Thursday, July 2, 2009

Circular 230 issue

This is interesting bececause legal issues will be fully considered
Chief Counsel Notice CC-2009-020

July 2, 2009

Circular 230 : Disciplinary appeals : Delegation of authority .



Department of the Treasury



Internal Revenue Service



Office of Chief Counsel



Notice

CC-2009-020

June 29, 2009

Delegation of Authority to Hear and Decide Disciplinary Appeals under Treasury Department Circular No.

Subject: 230

Cancel Date : One year from date of Issuance



Purpose

This is a notice regarding the delegation of the authority to hear and decide appeals to the Secretary of the Treasury of the decision of the Administrative Law Judge in disciplinary cases under subpart D of Part 10 of Title 31, Code of Federal Regulations 31 C.F.R. Part 10, Practice before the Internal Revenue Service (reprinted in Treasury Department Circular No. 230). On June 26, 2009, I delegated this authority to Ronald Pinsky, Appellate Authority. The full content of that delegation of authority is set forth below.



Delegation of Authority

Under the authority of General Counsel Order No. 9 (January 19, 2001) and the authority vested in me as the Acting Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service, I hereby delegate to Ronald Pinsky, Appellate Authority, the authority to decide disciplinary appeals to the Secretary of the Treasury filed under Part 10 of Title 31, Code of Federal Regulations ("Practice before the Internal Revenue Service", reprinted in Treasury Department Circular 230). This authority to decide disciplinary appeals includes all powers of the administrative law judge, except that the decision of the administrative law judge may not be reversed unless that decision is clearly erroneous in light of the evidence in the record and applicable law. This includes the authority to make findings of fact regarding unresolved issues necessary to the decision if there are sufficient facts in the record for such findings to be made. However, consistent with 31 C.F.R. § 10.78, the case may be remanded to the administrative law judge to elicit additional testimony or evidence when the record on appeal raises unresolved issues necessary to the decision and the unresolved issues require additional testimony or evidence. Issues that are matters of law will be reviewed de novo.

This delegation does not include the authority to decide appeals to the Secretary of the Treasury of decisions on enrollment under Treasury Department Circular No. 230.

This authority may not be redelegated.

All prior delegations of this authority are superseded.


/s/



Clarissa C. Potter



Acting Chief Counsel



Internal Revenue Service


Distribute to: X All Personnel


X Electronic Reading Room


Filename: CC-2009-020

File copy in: CC:FM:PF

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Monday, June 29, 2009

6694 Article - Taxes Magazine

I like seeing another article on 6694. It has a good discussion of the legislative history. I regret that it did not provide a "bread and butter" set of guidance how how the "substantial authority" standard will be met.




Shifting Sands Under Preparers’
Feet: Waiting for the Last Word on
Tax Return Preparer Penalties
By Michael J. Desmond and Christopher P. Murphy*
Michael J. Desmond and Christopher P. Murphy examine the
evolution of the preparer penalty regime and conclude with a
discussion of open issues and concerns with the current preparer
penalty standards.

In recent years, Congress has focused increased attention on improving compliance with the tax law. This heightened interest stems from a confl uence of events, including updated Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates of the “tax gap” re¬leased in 2 005,1 skyrocketing federal budget defi cits2 and the political appeal of fi nding ways to raise tax revenue without increasing taxes or cutting spend¬ing. The pressure on compliance only increased when Democrats regained control of Congress after the 2006 elections and refocused attention on the Congressional “pay-go” rules that require (at least in theory) every new tax expenditure to be offset with a revenue raiser.3 The heightened emphasis on compliance has generated a number of legislative, regulatory and administrative proposals.4 Until re¬cently, political constraints on legislation that might improve compliance, but could be viewed as a tax increase, focused the discussion on improved in¬formation reporting and tax penalty provisions. This focus helps to explain and put in context a number of recent changes to the return preparer penalty regime in Code Sec. 6694 of the Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”).


In the 20 years since Congress last overhauled the taxpayer accuracy-related and preparer penalty rules, there have been a number of proposals to modify those provisions to better target noncompliance. As the tax law has grown more complicated and paid preparers play an increasing role in our “voluntary” tax system,5 there has been a growing concern that preparers are falling short in their obligations to the tax system and, in some cases, even facilitating non¬compliance.6 In response, legislative proposals have been introduced to subject paid return preparers to regulation,7 the Treasury Department and the IRS have tightened the practitioner ethics rules under Circular 230,8 and increased government resources have been focused on pursuing problematic preparers.9

Against this backdrop, when debating revenue raisers to offset tax expenditures in the Small Busi¬ness and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 (“the 2007 Act”),10 Congress again considered amending the return preparer penalty rules, an idea that had been circulating in various forms for a number of years. With little substantive debate on the amend¬ment, the fi nal version of the 2007 Act included the fi rst major changes to Code Sec. 6694 since 1989. These changes expanded the statute beyond prepar¬ers of income tax returns to include paid preparers of all returns, raised the confi dence standards pre¬parers are required to meet to avoid penalties and substantially increased the amount of the preparer penalty. The 2007 changes generated an immedi¬ate outcry from preparers, who argued that the new statute could actually hurt compliance by driving preparers out of business, forcing taxpayers to prepare their own returns or retain unscrupulous preparers who were not deterred by the increased penalty exposure.11

This article provides a general overview of the preparer penalty standards in place prior to the 2007 Act, a summary of the changes made in 2007, the interim guidance and proposed regulations that followed the 2007 changes, and a discussion of the statutory retraction from the 2007 Act made by the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Relief Act of 2008 (“the 2008 Act”).12 Noteworthy provisions in fi nal preparer penalty regulations published in December 2008, shortly after passage of the 2008 Act, are also discussed. The article concludes with a summary of open issues under the new statute and the fi nal regulations and a discussion of some problematic aspects of the preparer penalty rules in their current form.

Evolution of the Preparer Penalty Regime

A. Preparer Penalty Regime Following the 1989 Act

In 1989, Congress amended the return preparer penalty rules in the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia¬tion Act of 1989 (“the 1989 Act”) to link them to the newly enacted accuracy-related penalty rules applicable to taxpayers under Code Sec. 6662.13 Under prior law, the preparer penalty was imposed only in the event of a “negligent or intentional dis¬regard of rules or regulations.”14 With the changes made by the 1989 Act, return preparers, like tax¬payers, were required to meet certain “confi dence” levels in order to avoid penalties with respect to reporting positions taken on returns they prepared. Importantly, under the 1989 Act, the confi dence levels that applied to preparers were lower than the confi dence levels that applied to taxpayers under Code Sec. 6662. Thus, as long as minimum stan¬dards were met, the taxpayer’s appetite for penalty exposure effectively controlled the reporting posi¬tion, and preparers generally were not subject to penalties on any position unless their clients would also have penalty exposure.

Under the 1989 Act, different confi dence require¬ments applied, depending on whether the return position was “disclosed” to the IRS.15 If disclosed, the position needed only to meet a low, “not frivolous” standard in order for a preparer to avoid penalties. If not disclosed, the return preparer had to meet a higher (but still relatively low) “realistic possibility of being sustained on the merits” stan¬dard.16 See Table 1.

Table 1.

Preparer Conf dence Standards Under the 1989 Act
“Tax Shelters” and Reportable No separate standard
Avoidance Transactions
Undisclosed Return Positions Realistic Possibility1
Disclosed Return Positions Not Frivolous2
Realistic possibility of success on the merits is the equivalent of a 1 in 3 chance of prevailing if the position is challenged. The standard is more fully defi ned in the prior version of Reg. §1.6694-2(b). See T.D. 8382, 1992-1 CB 392.
“Not frivolous” is the equivalent of a likelihood of success of at least 10 percent if the position is challenged. The standard is in the prior version of Reg. §1 .6694-2(c)(2) as being “not patently improper.” See T.D. 8382, 1992-1 CB 392; see also Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxa¬tion, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., Comparison of Joint Committee Staff and Treasury Recommendations Relating to Penalty and Interest Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, at 13, JCX-79-99 (1999), available at www.house.gov/jct/x-79-99.pdf.

Although the 1989 Act’s changes were not uni¬versally praised, they were generally accepted by taxpayers and preparers alike, essentially aligning the Code’s return preparer standards with other prevail¬ing ethical standards already in place.17 There is no evidence, however, that the 1989 Act’s changes had any measurable effect on compliance. As a result, new ideas to again modify the taxpayer and preparer penalty rules soon began to circulate.

In 1999, as part of a comprehensive review of the penalty and interest provisions of the Code, the Joint Committee on Taxation issued a report recommending that the minimum confi dence lev¬els for both taxpayers and paid income tax return preparers be raised to a “reasonable belief of more likely than not” standard.18 Over the ensuing years, proposals were introduced in Congress to raise the confi dence levels for both taxpayers and preparers, although they failed to generate broad popular or Congressional interest.19 With the release of the IRS’s updated tax gap estimate in February 2005, which showed that some $300 billion in taxes was owed but not paid each year, Congress refocused its attention on compliance measures and began to
consider a range of legislative compliance propos¬als in an effort to collect some of the $300 billion in lost annual “tax gap” revenue.

B. Changes to the Preparer Penalty Regime Made by the 2007 Act, Interim Guidance and Proposed Implementing Regulations

By early 2007, mounting political pressure to fi nd ways to improve compliance created an opportune environment for reconsideration of heightened preparer penalty standards. In May of that year, the 2007 Act was signed into law. The 2007 Act made a number of key changes to the preparer penalty regime, including the following:
Expansion beyond income tax returns. The preparer penalty was expanded to apply to preparers of all tax returns, rather than just income tax return preparers. While the stat¬ute remained linked to an “understatement of liability” (and thus seemingly limited to returns that actually report a tax liability) the long-standing defi nition of “return preparer”20 broadened application of the statute to include work done by any person that constituted a “substantial portion” of a return, thereby po¬tentially subjecting information returns and a wide range of other documents to the expanded preparer penalty rules, notwithstanding that these documents do not themselves refl ect an “understatement of liability.”

Increase in preparer confidence standards. For undisclosed positions, the “realistic pos¬sibility” confidence standard for avoiding preparer penalties was raised to require a “reasonable belief” that the position would “more likely than not be sustained on its merits.” The standard for disclosed positions was also raised, requiring a preparer to have a “reasonable basis” for the reporting position, replacing the prior “not frivolous” standard. See Table 2.

Table 2.

Preparer Confi dence Standards Under the 2007 Act
“Tax Shelters” and Reportable Avoidance Transactions
Undisclosed Return Positions
Disclosed Return Positions
Increase in penalty amount. The penalties ap¬plicable to “unreasonable” positions that did not meet the increased confi dence standards jumped from $250 per return to the greater of $1,000 or 50 percent of the income derived (or to be derived) by the preparer.21

By elevating the preparer confi dence standards above the standards generally applicable to taxpay¬ers under the accuracy-related penalty provisions of Code Sec. 6662, the 2007 Act created a troubling potential for confl icts of interest between preparers and their clients. When the substantial understate¬ment penalty under Code Sec. 6662(b)(2) and (d) is asserted against a taxpayer, that penalty can be avoided (so long as the adjustment is not attribut¬able to a “tax shelter”) if the taxpayer can show that it had “substantial authority” for its reporting posi¬tion.22 Similarly, the negligence penalty under Code Sec. 6662(b)(1) and (c) generally does not apply if there is at least a reasonable basis for the reporting position.23 Accordingly, after the 2007 Act, taxpayers could take an undisclosed reporting position that fell between the “substantial authority” and “more likely than not” confi dence standards, but paid preparers could not prepare the return taking that position without disclosure. This placed preparers in the uncomfortable position of requiring disclosure to protect themselves from penalties, while disclosure was not required from their clients, whose interests were actually against disclosure to the extent it would increase their audit risk. This confl ict was particularly troubling in the context of return positions that had no tax avoidance purpose, but fell short of the “more likely than not” standard as a result of ambiguities in the tax law and the absence of published guidance or other “authority.”24 Increasing the penalty to 50 percent of the preparer’s fee only compounded the potential for confl ict.

