personnel and the clergy.

Military personnel receive tax-free housing as a condition of their employment. See IRC Section 134. The structure of the housing arrangement can vary between branches of the military and from base to base. Some bases provide government-owned housing where the only out-of-pocket costs may be cable and Internet expenses. On other bases, housing is privatized. Military personnel receive the nontaxable allowance in their monthly checks and are responsible for paying the rent and utilities directly to the housing contractor. It is possible that the amount of rent and utilities could exceed the housing allowance. Military personnel may also live off base in privately owned housing. They may use the nontaxable housing allowance to pay for rent and utilities or to make their house payment if they own a home.

A member of the clergy may receive a nontaxable housing (parsonage) allowance. See IRC Section 107 and Publication 517 for more details on the requirements for the allowance to be nontaxable.

IRC Section 265(a)(1) disallows otherwise allowable deductions for expenses attributable to the business use of the home to the extent that such expenses are allocable to tax-exempt income. The courts have stated that the legislative purpose behind IRC Section 265 is to prevent taxpayers from reaping a double tax benefit by using deductions attributable to tax-exempt income to offset taxable income See Induni v. Commissioner , 98 T.C. 618, 621 (1992), aff'd , 990 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1993). Thus, for example, expenses incurred to maintain the home (deductible under IRC Section 162), casualty losses suffered due to the partial or complete destruction of the home (deductible under IRC Section 165(c)(1)), state and local real property taxes (deductible under IRC Section 164(a)), and depreciation of the home (deductible under IRC Section 167) are subject to the Section 265 limitation. However, under IRC Section 265(a)(6), the recipient of a tax-exempt military housing allowance or a parsonage allowance may deduct the full amount of otherwise deductible mortgage interest and real property taxes.

In determining the amount of business expense properly deductible in the event (1) a tax-exempt military housing allowance or a parsonage allowance is received, and (2) the home is used for the business of providing child care, the methodology described in Revenue Ruling 92-3 should first be applied to each type of deductible expense. The business portion of the mortgage interest and real property taxes so determined should be claimed on the Form 8829 with the balance claimed on Form 1040, Schedule A (assuming itemized deductions are used). All remaining deductible expenses relating to the business use of the home should then be multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the tax-exempt housing allowance and the denominator of which is the total amount of the deductible expenses relating to the business use of the home (e.g. the total amount of the mortgage interest, real property taxes, depreciation, and maintenance expenses). The resultant amount is the amount to be disallowed.

The effects of this formula may be shown as follows.


The taxpayers receive a $6,000 housing allowance and their housing expenses total $7,000, of which $4,000 is property taxes and mortgage interest and $3,000 is other expenses of maintaining the home (including $500 for house depreciation allocable to the business use of the home for the child care activity). There is a 30-percent time and space use allocation of the home to the child care activity. The deductibility of the property taxes and mortgage interest is unaffected by IRC Section 265. Accordingly, the normal allocation required by IRC Section 280A should be performed. So, 30 percent of the $4,000 in property taxes and mortgage interest, or $1,200, should be reported on Form 8829 as allocable to the child care business. The remaining $2,800 should be reported on Schedule A in the appropriate categories.



An allocation of the remaining $3,000 of expenses is required by IRC Section 265. First, determine the amount attributable to the child care activity by multiplying 30 percent by those house expenses other than house depreciation ($2,500), which equals $750. Then calculate the amount of house depreciation that would normally be allowed if fully claimed on Form 8829 ($500) and add this to the business portion of the remaining expenses ($750) equaling $1,250. Next, $6,000 of the total $7,000 housing expenses is allocable to the housing allowance. Thus 6/7`s of the $1,250, or $1,071.43, cannot be allowed as a deduction by virtue of IRC Section 265. This leaves only $178.57 of the additional housing expenses that are deductible on Form 8829.


Note to Examiners: Ask in your interview if a nontaxable housing allowance is an issue. The military does not put the nontaxable housing allowance on the Form W-2, hence if it is an issue, you will need to look at the pay stub, which will list the amount of the allowance.



Depreciation of the Home

This only applies to the residence building and not to the value of the land, equipment or other depreciable assets. To determine the depreciable basis, use the lesser of (1) cost or other basis of the home, or (2) the fair market value on the date the property was placed in service for business purposes.



Modifications to the Home

Expenses incurred to modify a residence should be treated as capital expenditures even if it is to comply with licensing requirements. A capital expenditure includes any amount paid for permanent improvements or modifications that have a useful life that extends beyond the tax year and which is made to increase the value of the property. These types of improvements are generally depreciable.



Sale of Home

A capital gain issue may arise if the provider/owner sells the residence (home) in which he or she operated a business and depreciation deductions were allowed or were allowable. All or a portion of the gain on the sale of the home may qualify under IRC Section 121 to be exempt from taxation if the provider meets certain requirements discussed below. However, IRC Section 121(d)(6) provides that the exclusion provided under IRC Section 121 does not apply to any gain from the sale of a principal residence attributable to depreciation adjustments (as defined in IRC Section 1250(b)(3)) allowed or allowable for periods after May 6, 1997. Therefore, a provider/owner who used part of his or her home for business purposes may not exclude any gain from the sale of that residence that is attributable to depreciation adjustments taken or allowed for periods after May 6, 1997.

If the business is conducted within the primary residence structure, then the gain, except for depreciation allowed or allowable, can be excluded if the provider/owner meets certain requirements, including the time and ownership test discussed below. If the business is conducted in a structure separate from the personal residence, then the portion of the gain allocable to that structure would not qualify under Section 121 for exclusion unless the provider/owner can show personal use of the structure that meets the time and ownership test. An allocation between the separate business use structure and the personal residence structure is required. (IRC Regulation 1.121-1(e) and Publication 523 provide more information and examples relating to this issue.)

Time and Ownership test: Even if property is used exclusively as the provider's principal residence in the year of sale, the provider is not necessarily entitled to the exclusion under IRC Section 121. To qualify for the full exclusion, the provider must have owned and used the property as his principal residence for at least 2 years during the 5-year period immediately preceding the sale. If the provider does not meet the 2-year requirement, then a portion of the exclusion will be allowed if the sale is made under the circumstances described in IRC Section 121(c).



Toys

This can be a significant expense depending on the size of the operation. Some toys may be depreciable while others may be deductible. Refer to IRC Sections 167, 168, and 179 and Publication 946, How To Depreciate Property , for information on this distinction. Examine this item for large, unusual, questionable, and personal items.



Advertising

Advertising is usually a minimal deduction for the "kith and kin" care providers and family child care operations. Usually the program sponsors or agencies provide free referral services.

Child care centers usually advertise in telephone directories, local newspapers, church bulletins, flyers, etc.

Note to Examiner: Use the RGS lead sheet for the audit steps.



Bad Debts

A "cash method" taxpayer should not have a bad debt expense. An "accrual method" taxpayer may have bad debts generated by nonpayment for services provided.

Follow normal procedures to substantiate the expense and the efforts to collect. Also, ask if the child is still in the program. If so, why is it a bad debt and was it subsequently collected?

Note to Examiner: Use the RGS lead sheet for the audit steps.



Commissions and Fees

Fees paid to contractors for such things as landscaping, repairs, etc. are common among larger facilities and may be present in smaller sized providers. Filing of Forms 1099 Misc. for the work performed by the contractor may be required based on the amount the provider paid, and failure to issue the forms may be an issue and may result in the assessment of penalties (See IRC Section 6041 and Instructions for Form 1099 ).

Whether the expense is an ordinary and necessary expense per IRC Section 162 and what business use percentage is applicable depends on the facts and circumstances in each case. Providers whose businesses are located in a separate facility apart from the personal residence do not pose the same challenges.

A potential employment tax issue can be found in this type of business where "employees" are being treated as independent contractors. See the discussion below under wages and compensation.

Note to Examiner: Use the RGS lead sheet for the audit steps



Employee Benefit Program/Pension and Profit Sharing

There are numerous employee benefit programs available, some of which are medical, disability and other accident or health plans described in IRC Sections 105 and 106; group term life insurance coverage described in IRC Section 79; coverage under a dependent care assistance program described in IRC Section 129; coverage under an adoption assistance program described in IRC Section 137, and coverage under an IRC Section 401(k) or other type of retirement plan. More sophisticated and/or complex child care providers might offer more benefit plans than smaller providers, while many others might have none. This can be a complicated issue. Follow local procedures to determine if a referral is necessary. See appropriate publications for further information on benefit plans, including Publication 15-B, Employer's Tax Guide to Fringe Benefits , and Publication 560, Retirement Plans for Small Businesses .

Note to Examiner: Use the RGS lead sheet for the audit steps



Insurance

This expense item normally includes general business liability coverage, workmen's compensation coverage for employees, casualty insurance for large assets used by the facility, and other property-related insurance costs. This does not include home owner's insurance, which is one of the expenses reported on Form 8829, Business Use of the Home.

Evaluate the nature of the insurance and the assets covered to determine what business use percentage should be applied to the cost to be deductible based on the facts and circumstances.

Note to Examiner: Use the RGS lead sheet for the audit steps



Office Expenses and Supplies

The office expense and supply category can include numerous expenses, such as food (previously discussed), toys, diapers (often provided by the parents), office supplies, cleaning supplies, educational and art supplies, etc. If material, these categories should be examined to see if they include personal items or whether the business use percentage utilized is realistic based on the facts and circumstances of the case.

The provider should list large expenses separately under the "Other Expenses" category as well as keep records how they determined the business usage percentage. Some items such as cleaning supplies, the business use of the home percentage would be appropriate to use while other expenses should use an actual usage method percentage such as computer related supplies would use the computer business usage percentage computed under IRC Section 274, discussed earlier. If the expense is material, records on usage should be maintained to avoid areas of controversy.



Rent

Rental expenses should be allocated according to the business use percentage. If the rental is for the personal residence, see "Business Use of Home" section above.



Start-Up Costs (paid or incurred after October 22, 2004)

Start-up costs are expenses the taxpayer incurs prior to opening the business that would ordinarily be deductible if the business was open and active. These include licensing fees, advertising costs, inspection fees, supply expenses, pre-opening payroll expenses, professional fees, and other miscellaneous expenses paid or incurred prior to the opening day. Depreciation on assets purchased prior to the opening day begins on the opening day or the day upon which the asset is actually placed in service after opening day. Start-up expenditures cannot be deducted as a current expense. However, the taxpayer may elect in the year the business opens to deduct $5,000 (or the amount of the actual start-up expenses if less) and amortize the remaining expenses ratably over the 180-month period beginning with the month in which the active trade or business opens. If the total start-up expenses exceed $50,000, then the $5,000 deduction allowed is reduced by the amount by which the expenses exceed $50,000. Effective for expenses incurred or paid after Sept. 8, 2008, per IRC Regulation 1.195-1T a taxpayer is deemed to have made the election to expense and amortize the start-up costs unless the taxpayer clearly elects to capitalize them on a timely-filed federal Income tax return (including extensions) for the year in which the trade or business becomes active (begins). Taxpayers may apply the new regulations to expenses paid or incurred after Oct. 22, 2004, by filing amended returns, provided the statute of limitations has not expired.

Reference: IRC Section 195; Publication 535



Organizational Costs of Corporations or Partnerships (paid or incurred after October 22, 2004)

Organizational costs paid or incurred to create a corporation or partnership may be deducted in the same manner as start-up costs for a sole proprietorship. Effective for organizational expenses incurred or paid after September 8, 2008, per IRC Regulations 1.248-1T and 1.709-1T, a taxpayer is deemed to have made the election to expense and amortize the organizational costs unless the taxpayer clearly elects to capitalize them on a timely-filed federal Income tax return (including extensions) in the year in which the trade or business becomes active (begins). Taxpayers may apply the new regulations to expenses paid or incurred after Oct. 22, 2004, by filing amended returns, provided the statute of limitations has not expired.

Reference: See IRC Sections 248 and 709 and Publication 535 for more details.



Telephone Expense

The monthly expense for basic local telephone service is a nondeductible personal expense (IRC section 262(b)) even though the state requires the provider to have a telephone in order to be licensed. Additional telephone charges incurred for business purposes are deductible under IRC Section 162 to the extent substantiated.

Cellular phones are Listed Property and are required to be substantiated in accordance to the IRC Section 274(d) and IRC Regulation 1.274-5T whose elements are discussed in the section on depreciation set forth above. Also see the previous section entitled "Substantiation Requirements of IRC Section 274(d) and IRC Regulation 1.274-5T" for a general discussion of the issue.



Utilities

The cost of utilities is generally an allowable expense. For facilities located in the personal residence, this is an expense includable in the business-use-of-the-home deduction (Form 8829) discussed above. For facilities that are located separate and apart from the residence, utilities should be listed on the Schedule C line for that expense.



Bank Charges

Bank charges are allowable for a separate business account. For a combined business/personal account, bank charges are allowed to the extent of the business percentage.



Gifts

Under IRC Section 274(b)(1), the deduction for gifts to the children or their parents are limited to $25 per person per year and must meet the recordkeeping requirements of IRC Section 274(d) and IRC Regulation1.274-5T. See also Publication 463 . Examiners should not confuse expenses related to activities done with the children with gifts.



Other Expenses

The "Other Expenses" category may be used to deduct expenses separately identified on the return, such as food, toys, gifts, etc.



Wages/Compensation

Child care providers may have people who work for them either part-time or full-time. Larger providers, such as child care centers, may have directors, assistant directors, teachers, assistants, cooks, drivers, etc. These workers are generally considered employees. Wages for these people are deductible and normal employment taxes apply.

Family members may work as employees of the business if bona fide services are performed. It is recommended for family member that the provider keeps a record of the dates, time, compensation rates, and work performed that clearly establishes the business purpose and to establish the bona fide service aspect. See Publication 15 for related employment tax details.

If the child care provider is a sole proprietorship, then the payments made to the provider are considered "draws" and are not deductible under wages or any other category. Partnerships are flow-through entities. Payments to the partners are not deductible by the partnership in determining net income unless they are guaranteed payments. Guaranteed payments and the net income allocated to each partner are usually subject to self-employment tax. If the provider is organized as a corporation or an S corporation, then the payments taken by the shareholders who perform services for the entity are wages subject to employment tax and deductible as wages.



Employee Versus Independent Contractor

Note to Examiner: If you have a potential employment tax issue or a worker reclassification issue, refer the issue to the Employment Tax Specialty Group to work. The discussion below is included to help you identify this issue in your case.

The following is a brief outline of the law regarding employment status and employment tax relief. It is important to note that either worker classification --independent contractor or employee --can be valid.