1. Interim Guidance Under the 2007 Act

Although changes to the preparer penalty rules had been under consideration by Congress for many years, inclusion of these changes in the 2007 Act came as a surprise to many preparers and to the IRS.25 This, combined with impending return fi ling deadlines and the need for more deliberate consid¬eration of transition rules, led the IRS to issue Notice 2007-54 on June 11, 2007.26 With the exception of understatements due to willful or reckless conduct by a preparer, Notice 2007-54 effectively delayed enforcement the 2007 Act changes to Code Sec.
6694 until 2008, with additional guidance promised by the end of 2007.
On December 31, 2007, the Treasury and the IRS issued Notice 2008-13, providing substantive, interim guidance on the 2007 Act changes to Code Sec. 6694.27 Among its more signifi cant provisions, Notice 2008-13 provided an expanded view of what consti¬tuted “adequate disclosure” of a position that would trigger the lower “reasonable basis” confi dence stan¬dard, provided a defi nition of the “reasonable belief of more likely than not” standard, and provided lists of the types of returns that would, could, and did not subject paid preparers to penalties.
Of particular signifi cance, Notice 2008-13 ad¬dressed the potential confl ict between preparers and their clients by relaxing the “disclosure” require¬ment that triggers a lower “reasonable basis” con¬fidence standard.28 For “nonsigning” preparers who may never see or re¬view the return that their work is ultimately report¬ed on, Notice 2008-13 provided a number of alternative mechanisms to meet the “adequate disclosure” test, thereby trigger¬ing the lower reasonable basis confi dence standard. In addition to actual disclosure on the return or on the return as prepared, under Notice 2008-1 3, the adequate disclosure test could be met by providing “a statement informing the taxpayer of any oppor¬tunity to avoid penalties under Code Sec. 6662 that could apply to the position as a result of disclosure, if relevant, and of the requirements for disclosure.” If the substantive advice was given in writing, this statement was required to be given in writing. If the advice was given orally, the statement could also be given orally, as long as the return preparer “[c] ontemporaneously prepared documentation ... suffi cient to establish that the statement was given to the taxpayer.” This disclosure mechanism (which has come to be known as the “speech rule”) effec¬tively allowed return preparers, through the simple expedient of a “statement,” to avoid the confl ict that would otherwise arise when the taxpayer was not required to disclose the position on its return in order to avoid accuracy-related penalties (i.e., when the confi dence level for the return position was somewhere between “substantial authority” and “more likely than not”).2. June 2008 Proposed Regulations

Although legislation was quickly introduced to modify the confi dence standards imposed by the 2007 Act,29 with no assurance of passage, the Treasury and the IRS proceeded with publication of proposed regulations in June 2008.30 Those regulations gener¬ally followed the template set out in Notice 2008-1 3, but also added a number of detailed new rules to relieve some of the pressure created by the 2007 Act. Noteworthy provisions in the proposed regulations included the following:
One preparer per firm rule. Modification of the prior “one preparer per firm” rule, which provided that when a person associ¬ated with a firm signed a return, that person alone was liable for the preparer penalty arising from any understatement on the return, regardless of actual culpability. Similarly, when several persons at a firm worked on a return but none of them signed the return, the “one preparer per firm” rule provided that only the person with “overall supervisory responsibility” for the firm’s work was liable for the penalty, again regardless of actual culpability. The proposed regulations use the prior rule as a starting point, assuming that the signing preparer or supervisor is liable for the penalty. However, the proposed regulations then add to that rule a “position-by-position” analysis. This analysis supports holding someone at the firm other than the signing preparer or supervisor liable for the position (or positions) giving rise to the understatement if information is available showing that another person should appropri¬ately be held liable. This modification to the “one preparer per firm” rule permits the penal¬ties to be targeted at the culpable individual (or individuals) within a firm, taking pressure off of signing and supervising preparers.
Reliance. The proposed regulations incorporate an expansion of the “reliance” rule set forth in Notice 2008-13, permitting preparers to reason¬ably rely on information provided by the taxpayer, other preparers, or third parties. Under prior regulations, the “reliance” concept was limited to reliance on taxpayer representations.

Penalty computation. The 2007 Act included a substantial increase in the amount of the preparer penalty, raising it to a maximum of 50 percent of the income derived from preparation of the return giving rise to an understatement. In the context of nonsigning preparers, the increased penalty amount gave rise to concerns over how broadly the IRS would interpret “income derived.” The proposed regulations address this by focusing on a specifi c return preparation engagement (if there is one) and allowing targeted allocation of the income derived from the engagement to the specifi c activity giving rise to the understatement, thereby reducing the base from which the penalty amount is computed.

Adequate disclosure. The proposed regulations follow the model of Notice 2008-13 by includ¬ing an expansive defi nition of “disclosure” to trigger the lower “reasonable basis” confi dence standard—the so-called speech rule.

Defi nition of “tax return preparer.” Some of the more troublesome issues that arose from the changes made by the 2007 Act stem from the long-standing, broad defi nition of “return preparer” (or, prior to 2007, “income tax return preparer”), which sweeps into the scope of the statute a wide range of persons who may not ever see, or have occasion to see, the return on which their work is reported. These “non-signing” preparers are nonetheless subject to penalties of up to 50 percent of their fees. Not¬withstanding the pressure brought to bear by this broad defi nition, the proposed regulations do not narrow the defi nition, although they do expand several de minimis safe harbors so that persons performing work on relatively nominal reporting positions are carved out (assuming they can somehow determine that the positions are in fact nominal). The proposed regulations also create an important new safe harbor. Pre¬viously, any advice given after a transaction closed subjected an individual to the return preparer penalty provisions. With the new safe harbor, individuals who spend less than fi ve percent of their aggregate time on advice given after the transaction has closed are not considered return preparers.
The June 2008 proposed regulations were, in part, overtaken by legislation enacted later in the year, although most of the provisions remained relevant notwithstanding changes made by the 2008 Act.

C. Congressional Retraction in the 2008 Act and Implementing Final Regulations
From 1989 through 2007, tax return preparers could take comfort in knowing the confi dence standards that applied to them were lower than the standards applicable to their clients. The change in confi dence standards included in the 2007 Act reversed this situation, subjecting preparers to more stringent stan¬dards than their clients and raising the prospect of signifi cant confl icts, particularly in situations where the “substantial authority” standard was met but the preparer could not reach a “more likely than not” conclusion with respect to the reporting position.

1. Bush Administration’s Budget Proposal

Recognizing the serious problems created by the 2007 Act, the Bush Administration’s Fiscal Year 2009 Bud¬get Bluebook, released in February 2008, included a proposal to change Code Sec. 6694 to “conform [the] penalty standards between preparers and taxpayers.”31 The proposal called for lowering the preparer standard for undisclosed positions to the substantial authority standard generally applicable to taxpayers, except in the case of “reportable avoidance transactions” covered by Code Sec. 6662A.32 Under this proposal, although taxpayers are generally subject to a “more likely than not standard” if the transaction involves a “tax shelter,” preparers would be held only to the lower substantial authority standard for tax shelter transactions. The disparate treatment of tax shelter transactions recognized the over-inclusive defi nition of that term under the accuracy-related penalty rules of Code Sec. 6662 (i.e., “a signifi cant purpose” of tax avoidance). The proposal also recognized the prob¬lems that the taxpayer-specifi c subjective defi nition of “tax shelter” could create if incorporated into a third party’s (i.e., a preparer’s) penalty standard. Under the Budget proposal, the standard for disclosed positions would remain at “reasonable basis,” as adopted by the 2007 Act.

2. 2008 Legislation

Following the Bush Administration’s Budget proposal, legislation was introduced in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate to revise the con¬fi dence standards to address the confl ict of interest concern. More restrictive than the Administration’s proposal, the legislation introduced in 2008 in the House, H.R. 5719, and the Senate, S. 2851, retained
the “more likely than not” standard for “tax shelter” transactions where the taxpayer had a signifi cant purpose of avoidance or evasion of income tax. The legislative proposal to harmonize the taxpayer and preparer standards was later included in H.R. 6049, which contained, among other provisions, an extension of energy tax incentives and relief from the individual alternative minimum tax. Riding the coattails of the economic stimulus legislation that moved in the fall of 2008, H.R. 6049 and the proposal to again amend Code Sec. 6694 was included in a package of miscellaneous tax extender provisions and individual alternative minimum tax relief that was enacted as part of the stimulus legislation.33

As detailed below, the 2008 statutory change gen¬erally (but not completely) harmonized the taxpayer and return preparer penalty standards, thus address¬ing the troublesome gap between the substantial authority standard generally applicable to taxpayers and the return preparer standard. This general harmo¬nization was retroactive to May 25, 2007, although prospective changes were made by the 2008 Act subjecting a broad class of “tax shelter” transactions to the higher reasonable belief of more-likely-than¬not confi dence standard.

Table 3 summarizes the taxpayer standard and the evolution of the return preparer standard from May 2007 to current law.

3. December 2008 Final Regulations
The statutory changes made by the 2008 Act only modifi ed the confi dence standards for undisclosed positions under Code Sec. 6694, leaving unchanged the 2007 Act’s expansion of Code Sec. 6694 to cover all returns and to substantially increase the penalty amount. Accordingly, shortly after the 2008 Act passed, the Treasury and the IRS moved forward with fi nalizing the proposed June 2008 regulations to the extent that those regulations covered these and various other technical issues. Concurrent with publication of the fi nal regulations, the Treasury and the IRS released Notice 2009-5,34 which provided interim guidance on aspects of Code Sec. 6694 that were changed by the 2008 Act, including a defi nition of the new “substantial authority” standard. Notice 2009-5 also included interim guidance with respect to the elevated “reasonable belief of more likely than not” standard applicable to tax shelter transactions.

Open Issues and Concerns with the Current Preparer Penalty Regime

Recent legislative changes and administrative guid¬ance issued under Code Sec. 6694 have gone a long way in addressing some of the problems created by the 2007 Act, including the serious potential for confl ict between taxpayers and paid preparers. However, some of the administrative solutions to these problems, while perhaps justifi ed under the circumstances, have weakened the effect that the preparer penalty regime should have on improving compliance with the tax law. Since Congress contin¬ues to actively consider legislative measures to improve compliance and will likely return to the subject of paid preparers at some point in the near future, an ongoing discussion on recent and potential changes to Code Sec. 6694 is appropriate.

A. Application of Reasonable Belief of More-Likely-Than¬Not Standard to “Tax Shelter” Transactions

When enacted as part of the 1989 Act, the taxpayer accuracy-related penalty provisions in Code Sec. 6662 included special treatment for penalty defenses in the case of “tax shelter” transactions. Although the Code Sec. 6662(b) (2) penalty for substantial understatement of income tax could be avoided for an undisclosed position if there was “substantial authority” for that position, in the case of a “tax shelter” transaction, the confi dence standard was elevated in 1989 to reasonable belief of more likely than not. At the time, “tax shelter” was defi ned to include any transaction where “the principal purpose” was the “avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.”35 Since 1989, this “tax shelter” exception has been modifi ed on several occasions, most signifi cantly in 1997, when the subjective “the principal purpose” test was lowered to the current “a significant purpose” test, greatly expand¬ing the scope of the tax shelter carve out for pen¬alty disclosure defenses.36

Without a meaningful ex¬planation of “a signifi cant purpose,” this defi nition of tax shelter has proven problematic both because of its scope and because it turns on a taxpayer’s subjective intent.37 As the ABA Section of Taxation recently noted, when combined with ambiguous reportable transaction reporting rules, the undefi ned nature of “tax shelter” creates “imprecision and com¬plexity [that] impairs effective enforcement and does little to encourage compliance.”38 Absent a meaning¬ful defi nition of tax shelter, conventional wisdom among practitioners is to assume that a transaction involving even a marginal amount of tax planning, even if it is otherwise consistent with Congressional intent and imbued with meaningful nontax purpose and benefi ts, can be swept into the broad defi nition of tax shelter.39

Against this backdrop, incorporation of the Code Sec. 6662 defi nition of “tax shelter” into the preparer penalty statute by the 2008 Act raises a number of concerns. First, the defi nition is inherently subjec¬tive, turning on the taxpayer’s intent in entering into a transaction. While a paid preparer will often be aware of a client/taxpayer’s tax-avoidance motive, this will not always be the case. Since 50 percent of their fee is on the line, preparers uncertain of the client’s intent will have to assume that there is a signifi cant purpose of tax avoidance. With that assumption, the preparer must (with the caveatof the “tax shelter speech rule” in Notice 2 009-5 discussed below) be at a confi dence level of more likely than not, or the preparer cannot prepare the return. This raises a signifi cant concern in the context of the myriad reporting positions that fall short of a more likely than not confi dence level because of an ambiguous statutory provision and the absence of interpretive guidance. It is these very “uncertain” positions on which taxpayers should be encouraged to seek help from paid preparers. The tax shelter pro¬visions of Code Sec. 6694, however, seem to drive
taxpayers in the opposite direction, away from the professionals who are in the best position to un¬derstand them.

Second, the Code Sec. 6662 definition of tax shelter is an imperfect fi t for the preparer pen¬alty regime. As noted, the 2007 Act expanded Code Sec. 6694 to apply to all returns, not just income tax returns. Linking the heightened confi dence standards for “tax shelters” to Code Sec. 6662, however, appears to limit the heightened standard to income tax returns since the defi nition of tax shelter in Code Sec. 6662(d)(2)(C) is limited to transactions with a signifi cant purpose of avoiding “Federal income tax.” Thus, although preparers of excise, employment, transfer and other tax returns are now subject to Code Sec. 6694, transactions with a “signifi cant purpose” of avoiding taxes other than income taxes are not covered by the heightened confi dence standard otherwise applicable to “tax shelters.”
In Notice 2009-5, the Treasury and the IRS rec¬ognized the problem with applying a heightened preparer confi dence standard to tax shelters. Indeed, Notice 2009-5 acknowledges the long-standing defi - nitional problem under Code Sec. 6662 generally, noting that the Treasury and the IRS are currently “consider[ing] further guidance for tax return prepar¬ers and taxpayers on the defi nition of tax shelter for purposes of Code Secs. 6694 and 6662(d)(2)(C).”40 This may be a signal that the Treasury and the IRS are considering a more targeted interpretation of “tax shelter,” although the statutory reference to “signifi - cant purpose” of tax avoidance or evasion may limit the options for administrative relief.

As a stop-gap measure, Notice 2009-5 provides interim guidance on application of the heightened preparer penalty standard applicable to tax shelters. Specifi cally, Section C of the Notice provides that a position with respect to a tax shelter will not be deemed “unreasonable,” and in turn will not trigger preparer penalties, if (i) there is substantial author¬ity for the position, and (ii) “the tax return preparer advises the taxpayer of the penalty standards appli¬cable to the taxpayer in the event that the transaction is deemed to have a signifi cant purpose of Federal tax avoidance or evasion.”41 In order to meet this modifi ed “tax shelter speech rule” safe harbor and trigger the lower “substantial authority” standard, the preparer “must explain [to the taxpayer] that, if the position has a significant purpose of tax avoidance or evasion, then there needs to be at a minimum substantial authority for the position, [and] the taxpayer must possess a reasonable belief that the tax treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment.”42 As a practical matter, it is not clear how a taxpayer could form a “reasonable belief of more likely than not” when the preparer could not reach that confi dence level.
While this “tax shelter speech rule” is an understandable and pragmatic rule under the cir¬cumstances, it raises a number of issues. First, it has no basis in the statute, which unambiguously requires a “reasonable belief of more likely than not” confi dence level for tax shelters, allows for no disclosure or other exceptions, and provides no grant of regulatory authority to narrow its scope.43 In fact, the 2008 Act specifi cally rejected the Bush Administration’s proposal to apply the lower substantial authority standard to tax shelter transactions.44 In contrast, the “disclosure speech rule” included in Notice 2008-13 and incorporated in the December 2008 fi nal regulations triggered lower confi dence standards for disclosed positions, keying off the statutory reference to “adequate disclosure.”45 The “disclosure speech rule” also had precedent in regulations dating back to 1977, of which Congress was presumably aware when it enacted changes to Code Sec. 6694 in 2007 and 2008. The “tax shelter speech rule” included in Notice 2009-5 has no similar basis in the statute or in historical interpretation.
Second, the “tax shelter speech rule” arguably weakens the statute by easily permitting return preparers to take return positions on tax structured transactions at confi dence levels below 50 percent.

In balancing application of the heightened standard to a wide range of nonabusive transactions that lack a clear answer under the Code against the prophylactic effect the statute might have on truly abusive transactions (since it would arguably pre¬vent preparers from taking return positions at all), the Notice probably reaches the right result, but only through an unconventional path that is diffi cult to reconcile with the statute. A more reasoned ap¬proach would be for Congress to revisit application of the heightened “tax shelter” standard to prepar¬ers, recognizing the problem that Notice 2009-5 attempts to address.

Finally, the “tax shelter speech rule” is problem¬atic because it is either wrong as a matter of law or, at a minimum, misleading in contexts outside income tax. Specifi cally, Notice 2009-5 states that “if the position has a signifi cant purpose of tax avoidance” then the preparer must inform the tax¬payer that there must be substantial authority and a reasonable belief of more likely than not in order for the taxpayer to avoid penalties.46 As noted above, positions with a signifi cant purpose of avoiding tax other than income tax are not subject to the height¬ened confi dence standards of Code Sec. 6694, nor do taxpayers need to meet a heightened confi dence standard to avoid accuracy-related penalties with respect to non–income tax return positions. Notice 2009-5 links the “tax shelter speech rule” to the ac¬curacy-related penalty under Code Sec. 6662(d),47 which applies only to income tax, but it makes no mention of this statutory limitation in contexts out¬side income tax. Code Sec. 6694 is illogical in its application outside income tax and Notice 2009-5 serves only to compound the problems created b
y the statutory cross-reference to Code Sec. 6662’s defi nition of “tax shelter.”

B. “List” of Returns Subject (and not Subject) to Code Sec. 6694

Since its enactment in the 1 970s, the penalty imposed by Code Sec. 6694 has been limited to preparation of returns that refl ect an understatement of a tax liability.48 However, the defi nition of “return preparer” (and, before the 2008 Act, “income tax return preparer”) under Code Sec. 7701 (a)(36), to¬gether with the long-standing regulatory defi nition of that term, have broadened the scope of the penalty, keying off the statutory reference to preparation of a “substantial part” of a return. Thus, although Code Sec. 6694 itself is limited to preparation of
returns that refl ect an understatement, the defi nition of “preparer” sweeps in a wide range of persons whose work is incorporated into a return but who may never have occasion to see the return. Since the phrase “substantial part” is defi ned by the regulations only in very general terms (although the regulations do have narrowing safe harbor rules), nonsigning preparers often must assume that their work makes them a “return preparer,” potentially exposing them to penalties.
Although the expansive defi nition of “preparer” has been in the Code and regulations for many years, it created few problems when the confi dence standard for disclosed positions was at “reasonable basis.” When that standard was elevated by the 2007 Act to “reasonable belief of
more likely than not,” the large universe of non-signing preparers whose work is incorporated into a return grew understandably concerned that, without extensive diligence into exactly how that work is incorporated, 50 percent of their fees could be at risk. This created a particular concern for “preparers” of Forms 1099, W-2 and other infor¬mation returns, which are often generated in large volumes with little or no payee-specifi c diligence by the preparer. This issue remains a concern even after the standard for undisclosed (non–tax shelter) positions was lowered to substantial authority by the 2008 Act. Notice 2008-13 addressed this is¬sue on an interim basis by including as Exhibit 1 to the Notice a schedule of “returns” that report a liability and were explicitly included within the scope of Code Sec. 6694. The Notice also included, as Exhibit 2, a schedule of fl ow-through and other information returns that “may” subject a preparer to penalties. To address the concerns of preparers of information returns, Exhibit 3 to Notice 2008- 13 categorically excluded from Code Sec. 6694 (absent willful or reckless conduct under Code Sec. 6694(b)) a schedule of certain “pure” information returns such as Forms 1099 and W-2.

Consistent with the interim guidance provided in Notice 2008-1 3, the December 2008 fi nal regula¬tions identify (by reference to guidance published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin) “returns” that “will”(assuming other requirements are met), “may,” and “do not” subject preparers to penalties under Code Sec. 6694.49 Given the critical role that information returns play in compliance, the risk that preparers of such returns might drop that work out of a con¬cern for penalty exposure make inclusion of these lists (the “do not” list for information returns in particular) understandable. Permanently incorporat¬ing into the regulations the list approach of Notice 2008-1 3, however, raises several issues.

First, the list is both over- and under-inclu¬sive. Although it is not clear that Congress fo¬cused on this issue when enacting recent changes to Code Sec. 6694,50 the regulatory defi nition of “substantial part” can, in theory, sweep in per
sons who prepare a wide
range of documents and other information that do not carry IRS form numbers on them. For example, depreciation schedules, cost allocation schedules and other similar documents, assuming they relate to signifi cant items on a return, could make preparers of those documents preparers of a “signifi cant part” of a return. For the multitudes of accountants, book¬keepers, and others who do not think of themselves as preparing “returns,” but whose work is ultimately incorporated into a return (although not refl ected on a document with an IRS form number on it), the “list” approach does nothing to provide them with any indication of whether they will be considered a return preparer.

Moreover, some of the pure information returns that are carved out of Code Sec. 6694 (absent willful or reckless conduct under Code Sec. 6694(b)) may themselves be problematic and lead to noncompli¬ance. For example, a Form 1 099 issued under the preparer’s erroneous determination that a service provider is an independent contractor rather than an employee can lead to an obvious compliance problem, but Code Sec. 6694 has no application in this context.51 Similarly, the preparer of a Form W-2 that erroneously reports or omits deferred compen¬sation gives rise to serious compliance problems, but Code Sec. 6694 has no application, even if the issue is a “signifi cant part” of the employee’s Form 1040 income tax return.

In addition to the fact that the line between “re¬turns” that are and are not subject to Code Sec. 6694 is now somewhat arbitrary, the “list” approach is also problematic in that it requires regular updates and requires preparers to constantly check the Internal Revenue Bulletin simply to determine whether they “are,” “may be” or “are not” subject to penalties. This adds another layer of complexity to what should be a straightforward penalty regime.52

A better approach would be to revisit the broad defi - nition of “preparer” as including persons who prepare a wide range of documents that feed into a return but do not themselves refl ect an understatement of tax li¬ability. This broad defi nition already raises issues for other reasons, because preparers of these documents may never have reason to see the return to determine if the work they perform is a “substantial portion” of the reported (or unreported) liability.53 Narrowing the defi nition of “preparer” to include only persons who determine and control numbers actually reported on the return (whether they actually input those num¬bers or not) would go a long way to addressing this problem. This narrower defi nition of preparer could be accompanied by special add-on rules to ensure inclusion of partnership and other passthrough entity returns, and other special situations.
C. Reliance on Information Provided Regulations promulgated under Code Sec. 6694 have long provided that preparers may rely on taxpayer representations in preparing a return.54 Such reliance has been conditioned, however, on application of a due diligence standard precluding preparers from relying on information provided by a taxpayer that they know or have reason to know is inaccurate or incomplete. With the heightened pressure on preparers imposed by the 2007 Act, and taking into consideration the growing complexity of the tax law, the 2008 proposed regulations expanded and modifi ed the historical reliance rule in several ways.55 First, the proposed regulations permitted reasonable reliance on information provided by other preparers including, for example, preparers of prior year returns or preparers of separate schedules for a current year return. Second, the proposed regulations permitted reasonable reliance on representations by any third party—a rule which effectively subsumes the separate rule permitting reliance on other preparers. Finally, the historical rule permitting reliance on taxpayer repre¬sentations was qualifi ed in the proposed regulations with a prohibition on relying on information provided by a taxpayer with respect to legal conclusions on federal tax issues.
The December 2008 fi nal regulations retained the expanded reliance rule for information provided by other preparers and third parties. Responding to comments on the challenge inherent in dis¬tinguishing between taxpayer legal and factual representations, the fi nal regulations eliminated the proposed rule prohibiting reliance on taxpayer representations with respect to legal conclusions on federal tax issues. The fi nal regulations make clear, however, that the general due diligence standard must still be met.56

Growth in the complexity of the tax law since the reliance rule was fi rst promulgated in the 1 970s has led to increased specialization in the preparation of tax returns, warranting a broader reliance rule. Com¬plex returns of multi-national businesses often have numerous “return preparers” all around the globe and it would bring the U.S. return preparation process to a standstill if a signing preparer were required to reach a substantial authority (or, for tax shelters, a more likely than not) comfort level with respect to each of the numerous inputs to a complex tax return.

Contrary to the goal of an expanded reliance rule, the practical effect of the rule is to lower the confi - dence standard for the person ultimately signing off on the return. So long as the signing preparer was not aware of any problems with the inputs to the return (which will be rare, given that there is no ap¬parent obligation to inquire), that preparer can meet a high confi dence standard even if the reporting position itself stands on shaky ground.57 The three “diligence” examples included in the fi nal regulations are focused on individual taxpayers and do little to articulate a generally applicable rule, to say nothing of a rule targeted to complex returns of multinational businesses. Although the IRS may be able to pursue penalties against the third-party preparer (assuming the “substantial portion” test is met), doing so im¬poses a signifi cant administrative burden on the IRS, multiplies the number of preparer penalty inquiries, and has no practical effect if the third-party preparer is outside the United States. Moreover, the responsi¬bility of the IRS to proceed against either the signing preparer (on an assertion that reliance on a third party was unreasonable) or a third-party preparer, will be complicated by the fact that the IRS has the burden of production on preparer penalties.58 In the end, the broad reliance rule materially weakens the heightened preparer confi dence standards.