The first step in any case involving worker classification is to consider Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978. Before or at the beginning of an audit inquiry relating to employment status, an examiner must provide the taxpayer with a written notice of the provisions of Section 530 ( Publication 1976 ). If the requirements of Section 530 are met, a business may be entitled to relief from federal employment tax obligations. Section 530 terminates the business's, but not the worker's, employment tax liability, including any interest or penalties attributable to the liability for employment taxes.

In determining a worker's status, the primary inquiry is whether the worker is an independent contractor or an employee under the common law standard. Under the common law, the treatment of a worker as an independent contractor or an employee originates from the legal definitions developed in the law of agency --whether one party, the principal, is legally responsible for the acts or omissions of another party, the agent --and depends on the principal's right to direct and control the agent.

Guidelines for determining a worker's employment status are found in three substantially similar sections of the Employment Tax Regulations: Sections 31.3121(d) -1, 31.3306(i) -1, and 34.3401(c) -1, relating to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), and federal income tax withholding. The regulations provide that an employer-employee relationship exists when the business for which the services are performed has the right to direct and control the worker who performs the services. This control refers not only to the result to be accomplished by the worker, but also to the means and details by which that result is accomplished. In other words, a worker is subject to the will and control of the business not only as to what work shall be done, but also how it shall be done. It is not necessary that the employer actually direct or control the manner in which the services are performed if the employer has the right to do so. To determine whether the control test is satisfied in a particular case, the facts and circumstances must be examined.

The Service now looks at facts in the following categories when determining worker classification: behavioral control, financial control, and relationship of the parties.

Behavioral Control: Facts that substantiate the right to direct or control the details and means by which the worker performs the required services are considered under behavioral control. This includes factors such as training and instructions provided by the business. Virtually every business will impose on workers, whether independent contractors or employees, some form of instruction (for example, requiring that the job be performed within specified time frames). This fact alone is not sufficient evidence to determine the worker's status. The weight of "instructions" in any case depends on the degree to which instructions apply to how the job gets done rather than to the end result.

The degree of instruction depends on the scope of instructions, the extent to which the business retains the right to control the worker's compliance with the instructions, and the effect on the worker in the event of noncompliance. The more detailed the instructions that the worker is required to follow, the more control the business exercises over the worker, and the more likely the business retains the right to control the methods by which the worker performs the work. The absence of detail in instructions reflects less control.

Financial Control: Facts on whether the business has the right to direct or control the economic aspects of the worker's activities should be analyzed to determine worker status. Economic aspects of a relationship between the parties illustrate who has financial control of the activities. The items that usually need to be explored are whether the worker has a significant investment, whether the worker has unreimbursed expenses, whether the worker's services are available to the relevant market, whether the worker is paid by the hour as opposed to a flat fee for the services performed, and whether the worker has the opportunity for profit or loss. The first four items are not only important in their own right but also affect whether there is an opportunity for the realization of profit or loss. All of these can be thought of as bearing on the issue of whether the recipient has the right to direct and control the means and details of the business aspects of how the worker performs the services.

The ability to realize a profit or incur a loss is probably the strongest evidence that a worker controls the business aspects of the services rendered. Significant investment, unreimbursed expenses, making services available, and method of payment are all relevant in this regard. If the worker is making decisions which affect his or her bottom line, the worker likely has the ability to realize profit or loss.

Relationship of the Parties: The relationship of the parties is important because it reflects the parties' intent concerning control. Courts often look to the intent of the parties, which is most often embodied in contractual relationships. A written agreement describing the worker as an independent contractor is viewed as evidence of the parties' intent that a worker is an independent contractor, especially in close cases. However, a contractual designation, in and of itself, is not sufficient evidence to determine worker status. The facts and circumstances under which a worker performs services are determinative of a worker's status. The designation or description of the parties is immaterial. This means that the substance of the relationship governs the worker's status, not the label.

References: For an in-depth discussion, refer to Internal Revenue Manual 4.23.5 , Technical Guidelines for Employment Tax Issues, which includes the Section 530 determination, and related exhibits . Publication 15B, Employer's Supplemental Tax Guide, is also available to provide guidance.



Exhibit A Sample IDR

Shown below are items examiners may want to consider when preparing an Information Document Request (IDR) for a child care provider.

NOTE: While the list is not all inclusive, at the same time not all items should be requested in every case. Examiners should use this information as a guide and request only the items that are appropriate and relevant for their specific cases.


1. Be prepared to discuss the business history of your child care activity, including the starting date, a brief description of a typical day's activities, rooms used on a "regular" basis, and internal controls for income and expense information.



2. If you are taking any deductions for the use of your home in your child care activity, provide a floor plan, blueprint, or other relevant documents that reflect the square footage of the residence. Provide the escrow and/or closing statement to verify the cost of the property. Provide mortgage company statements or other relevant documents that show the property taxes and mortgage interest paid during the taxable years (insert the taxable years). If you are renting your home, provide substantiation of the rent paid during the taxable years (insert the taxable years) and a copy of the rental agreement.



3. Provide copies of your federal income tax returns for the taxable years (insert the taxable years); prior federal and state tax audit reports for the taxable years (insert the taxable years); and any related tax returns (e.g., partnership returns, corporate returns, or employment tax returns) for the taxable years (insert the taxable years)); and any Forms 1099 filed and/or received during the taxable years (insert the taxable years).



4. Provide journals, ledgers, records, and/or notebooks used to keep a record of your clients and the amount they paid (weekly, monthly, etc.) during the taxable years (insert the taxable years).



5. Provide all bank statements, business and personal, for the period beginning (insert first day of the period) and ending (insert last day of the period).



6. If you are a participant in a food program, provide copies of the reimbursement statements, name and address of the food sponsor, attendance and meal count record, and time record for reimbursements received during the taxable years (insert the taxable years).



7. Provide a copy of any benefit or retirement plan offered to your employees.



8. Provide substantiation in the form of canceled checks, receipts, statements, or invoices for expenses identified for examination.



9. Provide all business licenses, approvals, registrations, and certifications.



10. For the taxable years (insert the taxable years ), provide any contracts for services, rate schedules, policy statements, sign-in/out sheets or any other attendance records, emergency contact sheets and/or medical treatment forms for children in program for year of examination, permission slips for trips, and year end statements to parents, if any.




Exhibit B Internal Revenue Regulation 1.280A-2(i)



Proposed Regulation 1.280A-2 Deductibility of expenses attributable to business use of a dwelling unit used as a residence

(i) Limitation on deductions - (1) In general. The deductions allowable under chapter 1 of the Code for a taxable year with respect to the use of a dwelling unit for one of the purposes described in paragraphs (b) through (f) of this section shall not exceed the gross income derived from such use of the unit during the taxable year, as determined under subparagraph (2) of this paragraph. Subparagraphs (3) and (4) of this paragraph provide rules for determining the expenses allocable to the business use of a unit. Subparagraph (5) of this paragraph prescribes the order in which deductions are allowable.

(2) Gross income derived from use of unit. (i) Only income from qualifying business use to be taken into account. For purposes of section 280A and this section, the taxpayer shall take into account, in applying the limitation on deductions, only gross income from a business use described in section 280A(c). For example, a taxpayer who teaches at school may also be engaged in a retail sales business. If the taxpayer uses a home office on a regular basis as the principal place of business for the retail sales business (a use described in section 280A(c)(1)(A)) and makes no non-business use of the office, the taxpayer shall take the gross income from the use of the office for the retail sales business into account in applying the limitation on deductions. Even if the taxpayer also corrects student papers and prepares class presentations in the home office (not a use described in section 280A(c)), no portion of the taxpayer's gross income from teaching may be taken into account in applying the limitation on deductions.

(ii) More than one location. If the taxpayer engages in a business in the dwelling unit and in one or more other locations, the taxpayer shall allocate the gross income from the business to the different locations on a reasonable basis. In making this determination, the taxpayer shall take into account the amount of time that the taxpayer engages in activity related to the business at each location, the capital investment related to the business at each location, and any other facts and circumstances that may be relevant.

(iii) Exclusion of certain amounts. For purposes of section 280A(c)(5)(A) and this section, gross income derived from use of a unit means gross income from the business activity in the unit reduced by expenditures required for the activity but not allocable to use of the unit itself, such as expenditures for supplies and compensation paid to other persons. For example, a physician who uses a portion of a dwelling unit for treating patients shall compute gross income derived from use of the unit by subtracting from the gross income attributable to the business activity in the unit any expenditures for nursing and secretarial services, supplies, etc.

(3) Expenses allocable to portion of unit. The taxpayer may determine the expenses allocable to the portion of the unit used for business purposes by any method that is reasonable under the circumstances. If the rooms in the dwelling unit are of approximately equal size, the taxpayer may ordinarily allocate the general expenses for the unit according to the number of rooms used for the business purpose. The taxpayer may also allocate general expenses according to the percentage of the total floor space in the unit that is used for the business purpose. Expenses which are attributable only to certain portions of the unit. e.g., repairs to kitchen fixtures, shall be allocated in full to those portions of the unit. Expenses which are not related to the use of the unit for business purposes ,e.g., expenditures for lawn care, are not taken into account for purposes of section 260A.

(4) Time allocation for use in providing day care services. If the taxpayer uses a portion of a dwelling unit in providing day care services, as described in paragraph (f) of this section, and the taxpayer makes any use of that portion of the unit for nonbusiness purposes during the taxable year, the taxpayer shall make a further allocation of the amounts determined under subparagraph (3) of this paragraph to be allocable to the portion of the unit used in providing day care services. The amounts allocated, to the business use of the unit under this subparagraph shall bear the same proportion to the amounts determined under subparagraph (3) of this paragraph as the length of time that the portion of the unit is used for day care services bears to the length of time that the portion of the unit is available for all purposes. For example, if a portion of the unit is used for day care services for an average of 36 hours each week during the taxable year, the fraction to be used for making the allocation required under this subparagraph is 36/168, the ratio of the number of hours of day care use in a week to the total number of hours in a week.

(5) Order of deductions. Business deductions with respect to the business use of a dwelling unit are allowable in the following order and only to the following extent:

(i) The allocable portions of amounts allowable as deductions for the taxable year under chapter 1 of the Code with respect to the dwelling unit without regard to any use of the unit in trade or business, e.g., mortgage interest and real estate taxes, are allowable as business deductions to the extent of the gross income derived from use of the unit.

(ii) Amounts otherwise allowable as deductions for the taxable year under chapter 1 of the Code by reason of the business use of the dwelling unit (other than those which would result in an adjustment to the basis of property) are allowable to the extent the gross income derived from use of the unit exceeds the deductions allowed or allowable under subdivision (i) of this subparagraph.

(iii) Amounts otherwise allowable as deductions for the taxable year under chapter 1 of the Code by reason of the business use of the dwelling unit which would result in an adjustment to the basis of property are allowable to the extent the gross income derived from use of the unit exceeds the deductions allowed or allowable under subdivisions (i) and (ii) of this subparagraph.

(6) Cross reference. For rules with respect to the deductions to be taken into account in computing adjusted gross income in the case of employees, see section 62 and the regulations prescribed thereunder.

(7) Example. The provisions of this subparagraph may be illustrated by the following example:

Example. A, a self-employed individual, uses an office in the home on a regular basis as a place of business for meeting with clients of A's consulting service. A makes no other use of the office during the taxable year and uses no other premises for the consulting activity. A has a special telephone line for the office and occasionally employs secretarial assistance. A also has a gardener care for the lawn around the home during the year. A determines that 10% of the general expenses for the dwelling unit are allocable to the office, On the basis of the following figures, A determines that the sum of the allowable business deductions for the use of the office is $1,050.

Note: The example in the regulation has been modified to keep the content while making the example assessible for visually challenged individuals to read and understand in the below table.




_____________________________________________________________________________________
Credit/Debit Dollar amount

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Gross Income from consulting service $1,900

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Less Expense for secretary $500

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Less Business telephone $150

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Less Supplies $200

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Equal Total expenditures not allocable to use of unit $850

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Gross income derived from use of unit (Gross Income less total
expenses) $1,050

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Deductions allowable under subparagraph (5) (i) of this paragraph:

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Mortgage interest (total $5,000) allocable to office $500

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Plus Real estate taxes (total $2,000) allocable to office $200

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Equal Amount allowable $700

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Limit on further deductions ($1,050 less $700) $350

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Deductions allowable under subparagraph (5) (ii) of this paragraph:

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Insurance (total $600) allocable to office $60

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Plus Utilities, other than residential telephone (total $900)
allocable to office $90

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Plus Lawn Care (total $500) 0

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Equals Amount allowable $150

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Limit on further deductions ($350 less $150) $200

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Deductions allowable under subparagraph (5)(iii) of this paragraph:

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Depreciation (total $3,200) allocable to office $320

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Amount allowable $200

_____________________________________________________________________________________



No portion of the lawn care expense is allocable to the business use of the dwelling unit. A may claim the remaining $6,300 paid for mortgage interest and real estate taxes as itemized deductions.

Comment by Author of ATG: Lawn expense may be an allowable business expense for a child care provider - see section Introduction: determining the deductible amount under IRC Section 162 and the business usage . The taxpayer in the regulation is a business consultant and would not be allowed any lawn care expense.

Page Last Reviewed or Updated: April 17, 2009

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Tuesday, April 21, 2009

Employee classification case and annotations

Two blogs are posted today. The first deals with a very common issues: whether an individual should be classified as an employee or a contractor. This is one of the most common examination issues, and return preparers need to be on top of the latest developments and case law. The second deals with return preparer tax fraud.

doctor was a common law employee rather than an independent contractor and was not entitled to deduct claimed business expenses on Schedule C. He entered into an employment contract that expressly identified him as an employee. Further, he received a fixed salary without regard to the medical fees he generated, paid vacations, employee benefits, and reimbursement for expenses. He participated in an employee retirement plan, and received Forms W-2 reporting his compensation. He was required to work normal office hours, maintained a long-term relationship with his employer, and did not perform medical services for a fee except for patients assigned by his employer. The employer provided his office space, paid for hospital staff privileges and provided a substantial portion of his medical equipment. Although the taxpayer substantiated that he paid legal fees and professional dues in connection with his employment, they were miscellaneous itemized deductions and the two-percent limitation prevented any deduction of these expenses for the tax year at issue.

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return preparer tax fraud

A sentence of incarceration and supervised release imposed on an individual following his conviction for aiding and assisting in the preparation of fraudulent income tax returns was not an abuse of discretion. The individual committed substantial fraud over a span of several years by claiming false deductions for himself and obtaining income from a tax preparation business that submitted fraudulent returns on behalf of many other taxpayers. The trial court properly considered the relevant factors, including the sentencing guidelines, the individual's medical and mental health requirements, the scale of the offenses and the length of time over which they took place.



United States of America, Appellee v. Robert M. Quinones, Defendant-Appellant.

U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit; 08-2298-cr, April 6, 2009.

Unpublished opinion affirming an unreported DC N.Y. decision.

[ Code Sec. 7206]






SUMMARY ORDER


UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.

On June 14, 2007, Appellant Robert M. Quinones ("Appellant") was indicted in the Southern District of New York (Cote, J.) on twenty-five counts of aiding and assisting in the preparation of fraudulent income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 2706(2) and two counts of filing a false claim for an income tax refund in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 287. Appellant pleaded guilty to all counts. In its presentence report, the Probation Office determined Appellant's United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") adjusted offense level was 19, his Criminal History Category was I, and his sentencing range was 30 to 37 months. Appellant's counsel requested a non-Guidelines sentence, contending that "[a] term of imprisonment is not only not needed to deter, punish, or rehabilitate Mr. Quinones, but is likely to be far harsher than necessary to achieve any of these goals, given his severe mental illness, drug addiction, and physical issues." The district court acknowledged its obligation to "consider all of the [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) factors," and sentenced Appellant to serve concurrently 30 months in prison on each count and recommended that Appellant serve his sentence as near to New Jersey as possible, that he be allowed to participate in a residential drug-treatment program, and that he be evaluated for the need for medical care related to diabetes and problems with his knees. Appellant was also sentenced to three years of supervised release on each count, to run concurrently, with the conditions that he submit to drug testing, provide restitution, and participate in substance abuse and mental health counseling during his term of supervised release.

Appellant appeals only the length of his incarceration, arguing that thirty months of incarceration is unreasonable for a 50-year-old with a spouse, two children, no prior criminal record, and a history of drug addiction and depression. However, as the district court noted, this case involves "a very substantial fraud that was committed over a number of years to obtain false deductions for the defendant himself personally and to obtain income from a tax prepar[ation] business in which fraudulent returns were submitted on behalf of [many individual] taxpayers year after year ... ." In addition to the Guidelines, the district court considered the scale of the offenses and the length of time over which they took place, the interests of general and specific deterrence, Appellant's apparent failure to take advantage of previous drug treatment opportunities, the need for just punishment, and the option of imposing a probationary sentence as requested by Appellant. We cannot conclude on this record that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing Appellant to 30 months incarceration. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445, 454-55 (2007); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED and all previous motions are hereby VACATED as moot.

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Monday, April 20, 2009

Proposed withholding regulations

Proposed Withholding regulations. Proposed Reg. §§31.3402(t)-0, 31.3402(t)-1, 31.3402(t)-2, 31.3402(t)-3, 31.3402(t)-4, 31.3402(t)-5, 31.3402(t)-6, 31.3402(t)-7, 31.6051-5 and 31.6071(a)-1 and amendments of Proposed Reg. §§31.3406(g)-2, 31.6011(a)-4 and 31.6302-1, relating to withholding under section 3402(t) of the Internal Revenue Code, are proposed. The texts.


Amendments of Regulations (REG-158747-06) , published in the Federal Register on December 5, 2008.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY



Internal Revenue Service

26 CFR Part 31

[REG-158747-06]

RIN 1545-BG45

Withholding Under Internal Revenue Code Section 3402(t)

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY: This document contains proposed regulations relating to withholding under section 3402(t) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). The proposed regulations reflect changes in the law made by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 that require Federal, State, and local government entities to withhold income tax when making payments to persons providing property or services. These proposed regulations provide guidance to assist the government entities in complying with section 3402(t). The regulations also provide certain guidance to persons receiving payments for property or services from government entities. This document also contains proposed amendments to regulations under sections 3406, 6011, 6051, 6071, and 6302 of the Code.

DATES: Written or electronic comments and requests for a public hearing must be received by [ INSERT DATE 90 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].

ADDRESSES: Send submissions to: CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-158747-06), room 5205, Internal Revenue Service, PO Box 7604, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044. Submissions may be hand-delivered Monday through Friday between the hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. to CC:PA:LPD:PR (REG-158747-06), Courier's Desk, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC, or sent electronically via the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov/ (IRS REG-158747-06). FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Concerning these proposed regulations, Jean Casey, (202) 622-6040; concerning submissions of comments or to request a public hearing, Richard Hurst at Richard.A.Hurst@irscounsel.treas.gov or (202) 622-7180 (not toll-free numbers).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:



Background

This document contains proposed amendments to 26 CFR Part 31 under section 3402(t) of the Code. This document also contains proposed amendments to 26 CFR Part 31 under sections 3406, 6011, 6051, 6071, and 6302 of the Code.

Section 3402(t) of the Code was added by section 511 of the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Public Law 109-222 (TIPRA), 120 Stat. 345, which was enacted into law on May 17, 2006. Section 3402(t)(1) provides that the Government of the United States, every State, every political subdivision thereof, and every instrumentality of the foregoing (including multi-State agencies) making any payment to any person providing any property or services (including any payment made in connection with a government voucher or certificate program which functions as a payment for property or services) shall deduct and withhold from such payment a tax in an amount equal to 3 percent of such payment. Under the statute, section 3402(t) applies to payments made after December 31, 2010.

Exceptions to section 3402(t) withholding are contained in section 3402(t)(2). Section 3402(t)(2) provides that section 3402(t) withholding shall not apply to any payment --

(A) Except as provided in section 3402(t)(2)(B), which is subject to withholding under any other provision of chapter 24 (Collection of Income Tax at Source on Wages, sections 3401 through 3406) or chapter 3 (Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Corporations, sections 1441 through 1464) of the Code;

(B) Which is subject to withholding under section 3406 (backup withholding) and from which amounts are being withheld under such section;

(C) Of interest;

(D) For real property;

(E) To any government entity subject to the requirements of section 3402(t)(1), any tax-exempt entity, or any foreign government;

(F) Made pursuant to a classified or confidential contract described in section 6050M(e)(3);

(G) Made by a political subdivision of a State (or any instrumentality thereof) which makes less than $100,000,000 of such payments annually;

(H) Which is in connection with a public assistance or public welfare program for which eligibility is determined by a needs or income test; and

(I) To any government employee not otherwise excludable with respect to his or her services as an employee.

Section 3402(t)(3) provides for the coordination of section 3402(t) with other Code sections. Section 3402(t)(3) provides that, for purposes of sections 3403 and 3404 and for purposes of so much of subtitle F (except section 7205) as relates to chapter 24, payments to any person for property or services which are subject to withholding shall be treated as if such payments were wages paid by an employer to an employee.

The legislative history in connection with section 3402(t) indicates that "[t]he withholding requirement applies regardless of whether the government entity making such payment is the recipient of the property or services." H.R. Conf. Rep. No.109-455, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. at 300 (2006). Further, the conference report also provides, with respect to the exception provided by section 3402(t)(2)(H), that "payments under government programs to provide health care or other services that are not based on the needs or income of the recipients are subject to withholding, including programs where eligibility is based on the age of the beneficiary." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-455 at page 301. In addition, with respect to section 3402(t)(2)(A), the conference report states that section 3402(t) withholding "does not apply to payments of wages or to any other payment with respect to which mandatory (e.g., U.S.-source income of foreign taxpayers) or voluntary (e.g., unemployment benefits) withholding applies under present law." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-455 at page 301. The origins of the provision indicate that it was conceived to address tax noncompliance. See also, "Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures" (JCS-2-05), Joint Committee on Taxation, Jan. 27, 2005.

Notice 2008-38, 2008-13 IRB 683, published by the IRS on March 31, 2008, invited public comments regarding guidance under section 3402(t). In particular, Notice 2008-38 requested comments on the application of section 3402(t) to credit cards and payment cards, payments to payees not subject to United States taxation, passthrough entities in which a government entity is a partner or owner, government contractors and subcontractors, and de minimis payments. The Notice also requested comments on when and how amounts withheld under section 3402(t) should be transmitted to the IRS. See §601.601(d)(2)(ii)(b).

Many comments were received in response to Notice 2008-38, and the comments were taken into consideration in developing the proposed regulations.



Explanation of Provisions

The proposed regulations provide rules about which government entities are subject to the requirement of section 3402(t) withholding, which payments are subject to section 3402(t) withholding (and which are excepted from such withholding), when withholding is required on such payments, and how government entities pay and report the tax to the IRS. The proposed regulations also include transition rules providing relief from liability for the tax imposed by section 3402(t) with respect to payments under existing contracts. The proposed regulations also provide temporary relief from penalties and interest if a government entity makes a good faith effort but fails to withhold on payments as required under section 3402(t).

The regulations provide guidance primarily on what government entities need to do to comply so that they can make timely preparations. The Treasury Department and IRS anticipate issuing further guidance to address questions raised by taxpayers who expect to receive payments subject to section 3402(t) withholding from government entities including, but not limited to, how to claim credits and how to claim the benefit of statutory exemptions from withholding under section 3402(t). Although some commenters requested that the Treasury Department and IRS issue guidance exempting payments from withholding where the 3-percent rate for withholding prescribed under section 3402(t) is expected to exceed either the profit margin in the taxpayer's industry or the income tax the taxpayer will owe for reasons particular to the taxpayer's business, the Treasury Department and IRS have determined that exemptions of this type would be contrary to the requirements of the statute. Commenters also requested that they be permitted to credit amounts withheld under section 3402(t) against Federal taxes other than income taxes, such as employment taxes. Consistent with the statute's purpose of addressing income tax noncompliance, the Treasury Department and IRS propose to allow credits to be claimed only against income tax.



Government Entities Subject to Section 3402(t)

Section 3402(t)(1) applies to "the Government of the United States, every State, every political subdivision thereof, and every instrumentality of the foregoing." Section 3402(t) does not restrict the term the Government of the United States in any manner. Therefore, the entire Federal government, including the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch, is subject to the requirements of section 3402(t). Thus, Congress, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Executive Office of the President, Federal agencies, and all other components of the Federal government are included in the definition of Government of the United States and are required to withhold under section 3402(t).

The term State includes the District of Columbia. See section 7701(a)(10) of the Code. For purposes of section 3402(t), the term State does not include Indian tribal governments. Section 7871(a) prescribes when an Indian tribal government is to be treated as a State under the Code, and section 7871(a) does not provide that Indian tribal governments will be treated as States for purposes of section 3402(t). Consequently, the term political subdivision also does not include a subdivision of an Indian tribal government. See section 7871(a) and (d). Accordingly, because Indian tribal governments and their subdivisions are not among the listed government entities subject to section 3402(t), payments by Indian tribal governments and their subdivisions are not subject to the withholding requirements of section 3402(t).

The definition of political subdivision in the proposed regulations follows the definition in the section 103 regulations. Section 1.103-1(b) of the Income Tax Regulations provides, in part, that the term political subdivision denotes any division of any State or local government unit that is a municipal corporation or that has been delegated the right to exercise part of the sovereign power of the unit.

Although the Code makes references to government instrumentalities in multiple sections, the Code and regulations do not currently provide a definition of instrumentality. In Rev. Rul. 57-128, 1957-1 CB 311, the IRS adopted a six-factor test for use in determining what is an instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision thereof for purposes of an exception from the requirement to pay tax under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA). The factors are: (1) whether the organization is used for a government purpose and performs a government function; (2) whether performance of its function is on behalf of one or more States or political subdivisions; (3) whether there are any private interests involved, or whether the States or political subdivisions involved have the powers and interests of an owner; (4) whether control and supervision of the organization is vested in public authority or authorities; (5) if express or implied statutory or other authority is necessary for the creation and/or use of such an instrumentality, and whether such authority exists; and (6) the degree of financial autonomy and the source of its operating expenses. A number of revenue rulings published by the IRS illustrate the application of this test. See, for example, Rev. Rul. 65-26, 1965-1 CB 444; Rev. Rul. 65-196, 1965-2 CB 388; and Rev. Rul. 69-453, 1969-2 CB 182. See §601.601(d)(2)(ii)(b). The Treasury Department and IRS invite comments on use of the same or a similar test for purposes of section 3402(t).



Persons Subject to Withholding Under Section 3402(t)

Section 3402(t) applies to government payments to "persons" providing any property or services. Section 7701(a)(1) of the Code provides that, when used in the Code, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof, the term person shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company, or corporation. Because no alternative definition of person is provided in section 3402(t), the definition in section 7701(a)(1) and the regulations under section 7701(a)(1) applies. Therefore, section 3402(t) withholding can apply to payments for property or services to individuals, trusts, estates, partnerships, associations, companies, or corporations.



Payments Subject to Section 3402(t) Withholding

The proposed regulations provide that a payment subject to withholding arises when the government entity or its payment administrator pays a person for providing property or services. Under the proposed rules, the withholding requirements of section 3402(t) will not apply to any payment that is less than the payment threshold amount, which is $10,000. The Treasury Department and IRS are proposing this payment threshold of $10,000 because the burden of withholding on smaller transactions is likely to be substantial and outweigh the benefits of increased withholding. This threshold corresponds to a minimum withholding of $300.

Under the proposed rules, multiple payments made by a government entity to any person generally would not be aggregated in determining whether the payment threshold amount has been met. However, the proposed regulations provide an antiabuse rule to ensure that the payment threshold is not manipulated to avoid the required withholding. If a government entity divides a payment into two or more separate payments primarily to avoid the payment threshold for one or more payments, the separate payments would be treated as one payment made on the date that the first payment was made for purposes of this rule. For example, if a government entity is scheduled to make a contractual payment to a person for landscaping services of $15,000 on July 2, 2011, but divides the payment into payments of $7,000 and $8,000 made on July 1, 2011, and July 2, 2011, respectively, the government entity would be treated as having made a single payment of $15,000 on July 1, 2011. This anti-abuse rule would not apply if the primary reason for division into separate payments is unrelated to section 3402(t).

If a government entity makes a single payment of $10,000 or more to any person for more than one property or service provided by that person, the government entity would be required to withhold on the payment. For example, if a person bills a government entity $5,000 each day for seven days for services provided each day, but the government entity makes one payment of $35,000 in satisfaction of these bills, the payment threshold is applied to the $35,000 payment.

Many commenters requested guidance on how the requirements of section 3402(t) apply to prime contractors and subcontractors. Under the proposed rules, if a government entity or its payment administrator makes a payment to a person that is subject to withholding under section 3402(t), no subsequent transfer of cash or property by that person to another person is treated as a payment for section 3402(t) purposes. Thus, if the government entity enters into a contract with a prime contractor for property and services, and that prime contractor separately contracts with subcontractors for delivery of certain property and services, then withholding under section 3402(t) applies only to payments by the government entity or its payment administrator to the prime contractor, and does not apply to successive payments by the prime contractor to its subcontractors.