To address this weakness, consideration should be given to additional language that would better de¬scribe a general due diligence standard. One possible method for accomplishing this would be to require a basic inquiry by the signing preparer into the inputs to a return, helping to ensure that those inputs are reli¬able.59 This could include, for example, a requirement that the preparer ask who prepared each input, inquire as to that person’s familiarity with the issue covered, and ask about that person’s historical relationship with the taxpayer. In many cases, the preparer will already know the answer to these questions, in which case no additional burden would be imposed. In other cases, mandating such basic inquiries would impose only a minimal burden unless the answers to those inquiries cannot be determined, in which case the reliability of the input should be questioned in any event. A paral¬lel set of diligence standards could be required for items omitted from returns, an issue relevant mostly to individuals and small businesses that do not have the compliance backstop of audited fi nancial statements. These parallel diligence standards could include, for example, a basic list of questions targeted to particular compliance issues associated with particular returns such as offshore bank accounts, household employees and cash and in-kind income not otherwise reported on information returns. Most preparers already make some type of general inquiry along these lines, but there is nothing in the 2008 fi nal regulations that requires any targeted diligence unless the preparer “knows or has reason to know” that the information actually being provided is inaccurate.

D. One Preparer Per Firm Rule

In regulations promulgated in 1991 (after the 1989 Act), the Treasury and the IRS considered changing the “one preparer per fi rm” rule, which historically re¬quired that for both signing and nonsigning preparers, only one person would be on the hook for penalties. This led to obvious inequities in situations where, for example, a mid-level manager at a large accounting fi rm takes direction from a corporate partner on the proper reporting of a complex merger transaction that leads to an understatement. When the manager signs the return and has responsibility for all aspects of its preparation other than with respect to the merger transaction, under the prior regulations the manager was liable for the penalty, notwithstanding that the corporate partner was the culpable individual. While acknowledging the unfairness of this situation, in the 1991 regulations the Treasury and the IRS explicitly rejected a more targeted rule on the grounds that it would be too complex for the IRS to administer and lead to irresolvable fi nger pointing within a fi rm.60
As with the reliance rule, under the heightened confi dence standards and increased penalty amounts imposed by the 2007 and 2008 Acts, there were prag¬matic and equitable reasons for the Treasury and the IRS to revisit the “one preparer per fi rm” rule. In an effort to address the countervailing administrative burden, the December 2008 fi nal regulations adopt a rebuttable presumption that the signing preparer or supervisory nonsigning preparer is liable.61 This approach gives the signing or supervisory nonsign ing preparer the ability to escape penalty liability if they can make a showing that some other person within their fi rm was responsible for the position giving rise to the understatement.62

Qualifying the “one preparer per fi rm” rule is clearly the right approach under the new, toughened statute. It does, however, again illustrate the practical problem of Congress imposing heightened confi - dence standards and penalty amounts. The rebuttable presumption gives signing and supervising preparers another “out” from penalty liability, weakening the effectiveness of the statute and again suggesting that the changes made by the 2007 Act and the 2008 Act will not have their desired affect of improving compliance. A better approach might be to heighten the due diligence standards, as discussed in Part 3(C) above, or revise the defi nition of “return preparer” so that it does not apply to such a large universe of individuals within a fi rm, in which case relief from the historical one preparer per fi rm rule might not be necessary.

E. Juxtaposition of Preparer Penalty and Taxpayer Defi ciency Proceedings
As an assessable penalty, Code Sec. 6694 cre¬ates a procedural issue and potential for conflict since it can be assessed against a preparer long before the taxpayer “understatement” on which it is based is finally determined. In the typical case, one would expect the IRS to open an examina¬tion of a taxpayer’s return and, at the end of the audit, make a deficiency determination, adding accuracy-related penalties in appropriate cases. Near the conclusion of the taxpayer’s audit, the IRS would also open an examination of the preparer (or preparers) of the return or position giving rise to the understatement. Although the taxpayer would have the right (after exhausting administrative ap¬peals) to challenge the deficiency determination in Tax Court—thus delaying assessment—the pre-parer would not.63 Parallel taxpayer deficiency and preparer penalty refund proceedings could force the preparer into a difficult position of personally defending against a Code Sec. 6694 penalty at the same time that the taxpayer is defending the transaction on its merits.

Whether and to what extent this procedural is¬sue and potential for confl ict creates problems for taxpayers, preparers and the courts under the heightened penalty standards remains to be seen. The possibility for confl ict could be mitigated by ap¬propriate IRS coordination and exercise of discretion in bringing preparer penalty claims only in cases that truly deserve them, rather than as a tactical tool to drive a wedge between preparers and their clients.64 Should this become an issue, an alternative approach might be to consider amending Code Sec. 6501 to toll the assessment limitations period for Code Sec. 6694 penalties until after resolution of the underlying defi ciency proceeding. While this could delay resolution of the preparer penalty, it would ensure that the penalty is not imposed if the taxpayer prevails in its case. Even under current law, ultimate resolution will always be delayed, since Code Sec. 6694 mandates that the preparer penalty be abated if the IRS makes a fi nal determination “at any time” that the taxpayer did not have an understatement(i.e., regardless of whether the refund limitations period for the preparer penalty has expired).

Conclusion

Although compliance rates in the United States compare favorably with those in other developed countries, they can and should be improved. With unprecedented federal budget deficits and the political appeal of raising revenue from improv¬ing compliance rather than raising taxes or cutting spending, policy makers will continue to focus sig¬nifi cant attention in this area. Given the critical role that paid return preparers play in facilitating compli¬ance and the shortcomings of the current preparer penalty regime, new proposals to modify Code Sec. 6694 can be expected. Those proposals should be debated in the context of broader changes to the pro¬cedural rules in the tax law, including the taxpayer penalty regime and the over-inclusive defi nition of “tax shelter.” In an ideal world, they would also be debated in the context of broader tax reform and simplifi cation, since complexity is perhaps the larg¬est driver of noncompliance. Until that day comes, incremental improvements to the preparer and tax¬payer penalty regimes can and should be made. The fl urry of legislative and regulatory activity since 2007 is by no means the last word in this area.

ENDNOTES

* Helpful comments on and a review of this article were provided by Ronald L. Buch, Jr.
1 See New IRS Study Provides Preliminary Tax Gap Estimate, IR-2005-38 (Mar. 29, 2005), available at www.irs.gov/news¬room/article/0,, id= 137247, 00.html; see also Understanding the Tax Gap (IRS Fact Sheet), FS-2005-14 (Mar. 2005), available at www.irs.gov/newsroom/ article/0,, id= 137246, 00.html.
2 Congressional Budget Office, The Bud¬get and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2009–2019, at 1 (Jan. 2009), available at www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9957/01- 07-Outlook. pdf.
3 See, e.g., Heidi Glenn, Pay-Go Puts K Street on Guard, 2007 TNT 54-8 (Mar. 20, 2007).
4 See, e.g., Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures, at 6, JCS-02-05 (2005), available at www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf (detailing numerous proposals designed to improve compliance by “curtailing tax shelters, closing unintended loopholes, and addressing other areas of noncompliance in
present law”); Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2007 Revenue Proposals, at 123 (Feb. 2006), available at www.ustreas.gov/ offi ces/tax-policy/library/bluebk06.pdf (de¬tailing an expansion of the return preparer penalty to all tax return preparers).
5 See Government Accountability Offi ce, Paid Tax Return Preparers: In a Limited Study, Chain Preparers Made Serious Errors, at 1, GAO-06-563T (Apr. 4, 2006), avail¬able at www.gao.gov/new.items/d06563t. pdf (‘‘GAO Preparer Report’’) (noting that several hundred thousand individuals are authorized to practice before the IRS, while the estimate of unenrolled return preparers is as high as 600,000); see also National Taxpayer Advocate, 2007 Annual Report to Congress, Vol. 2, at 45, note 5, available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/arc_2007_vol_2. pdf (stating that there may be as many as 800,000 unenrolled tax return preparers).
6 See GAO Preparer Report, supra note 5.
7 See, e.g., Taxpayer Protection & Assistance Act of 2005, S. 832, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., §4 (2005).
8 T.D. 9165, 2005-1 CB 357 (effective date of
December 20, 2004).
9 In recent years, the IRS has seen a steady increase in its enforcement budget. Re¬cently passed legislation increased the IRS’s enforcement funding in fi scal year 2009 by $337 million over appropriated funding for 2008. See the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8), 123 Stat. 524 (2009). Additionally, the IRS’s enforcement budget grew by $93.5 million in FY 2008. See Department of the Treasury, Budget in Brief FY 2009, available at http://treas.gov/offi ces/ management/budget/budgetinbrief/fy2009/ irs.pdf.
10 Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-28).
11 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the changes to Code Sec. 6694 made by the 2007 Act would raise $82 million in revenue through 201 7, see Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimated Revenue Effects of the Tax Provisions Contained in H.R. 1591, as Passed by the Senate on March 29, 2007, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., JCX-22-07 (Apr. 4, 2007), a number that many believed would be dwarfed by the increased cost of complying with those changes.