The proposed regulations apply to payments made by the government entity or its payment administrator. For purposes of the proposed regulations, a payment administrator is any person that acts with respect to a payment solely as an agent for a government entity by making the payment on behalf of the government entity to a person providing property or services to, or on behalf of, the government entity. Transfers of funds from a government entity to a payment administrator to be used by the payment administrator, on the government entity's behalf, to pay persons for providing property or services are not payments subject to withholding under section 3402(t). However, if the government entity pays the payment administrator a fee for its services, the government entity would treat the fee as a payment subject to withholding. The government entity is liable for the withholding required and responsible for all related reporting regardless of whether the government entity or its payment administrator makes the payment and regardless of when the payment for property or services is made under this section.



Credit Card Payments

Many commenters questioned how the requirements of section 3402(t) apply to payments made by government credit card or payment card. Under the proposed regulations, when a government entity or its payment administrator uses a credit card or payment card to pay a person for providing property or services, payment occurs at the point of sale when the government credit card or payment card is tendered and not when the government entity pays the credit card company. The government entity is liable for the withholding and reporting associated with the payment, and this liability is not transferred to any other party involved in the credit card or payment card transaction, including, but not limited to, the acquiring bank, the issuing bank, or the credit card association. (The acquiring bank may be separately required to report amounts it pays under new section 6050W, which was enacted as part of the Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, Div. C of Public Law 110-289.)



Section 3402(t)(2)(A) --Payments Subject to Withholding Under Chapter 3 or Chapter 24 and Section 3402(t)(2)(B) --Payments from Which Backup Withholding Is Withheld

Section 3402(t)(2)(A) provides an exception from the requirement of section 3402(t) for amounts that are subject to withholding under some other provision of chapter 3 or chapter 24 (other than section 3406). Thus, payments that are subject to withholding under the wage withholding regime or the regime for withholding of tax on nonresident aliens and foreign corporations are exempt from withholding under section 3402(t). Furthermore, consistent with the legislative history, amounts for which the payee may elect withholding are exempt from withholding under section 3402(t), regardless of whether the payee in fact makes such an election. These payments include: (1) unemployment compensation as defined in section 85(b) (section 3402(p)(2)); (2) social security benefits as defined in section 86(d) (section 3402(p)(1)(C)(i)); (3) any payment referred to in the second sentence of section 451(d) that is treated as insurance proceeds, relating to certain disaster payments received under the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, or Title II of the Disaster Assistance Act of 1988 (section 3402(p)(1)(C)(ii)); (4) any amount that is includible in gross income under section 77(a), relating to amounts received as loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation that the taxpayer has elected to treat as income (section 3402(p)(1)(C)(iii)); and (5) any payment of an annuity to an individual.

A special rule applies for payments subject to backup withholding. Section 3402(t)(2)(B) provides that a payment that is subject to 28 percent withholding under section 3406 (backup withholding) is not excepted from the requirement of 3 percent withholding under section 3402(t) unless backup withholding is actually being deducted from the payment. Thus, if backup withholding is required with respect to a payment made by a government entity and the government entity performs backup withholding on the payment, section 3402(t) does not apply. If the government entity fails to backup withhold on such a payment, the government entity would remain liable for backup withholding regardless of whether it imposed withholding under section 3402(t) with respect to the payment. Proposed amendments to the regulations under section 3406 clarify that if backup withholding is required, withholding under section 3402(t) is not required.

Under the proposed regulations, payments made to nonresident aliens or foreign individuals that are exempt from United States taxation pursuant to a treaty would be exempt from withholding under section 3402(t) because such payments are subject to withholding absent application of the treaty. Specifically, absent a treaty, United States source fixed or determinable, annual or periodical (FDAP) income paid to a nonresident alien individual or foreign corporation is subject to withholding under chapter 3, except for income that is effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business (other than compensation for personal services) pursuant to sections 1441 and 1442. Relevant examples of FDAP include salaries, compensation and emoluments.

Imposing a new withholding requirement on nonresident aliens and foreign corporations that owe no United States tax would serve no purpose. Foreign persons that are exempt from withholding under sections 1441 and 1442 by reason of an income tax treaty are not the source of the tax noncompliance problem that section 3402(t) was enacted to address. Further, our existing documentation procedures are intended to ensure that those claiming treaty benefits are in fact entitled to treaty benefits. See, for example, Form W-8BEN, "Certificate of Foreign Status of Beneficial Owner for United States Tax Withholding," and Form 8233, "Exemption From Withholding on Compensation for Independent (and Certain Dependent) Personal Services of a Nonresident Alien Individual." Accordingly, the proposed regulations under section 3402(t) provide that the "subject to withholding under chapter 3" exception in section 3402(t)(2)(A) applies to payments with respect to which a foreign person claims a zero rate of tax under an income tax treaty. Thus, if a foreign person furnishes documentation establishing entitlement to an exemption from withholding under chapter 3 by reason of an income tax treaty, government entities would not be required to withhold under section 3402(t) from payments to such person.



Section 3402(t)(2)(C) --Interest

Section 3402(t)(2)(C) provides that payments of interest are exempt from withholding. The proposed regulations do not provide a definition of interest. The Treasury Department and IRS request comments concerning whether a definition of interest is needed and if so, what that definition should be.



Section 3402(t)(2)(D) --Payments for Real Property

Section 3402(t)(2)(D) provides that payments for real property are not subject to section 3402(t). Because the exception is not limited to payments for fee ownership, the proposed regulations provide that payments for real property include payments for leasing real property and leasehold improvements.

Commenters asked whether real property included payments made under contracts for the construction of buildings or other public works. Neither the statute itself nor the legislative history defines "real property" for purposes of section 3402(t).

The proposed regulations adopt the position that payments for the construction of buildings or public works are not payments for real property excepted by section 3402(t)(2)(D). Payments for the construction of a building are payments for services to build the building and personal property to be used in the construction of the building rather than payments for real property. This position is consistent with statutes governing construction contracts of the Federal government. See, for example, 40 USC 3131-3134 (the "Miller Act").



Section 3402(t)(2)(E) --Payments to Government Entities Subject to Section 3402(t), Tax-Exempt Organizations, and Foreign Governments

Section 3402(t)(2)(E) provides exceptions from section 3402(t) withholding for payments to any government entity subject to the requirements of section 3402(t)(1), payments to any tax-exempt entity, and payments to any foreign government. The determination of whether an entity is a government entity such that payments it receives are exempt parallels the determination whether the entity is a government entity required to withhold on payments it makes. Thus, if a government entity is required to withhold under section 3402(t)(1), payments to that government entity are not subject to withholding under section 3402(t). The proposed regulations also clarify that, even if no withholding is required on payments from a government entity because the government entity qualifies for the exception of section 3402(t)(2)(G) for political subdivisions and instrumentalities making total payments of less than $100 million (discussed later in this preamble), payments to that government entity are not subject to withholding.

The proposed regulations define the term tax-exempt entity for purposes of section 3402(t)(2)(E) as any organization exempt from federal income tax under section 501(a) as an organization described in section 501(c), 501(d), or section 401(a).



Section 3402(t)(2)(F) --Payments Made Pursuant to a Classified or Confidential Contract

Section 3402(t)(2)(F) provides an exception from section 3402(t) withholding for payments made pursuant to a classified or confidential contract described in section 6050M(e)(3). Section 6050M(e)(3) describes a contract between a Federal executive agency and another person if --

(A) The fact of the existence of such contract or the subject matter of such contract has been designated and clearly marked or clearly represented, pursuant to the provisions of Federal law or an Executive order, as requiring a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security, or

(B) The head of such Federal executive agency (or his designee), pursuant to regulations issued by such agency, determines, in writing, that filing the required return under section 6050M (related to information returns required to be filed by any Federal executive agency with respect to persons receiving contracts) would interfere with the effective conduct of a confidential law enforcement or foreign counterintelligence activity.



Section 3402(t)(2)(G) --The Exception for Political Subdivisions and Instrumentalities Making Total Payments Under $100,000,000

Section 3402(t)(2)(G) provides that payments made by certain smaller government entities are not subject to withholding under section 3402(t). Specifically, a political subdivision of a State (or any instrumentality thereof) that makes less than $100,000,000 of payments for property or services annually (other than for payroll or of another type exempt from withholding under these proposed regulations) is not required to withhold under section 3402(t) on any of its payments. The proposed regulations provide a simple rule for determining before each year starts whether the exception provided by section 3402(t)(2)(G) applies to a given political subdivision or instrumentality. The determination would be based on the payments made during the accounting year of the political subdivision or instrumentality ending with or within the second preceding calendar year. For example, to determine whether the political subdivision or instrumentality is subject to withholding with respect to payments made in 2011, the proposed regulations would look to whether payments made by the political subdivision or instrumentality for its accounting year ending with or within the calendar year 2009 equaled or exceeded $100,000,000. For this purpose, the accounting year is considered to be the year used by the political subdivision or instrumentality to keep its accounting books and determine budgets. In most cases, political subdivisions and instrumentalities would be able to make a reasonably accurate estimate whether the exception applies before the end of the accounting year ending in 2009 based on budgetary projections. However, in cases where the payments are expected to be near the $100,000,000 threshold, the time between the end of the accounting year in 2009, when a definitive determination could be made, and December 31, 2010, should give the political subdivision or instrumentality sufficient time to prepare for withholding under section 3402(t) for payments made in 2011.

In determining whether the political subdivision or instrumentality has made $100,000,000 of total payments, the proposed regulations would require that all payments for property and services made during the accounting year be considered with the exception of those payments qualifying for any of the exceptions provided by §31.3402(t)-4(a) through (l) of the proposed regulations. For this purpose, payments that are less than the $10,000 payment threshold count toward the $100,000,000 test.

This exception provided by section 3402(t)(2)(G) does not apply to the United States Government, States, or instrumentalities of the United States Government or States.

The Treasury Department and IRS request comments on the application of section 3402(t)(2)(G), particularly with regard to whether the rules for determining whether the exception applies would provide adequate time to modify systems for compliance with section 3402(t), whether a special rule should be considered allowing the averaging of multiple accounting years for political subdivisions and instrumentalities that have unusually high expenditures in a given accounting year, and whether the determination of total payments under the proposed regulations is practicable.



Section 3402(t)(2)(H)-Payments in Connection with a Public Welfare or Public Assistance Plan

Section 3402(t)(2)(H) provides an exception from section 3402(t) withholding for any payment in connection with a public assistance or public welfare program for which eligibility is determined by a needs or income test. The proposed regulations adopt a broad definition of in connection with to include payments made to third parties under a public assistance or public welfare program for the benefit of the recipient of benefits under the program. The proposed regulations also are consistent with the legislative history in providing that a program for which eligibility is determined under a needs or income test does not include a program under which eligibility is based on age only (for example, Medicare). The proposed regulations provide that, for purposes of this exception, a program providing disaster relief to victims of a natural or other disaster is considered to be a program for which eligibility is determined under a needs test.



Section 3402(t)(2)(I) --Payments to a Government Employee with Respect to Services as an Employee

Section 3402(t)(2)(I) provides an exception from section 3402(t) withholding for payments to any government employee not otherwise excludable with respect to the employee's services as an employee. The proposed regulations broadly interpret this exception to exclude from section 3402(t) withholding any form of compensation that is paid to the employee or on the employee's behalf. For example, the proposed regulations exclude employer contributions to employee benefit and deferred compensation plans as well as employee contributions to such plans. This exception applies to any payments by an employer for fringe benefits or deferred compensation to, or for the benefit of, an employee.

The proposed regulations provide that the section 3402(t)(2)(I) exclusion from section 3402(t) withholding also applies to: (a) travel reimbursements paid by a government entity to a government employee under accountable plans within the meaning of section 62(c) for the individual employee's travel, lodging, and meal expenses; and (b) the government employee's payments to third parties that provide travel, lodging, and meals that are reimbursable under such travel reimbursement plans. Most payments for individual travel, lodging, and meal expenses would fall beneath the $10,000 payment threshold. Nevertheless, this exception may be significant in determining whether the government entity making the payments qualifies for the exception under section 3402(t)(2)(G) for political subdivisions of a State (or their instrumentalities) making payments under $100,000,000, as payments under section 3402(t)(2)(I) are excluded when calculating the total amount of payments.

Section 31.3401(a)-4(a) of the Employment Tax Regulations provides that if a reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement meets the requirements of section 62(c) and §1.62-2 and the expenses are substantiated within a reasonable period of time, payments made under the arrangement that do not exceed the substantiated expenses are treated as paid under an accountable plan and are not wages. Thus, these payments would qualify for the exception under section 3402(t)(2)(I).

By comparison, if the travel reimbursement or payment by the employer is not paid under an accountable plan, the reimbursement would be treated as paid under a nonaccountable plan. Payments to the employee under a nonaccountable plan are includible in gross income and wages and subject to income tax withholding under section 3402(a). Thus, such payments would be excepted from withholding under section 3402(t) by section 3402(t)(2)(A).



Exception for Certain Payments Received by Nonresident Alien Individuals and Foreign Corporations

In general, in the case of a nonresident alien individual or a foreign corporation (foreign person), sections 872(a) and 882(b) provide that gross income for United States income tax purposes consists of (1) gross income derived from sources within the United States; and (2) gross income derived from sources outside the United States (foreign source income), but only if it is effectively connected with a trade or business within the United States. The source of income is determined under sections 861 through 865. The source of income derived from the performance of services is the place where the services are performed as provided in sections 861(a)(3) and 862(a)(3), whereas the source of income from the purchase and sale of inventory property (other than unprocessed timber) is the location where the sale takes place as described in §1.861-7(c) of the Income Tax Regulations (see also sections 861(a)(6) and 862(a)(6)). Therefore, if a foreign person provides services or sells inventory property in a foreign country, it will have no United States income tax liability with respect to the income earned from providing the services or selling the property --even to a United States government entity --provided that the income is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.

Accordingly, the proposed regulations exclude such payments made to foreign persons from 3-percent withholding under section 3402(t). For administrative reasons, subjecting these foreign source payments to withholding under 3402(t) would be unduly burdensome to the foreign persons receiving such payments and the IRS. The foreign persons, most of whom are not presently United States income tax filers, would have to get taxpayer identification numbers (TINs) and file refund claims. Likewise, the IRS would have to issue TINs, process the claims, and refund all of the funds collected. Withholding on foreign source payments to foreign persons has no potential to reduce tax noncompliance because the potential income resulting from the payments is not subject to United States income taxation. Procedures to be followed by government entities and foreign persons for purposes of claiming this exception from section 3402(t) withholding will be issued at a later date.