12 Alternative Minimum Relief Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343), §506, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
13 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-239), §7732, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989); see also id., at §7721(a) (enacting taxpayer accuracy-related penalty provi¬sions, codifi ed at Code Sec. 6662).
14 Code Sec. 6694(a) (1988).
15 In this context, “disclosed” was defi ned to mean “disclosed as provided in Code Sec. 6662 (d)(2)(B)(ii)” which, in turn, meant “ad¬equately disclosed in the return or in a state¬ment attached to the return.” The concept of “disclosure” is discussed in more detail below, in the context of statutory changes made in 2007 and 2008.
16 Final regulations implementing the changes to Code Sec. 6694 made by the 1989 Act were released in 1991. T.D. 8382, 1992-1 CB 392, 394.
17 For a more detailed discussion regarding the background of industry ethical standards and return preparer regulation, see R. Pai &
C. Murphy, 2007 Amendments to Internal Revenue Code Section 6694 Raise New Is¬sues and Concerns for Taxpayers and Return
Preparers, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Oct. 31, 2007, No. 210, ISSN 1522-8800.
18 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, Study of Present-Law Penalty and Interest Provi¬sions as Required by Section 3801 of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (Including Provisions Relating to Corporate Tax Shelters), Volume I, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., at 153, JCS-3-99 (1999), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ getdoc.cgi?dbname= 1999_joint_commit¬tee_on_taxation&docid= f:57655.pdf.
19 See, e.g., Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown and Taxpayer Accountability Act of 2005, H.R. 2626, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005); Tax Shelter Transparency Act, S. 2498, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002); Community Solu¬tions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001).
20 See Code Sec. 7701 (a)(36)(A) (2006) (“[T]he preparation of a substantial portion of a return or claim for refund shall be treat¬ed as if it were the preparation of such return or claim for refund”); Reg. §301 .7701-15(b) (2006) (defi ning “substantial preparation”).
21 Code Sec. 6694(a). For understatements due to willful or reckless conduct, the 2007 Act increased the penalty to $5,000 or 50 percent of the income derived from such conduct. See Code Sec. 6694(b). Oddly, the maximum penalty is the same (50 percent of income derived) regardless of whether the position was “unreasonable” because the “more likely than not” standard could not be met (myriad positions, many of which have nothing to do with tax avoidance) or because of willful or reckless conduct by the preparer.
22 Code Sec. 6662(d)(2)(B)(i); Reg. §1 .6662-4- (a).
23 Reg. §1 .6662-3(b)(1) (“A return position that has a reasonable basis ... is not attributable to negligence”); see Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., Com¬parison of Joint Committee Staff and Treasury Recommendations Relating to Penalty and Interest Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, at 13, JCX-79-99 (1999), available at www.house.gov/jct/x-79-99.pdf (stating that “reasonable basis” generally has “at least a 20% likelihood of success if challenged”).
24 “Authority” in the context of taxpayer accuracy-related and preparer penalties is defi ned by Reg. §1 .6662-4(d)(3)(iii). See also Reg. §1 .6694-2(b)(2) (cross-referencing Reg. §1 .6662-4(d)(3)(iii)).
25 Dustin Stamper, Treasury to Address Preparer Disclosure Standard Changes, 115 TAX NOTES 1008 (June 11, 2007) (citing the statement of former IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb, who noted that he was completely surprised by the change in law).
26 Notice 2007-54, 2007-2 CB 12.
27 Notice 2008-13, 2008-1 CB 282. Con¬temporaneous with the release of Notice 2008-13, the Treasury and the IRS released Notice 2008-12, 2008-1 CB 280, which provided interim guidance on the preparer signature requirement in Code Sec. 6695 (also amended and expanded in the 2007 Act), and released Notice 2008-11, 2008-1 CB 279, which clarifi ed the immediate tran¬sition relief provided by Notice 2007-54.
28 Precedent for the relaxed “adequate dis¬closure” standard has been in the regula¬tions under Code Sec. 6694 since 1977. Specifi cally, former Reg. §1.6694-2(c)(2) (A) provided that a nonsigning preparer who could not meet the “realistic possibil¬ity” standard would be deemed to have “adequately disclosed” the position if the preparer’s advice “include[d] a statement that the position lacks substantial authority and, therefore, may be subject to penalty under Code Sec. 6662(d) unless adequately disclosed [by the taxpayer].” Reg. §1.6694- 2(c)(2)(A) (2007) (adopted by T.D. 7519, 1978-1 CB 391 (Nov. 17, 1977)).
29 See H.R. 5719, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (2008); S. 2851, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (2008).
30 73 FR 34560-01 (June 17, 2008).
31 Department of the Treasury, General Ex¬planations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2009 Revenue Proposals, at 93 (Feb. 2008), available at www.ustreas.gov/offi ces/ tax-policy/library/bluebk08.pdf.
32 Under the Budget proposal, reportable avoidance transactions would remain subject to the higher “reasonable belief of more likely than not” standard. Reportable avoidance transactions are defi ned in Code Sec. 6662A(b)(2) to include listed transac¬tions (identifi ed pursuant to Reg. §1.6011-4 (b)(2)) and other reportable transactions (defi ned under Reg. §1.6011-4(b)(3)–(b)(6)) that have a “signifi cant purpose” of avoid
ance or evasion of income tax.
33 Tax Extenders & Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343), §506, 122 Stat. 3765, 3862 (2008).
34 Notice 2009-5, IRB 2009-3, 309.
35 Code Sec. 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (1989).
36 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34), §1028(c)(1), 111 Stat. 788 (1997). See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in 1997, at 221-25 (“1997 Blue Book”) (Comm. Print 1997) (noting that the change in the tax shelter standard was intended to “improve compli¬ance with the tax laws ... by discouraging taxpayers from entering into questionable transactions”).
37 The Treasury and the IRS attempted to defi ne “tax shelter” in this context in now superseded regulations under Code Sec. 6112. See T.D. 9046, 2003-1 CB 614 (prior fi nal Reg. §301.6112-2(b)); see also Reg. §1.6662-4(g)(3) (circular defi nition of “tax shelter,” as including an item “directly or indirectly linked to the principal purpose of a tax shelter to avoid or evade Federal income tax”). The regulations under Code Sec. 6662 have remained unchanged over 10 years after Code Sec. 6662 was amended from “the principal purpose” to “a signifi cant purpose.”
38 ABA Section of Taxation, Statement of Policy Favoring Reform of Federal Civil Tax Penal¬ties, at 6 (Apr. 21, 2009), available at www. abanet.org/tax/pubpolicy/2009/090421state mntciviltaxpenalties.pdf.
39 See, e.g., Michael L. Sch ler, Effects of Anti¬Tax-Shelter Rules on Nonshelter Tax Practice, 2005 TNT 219-41 (Nov. 14, 2005) (noting that “almost any transaction that results in tax savings might be said to have a signifi cant purpose of tax avoidance”); Nathan W. Gies¬selman, A Signifi cant Problem Defi ning a “Signifi cant Purpose” and the Signifi cant Dif¬ficulties that Result, 2006 TNT 108-34 (June 5, 2006) (discussing the meaning within the context of Circular 230). Problems created by the expansive but undefi ned scope of “tax shelter” have been compounded by incorporation of the Code Sec. 6662(d)(2) (C) “defi nition” into other provisions of the Code. See Code Secs. 461(i), 1274(b)(3) (B), 7525; see also Code Sec. 6662A(b)(2) (B) (linking heightened penalty provision to transactions with a “signifi cant purpose” of tax avoidance).
40 Notice 2009-5, IRB 2009-3, 309 (empha¬sis added). The current Priority Guidance Plan lists a project under Code Sec. 6662, which could provide a vehicle for the Treasury and the IRS to revisit the broad defi nition of tax shelter, although sugges¬tions on how to better defi ne “signifi cant purpose” of tax avoidance have been few and far between. Department of the Trea¬sury, 2008–2009 Priority Guidance Plan

Waiting for the Last Word on Tax Return Preparer Penalties

(Sept. 10, 2008), available at www.irs. gov/pub/irs-il/2008-2009pgp.pdf; see also March 13, 2009, Letter from Alan Einhorn, Chair, Executive Committee, AICPA, to IRS (responding to Notice 2009-5 and urging “the IRS and Treasury to place a high priority on providing further guidance that includes a clearly defi ned, objective test for determining what constitutes a tax shelter”), reprinted in 2009 TNT 54-27 (Mar. 24, 2009).
41 Notice 2009-5, IRB 2009-3, at 310.
42 Notice 2009-5, 2009-3 IRB, at 310–11.
43 Thus, any guidance promulgated under this section would presumably be under the general grant of regulatory authority found in Code Sec. 7805.
44 As detailed in the Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2009 Revenue Proposals, at 93 (Feb. 2008), available at www.ustreas.gov/ offi ces/tax-policy/library/bluebk08.pdf, the Administration’s proposal called for the substantial authority standard to apply to all transactions, regardless of whether they qualifi ed as tax shelters. H.R. 5719 and S. 2851 rejected this proposal and included the heightened standard for tax shelters in the fi nal statute.
45 For nonsigning preparers, the “speech rule” in Notice 2008-13 reduced the required confi dence level under the 2007 Act from reasonable belief of more likely than not to the reasonable basis standard applicable to “disclosed” positions. Similarly, the “disclosure speech rule” in the December 2008 fi nal regulations reduces the required confi dence level for transactions other than tax shelters from substantial authority to the reasonable basis standard that remains applicable to disclosed positions. Reg. §1 .6694-2(d)(3).
46 Notice 2009-5, IRB 2009-3, at 310.
47 The penalty is actually imposed by Code Sec. 6662(a) and (b)(2), but Code Sec. 6662(d) provides the defi nition.
48 The limitation is imposed by Code Sec. 6694(a), which triggers the preparer penalty only in the case of an “understatement of liability” on a return or claim for refund.

49 Reg. §301.7701-1 5(b)(4) (referencing returns identifi ed in Internal Revenue Bul¬letin guidance).
50 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., Technical Explanation of the “Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007” and Pension Related Provisions Contained in H.R. 2206 as Considered by the House of Representatives on May 24, 2007, at 34 (Comm. Print) (May 24, 2007), available at httpi/waysandmeans.house.gov/ media/pdf/tax/JCT_description_of_tax_title_ in_HR_2206.pdf (referencing only employ¬ment tax, excise tax, exempt organization, and estate and gift tax returns and related documents).
51 Arguably the same “position” might be re-fl ected on the service provider’s income tax return or employment tax returns fi led by the service recipient, although application of the “signifi cant part” test of Code Sec. 7701 (a)(36) might exclude the nonsigning preparer of those returns from penalty ex¬posure, whereas it may not if the preparer were deemed a nonsigning preparer of the service recipient’s return.

52 The IRS has, in the short history of the “list¬ing” procedure, already been forced to make corrections to its list. See Notice 2008-46, 2008-1 CB 868 (updating the list of returns originally included in Notice 2008-1 3).

53 See Code Sec. 7701 (a)(36) for complete defi nition of return preparer.

54 Reg. §1 .6694-1 (e) (2007).

55 Proposed Reg. §1.6694-1(e) (2008).

56 T.D. 9436, 2009-3 IRB 268, 73 FR 78430, 78433 (Dec. 22, 2008) (“While th[e] phrase [prohibiting reliance on taxpayer legal representations] is removed from the text of the fi nal regulations, the tax return preparer nevertheless must meet the diligence stan¬dards otherwise imposed by this regulation in order to rely properly on information and advice provided by taxpayers or other individuals”).

57 In describing the general due diligence stan¬dard, the final regulations appear to require that the preparer make further inquiries only “if the information as furnished appears to be incorrect or incomplete.” Reg. §1.6694-1 (e)(1).

Labels:

Friday, June 26, 2009

IRS tax lien abuse

TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION






Additional Actions Are Needed to Protect Taxpayers’ Rights During the Lien Due Process







June 16, 2009



Reference Number: 2009-30-089





This report has cleared the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration disclosure review process and information determined to be restricted from public release has been redacted from this document.



Redaction Legend:

1 = Tax Return/Return Information

3(d) = Identifying Information - Other Identifying Information of an Individual or Individuals



Phone Number | 202-622-6500

Email Address | inquiries@tigta.treas.gov

Web Site | http://www.tigta.gov



June 16, 2009





MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER, SMALL BUSINESS/SELF-EMPLOYED DIVISION



FROM: Michael R. Phillips /s/ Michael R. Phillips

Deputy Inspector General for Audit



SUBJECT: Final Audit Report – Additional Actions Are Needed to Protect Taxpayers’ Rights During the Lien Due Process (Audit # 200930001)



This report presents the results of our review to determine whether liens issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) comply with legal guidelines set forth in Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) Section (§) 6320 (a)[1] and related guidance in the Federal Tax Lien Handbook. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration is required by law to determine annually whether lien notices sent by the IRS comply with the legal guidelines in I.R.C. § 6320.[2] This is our eleventh annual audit to determine the IRS’ compliance with the law and with its own related internal guidelines when sending lien notices.

Impact on the Taxpayer

After filing Notices of Federal Tax Lien, the IRS must notify the affected taxpayers in writing, at their last known address,[3] within 5 business days of the lien filings. However, as noted in previous audits, the IRS has not always complied with this statutory requirement and did not always follow its own internal guidelines for notifying taxpayer representatives of the filing of lien notices. Therefore, some taxpayers’ rights to appeal the lien filings may have been jeopardized, and others may have had their rights violated when the IRS did not notify their representatives of lien filings.

Synopsis

The IRS attempts to collect Federal taxes due from taxpayers by sending letters, making telephone calls, and meeting face to face with taxpayers. The IRS has the authority to attach a claim to the taxpayer’s assets for the amount of unpaid tax when the taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay.[4] This claim is referred to as a Federal Tax Lien, which notifies interested parties that a lien exists.

Our review of a statistically valid sample of 125 Federal Tax Lien cases determined that in all 125 cases the IRS mailed lien notices in a timely manner, as required by I.R.C. § 6320 and internal procedures. However, the IRS did not always follow its own regulations and internal guidelines for notifying taxpayers’ representatives of the filing of lien notices. For 8 (30 percent) of the 27 cases in which the taxpayer had an authorized representative at the time of the lien actions, the IRS did not notify the taxpayer’s representative of the lien filing. The IRS did not have an automated process that updated taxpayer representative information directly with the system that generates the lien notices.

When an initial lien notice is returned because it could not be delivered and a different address is available for the taxpayer, the IRS does not always meet its statutory requirement to send the lien notice to the taxpayer’s last known address. For 234 (83 percent) of 283 cases, employees did not research IRS computer systems for different addresses. We also identified 17 cases for which a new lien notice should have been sent to the taxpayer at the updated address because the IRS systems listed the address prior to the lien filing. The 17 cases could involve legal violations because the IRS did not meet its statutory requirement of sending lien notices to the taxpayer’s last known address.

In August 2007, the IRS decentralized the processing of undelivered lien notices by returning them to the employees or functions requesting the lien instead of returning them to a single location. This was done because employees were not always researching undelivered notices timely and the IRS believes that the originating employee is in the best position to address undelivered lien notices. However, instead of improving the process, the number of undelivered notices that were not timely researched increased from 33 percent in Fiscal Year 2008 to nearly 83 percent in Fiscal Year 2009. This occurred, in part, because management oversight was not adequate to ensure undelivered mail was worked timely. In addition, management did not have the information necessary to monitor the processing of undelivered lien notices, which are now being returned to over 450 locations throughout the country instead of 1 centralized site.