Exception for Payments to Indian Tribal Governments

Indian tribal governments are not subject to United States income tax. Subjecting payments made by government entities to Indian tribal governments to withholding under section 3402(t) would be unduly burdensome for the same reasons discussed above with respect to certain payments made to foreign persons. Therefore, the proposed regulations except these payments from 3-percent withholding under section 3402(t).



Deposits and Reporting of Amounts Withheld Under Section 3402(t)

In determining rules for reporting amounts withheld under section 3402(t), the Treasury Department and IRS have considered the administrative burden on government entities imposed by reporting, the need for payees to receive timely and accurate information about the amounts withheld, and the need for IRS systems to process the information reported. Many comments reflected a preference for using an existing system and adapting current forms and procedures to accommodate section 3402(t) withholding, rather than creating a new system and forms for such withholding. The commenters indicated that using an existing system would ease compliance by government entities and would ease the processing of the payment and reporting of such tax.

The Treasury Department and IRS believe the existing procedure for reporting nonwage withholding on Form 945, "Annual Return of Withheld Federal Income Tax," and reporting payments subject to withholding on Form 1099-MISC, "Miscellaneous Income," with slight modifications to existing forms, would provide the most satisfactory method of payment and reporting. Because most government entities have a system for issuing Form 1099-MISC, using this system with modifications for reporting section 3402(t) withholding should ease compliance. Additionally, using Form 1099-MISC would give payees the information they need to timely file their income tax returns claiming credit for the withholding. Because this system would be similar to the system used currently for reporting and paying nonwage income tax withholding, the IRS would be able to process the withholding timely and on a cost-effective basis.

Accordingly, the proposed amendments to the regulations under section 6011 provide that payors required to withhold amounts under section 3402(t) must file Form 945 reporting the amounts withheld. Proposed amendments to the regulations under section 6302 further provide that the amounts withheld under section 3402(t) must be deposited and reported in the same manner as other nonwage withheld amounts, such as withholding on gambling winnings and pensions. Pursuant to existing regulations, such amounts are treated as if they were employment taxes for purposes of the deposit rules, but are subject to special rules for determining the payor's deposit schedule, as provided in §31.6302-4.

Additionally, proposed amendments to regulations under section 6051 provide that payors required to withhold amounts under section 3402(t) must file information returns and furnish payee statements on Form 1099-MISC reporting such payments and tax withheld. Because this reporting would be done pursuant to regulations under section 6051, the exceptions provided in the regulations under section 6041 relating to Form 1099 would not apply (for example, the exception for payments to corporations).



Payments for Jury Duty, Utilities, and Fuel Surcharges

Commenters asked whether jury duty pay is subject to withholding under section 3402(t). Jury duty pay generally will not meet the $10,000 payment threshold provided in the proposed regulations. No special rule for jury duty pay is provided.

Commenters also requested guidance about utility payments. Rates for utility services are generally prescribed through a State regulatory process. Commenters expressed concern about the consequences of paying something less than the regulatorily prescribed rate to the utility. In fact, utility companies --like all persons receiving payments subject to withholding under section 3402(t) --would be paid the full amount charged, albeit in the form of a combination of a cash payment and a deposit of tax made to the IRS. Therefore, unless otherwise excepted, utility payments are subject to withholding under section 3402(t) on the same basis as payments for other property and services.

Commenters also requested that fuel surcharges be exempted from withholding, arguing that a fuel surcharge provided under a contract is merely a cost recovery mechanism used to garner the lowest possible rates for the government by controlling volatile cost components in bid calculations. Although the use of separately stated charges for certain costs may well serve this purpose in contracting, section 3402(t) provides no exception for fuel surcharges or any other separately stated cost item. Section 3402(t) requires withholding on payments made regardless of how the payee may apply them against costs. Therefore, the proposed regulations do not provide an exception for payments allocated to fuel surcharges or any other separately stated costs.



Application of Section 3402(t) to Passthrough Entities

Commenters requested guidance with respect to the application of section 3402(t) where either the payor or the payee is a partnership or S corporation ("passthrough entities"). With respect to payments from a passthrough entity, the proposed regulations provide that such payments are not generally subject to withholding under section 3402(t) unless 80 percent or more of the passthrough entity is owned by government entities that are required to withhold under section 3402(t)(1). With respect to payments to a passthrough entity, the proposed regulations provide that such payments are generally subject to withholding under section 3402(t) unless 80 percent or more of the passthrough entity is owned by persons described in section 3402(t)(2)(E) (government entities required to withhold under section 3402(t)(1), tax-exempt entities, and foreign governments). An 80-percent threshold is consistent with similar thresholds in various areas of the tax law. See, for example, section 775(b)(3) and §§1.414(c)-2(b)(2) and 301.7701(i)-1(d)(3)(i)(A). The proposed regulations also provide that, as a general rule, whether a passthrough entity is subject to section 3402(t) is determined on the first day of the entity's taxable year. The Treasury Department and IRS believe that this general rule simplifies compliance and administration by requiring one annual determination of whether a passthrough entity's payments are subject to withholding under section 3402(t). However, the proposed regulations provide that any manipulation of the ownership percentage with an intent to avoid application of section 3402(t) would be recharacterized as appropriate to reflect the actual ownership percentage.



Effective Date and Transition Relief for Existing Contracts

The proposed regulations provide that the regulations will generally be effective for payments made after the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the publication of final regulations. Commenters questioned whether section 3402(t) would apply to payments made under contracts in existence prior to the effective date of section 3402(t). They noted that many government entities are party to multi-year contracts. These contracts did not contemplate the withholding of income tax from payments under the contracts. Future contracts can address the withholding requirement and its effect on the contractor's cash flow. Accordingly, the proposed regulations provide that payments made under written binding contracts in effect on the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the publication of final regulations are not subject to withholding under section 3402(t), unless such contract is materially modified. Payments pursuant to contracts entered into after the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the publication of final regulations will be subject to section 3402(t).

Under the proposed regulations, if there is a material modification to an existing contract after the later of the effective date of the legislation or six months after the issuance of final regulations under section 3402(t), the contract would cease to be an existing contract for purposes of this transition relief and payments under the contract would become subject to the withholding requirements of section 3402(t). The Treasury Department and IRS are considering whether contracts that contain the option of renewal should be considered new contracts as of the date of renewal. The final regulations may provide that a contract that is renewable as of a certain date is treated as a new contract on the first date the contract is renewed. The Treasury Department and IRS request comments on how option terms in contracts, including, but not limited to, options to renew, should affect the transition relief for payments under written binding contracts.



Credit Against Income Tax

The Treasury Department and IRS received numerous comments from taxpayers expecting to receive payments subject to section 3402(t) withholding. Most of these comments asked how taxpayers would take the credit for the section 3402(t) withholding. Section 31 provides the general crediting rule for withholding of income tax. Specifically, section 31(a)(1) provides that "[t]he amount withheld as tax under chapter 24 shall be allowed to the recipient of the income as a credit against the tax imposed by this subtitle." Chapter 24 includes section 3402(t), and section 31(a)(1) is in subtitle A, income taxes. Thus, by its terms, section 31(a)(1) applies to persons who have had income tax withheld from a payment pursuant to section 3402(t) and allows a credit against income tax only.

Section 31(a)(2) provides the general rule on the timing of the allowance of the credit: "The amount so withheld during any calendar year shall be allowed as a credit for the taxable year beginning in such calendar year. If more than one taxable year begins in a calendar year, such amount shall be allowed as a credit for the last taxable year so beginning." Thus, absent a special rule, the rule of section 31(a)(2) generally applies for purposes of withholdings required under chapter 24, which includes section 3402(t).

Section 31(c) provides a special rule solely for backup withholding. Under section 31(c), any credit allowed by section 31(a) for backup withholding under section 3406 must be allowed for the taxable year of the recipient of the income in which the income is received. Congress did not provide a similar exception for the timing of the credit for section 3402(t) withholding. Section 31(c) is limited by its terms to section 3406 withholding only. Thus, the general rule of section 31(a)(2) applies to section 3402(t) withholding rather than the special rule of section 31(c).

The effect of section 31(a)(2) is that fiscal year taxpayers may be entitled to take credit for withholding under section 3402(t) only in a taxable year subsequent to the taxable year in which the amount was withheld. For example, if amounts were withheld under section 3402(t) from a June 30 fiscal year taxpayer during the period from January 1, 2011, to June 30, 2011, the taxpayer will be entitled to take credit for the withheld tax on its income tax return for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2012, rather than its income tax return for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2011.

The Treasury Department and IRS recognize that, in the case of fiscal year taxpayers, the application of the rule in section 31(a)(2) requiring that the credit be taken in the second of two possible taxable years may be burdensome for taxpayers. The Treasury Department and IRS request comments on what impact the timing rule in section 31(a)(2) described above for income tax credits will have on taxpayers that have tax withheld under section 3402(t).



Crediting Against Estimated Income Tax Liability

Taxpayers may take into account the income tax withheld under section 3402(t) and allowed as a credit under section 31 in determining estimated tax liability pursuant to sections 6654 and 6655. With respect to individual taxpayers, section 6654(g)(1) provides that, for purposes of determining the application of the penalty for an individual's failure to pay estimated tax, the amount of the credit allowed under section 31 for the taxable year shall be deemed a payment of estimated tax. As with other income tax withheld, an individual recipient may account for income tax withheld in computing estimated income tax liability on Form 1040-ES, "Estimated Tax for Individuals." Because most individuals are calendar year taxpayers, the section 3402(t) withholding would generally be treated as a payment of estimated tax for the same calendar year, and the individual's liability for other payments of estimated tax for that year would be reduced. However, if the individual is a fiscal year taxpayer, the individual may not take into account the withholding for estimated tax purposes until the fiscal year that begins in the calendar year in which the tax is withheld.

Similar rules apply to corporate taxpayers. In determining the amount of estimated tax required to be paid to avoid the section 6655 penalty applicable to corporations for failure to pay estimated tax, section 6655(g)(1)(B) provides in effect that credits against tax under section 31 are taken into account. Thus, corporate taxpayers can also take into account the amount of credit allowed under section 31(a) in determining income tax liability and in computing estimated income tax liability. As with individual taxpayers, corporate taxpayers on a fiscal year could have the problem of delay in taking account of the credit if withholding occurs in the part of the calendar year before the beginning of the fiscal year that begins in that calendar year.



Credit Against Employment Taxes or Other Taxes

Many commenters requested that taxpayers be allowed to take credit for section 3402(t) withholding with respect to employment taxes or other taxes. The statute directs that crediting follow the rules under section 31(a), which provide for crediting against income tax. Where the statute permits income tax payments to be treated as employment tax payments, or vice versa, it makes specific provision for that treatment. See, for example, section 3507(d) (providing for the treatment of advance payments of the earned income credit as payments of the income tax withholding and FICA liability of the employer); section 3510(b) (providing that domestic employment taxes are treated as taxes due for estimated tax purposes under section 6654); and section 31(b) (providing for the crediting against income tax of the special refund of social security tax under section 6413(c) applicable when an employee receives wages from two or more employers in excess of the social security tax contribution and benefit base). The Code does not provide for withholding under section 3402(t) to be treated as payments of the taxpayer's employment tax liability.



Rate of Income Tax Withholding

Some taxpayers requested that the Treasury Department and IRS provide for lower withholding rates for taxpayers with lower profit margins or lower marginal income tax rates. The statute provides for a uniform 3-percent rate of withholding. Thus, the proposed regulations apply withholding at the 3-percent rate to all payments for services and property from which withholding under section 3402(t) is required to be made.



Liability for Section 3402(t) Withholding in the Event of Failure to Withhold

If a government entity fails to withhold the tax imposed by section 3402(t), section 3403 applies. Under section 3402(t)(3) and section 3403, the government entity is generally liable for the payment of the tax to the IRS unless it can prove that the payee has paid its income tax liability.

Section 3403 provides that the employer shall be liable for the payment of tax required to be deducted and withheld under chapter 24, and shall not be liable to any person for the amount of any such payment.

Section 31.3403-1 of the Employment Tax Regulations provides that every employer required to deduct and withhold the tax under section 3402 from the wages of an employee is liable for the payment of such tax whether or not it is collected from the employee by the employer. If, for example, the employer deducts less than the correct amount of tax, or if the employer fails to deduct any part of the tax, the employer is nevertheless liable for the correct amount of the tax. Section 3402(t)(3) provides that for purposes of section 3403, payments to any person for property or services that are subject to withholding under section 3402(t) are treated as if such payments were wages paid by an employer to an employee.

Thus, sections 3402(t)(3) and 3403 establish the liability of the government entity for the amount of the tax imposed by section 3402(t) if it fails to withhold.

However, section 3402(d) provides an exception to the entity's liability for income tax withholding in certain cases. Under this exception, if the entity required to withhold fails to do so, and thereafter the tax is paid, the tax will not be collected from the entity that failed to withhold. Thus, for purposes of section 3402(t), the government entity generally will be liable if it fails to withhold unless it is able to demonstrate, consistent with IRS procedures, that the taxpayer reported the amounts that were subject to withholding on its income tax return and paid the income tax due.



Transition Rule for Penalties and Interest on Underpayments

The proposed regulations provide a special transition rule for a government entity's liability for interest and penalties with respect to the failure to pay the tax on payments for property and services made before January 1, 2012. Under the transition rule, a government entity would not be liable for penalties and interest with respect to liability for withholding imposed by section 3402(t), on payments for property or services made before January 1, 2012, if the entity made a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of section 3402(t). However, this transition rule would not provide relief from liability for the amount of tax required to be withheld under section 3402(t).



Proposed Effective Date

These regulations are proposed to apply to payments made after the later of December 31, 2010, or six months after the date of publication of final regulations. In addition, the regulations will not apply to payments under contracts existing on the later of December 31, 2010, or six months after the date of publication of final regulations.



Special Analyses

It has been determined that this notice of proposed rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action as defined in Executive Order 12866. Therefore, a regulatory assessment is not required. It also has been determined that section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 5) does not apply to this regulation, and because the regulation does not impose a collection of information on small entities, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. chapter 6) does not apply. Pursuant to section 7805(f) of the Internal Revenue Code, this regulation has been submitted to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on its impact on small business.



Comments and Requests for Public Hearing

Before these proposed regulations are adopted as final regulations, consideration will be given to any written (a signed original and eight (8) copies) or electronic comments that are timely submitted to the IRS. All comments will be available for public inspection and copying. A public hearing will be scheduled if requested in writing by any person that timely submits written or electronic comments. If a public hearing is scheduled, notice of the date, time, and place for the hearing will be published in the Federal Register.



Drafting Information

The principal author of these proposed regulations is A. G. Kelley, Office of the Division Counsel/Associate Chief Counsel (Tax Exempt and Government Entities). However, other personnel from the IRS and the Treasury Department participated in their development.



List of Subjects in 26 CFR Part 31

Employment taxes, Income taxes, Penalties, Pensions, Railroad retirement, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Social security, Unemployment compensation.



Proposed Amendments to the Regulations

Accordingly, 26 CFR part 31 is proposed to be amended as follows:



PART 31 --EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND COLLECTION OF INCOME TAX AT SOURCE

Paragraph 1. The authority citation for part 31 continues to read in part as follows:

Authority: 26 U.S.C. 7805

Par. 2. The following §§31.3402(t)-0, 31.3402(t)-1, 31.3402(t)-2, 31.3402(t)-3, 31.3402(t)-4, and 31.3402(t)-5 are added, §31.3402(t)-6 is added and reserved, and §31.3402(t)-7 is added to read as follows:

§31.3402(t)-0 Outline of the Government withholding regulations.

This section lists paragraphs contained in §§31.3402(t)-1 through 31.3402(t)-5, and §31.3402(t)-7.

§31.3402(t)-1 Withholding requirement on certain payments made by government entities.

(a) In general.

(b) Special rules.

(c) Deposit and reporting requirements.

(d) Effective/applicability date.

§31.3402(t)-2 Government entities required to withhold under section 3402(t).

(a) In general.

(b) Government of the United States.

(c) State.

(d) Political Subdivision.

(e) [Reserved].

(f) Possessions of the United States.

(g) Passthrough entities.

(h) Small entity exception.

(i) Effective/applicability date.

§31.3402(t)-3 Payments subject to withholding

(a) In general.

(b) Payment threshold of $10,000.

(c) No withholding on successive payments.

(d) Payments made through a payment administrator or to a contractor.

(e) Payments by credit card or payment card.

(f) Examples.

(g) Effective/applicability date.

§31.3402(t)-4 Certain payments excepted from withholding.

(a) Payments subject to withholding under chapter 3 or chapter 24 (other than section 3406).

(b) Payments subject to withholding under section 3406 with backup withholding deducted.

(c) [Reserved].

(d) Payments for real property.

(e) Payments to government entities, tax-exempt organizations, and foreign governments.

(f) Payments made pursuant to a classified or confidential contract.

(g) Exception for political subdivisions or instrumentalities thereof making less than $100,000,000 of payments for property or services annually.

(h) Payments made in connection with a public assistance or public welfare program.

(i) Payments made to any government employee with respect to his or her services.

(j) Payments received by nonresident alien individuals and foreign corporations.

(k) Payments to Indian tribal governments.

(l) Payments in emergency or disaster situations.

(m) Effective/applicability date.

§31.3402(t)-5 Application to passthrough entities.

(a) In general.

(b) Definitions.

(c) Payments from a passthrough entity.

(d) Payments to a passthrough entity.

(e) Effective/applicability date.

§31.3402(t)-6 Crediting of tax withheld under section 3402(t)

[Reserved].

§31.3402(t)-7 Effective date and transition rules.

(a) General rule.

(b) Exception for payments made under existing written binding contracts.

(c) Good faith exception for interest and penalties on payments before January 1, 2012.



§31.3402(t)-1 Withholding requirement on certain payments made by government entities.

(a) In general. Except as provided in §§31.3402(t)-3(b) and 31.3402(t)-4, the Government of the United States, every State, every political subdivision thereof, and every instrumentality of the foregoing (including multi-State agencies) making any payment to any person providing any property or services shall deduct and withhold from such payment a tax in an amount equal to 3 percent of such payment.

(b) Special rules. See §31.3402(t)-2 for government entities required to withhold under this section, §31.3402(t)-3 for what constitutes a payment to a person for property or services and when such payment is deemed to occur for purposes of this section, and §31.3402(t)-4 for payments that are excepted from withholding under this section.

(c) Deposit and reporting requirements. See §31.6302-4 for deposit requirements with respect to withholding under section 3402(t). See §§31.6011(a)-4(b) and 31.6051-5 for the reporting requirements with respect to withholding under section 3402(t).

(d) Effective/applicability date. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, this section is effective for payments by the Government of the United States, every State, every political subdivision thereof, and every instrumentality of the foregoing (including multi-State agencies) to any person providing property or services made after the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t).

(2) Payments made under a written binding contract that was in effect on the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t), are not subject to the withholding requirements of this section. The preceding sentence does not apply to payments made under any contract that is materially modified after the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t).



§31.3402(t)-2 Government entities required to withhold under section 3402(t).

(a) In general. The requirement to withhold under section 3402(t) and §31.3402(t)-1(a) applies to the Government of the United States (see paragraph (b) of this section) and every State (see paragraph (c) of this section), as well as instrumentalities of the foregoing. The requirement also applies to political subdivisions of every State (see paragraph (d) of this section), and their instrumentalities, unless the small entity exception of §31.3402(t)-4(g) applies.

(b) Government of the United States. The Government of the United States includes the legislative branch, the judicial branch, and the executive branch, and all components of the United States Government. Thus, departments and agencies are included within the definition of United States Government.

(c) State. The term State includes the District of Columbia. However, an Indian tribal government is not considered a State for purposes of section 3402(t) and §31.3402(t)-1(a). See section 7871(a).

(d) Political subdivision. The term political subdivision for purposes of section 3402(t) and §31.3402(t)-1(a) is defined as a political subdivision within the meaning of §1.103-1(b) of this chapter, except that a subdivision of an Indian tribal government is not considered a political subdivision. See section 7871(a) and (d).

(e) [Reserved].

(f) Possessions of the United States. For purposes of section 3402(t) and §31.3402(t)-1(a), the government of a possession or territory of the United States is not treated as a government entity subject to the withholding requirements of section 3402(t)(1).

(g) Passthrough entities. See §31.3402(t)-5(c) for the treatment of payments from certain passthrough entities as subject to the withholding requirements of §31.3402(t)-1.

(h) Small entity exception. See §31.3402(t)-4(g) for the exception from the withholding requirements of §31.3402(t)-1 for political subdivisions and instrumentalities thereof making less than $100,000,000 of payments for property or services annually.

(i) Effective/applicability date. This section is effective the later of January 1, 2011, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t).



§31.3402(t)-3 Payments subject to withholding.

(a) In general. A payment is subject to withholding for purposes of §§31.3402(t)-1 through 31.3402(t)-7 when paid by a government entity to any person, as defined in §301.7701-6(a) of this chapter, for property or services. If, however, the government entity uses a payment administrator to pay a person for property or services, payment occurs when the payment administrator pays such person. The government entity subject to the withholding requirements of §31.3402(t)-1 is liable for the withholding required and responsible for all related reporting regardless of whether the government entity or its payment administrator makes the payment for property or services.

(b) Payment threshold of $10,000 --(1) In general. The term payment threshold means an amount equal to $10,000. The withholding requirements of §31.3402(t)-1 will not apply to any payment that is less than the payment threshold. Whether a payment is equal to or in excess of the payment threshold is determined when the payment is made.

(2) Payment threshold applied per payment. If a government entity makes a single payment to a person for property or services combining charges for more than one transaction with the person, the determination of whether the payment threshold provided by paragraph (b)(1) of this section applies will be based on the amount of the single payment, rather than the amount attributable to each separate transaction. Thus, if a government entity makes a single payment of $10,000 or more to a person, the government entity will be required to withhold on the payment, even if the payment is for more than one property or service. The same rule applies if a government entity enters into multiple transactions with a single person, each of which would result in a payment of less than $10,000 if paid separately, but elects to make a single payment covering all the transactions such that the aggregated payment is $10,000 or more. Under these circumstances, the government entity is required to withhold on the aggregated payment.

(3) Anti-abuse rule. If a government entity or payment administrator divides a payment or payments to any person for property or services into two or more payments primarily to avoid the $10,000 payment threshold provided in paragraph (b)(1) of this section on one or more of these payments, the divided payments will be treated as a single payment made on the date that the first of these payments is made.

(c) No withholding on successive payments. If a government entity or its payment administrator makes a payment that is subject to the withholding requirements of §31.3402(t)-1 to a person, no subsequent transfer of cash or property from that payment by such person to another person is treated as a payment subject to withholding for purposes of §§31.3402(t)-1 through 31.3402(t)-7.

(d) Payments made through a payment administrator or to a contractor --(1) Definition --For purposes of this section --

(i) A payment administrator is any person that acts with respect to a payment solely as an agent for a government entity by making the payment on behalf of the government entity to a person providing property or services to, or on behalf of, the government entity.

(ii) A payment administrator is treated as a person providing property or services for purposes of the withholding requirements of section 3402(t) to the extent it receives a fee from the government entity for its services as a payment administrator for the government entity.

(2) Payments to a contractor. If a person provides property or services to a government entity under a contract and is not a payment administrator, the person, who is in privity with the government entity, is treated as the person providing property or services subject to withholding under section 3402(t) for all payments received from the government entity, regardless of whether some payments the person receives relate to invoices for property or services provided by subcontractors.

(3) Application of payment threshold. Where a government entity uses a payment administrator to make a payment, the determination of whether the payment meets the payment threshold is made at the time the payment administrator makes the payment to the person providing property or services. If a government entity makes one transfer of funds to a payment administrator that is composed of a fee to compensate the payment administrator for its services and other funds that are to be paid to persons providing property or services, the determination of whether the payment threshold is met on the portion that is the fee is made at the time of the transfer of funds to the payment administrator.

(e) Payments by credit card or payment card. For purposes of section 3402(t), a payment made by a government entity by credit card or payment card to a person for property or services occurs when the credit card or payment card is tendered at the point of sale. The government entity is liable for withholding under section 3402(t) and reporting associated with such withholding. See section 6050W of the Internal Revenue Code for separate reporting obligations imposed on the acquiring bank of the person receiving payment by credit card or payment card.

(f) Examples. This section is illustrated by the following examples:

Example 1. (i) Prime contractor X has a contract with a government entity to provide services and property to the government entity. X contracts with numerous subcontractors to provide services and property in connection with the contract. While the engagement of any particular subcontractor is subject to approval by the government entity, the subcontractors are not parties to the contract between X and the government entity, and the government entity is not a party to the contracts between X and subcontractors. Under its contract with the government entity, X submits an invoice for $48,000 for providing services and property to the government entity, including charges for services and property provided by two subcontractors, M and N. The invoice reflects charges of $16,000 for M and $2,000 for N. The government entity pays X the entire amount of the invoice in one payment of $48,000. X pays M for M's billed portion of the invoice in a single payment of $16,000, and X pays N for N's billed portion of the invoice in a single payment of $2,000.

(ii) Under the facts of this Example 1, X is the person providing property or services to, or for the benefit of, the government entity with respect to the entire amount of the $48,000 payment under the invoice, including the charges for services or property provided by its subcontractors M and N. X is not a payment administrator (as defined in paragraph (d)(1)(i) of this section) because X is not making payments solely as an agent of the government entity to persons providing property or services. Instead, X makes payments to subcontractors M and N pursuant to X's separate contracts with these subcontractors to which the government entity is not a party. Therefore, under paragraphs (a) and (d)(2) of this section, the entire amount of the $48,000 payment to X under the invoice, including the charges for services and property provided by its subcontractors M and N, is the payment subject to withholding for purposes of section 3402(t).

(iii) Under paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the determination whether the payment meets the payment threshold is based on the entire amount of the payment from the government entity to X. Withholding under section 3402(t) applies to the government entity's $48,000 payment to X because the payment meets the payment threshold and is not otherwise excepted from section 3402(t) withholding. Thus, the payment is subject to withholding of 3 percent, or $1440.

(iv) Payments made by X to the subcontractors, M and N, are not payments by the government entity or its payment administrator. Thus, X's $16,000 payment to M and X's $2,000 payment to N for services or property under the contract are not subject to withholding under section 3402(t). See paragraphs (c) and (d)(2) of this section.

(v) The government entity is liable for the $1440 withholding required under section 3402(t) on its payment to X and is responsible for the related reporting required under §31.6051-5. See paragraph (a) of this section. X is the person receiving the payment for purposes of reporting under §31.6051-5. Thus, the government entity is responsible for providing X with a Form 1099 including the entire amount of the payment ($48,000) and the entire amount of the withholding ($1440).

Example 2. (i) Z has a contract with a government entity to make payments as an agent of the government entity to persons providing services or property to, or on behalf of, the government entity. The only services Z provides under the contract are its services in acting as an agent for the government entity in making payments to persons providing property or services to, or on behalf of, the government. The government entity transfers funds of $71,000 to Z, which includes a fee of $1,000 to Z for its services as an agent under the contract. Z then makes payments of the $70,000 remainder of the funds to persons providing property or services to, or on behalf of, the government entity, including a single payment of $18,000 to P and a single payment of $7,000 to R.

(ii) Under the facts of this Example 2, Z is a payment administrator (as defined in paragraph (d)(1)(i) of this section) because Z makes payments solely as an agent for the government entity to persons providing property or services to, or on behalf of, the government entity. Under paragraphs (a) and (d) of this section, Z is not treated as a person providing property or services with respect to $70,000 of the transfer of funds (the amount of the funds to be paid to persons providing property or services to, or on behalf of, the government entity). Because Z is not treated as a person providing property or services with respect to this $70,000 portion of the funds, this portion of the transfer of funds by the government entity to Z is not subject to withholding under section 3402(t) when transferred to Z.

(iii) Under paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of this section, the payment administrator is treated as a person providing property or services with respect to the portion of the $71,000 fund transfer that is a fee for its services as a payment administrator, or $1,000. Under paragraph (d)(3) of this section, the determination of whether the payment threshold is met with respect to the fee portion of the payment from the government entity to Z is made at the time of the payment from the government entity to Z. Because the $1,000 fee portion of the payment falls beneath the $10,000 payment threshold, withholding under section 3402(t) is not required with respect to that portion of the payment.

(iv) P and R are persons providing services or property to, or on behalf of, the government entity with respect to the payments they receive from Z.

(v) Withholding is required under section 3402(t) on the payment by Z, a payment administrator, to a person providing property or services to, or on behalf of, a government entity provided the payment meets the payment threshold and is not otherwise excepted. Under paragraph (d)(3) of this section, the determination of whether the payment threshold is met on the payment Z makes to a person providing property or services is made at the time Z pays the person providing property or services. Under the facts of this Example 2, Z's payment to P of $18,000 meets the payment threshold, and therefore withholding of $540 under section 3402(t) applies. Z's payment to R of $7,000 does not meet the payment threshold, and therefore, no withholding under section 3402(t) is required.