To provide a method of monitoring and reviewing undelivered lien notices, the IRS established procedures to enable employees and managers to determine the mail status of lien notices without Automated Lien System (ALS)[5] research. These procedures require employees processing undelivered lien notices to input a specific transaction code with an appropriate action code to the Integrated Data Retrieval System[6] to indicate the reason the lien notice was returned (e.g., undelivered, unclaimed, or refused). This would allow management to monitor and track the status of undelivered lien notices. Our test of undelivered lien notices determined that the IRS is not complying with this procedure. The transaction code and associated action code were not input to the Integrated Data Retrieval System for any of the 283 undelivered lien notices that we sampled. Management recognized this problem prior to our review and began corrective action by revising the Internal Revenue Manual to require employees to enter the undeliverable lien information into the Integrated Data Retrieval System. Because the corrective action occurred after the period of our sample cases, we are not making a recommendation to address this problem. We will assess the effectiveness of the corrective action in next year’s review.

Recommendations

To ensure taxpayers’ representatives receive lien notices, we recommended that the Director, Collection, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, establish an automated process that would systemically upload taxpayer representative information directly from the Centralized Authorization File[7] to the ALS. In addition, the Director, Collection, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, should determine why lien notices were not sent to taxpayers’ representatives in the cases where the lien was initiated after the upload of Centralized Authorization File information to the Automated Collection System was automated and take actions to correct the problem. Also, to ensure accurate notification of lien filings, we recommended that the Director, Collection Policy, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, establish an automated check of a taxpayer’s last known address in the ALS prior to printing a lien notice.

Response

IRS management agreed with all of our recommendations and is taking corrective actions. The Director, Collection, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, will determine the feasibility of establishing an automated process that would systemically upload taxpayer representative information directly from the Centralized Authorization File to the ALS and, if feasible, request and implement programming enhancements. The Director, Collection, also reviewed the cases we identified in this report and has taken appropriate corrective actions. In addition, the Director, Collection, will review current programming of the systems interfacing with the ALS to ensure that taxpayer representative notifications are sent to the ALS for each lien when multiple liens are requested and, if required, prepare and issue memorandums to system owners requiring programming corrections be initiated to ensure that a separate taxpayer representative notification is issued with each lien request. Further, the Director, Collection Policy, will determine if the ALS can accommodate Integrated Data Retrieval System real-time data exchange and, if feasible, initiate programming work requests. Management’s complete response to the draft report is included as Appendix VII.

Copies of this report are also being sent to the IRS managers affected by the report recommendations. Please contact me at (202) 622-6510 if you have questions or Margaret E. Begg, Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Compliance and Enforcement Operations), at (202) 622-8510.





Table of Contents



Background

Results of Review

Lien Notices Were Mailed Timely

The Internal Revenue Service Did Not Comply With Regulations for Notifying Taxpayer Representatives

Recommendation 1:

Recommendation 2:

Ineffective Working of Undelivered Lien Notices Resulted in Potential Violations of Taxpayers’ Rights

Recommendation 3:

Appendices

Appendix I – Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Appendix II – Major Contributors to This Report

Appendix III – Report Distribution List

Appendix IV – Outcome Measures

Appendix V – Synopsis of the Internal Revenue Service Collection and Lien Filing Processes

Appendix VI – Internal Revenue Service Computer Systems Used in the Filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien

Appendix VII – Management’s Response to the Draft Report





Abbreviations



ACS
Automated Collection System

ALS
Automated Lien System

CAF
Centralized Authorization File

ICS
Integrated Collection System

IDRS
Integrated Data Retrieval System

I.R.C.
Internal Revenue Code

IRS
Internal Revenue Service

SB/SE
Small Business/Self-Employed






Background



The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) attempts to collect Federal taxes due from taxpayers by sending letters, making telephone calls, and meeting face to face with taxpayers. The IRS has the authority to attach a claim to the taxpayer’s assets for the amount of unpaid tax when the taxpayer neglects or refuses to pay.[8] This claim is referred to as a Federal Tax Lien. The IRS files in appropriate local government offices a Notice of Federal Tax Lien[9] (lien notice), which notifies interested parties that a lien exists.

The IRS must notify taxpayers in writing of the filing of a Federal Tax Lien within 5 business days of the filing.

Since January 19, 1999, Internal Revenue Code Section (I.R.C. §) 6320[10] has required the IRS to notify taxpayers in writing within 5 business days of the filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien. The IRS is required to notify taxpayers the first time a Notice of Federal Tax Lien is filed for each tax period. The lien notice, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320[11] (Letter 3172), is used for this purpose and advises taxpayers that they have 30 calendar days, after that 5-day period, to request a hearing with the IRS Appeals office. The lien notice indicates the date on which this 30-day period expires.

The law also requires that the lien notice explain, in simple terms, the amount of unpaid tax, administrative appeals available to the taxpayer, and provisions of the law and procedures relating to the release of liens on property. The lien notice must be given in person, left at the taxpayer’s home or business, or sent by certified or registered mail to the taxpayer’s last known address.[12]

Most lien notices are mailed to taxpayers by certified or registered mail rather than being delivered in person. The IRS Automated Lien System (ALS) generates a certified mail list which identifies each notice that is to be mailed. The notices and a copy of the certified mail list are delivered to the United States Postal Service. A Postal Service employee ensures that all notices are accounted for and date stamps the list and returns a copy to the IRS. The stamped certified mail list is the only documentation the IRS has that certifies the date on which the notices were mailed. A synopsis of the IRS collection and lien filing processes is included in Appendix V.

Depending on employee access, lien requests can be generated using one of three IRS systems: 1) the Integrated Collection System (ICS), 2) the Automated Collection System (ACS), or 3) the ALS. A description of IRS computer systems used in the filing of lien notices is included in Appendix VI.

The IRS has increased the number of Federal Tax Liens it has filed to protect the Federal Government’s interest. As shown in Figure 1, the number of Federal Tax Liens increased sharply in Fiscal Year 2001, decreased slightly in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005, and has increased each year since then.

Figure 1: Number of Liens Filed From Fiscal Years 2000 - 2008

Figure 1 was removed due to its size. To see Figure 1, please go to the Adobe PDF version of the report on the TIGTA Public Web Page.[13]

The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration is required to determine annually whether, when filing lien notices, the IRS complied with the law regarding the notifications of affected taxpayers and their representatives.[14] This is our eleventh annual audit to determine whether the IRS complied with the legal requirements of I.R.C. § 6320 and its own related internal guidelines for filing lien notices. In prior years, we reported that the IRS had not yet achieved full compliance with the law and its own internal guidelines. This year, our statistically valid sample did not identify any lien notices that were not mailed in a timely manner. However, we identified potential violations of taxpayer rights because the IRS did not notify the taxpayer’s representative. Our review of a judgmental sample of undelivered lien notices found potential violations of taxpayer rights when the IRS did not use the taxpayer’s last known address. Figure 2 shows the percentages of potential violations of taxpayer rights we identified during our prior annual audits.

Figure 2: Potential Violations of Taxpayer Rights Based on Timely Notification

Figure 2 was removed due to its size. To see Figure 2, please go to the Adobe PDF version of the report on the TIGTA Public Web Page..

We performed our audit work in the Small Business/Self-Employed (SB/SE) Division Office of Collection Policy in Washington, D.C., and the Centralized Lien Unit in Covington, Kentucky, during the period August 2008 through January 2009. We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. Detailed information on our audit objective, scope, and methodology is presented in Appendix I. Major contributors to the report are listed in Appendix II.





Results of Review



Lien Notices Were Mailed Timely

Our review of a statistically valid sample of 125 lien notices from the ALS did not identify any legal violations with I.R.C. § 6320. I.R.C. § 6320 requires the IRS to notify taxpayers in writing, at their last known address, within 5 business days of the filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien.

The majority of lien notices are sent to the taxpayers via certified mail. In order to support the timely notification of taxpayers, IRS procedures require retention of the date-stamped copy of the certified mail lists for 10 years after the end of the processing year. This year, the IRS was able to provide proof for the timely mailing of all 125 lien notices in our statistical sample. This is an improvement over our last year’s audit, in which the IRS could not provide proof of mailing for 3 percent of sampled lien notices.

The Internal Revenue Service Did Not Comply With Regulations for Notifying Taxpayer Representatives

Taxpayer representative information is contained on the Centralized Authorization File (CAF)[15] that is located on the Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS).[16] Using the IDRS, employees can research the CAF to identify the types of authorization given to taxpayer representatives.

IRS regulations[17] require that once a taxpayer representative has been recognized as such, he or she must be given copies of all correspondence issued to the taxpayer. This applies to all computer or manually generated notices or other written communications. Employees responsible for making lien filing determinations are to ensure that all appropriate persons, such as those with a taxpayer’s power of attorney, receive a notice of the lien filing and the taxpayer’s appeal rights. Specifically, IRS procedures require that a copy of the notice be sent to the taxpayer’s representative no later than 5 business days after the notice is sent to the taxpayer when a Notice of Federal Tax Lien is filed.

The ACS and the ICS interface with the ALS. In January 2008, the ACS implemented a process that provides CAF information to the ALS during the upload of the lien notice information. When a lien request is initiated on the ICS or the ACS, the taxpayer representative information on these systems is sent to the ALS as part of the lien request, which then generates the lien notice and any taxpayer representative copies. For this upload to be effective, the taxpayer representative data must be current and be on the CAF as well as the ACS or the ICS. For example, if a taxpayer submits a Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative (Form 2848) to a revenue officer, the revenue officer must forward the Form 2848 to the Centralized Authorization Unit to ensure the representative information is input to the CAF. There is no interface between the ALS and the CAF, so representative information must be manually input to the ALS when a lien request is initiated on the ALS.

Our review of the statistically valid sample of 125 liens determined that 27 cases involved taxpayers with representatives authorized to receive notifications at the time the liens were filed. In 8 (30 percent) of the 27 cases, ALS records did not indicate that the IRS had sent copies of the lien notices to the representatives. Specifically:

Four of the eight liens were initiated in the ACS. ****(1, 3(d))**** The other three liens were initiated after the IRS automated the upload of CAF information to the ACS. IRS management indicated that a lien notice may not have been sent to taxpayer representatives because systemic problems may exist with the automated upload established in January 2008.
****(1)**** of the eight liens were initiated in the ICS. ****(1, 3(d))****
****(1)**** of the eight liens were initiated in the ALS. ****(1, 3(d))****
Taxpayers might be adversely affected if the IRS does not follow requirements to notify both the taxpayers and their representatives of the taxpayers’ rights related to liens. We projected that 45,554 taxpayer representatives may not have been provided lien notices, resulting in potential violations of the taxpayers’ right to have their representative notified of the filing of a lien notice.

In addition to this year’s results, Figure 3 shows the error rates reported on the notification of taxpayer representatives in our last three reports. While the error rate has been reduced from 76 percent in Fiscal Year 2006 to 30 percent in Fiscal Year 2009, the potential for violations still exist in nearly one third of all cases requiring taxpayer representative notification.

Figure 3: Error Rates Reported on Notification of Taxpayer Representatives

Fiscal
Year
Sampled Lien Cases Requiring Representative Notification
Sampled Lien Cases Not Receiving Representative Notification
Error Rate

2006
45
34
76%

2007
25
15
60%

2008
30
12
40%

2009
27
8
30%


Source: Prior and current year results of Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration tests of taxpayer representative notification.

In last year’s report,[18] we recommended that the Director, Collection, SB/SE Division, provide better oversight to ensure that employees notify taxpayer representatives of lien filings and computer enhancements are uploading power-of-attorney information as intended. Management agreed to establish taxpayer representative verification procedures for employees initiating liens. They also agreed to determine if the ACS and the CAF could include programming to match lien notice data with taxpayer representative data prior to sending lien requests to the ALS to ensure the Notice of Federal Tax Lien and the CAF had at least one matching tax period. This would ensure there was no potential for unauthorized disclosure. Management also agreed to identify any computer program enhancements to the lien process. These corrective actions were implemented before our sample selection. However, we did not identify any plans to enhance the automated processes, which would help reduce the number of taxpayer representatives who are not notified of lien filings.

Recommendations

The Director, Collection, SB/SE Division, should:

Recommendation 1: Establish an automated process that would systemically upload taxpayer representative information directly from the CAF to the ALS.

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed with this recommendation and will 1) determine the feasibility of establishing an automated process that would systemically upload taxpayer representative information directly from the CAF to the ALS and 2) if feasible, request and implement programming enhancements.



Recommendation 2: Determine why lien notices were not sent to taxpayers’ representatives in the cases where the lien was initiated after the implementation of the automated CAF process and take appropriate corrective actions to resolve the problem.

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed with this recommendation and has already taken corrective action by reviewing the cases we identified and taking appropriate corrective actions. They will also 1) review current programming of systems interfacing with the ALS with systems owners to ensure taxpayer representative notifications are sent to the ALS for each lien when multiple liens are requested and 2) if required, prepare and issue memorandums to system owners requiring programming corrections be initiated to ensure that a separate taxpayer representative notification is issued with each lien request.

Ineffective Working of Undelivered Lien Notices Resulted in Potential Violations of Taxpayers’ Rights

IRS procedures require that employees send another lien notice to a new address if 1) the originally mailed notice is returned as undelivered mail, 2) research confirms the original lien notice was not sent to the last known address, 3) a different address is available for the taxpayer, and 4) the address was effective prior to the lien notice filing. Employees are responsible for certain actions when notices are returned as undeliverable. For example, they should research the IRS computer system within 5 business days to ensure that the address on the original lien notice is correct. If the employee cannot find a new address on the computer system, the undelivered lien notice will be destroyed and a new notice is not issued.

If the address on the notice is not the last known address and a different address was in effect prior to issuance of the original lien notice, employees should issue a new notice to the better address. A new notice may be created by using an option in the ALS.

We selected a judgmental sample of 283 undelivered lien notices returned to the Cincinnati, Ohio, Service Center for the period November 18 through November 25, 2008. The sample included only returned mail identified as undelivered and did not include returned mail identified as refused or unclaimed. For these 283 notices, we reviewed computer system audit trails to determine whether IRS employees performed timely research to determine whether the addresses were correct on the originally mailed notices. Our results showed that employees are not timely researching IRS computer systems.

In 234 (83 percent) of 283 notices, employees did not perform required research of the IRS computer system for a different address within 5 business days of receipt of the returned notice. This is significantly higher than last year’s review in which employees did not timely perform the research in 33 percent of lien notices. Employees performed the required research within 5 days of receipt of the returned notice for the remaining 49 notices (17 percent).

Our test of undelivered lien notices identified 26 notices where the address on the IRS computer system and the original lien notice did not agree. For 9 (35 percent) of the 26 notices, the address on the IRS computer system was updated after the original lien notice was sent to the taxpayer. Per IRS procedures, no additional action was required. However, for 17 notices (65 percent), the address was updated prior to the issuance of the original lien notice and, according to IRS procedures, a new lien notice should have been sent to the taxpayer at the updated address. These cases could involve potential violations of taxpayer rights because the IRS did not meet its statutory requirement of sending each lien notice to the taxpayer’s last known address.

Lien notices are not sent to the most current addresses on the IDRS because, in part, the user guides and applicable procedures pertaining to the systems that generate lien requests are inconsistent in regards to verifying the current address of the taxpayer prior to preparing a lien. In addition, employees are not always following established procedures for verifying the current address of the taxpayer prior to preparing a lien request. Specifically, ACS procedures do not require the user to verify the taxpayer’s name and address prior to preparing a lien. In addition, the ALS does not perform an automated verification of the taxpayer’s last known address prior to printing the lien notice. Further, management oversight was not adequate to ensure that undelivered mail is worked appropriately. Management also indicated that the routing of the returned mail could have contributed to the cause of the untimely research of the undelivered mail (i.e., not within the required 5 business days of receipt).

In last year’s report, we identified similar conditions and recommended that the IRS provide better oversight to ensure that employees are properly controlling and processing returned mail as undelivered, researching computer systems for correct addresses, and resending lien notices. The IRS agreed to establish proper control and processing of undelivered lien notices and, in August 2007, revised its requirements to return undelivered lien notices to the employee or function requesting the lien. This corrective action was implemented before our sample selection. However, instead of correcting the problem, the number of undeliverable lien notices that were not timely researched by employees increased from 33 percent to nearly 83 percent. This may have occurred because employees were not following procedures designed to establish accountability and visibility in the decentralized environment.

Employees are not following new procedures designed to monitor undeliverable lien notices

In August 2007, the Director, Collection Policy, SB/SE Division, revised procedures for handling undelivered lien notices. The new procedures decentralized the processing of undelivered lien notices by returning them to the employee or function requesting the lien notice instead of returning them to a single location. To provide a method of reviewing undelivered lien notices, the Director, Collection, SB/SE Division, also established procedures to enable employees to determine the mail status of lien notices without ALS research. Specifically, employees handling undelivered lien notices are now required to input a specific IDRS transaction code with an appropriate action code. The transaction code and appropriate action code indicate the reason the lien notice was returned (i.e., undelivered, unclaimed, or refused). These codes are required to be entered into the IDRS after appropriate research of the returned lien notice is performed.

Our test of undelivered lien notices determined that employees are not complying with this procedure. None of the 283 undelivered lien notices that we sampled had the transaction code and associated action code input to the IDRS. Management believes that the requirements to enter these codes were not being enforced because, initially, procedures were not consistent. For example, ACS procedures for processing undelivered lien notices did not include any reference to the requirement. Management also indicated that the procedures may not have been clear.

Compliance with these procedures is important because it allows management to review the handling of undelivered lien notices. Undelivered lien notices are being sent back to over 450 Collection function groups throughout the country where the employees or functions that requested the liens are located. The combination of decentralizing the handling of undelivered lien notices and the failure of employees to update taxpayers’ data in the IDRS resulted in management’s inability to ensure and enforce the timely resolution of undelivered lien notices. This contributed to the number of undelivered lien notices that were not researched timely increasing from 33 percent in Fiscal Year 2008 to nearly 83 percent in Fiscal Year 2009.

Further, because employees are not following the procedures to enter the information into the IDRS, information about undelivered mail is limited to the employees working the undelivered mail. IRS management, including Accounts Management organization[19] employees and even Centralized Lien Unit employees, who have access to the ALS, do not have access to information on undelivered lien notices. As a result, Taxpayer Assistance Center[20] employees would not be able to answer taxpayer questions about their Federal Tax Liens.

Management was aware of this condition and issued a memorandum in May 2008 to remind Collection function employees of this requirement. However, an internal review in July 2008 found that transaction and action codes were not entered in all 63 cases the IRS sampled in its review. As a result, in January 2009, management revised Internal Revenue Manual sections specifying the requirement to enter information about undeliverable mail into the IDRS. This corrective action was taken after our sample selection and will be evaluated in next year’s review.

Recommendation

Recommendation 3: To ensure accurate notification of lien filings, the Director, Collection Policy, SB/SE Division, should establish an automated check of a taxpayer’s last known address within the ALS immediately prior to printing a lien notice. This automated check should include an increase in the frequency of updates of IDRS information to reach the ALS to provide more timely updates of taxpayer information.

Management’s Response: IRS management agreed with this recommendation and will 1) determine if the ALS can accommodate IDRS real-time data exchange and 2) if feasible, initiate programming work requests.



Appendix I



Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology



Our overall objective was to determine whether liens issued by the IRS comply with legal guidelines set forth in I.R.C. § 6320 (a)[21] and related guidance in the Federal Tax Lien Handbook. To accomplish the objective, we:

I. Determined whether taxpayer lien notices related to 125 Federal Tax Liens filed by the IRS complied with legal requirements set forth in I.R.C. § 6320 (a) and related internal guidelines.

A. Selected a statistically valid sample of 125 Federal Tax Lien cases from the ALS[22] extract of the 711,780 liens filed by the IRS nationwide between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2008. We used a statistical sample because we wanted to project the number of cases with errors. We used attribute sampling to calculate the minimum sample size (n),[23] which we rounded to 125:

n = (Z2 p(1-p))/(A2)

Z = Confidence Level: 90 percent (expressed as 1.65 standard deviation)

p = Expected Rate of Occurrence: 4 percent (prior reports 5% - 3%)

A = Precision Rate: ±3 percent

B. Validated the ALS extract by comparing the sampled records to online data from the ALS and by reviewing management system evaluations that covered reliability, completeness, and accuracy.

C. Determined whether the sampled liens adhered to legal guidelines regarding timely notifications of lien filings to the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or business partners by reviewing data from the ALS, ICS, ACS, IDRS, and the certified mail list.

D. Evaluated the controls and procedures established for transferring, storing, and safeguarding certified mail lists at the Centralized Case Processing function.

E. Determined whether taxpayers’ representatives were provided a copy of the lien due process notice by reviewing data from the ALS, IDRS, ICS, and ACS.

1. Reviewed IDRS screens for CAF indicators (Transaction Code 960) for all sampled cases.

2. Reviewed ALS history screens for accounts with CAF indicators to see if lien notices were mailed to taxpayers’ representatives within 5 business days of mailing the taxpayer’s notice.

F. Validated data from the ACS and the ICS by relying on the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Data Center Warehouse[24] site procedures that ensure that data received from the IRS are valid. The Data Center Warehouse performs various procedures to ensure that it receives all the records in the ACS, ICS, and IRS databases. In addition, we scanned the data for reasonableness and are satisfied that the data are sufficient, complete, and relevant to the review. All the liens identified are in the appropriate period, and the data appear to be logical.

G. Provided all exception cases to Office of Collection Policy, SB/SE Division, for agreement to potential violations and corrective actions if appropriate.

II. Evaluated the procedures for processing lien notices[25] that are returned as undelivered.

A. Selected a judgmental sample of unprocessed mail containing undelivered lien notices received during the period November 18 through November 25, 2008, and recorded the taxpayer’s name, address, Social Security Number, and serial lien identification number. The judgmental sample included only returned mail identified as undelivered. The population of returned mail identified as undelivered is unknown because the IRS does not record the receipt of undelivered mail. A judgmental sample was used for this reason and the test was conducted to show weaknesses for which management needed to take corrective action.

B. Researched the IDRS using command code INOLES and determined whether the address on the Master File[26] matched the address on the undelivered lien notice for each sampled case.

C. Reviewed IDRS audit trails and determined whether IRS employees timely performed the required IDRS research for resolution of undelivered status for each sampled case.

D. Reviewed the IDRS and verified whether the Transaction Code 971 and corresponding action codes were entered into the IDRS for each sampled case.

III. Determined whether internal guidelines had been implemented or modified since our last review by discussing procedures and controls with appropriate IRS personnel in the National Headquarters.

IV. Determined the status of ICS and ACS system enhancements and any problems encountered.



Appendix II



Major Contributors to This Report



Margaret E. Begg, Assistant Inspector General for Audit (Compliance and Enforcement Operations)

Carl Aley, Director

Timothy Greiner, Audit Manager

Meaghan Shannon, Lead Auditor

Janis Zuika, Senior Auditor

Stephen Elix, Auditor

Curtis Kirschner, Auditor

Jeffrey Williams, Information Technology Specialist



Appendix III



Report Distribution List



Commissioner C

Office of the Commissioner – Attn: Chief of Staff C

Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement SE

Deputy Commissioner, Small Business/Self Employed Division SE:S

Director, Collection, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S:C

Director, Collection Policy, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S:C:CP

Chief Counsel CC

National Taxpayer Advocate TA

Director, Office of Legislative Affairs CL:LA

Director, Office of Program Evaluation and Risk Analysis RAS:O

Office of Internal Control OS:CFO:CPIC:IC

Audit Liaison: Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division SE:S



Appendix IV



Outcome Measures



This appendix presents detailed information on the measurable impact that our recommended corrective actions will have on tax administration. These benefits will be incorporated into our Semiannual Report to Congress.

Type and Value of Outcome Measure:

· Taxpayer Rights and Entitlements – Potential; 45,554 taxpayer representatives may not have been provided Notices of Federal Tax Lien and Your Right to a Hearing Under I.R.C. § 6320 (Letter 3172),[27] resulting in potential violations of taxpayers’ rights (see page 4).

Methodology Used to Measure the Reported Benefit:

From a statistically valid sample of 125 Federal Tax Lien cases, we identified 8 (30 percent) of 27 cases for which IRS employees did not provide notice to taxpayer representatives, resulting in potential violations of taxpayers’ rights. In the eight cases, the ALS record did not indicate that the IRS had sent copies of the lien notices to the representatives. The sample was selected based on a confidence level of 90 percent, a precision rate of ±3 percent, and an expected rate of occurrence of 4 percent. We projected the findings to the total population provided by the IRS of 711,780 Notices of Federal Tax Lien generated by the ALS between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2008.