(vi) The government entity, not Z, is liable for any withholding required under section 3402(t) on the payments from Z to persons providing property or services. Also, the government entity, not Z, is responsible for any reporting required under §31.6051-5 on the payment from Z to persons providing property or services. See paragraph (a) of this section. Each person providing property or services with respect to which withholding is required, not Z, is the person receiving the payment for purposes of the reporting required under §31.6051-5 if withholding under section 3402(t) applies. Thus, the government entity is responsible for issuing P a Form 1099 reflecting the amount of the payment from Z to P of $18,000 and the amount of withholding of $540.

(g) Effective/applicability date. This section is effective for payments by the Government of the United States, every State, every political subdivision thereof, and every instrumentality of the foregoing (including multi-State agencies) to any person providing property or services made after the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t).



§31.3402(t)-4 Certain payments excepted from withholding.

(a) Payments subject to withholding under chapter 3 or chapter 24 (other than section 3406) --(1) In general. Payments are excepted from withholding under section §31.3402(t)-1(a) if they are subject to withholding under chapter 3 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) or under sections 3401 through 3405 of the Code (other than section 3402(t)).

(2) Payments subject to withholding under chapter 3. Payments subject to withholding under chapter 3 include those payments that are subject to, but exempt from, withholding under chapter 3 on the ground that the payments are exempt from United States income tax pursuant to an income tax convention to which the United States is a party.

(3) Payments subject to withholding at election of payee. For purposes of this exception from section 3402(t), payments for which the payee may elect withholding are exempt from withholding under §31.3402(t)-1(a) regardless of whether the payee in fact makes such an election. These payments include --

(i) Unemployment compensation as defined in section 85(b) (see section 3402(p)(2));

(ii) Social security benefits as defined in section 86(d) (see section 3402(p)(1)(C)(i));

(iii) Any payment referred to in the second sentence of section 451(d) that is treated as insurance proceeds, relating to certain disaster payments received under the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, or Title II of the Disaster Assistance Act of 1988 (see section 3402(p)(1)(C)(ii));

(iv) Any amount that is includible in gross income under section 77(a), relating to amounts received as loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation that the taxpayer has elected to treat as income (see section 3402(p)(1)(C)(iii)); and

(v) Any payment of an annuity to an individual.

(b) Payments subject to withholding under section 3406 with backup withholding deducted. A payment is not subject to withholding under section 3402(t) if the payment is subject to withholding under section 3406, relating to backup withholding, and if backup withholding is actually being withheld from such payment.

(c) [Reserved].

(d) Payments for real property. Payments for real property are not subject to the withholding requirements of §31.3402(t)-1. For purposes of this exception, the term payments for real property includes the purchase and the leasing of real property. However, payments for the construction of buildings or other public works projects, such as bridges or roads, are not payments for real property.

(e) Payments to government entities, tax-exempt organizations, and foreign governments --(1) Government entities. Payments are not subject to withholding under section 3402(t) if the payments are made to government entities that are subject to the withholding requirements of section 3402(t)(1) pursuant to §31.3402(t)-2. For purposes of this exception, payments to government entities that qualify for the exception for political subdivisions and instrumentalities making less than $100,000,000 of payments for property and services annually, as provided by section 3402(t)(2)(G) and paragraph (g) of this section, are treated as payments to government entities that are subject to the withholding requirements of section 3402(t)(1).

(2) Tax-exempt organizations. Payments to an organization that is exempt from taxation under section 501(a) as an organization described in section 501(c), 501(d), or 401(a) are not subject to withholding under section 3402(t).

(3) Foreign governments. Payments to foreign governments are not subject to withholding under section 3402(t). For purposes of this paragraph (e), a government of a possession or territory of the United States is treated as a foreign government.

(f) Payments made pursuant to a classified or confidential contract. Payments made pursuant to a classified or confidential contract described in section 6050M(e)(3) are not subject to withholding under section 3402(t).

(g) Exception for political subdivisions or instrumentalities thereof making less than $100,000,000 of payments for property or services annually --(1) In general. Section 3402(t) withholding is not required on payments made by a political subdivision of a State (or any instrumentality of a political subdivision of a State) that makes less than $100,000,000 of payments for property or services annually.

(2) Determination of whether an entity is a political subdivision of a State. The determination of whether an entity is a political subdivision of a State is made under §31.3402(t)-2(d).

(3) Determination of whether a political subdivision or instrumentality makes less than $100,000,000 of payments for property or services annually. The determination of whether the exception provided by paragraph (g)(1) of this section applies is made for each calendar year. For purposes of any calendar year, the determination of whether a political subdivision or instrumentality makes less than $100,000,000 of payments for property or services annually is based on the total payments made by the entity for property or services in the entity's accounting year ending with or within the second preceding calendar year. For purposes of this paragraph (g), payments that would have qualified for the exceptions from withholding under §31.3402(t)-4(a) through (l) had these regulations been in effect shall not be included in calculating the total payments made. However, payments that would have been excepted from withholding only because such payments were less than the $10,000 payment threshold contained in §31.3402(t)-3(b) are included in calculating the total payments for purposes of this paragraph (g). Also, payments that were not subject to withholding under section 3402(t) solely based on the effective date rules or transition rules contained in §31.3402(t)-1(d), §31.3402(t)-2(i), §31.3402(t)-3(g), §31.3402(t)-4(m), §31.3402(t)-5(e), or §31.3402(t)-7 are included in calculating total payments for purposes of this paragraph (g). For purposes of this determination, the accounting year refers to the fiscal year (consisting of 12 months) or calendar year used by the government entity in setting its budgets and keeping its accounting books. If a political subdivision or instrumentality was not in existence in the second preceding calendar year or if no 12-month accounting year exists ending in the second preceding calendar year, the determination of whether this exception applies for a calendar year shall be based on the total payments as projected for the accounting year consisting of 12 months ending in that calendar year.

(4) Example. (i) Government entity X, which qualifies as a political subdivision or instrumentality thereof for the calendar years 2011 and 2012, uses a fiscal year ending June 30 to determine its budgets and to keep its accounting books. During its fiscal year ending June 30, 2009, X made payments to persons for property and services of $200,000,000, including $102,000,000 of payments that would have been excepted under §31.3402(t)-4(a) through (l) if section 3402(t) had been in effect.

(ii) During its fiscal year ending June 30, 2010, X made payments for property and services of $210,000,000, including $106,000,000 that would have been excepted under §31.3402(t)-4(a) through (l) if section 3402(t) had been in effect. In addition, during the fiscal year ending June 30, 2010, X made $15,000,000 of payments that were below the payment threshold of $10,000 in §31.3402(t)-3(b) if section 3402(t) had been in effect.

(iii) For the calendar year 2011, X determines whether it is eligible for the exception provided by this paragraph (g) based on the total payments X made for its accounting year ending June 30, 2009. Because total payments for this purpose exclude payments that would be excepted under §31.3402(t)-4(a) through (l), total payments were $200,000,000 less $102,000,000, or $98,000,000. Therefore, for calendar year 2011, X would qualify for the exception provided by this paragraph (g), and would not be required to withhold under section 3402(t).

(iv) For the calendar year 2012, X determines whether it is eligible for the exception provided by this paragraph (g) based on the total payments it made for its accounting year ending June 30, 2010. Because total payments for this purpose exclude payments that would have been excepted under §31.3402(t)-4(a) through (l), but include payments below the payment threshold of $10,000 provided under §31.3402(t)-3(b), total payments were $210,000,000 less $106,000,000, or $104,000,000. Therefore, for calendar year 2012, X would not qualify for the exception provided by this paragraph (g) and would be required to withhold under section 3402(t).

(h) Payments made in connection with a public assistance or public welfare program --(1) In general. Section 3402(t) withholding shall not apply to payments made in connection with a public assistance or public welfare program for which eligibility is determined by a needs or income test.

(2) Needs or income test. Eligibility for a public assistance or public welfare program is not considered to be determined by a needs or income test if eligibility for the program is based solely on the age of the beneficiary. A public assistance program providing disaster relief to victims of a natural or other disaster is considered to be a program for which eligibility is determined under a needs test. Payments under government programs to provide health care or other services that are not based on the needs or income of the recipient are subject to section 3402(t) withholding, including programs where eligibility is based on the age of the beneficiary.

(3) Payments to third parties. The exception provided by this paragraph (h) also applies to payments made to third parties to provide benefits to beneficiaries under a public assistance or public welfare program for which eligibility is determined by a needs or income test.

(i) Payments made to any government employee with respect to his or her services. Section 3402(t) withholding shall not apply to payments made to any government employee with respect to his or her services as an employee of the government. This exception applies to contributions to deferred compensation plans on behalf of an employee, contributions to employee benefit plans on behalf of an employee, fringe benefits provided to employees, and payments to employees under accountable plans for the individual travel expenses of the employee. This exception also applies to payments made by the government employee under accountable plans to providers of the employee's travel, meals, and lodging when the government employee is traveling on government business.

(j) Payments received by nonresident alien individuals and foreign corporations. Section 3402(t) withholding shall not apply to any payment received by a nonresident alien individual or foreign corporation (foreign person) for providing services or property if the payment is derived from sources outside the United States, as determined under sections 861, 862, 863, and 865, and is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States by the foreign person.

(k) Payments to Indian tribal governments. Section 3402(t) withholding shall not apply to any payment made to an Indian tribal government or its political subdivisions.

(l) Payments in emergency or disaster situations. The Secretary may provide by publication in the Internal Revenue Bulletin (see §601.601(d)(2)(ii)( b) of this chapter) for additional exceptions from section 3402(t) withholding for certain payments made in an emergency or disaster situation if the Secretary determines that withholding from the payments would impede a government entity's efforts to respond to the emergency or disaster.

(m) Effective/applicability date. This section is effective for payments by the Government of the United States, every State, every political subdivision thereof, and every instrumentality of the foregoing (including multi-State agencies) to any person providing property or services made after the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t).



§31.3402(t)-5 Application to passthrough entities.

(a) In general. This section sets forth rules that provide that section 3402(t)(1) does not apply to payments made by passthrough entities except as described in paragraph (c) of this section. In addition, the rules provide that section 3402(t)(1) applies to payments made to passthrough entities except as described in paragraph (d) of this section.

(b) Definitions. The following definitions set forth the meaning of certain terms for purposes of this section:

(1) Passthrough entity. The term passthrough entity means a partnership (for Federal income tax purposes) or an S corporation.

(2) Owner. The term owner means a partner (for Federal income tax purposes) or an S corporation shareholder.

(3) Ownership percentage. The term ownership percentage means an owner's interest, as a percentage, in partnership profits or capital (whichever is greater) in the case of a partnership, or an owner's interest, as a percentage, in S corporation stock in the case of an S corporation.

(4) Testing day. The term testing day refers to the first day of a passthrough entity's taxable year.

(c) Payments from a passthrough entity --(1) General rule. Section 3402(t)(1) shall not apply to payments made by passthrough entities during the taxable year, except as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section.

(2) Exception. Section 3402(t)(1) shall apply to any payment during the taxable year from a passthrough entity if the aggregate ownership percentage held, directly or indirectly, in the entity on the testing day by government entities described in section 3402(t)(1) is at least 80 percent. For purposes of this paragraph (c)(2), any manipulation of the ownership percentage with an intent to avoid application of section 3402(t) will be recharacterized as appropriate to reflect the actual ownership percentage.

(d) Payments to a passthrough entity --(1) General rule. Section 3402(t)(1) shall apply to payments made to passthrough entities during the taxable year, except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of this section.

(2) Exception. Section 3402(t)(1) shall not apply to any payment during a taxable year to a passthrough entity if the aggregate ownership percentage held, directly or indirectly, in the entity on the testing day by persons described in section 3402(t)(2)(E) is at least 80 percent. For purposes of this paragraph (d)(2), any manipulation of the ownership percentage with an intent to avoid application of section 3402(t) will be recharacterized as appropriate to reflect the actual ownership percentage.

(e) Effective/applicability date. This section is effective for payments by the Government of the United States, every State, every political subdivision thereof, and every instrumentality of the foregoing (including multi-State agencies) to any person providing property or services made after the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t).



§31.3402(t)-6 Crediting of tax withheld under section 3402(t).

[Reserved].



§31.3402(t)-7 Effective date and transition rules.

(a) General Rule. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the requirement to withhold under §31.3402(t)-1(a) applies to payments made after the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t).

(b) Exception for payments made under existing written binding contracts. Payments made under a written binding contract that was in effect on the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t), are not subject to the withholding requirements in §31.3402(t)-1. The preceding sentence does not apply to payments made under any contract that is materially modified after the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t).

(c) Good faith exception for interest and penalties on payments made before January 1, 2012. Government entities that make a good faith effort to comply with the provisions of these regulations will not be liable for penalties and interest with respect to income tax withholding under section 3402(t) that the government entity failed to withhold from payments made before January 1, 2012. However, this provision shall not relieve the government entity of liability for income tax that it failed to withhold. See, however, §31.3402(d)-1.

Par. 3. Section 31.3406(g)-2 is amended by adding paragraphs (h) and (i) to read as follows:



§31.3406(g)-2 Exception for reportable payment for which withholding is otherwise required.

* * * * *

(h) Certain payments made by government entities. A government entity that is required to withhold both on reportable payments pursuant to section 3406(a) and on certain payments pursuant to section 3402(t), must comply with the withholding requirements of section 3406, and not section 3402(t), with respect to a payment to which both types of withholding would apply. Pursuant to section 3402(t)(2)(B), withholding under section 3402(t) shall not apply if amounts are being withheld under section 3406 with respect to a payment. If a government entity fails to withhold as required under section 3406, the payment will not be deemed to be subject to withholding under another provision of the Code for purposes of this paragraph (h). Thus, even if the government entity withholds on such payment pursuant to section 3402(t), it will remain liable for the amount required to be withheld under section 3406.

(i) Effective/applicability date. Paragraph (h) relating to certain payments made by government entities applies to payments made by government entities under section 3402(t) made after the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t).

Par. 4. Section 31.6011(a)-4 is amended by adding paragraphs (b)(6) and (d) to read as follows:



§31.6011(a)-4 Returns of income tax withheld.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(6) Certain payments made by government entities subject to withholding under section 3402(t).

* * * * *

(d) Effective/applicability date. Paragraph (b)(6) relating to certain payments made by government entities subject to withholding under section 3402(t) applies to payments made by government entities under section 3402(t) made after the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t).

Par. 5. Section 31.6051-5 is added to read as follows:



§31.6051-5 Statement and information return required in case of withholding by government entities.

(a) Statements required from government entities. Every government entity required to deduct and withhold tax under section 3402(t) must furnish to the payee a written statement containing the information required by paragraph (d) of this section.

(b) Information returns required from government entities. Every government entity required to furnish a payee statement under paragraph (a) of this section must file a duplicate of such statement with the Secretary. Such duplicate shall constitute an information return.

(c) Prescribed form. The prescribed form for the statement required by this section is Form 1099-MISC, "Miscellaneous Income."

(d) Information required. Each statement on Form 1099-MISC must show the following --

(1) The name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the person receiving the payment subject to withholding under section 3402(t);

(2) The amount of the payment withheld upon;

(3) The amount of tax deducted and withheld under section 3402(t);

(4) The name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the government entity filing the form;

(5) A legend stating that such amount is being reported to the Internal Revenue Service; and

(6) Such other information as is required by the form.

(e) Time for furnishing statements. The statement must be furnished to the payee no later than January 31 of the year following the calendar year in which the payment subject to withholding was made.

(f) Cross references. For provisions relating to the time for filing the information returns required by this section and to extensions of the time for filing, see §§31.6071(a)-1(a)(3) and 1.6081-1(b)(3), respectively. For penalties applicable to failure to file information returns and furnish payee statements, see sections 6721 through 6724.

(g) Effective/applicability date. This section is effective on the later of January 1, 2011, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t).

Par. 6 . Section 31.6071(a)-1 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(3)(i) to read as follows:



§ 31.6071(a)-1 Time for filing returns and other documents.

* * * * *

(3) Information returns --(i) General rule. Each information return in respect of wages as defined in the Federal Insurance Contributions Act or of income tax withheld from wages which is required to be made under §31.6051-2 or of income tax withheld from payments by government entities as required under §31.6051-5 shall be filed on or before the last day of February (March 31 if filed electronically) of the year following the calendar year for which it is made, except that, if a tax return under §31.6011(a)-5(a) is filed as a final return for a period ending prior to December 31, the information statement shall be filed on or before the last day of the second calendar month following the period for which the tax return is filed.

* * * * *

Par. 7. Section 31.6302-1 is amended by adding paragraph (e)(1)(iii)(E) and revising paragraph (n) to read as follows:



§31.6302-1. Federal tax deposit rules for withheld income taxes and taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) attributable to payments made after December 31, 1992.

* * * * *

(e) * * * (1) * * *

(iii) * * *

(E) Certain payments made by government entities under section 3402(t); and * * * * *

(n) Effective/applicability date. Except for the deposit of employment taxes attributable to payments made by government entities under section 3402(t), §§31.6302-1 through 31.6302-3 apply with respect to the deposit of employment taxes attributable to payments made after December 31, 1992. Section 31.6302-1(e)(1)(iii)(E) applies with respect to the deposit of employment taxes attributable to payments made by government entities under section 3402(t) made after the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t).

Par. 8 . Section 31.6302-4 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(5) and adding paragraphs (b)(6) and (e) to read as follows:



§31.6302-4 Federal tax deposit rules for withheld income taxes attributable to nonpayroll payments made after December 31, 1993.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(5) Amounts withheld under section 3406, relating to backup withholding with respect to reportable payments; and

(6) Amounts withheld under section 3402(t), relating to certain payments made by government entities.

* * * * *

(e) Effective/applicability date. Paragraph (b)(6) relating to certain payments made by government entities applies to payments made by government entities under section 3402(t) made after the later of December 31, 2010, or the date that is 6 months after the date of publication in the Federal Register of final regulations under section 3402(t).

Linda E. Stiff

Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement.

Labels:

Friday, April 17, 2009

FAS Request for Guidance on FIN 48

Financial Accounting Standards Board Requests for Guidance on Interpretation 48 (FIN 48)

April 17, 2009





Financial Accounting Standards Board




Board Meeting Handout





REQUESTS FOR GUIDANCE ON INTERPRETATION 48


April 15, 2009



PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING


1. At the December 17, 2008, meeting, the Board directed the staff to proceed with the guidance phase for FASB Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainly in Income Taxes. At that meeting, the Board also decided to amend the disclosure requirements of Interpretation 48 to eliminate paragraphs 21(a) and 21(b). The purpose of this handout is to discuss comments received on guidance for pass-through and tax exempt not-for-profit entities. This handout discusses the staff's recommended format for the guidance. In addition, this handout will discuss issues the staff believes should be addressed in proposed FSP FIN 48-d, Application Guidance for Pass-through and Tax Exempt Not-for-Profit Entities, and Disclosure Modifications for Nonpublic Entities, and the specific guidance to be included.




INTRODUCTION


2. The Board issued proposed FSP FIN 48-c, Effective Date of FASB Interpretation No. 48 for Certain Nonpublic Enterprises, in November 2008. The proposed FSP's Notice for Recipients asked constituents to provide specific examples of problems that nonpublic pass-through and tax exempt not-for-profit entities will encounter when applying Interpretation 48. The comment letters contain many issues (some of which had multiple scenarios) that the respondents believe need clarification so that pass-through and tax exempt not-for-profit entities can properly apply Interpretation 48.



3. During the research phase of this project, the staff read an article published by the Pennsylvania Society of Certified Public Accountants (PICPA) in the Pennsylvania CPA Journal, Winter 2009 . The article, "Be Vigilant: State and Local Pass-through Entity Issues," discusses the wide variety of tax laws and regulations of state and local taxing jurisdictions. It highlights common issues and provides examples to illustrate the variety and complexity of taxation for pass-through entities. Some of those issues are (a) entity vs. aggregate theory of partnerships, (b) nexus, (c) entity level taxes, (d) nonresident withholding and credits, and (e) LLC taxes and fees. The article illustrates the diversity among taxing authorities that pass-through entities encounter if they operate in multiple jurisdictions.




ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION


4. The staff believes there are three topics for discussion:



a. The format for the proposed FSP



b. The content of the proposed FSP



c. The effective date and transition.




ISSUE 1: THE FORMAT FOR THE PROPOSED FSP


5. The staff has identified two alternative formats to provide guidance to pass-through and tax exempt not-for-profit entities on the implementation of Interpretation 48.



a. Alternative 1: Provide guidance in a question and answer (Q&A) format addressing the specific issues raised in comment letters and other sources.



b. Alternative 2: Provide guidance in narrative form with examples as needed to clarify the application of the guidance.



6. Those who support Alternative 1 point out that a Q&A format is well suited to answer many of the specific questions raised by constituents. Furthermore, they argue that the FASB has issued EITF Abstracts and other guidance in the past to answer specific tax questions.



7. Those who support Alternative 2 believe that a Q&A format is not a practical solution. Because tax laws and regulations change as jurisdictions look for more ways to raise revenue, the specific scenarios mentioned in the comment letters and the PICPA article may change and new scenarios may be created. This could lead to requests for guidance whenever new circumstances arise.



8. Those who support Alternative 2 also point out that there were a lot of questions raised, many with multiple parts asking how to handle a wide variety of situations. The staff identified common traits among the issues raised by respondents and the PICPA article. By developing general principles around those traits, the staff believes current and future questions can be resolved so future guidance will not be needed.




STAFF RECOMMENDATION


9. The staff recommends Alternative 2. The staff believes that a Q&A format answering specific questions will not properly address all constituent concerns and may create the need for more implementation guidance in the future.




QUESTION FOR THE BOARD


10. Does the Board agree with the staff's recommendation?




ISSUE 2: THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSED FSP


11. After reviewing the comment letters, the staff believes the comments and questions raised by respondents can be addressed by providing guidance to answer the following three questions:



a. Whose income tax is it?



b. What is a tax position?



c. How does Interpretation 48 apply to consolidated/combined financial statements?



12. Comments and questions also raised the issue of whether a tax is an income tax or not. The staff recommends not addressing this issue in the proposed FSP because the staff believes that whether a tax is an income tax is outside the scope of this project. The purpose of the proposed FSP is to address issues relating to Interpretation 48 as it applies to pass-through and tax exempt not-for-profit entities. The question of whether a tax is an income tax or not relates to Statement 109 and applies to all entities whether or not they are pass-through entities or tax exempt not-for-profit entities.



13. Does the Board agree with the staff's recommendation to exclude from the proposed FSP the issue of whether a tax is an income tax?




ISSUE 2A: WHOSE TAX IT IS?


14. Many respondents mentioned the fact that some jurisdictions do not follow the federal income tax laws regarding the entity's pass-through status. In some jurisdictions, the federal pass-through status is disregarded and the entity is subject to income taxes at the state, local, or foreign level. Some jurisdictions require the entity to pay income taxes on behalf of the owners. Some jurisdictions only require it for nonresident owners. Some jurisdictions allow the owners to file returns. Others do not. Several respondents asked where to record the debit when income taxes are paid by the entity but are being paid on behalf of the owners.



15. The staff believes that deciding if the debit should be to income taxes or a transaction with owners should be based on whose tax it is --the entity's or the owner's. The staff believes deciding whose tax it is should be based on the laws and regulations of the taxing authority. If it is the entity's income tax, the debit should go to income taxes. If it is the owner's income tax, the debit should be recorded as a transaction with the owners. The proposed FSP would provide examples, if needed, to clarify the application of this principle.



16. The staff also considered using agreements between the entity and the owners to determine whose tax it is --the entity's or the owner's. The staff believes this may result in abuse of the system and decided that it is more appropriate to use the laws and regulations of the taxing authority.



17. The staff initially considered the concept of ultimate responsibility based on the laws and regulations of the taxing authority to determine whose tax it is. However, during the research phase, the staff received a letter from a CPA practitioner stating that ultimate responsibility should not be the criterion. He expressed concern that the ultimate responsibility for payment might fall on the entity but the laws and regulations might indicate that the payment is made on behalf of the owners. He suggested the concept of assignment. He suggested that payments on behalf of the owners which have been assigned to the entity should be charged to distributions. If payments are made that exceed the amount assigned to the owners, that excess should be charge to income taxes.



18. The staff discussed the concept of ultimate responsibility with representatives from the Big Four. Two representatives raised the issue of joint and several liability for the income tax. They said that when the entity and the owners are jointly and severally liable for the income tax, ultimate responsibility could not be determined. One representative suggested the concept of primary responsibility. He said primary responsibility could be used when the laws and regulations indicate that both the entity and the owners have ultimate responsibility for payment. The primary responsible party would be determined by whom the taxing authority would go to first for payment.



19. The staff believes the concept of primary responsibility could have unintended consequences. First, it acknowledges that there are others who also are responsible for the income taxes, those who are secondarily liable. Who is primary and who is secondarily liable can be different for two jurisdictions with identical laws and regulations. The staff does not believe it is appropriate to provide guidance that could result in two entities with identical circumstances recognizing different amounts for the same transaction.



20. Also, if primary responsibility is the criterion, in the situation where the entity pays on behalf of the owners making the entity primarily responsible, the entity would have an income tax expense, which is counterintuitive. Because the taxing authority often goes to the entity first because it is administratively easier, there could be a situation in which the owners could utilize the payments on their returns when the entity is primarily responsible.




STAFF RECOMMENDATION


21. Based on the comments received, the staff believes the determination of whose income tax it is should be based on attribution of the income tax to the entity or its owners based on the laws and regulations of the taxing authority, rather than who has ultimate responsibility for paying the tax. The staff believes determining attribution of income taxes to either the entity or its owners rather than the responsibility for payment will resolve the issues raised in paragraphs 18 and 19. If income taxes are attributed to the entity based on the laws and regulations of the taxing authority, the debit should be to income taxes and Interpretation 48 would apply. If income taxes are attributable to the owners, the debit should be treated as a transaction with owners.



22. Management also should consider all the facts and circumstances when determining whether to attribute income taxes to the entity or its owners. If the laws and regulations state that the payments are on behalf of the owners, it would be an indication that the income taxes are attributable to the owners. If the laws and regulations indicate that the owners have the ability to utilize payments on their income tax returns, it also would be an indication that the income taxes are attributable to the owners. Management may consider who has responsibility to pay the income taxes, but that consideration would be used as part of the analysis rather than the overriding factor.



23. In summary, the staff proposes that based on the laws and regulations of the taxing authority when income taxes are attributed to the owners, the transaction should be treated as transaction with the owners. If the income tax is attributed to the entity, the transaction should be treated as income taxes subject to Statement 109 and Interpretation 48.



24. The guidance will include examples as needed, to illustrate the application of this guidance.




QUESTIONS FOR THE BOARD


25. Does the Board agree with the staff's recommendation to use the concept of attribution?



26. If not, does the Board prefer the assignment concept, ultimate responsibility, primary responsibility, or another approach?




ISSUE 2B: WHAT IS A TAX POSITION?


27. Another common theme among the comments and questions is whether certain situations create uncertain tax positions. [Emphasis added.]



28. The term tax position is defined in paragraph 4 of Interpretation 48 as follows:



The term tax position as used in this Interpretation refers to a position in a previously filed tax return or a position expected to be taken in a future tax return that is reflected in measuring current or deferred income tax assets and liabilities for interim or annual periods. A tax position can result in a permanent reduction of income taxes payable, a deferral of income taxes otherwise currently payable to future years, or a change in the expected realizability of deferred tax assets.




STAFF RECOMMENDATION


29. The staff believes that issues relating to tax positions can be resolved by referencing the definition of tax position in paragraph 4 of Interpretation 48. The staff also believes that the guidance should clarify that all tax positions can be uncertain. In other words, the proposed FSP should not define uncertain tax positions. Rather, it should clarify the concept of a tax position. Management should be using professional judgment when evaluating the level of uncertainty in the tax positions taken based on all the facts and circumstances.



30. Examples would be provided as needed, to illustrate the application of the proposed guidance.




QUESTION FOR THE BOARD


31. Does the Board agree with the staff's approach?




ISSUE 2C: HOW DOES INTERPRETATION 48 APPLY TO CONSOLDIATED/COMBINED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS?


32. Another area of concern identified in the comments and questions relates to consolidated or combined financial statements. Respondents asked about situations where a pass-through entity has subsidiaries that are taxable entities.



33. The staff believes that the underlying issue in the comments and questions is whether the parent's status as a taxable, pass-through, or tax exempt not-for-profit entity should govern whether Interpretation 48 is applicable. There seems to be confusion about whether the parent's status would override the tax status of any entities included with the consolidated group. The staff believes this question can be answered by referencing consolidation standards that would require that consolidat