Type and Value of Outcome Measure:

· Taxpayer Rights and Entitlements – Actual; 17 taxpayers were not provided Letters 3172, resulting in potential legal violations of taxpayers’ rights (see page 7).

Methodology Used to Measure the Reported Benefit:

In a judgmental sample of 283 undelivered lien notices, we determined that the IRS did not send notices to the updated addresses of 17 taxpayers. Taxpayer rights could be affected because a taxpayer not receiving a notice or receiving a late notice might be unaware of the right to appeal or might receive less than the 30-calendar day period allowed by the law to request a hearing. In addition, taxpayer rights could be further affected when the taxpayer appeals the filing of the lien and the IRS denies the request for the appeal.



Appendix V



Synopsis of the Internal Revenue Service Collection and Lien Filing Processes



The collection of unpaid tax begins with a series of letters (notices) sent to the taxpayer advising of the debt and asking for payment of the delinquent tax. IRS computer systems are programmed to mail these notices when certain criteria are met. If the taxpayer does not respond to these notices, the account is transferred for either personal or telephone contact.

· IRS employees who make personal (face-to-face) contact with taxpayers are called revenue officers and work in various locations. The ICS[28] is used in most of these locations to track collection actions taken on taxpayer accounts.

· IRS employees who make only telephone contact with taxpayers work in call sites in Customer Service offices. The ACS is used in the call sites to track collection actions taken on taxpayer accounts.

When these efforts have been taken and the taxpayer has not paid the tax liability, designated IRS employees are authorized to file a lien by sending a Notice of Federal Tax Lien[29] to appropriate local government offices. Liens protect the Federal Government’s interest by attaching a claim to the taxpayer’s assets for the amount of unpaid tax. The right to file a Notice of Federal Tax Lien is created by I.R.C. § 6321 (1994) when:

· The IRS has made an assessment and given the taxpayer notice of the assessment, stating the amount of the tax liability and demanding payment.

· The taxpayer has neglected or refused to pay the amount within 10 calendar days after the notice and demand for payment.

When designated employees request the filing of a Notice of Federal Tax Lien using either the ICS or the ACS, the ALS processes the lien filing requests from both Systems. In an expedited situation, employees can manually prepare the Notice of Federal Tax Lien. Even for manually prepared liens, the ALS controls and tracks the liens and initiates subsequent lien notices[30] to notify responsible parties of the lien filings and of their appeal rights. The ALS maintains an electronic database of all open Notices of Federal Tax Lien and updates the IRS’ primary computer records to indicate that a Notice of Federal Tax Lien has been filed.

Most lien notices are mailed to taxpayers by certified or registered mail, rather than delivered in person. To maintain a record of the notices, the IRS prepares a certified mail list (United States Postal Service Form 3877), which identifies each notice that is to be mailed. The notices and a copy of the certified mail list are delivered to the United States Postal Service. A United States Postal Service employee ensures that all notices are accounted for, date stamps the list, and returns a copy to the IRS. The stamped certified mail list is the only documentation the IRS has that certifies the date on which the notices were mailed. IRS guidelines require that the stamped certified mail list be retained for 10 years after the end of the processing year.



Appendix VI



Internal Revenue Service Computer Systems Used in the Filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien



The Automated Collection System (ACS) is a computerized call site inventory system that maintains balance-due accounts and return delinquency investigations. ACS function employees enter all of their case file information (online) on the ACS. Lien notices requested using the ACS are uploaded to the ALS, which generates the Notices of Federal Tax Lien[31] and related lien notices and updates the IRS’ primary computer files to indicate that Notices of Federal Tax Lien have been filed.

The Automated Lien System (ALS) is a comprehensive database that prints Notices of Federal Tax Lien and lien notices, stores taxpayer information, and documents all lien activity. Lien activities on both ACS and ICS cases are controlled on the ALS by Technical Support or Case Processing functions at the Cincinnati, Ohio, Campus.[32] Employees at the Cincinnati Campus process Notices of Federal Tax Lien and lien notices and respond to taxpayer inquiries using the ALS.

The Integrated Collection System (ICS) is an IRS computer system with applications designed around each of the main collection tasks such as opening a case, assigning a case, building a case, performing collection activity, and closing a case. The ICS is designed to provide management information, create and maintain case histories, generate documents, and allow online approval of case actions. Lien requests made using the ICS are uploaded to the ALS. The ALS generates the Notices of Federal Tax Lien and related lien notices and updates the IRS’ primary computer files to indicate Notices of Federal Tax Lien have been filed.

The Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS) is an online data retrieval and data entry system that processes transactions entered from terminals located in campuses and other IRS locations. It enables employees to perform such tasks as researching account information, requesting tax returns, entering collection information, and generating collection documents. The IDRS serves as a link from campuses and other IRS locations to the Master File[33] for the IRS to maintain accurate records of activity on taxpayers’ accounts.



Appendix VII



Management’s Response to the Draft Report



The response was removed due to its size. To see the response, please go to the Adobe PDF version of the report on the TIGTA Public Web Page.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] I.R.C. § 6320 (Supp. V 1999).

[2] I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1999).

[3] The last known address is that one shown on the most recently filed and properly processed tax return, unless the IRS received notification of a different address.

[4] I.R.C. § 6321 (1994).

[5] See Appendix VI for descriptions of IRS computer systems used in the filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien.

[6] IRS computer system capable of retrieving or updating stored information; it works in conjunction with a taxpayer’s account records.

[7] The Centralized Authorization File contains information regarding the types of authorization that taxpayers have given representatives for various tax periods within their accounts.

[8] Internal Revenue Code Section 6321 (1994).

[9] Notice of Federal Tax Lien (Form 668(Y) (c); (Rev. 10-1999)), Cat. No. 60025X.

[10] I.R.C. § 6320 (Supp. V 1999).

[11] Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (Letter 3172 (Rev. 9-2006)), Cat. No. 26767I.

[12] The last known address is that one shown on the most recently filed and properly processed tax return, unless the IRS received notification of a different address.

[13] The IRS Data Book is published annually by the IRS and contains statistical tables and organizational information on a fiscal year basis.

[14] I.R.C. § 7803(d)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1999).

[15] The CAF contains information about the type of authorizations taxpayers have given their representatives for their tax returns.

[16] IRS computer system capable of retrieving or updating stored information; it works in conjunction with a taxpayer’s account records.

[17] 26 Code of Federal Regulations § 601.506.

[18] Fiscal Year 2008 Statutory Review of Compliance With Lien Due Process Procedures (Reference

Number 2008-30-082, dated March 27, 2008).

[19] The Accounts Management organization is responsible for providing taxpayers with information on the status of their returns, refunds, and for resolving the majority of issues and questions to settle their accounts.

[20] IRS offices with employees who answer questions, provide assistance, and resolve account-related issues for taxpayers face to face.

[21] I.R.C. § 6320 (Supp. V 1999).

[22] See Appendix VI for descriptions of IRS computer systems used in the filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien.

[23] The formula n = (Z2 p(1-p))/(A2) is from Sawyer’s Internal Auditing - The Practice of Modern Internal Auditing, 4th Edition, pp. 462-464.

[24] A centralized storage and administration of files that provide data and data access services to IRS data.

[25] Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (Letter 3172 (Rev. 9-2006)), Cat. No. 26767I.

[26] The IRS database that stores various types of taxpayer account information. This database includes individual, business, and employee plans and exempt organizations data.

[27] Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under I.R.C. 6320 (Letter 3172 (Rev. 9-2006)), Cat. No. 26767I.

[28] See Appendix VI for detailed descriptions of IRS computer systems used in the filing of Notices of Federal Tax Lien.

[29] Notice of Federal Tax Lien (Form 668(Y) (c); (Rev. 10-1999)), Cat. No. 60025X.

[30] Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (Letter 3172 (Rev. 9-2006)), Cat. No. 26767I.

[31] Notice of Federal Tax Lien (Form 668(Y) (c); (Rev. 10-1999)), Cat. No. 60025X.

[32] A campus is the data processing arm of the IRS. The campuses process paper and electronic submissions, correct errors, and forward data to the Computing Centers for analysis and posting to taxpayer accounts.

[33] The Master File is the IRS database that stores various types of taxpayer account information. This database includes individual, business, and employee plans and exempt organizations data.

Labels:

Thursday, June 25, 2009

fraudulent transfer case

United States of America, Plaintiff v. Alvin A. Tolbert, Roberta Sue Tolbert, A&R Equity Holdings, Defendants.

U.S. District Court, West. Dist. Ark., Fayetteville Div.; Civ.06-5146, September 13, 2007.

[

Validity of Tax Assessments


4. IRS certificates of assessments for unpaid taxes are sufficient evidence to establish the validity of the assessments and support a summary judgment reducing those assessments to a judgment in favor of the Government. See United States v. Gerards, 999 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8 Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 th U.S. 1193 (1994); United States v. Meisner, 2007 W.L. 203950, *2 (D. Neb. Jan. 25, 2007). In an action to reduce federal tax assessments to judgment, certificates of assessments offered by the Government establish the Government's prima facie case and shift to the taxpayer the burden of proving that the IRS tax assessments are incorrect. See Mattingly v. United States [ 91-1 USTC ¶50,068], 924 F.2d 785, 787 (8 Cir. 1991); Kiesel v. United States [ 77-1 USTC ¶9101], 545 F.2d 1144, 1146 (8 Cir. 1976); Meisner, 2007 W.L. 203950, * 2. th

5. The Government has submitted Certified Form 4340 Certificates of Assessments for Mr. Tolbert's income tax liabilities for the years 1992 through 2002. In response, Mr. Tolbert has submitted copies of IRS 1040 Forms which he completed on August 7, 2007, indicating that he had no wages for the years in question. In an affidavit attached to the forms, Mr. Tolbert explains:
arly meritless. Mr. Tolbert has submitted nothing of substance to challenge the accuracy of the
Attachment of Tax Liens to the Property and Fraudulent Transfer


8. If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay it after demand, the amount owing "shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." 26 U.S.C. §6321. The lien "shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the liability for the amount so assessed . . . is satisfied." 26 U.S.C. §6322. Thus, on the dates of the assessments for the tax years in question, federal tax liens attached to all of Mr. Tolbert's property.

9. The Government may collect the tax debts of a taxpayer from property that has been fraudulently transferred to another. See United States v. Scherping [ 99-2 USTC ¶50,758], 187 F.3d 796, 804-06(8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1162 (2000). The Government argues that the conveyance of the subject property from the Tolberts to A & R Equity was a fraudulent conveyance and that the property is therefore subject to the tax liens.

Whether a conveyance may be set aside as fraudulent is determined in accordance with state law. Id. at 804. Under Arkansas law, a transfer of property by a debtor is considered fraudulent if the debtor made the transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. See Ark. Code Ann. §4-59-204(a)(1). The factors to be considered in determining the intent to defraud include whether:
* the transfer was to an insider;

* the debtor retained possession or control of the property after the transfer;

* the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred;

* the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; and

* the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the property transferred.

See Ark. Code Ann. §4-59-204(b).

10. In the present case, the Tolberts transferred title to the subject property to A & R Equity approximately two months after the IRS sent its first notice to Mr. Tolbert regarding his failure to pay taxes. While the value of the property is in excess of $100,000.00, A & R Equity paid only $10.00 to acquire title to the property. Further, Mr. and Mrs. Tolbert are the sole beneficiaries of the A & R (which stands for Alvin and Roberta Tolbert) Equity trust, the trustee is unknown, and the address for the entity is the Tolberts' residential address. Even more significant is the fact that the Tolberts have continued to reside at the property, have continued to pay the mortgage, taxes, and other bills on the property, and they do not have a lease agreement or pay rent on the property to A & R Equity.

These circumstances clearly demonstrate that title to the subject property was fraudulently conveyed to A & R Equity in an attempt to avoid tax liens attaching to the property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the transfer should be set aside and that the property is subject to the tax liens. 3

Labels:

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

Tax HKavens and International Tax Avoidance

Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, June 5, 2009

June 24, 2009

111th CongressCongressional

Research Service



Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion

Jane G. Gravelle

Senior Specialist in Economic Policy

June 5, 2009

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

R40623

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress



Summary

The federal government loses both individual and corporate income tax revenue from the shifting of profits and income into low-tax countries, often referred to as tax havens. The revenue losses from this tax avoidance and evasion are difficult to estimate, but some have suggested that the annual cost of offshore tax abuses may be around $100 billion per year. International tax avoidance can arise from large multinational corporations who shift profits into low-tax foreign subsidiaries or wealthy individual investors who set up secret bank accounts in tax haven countries.

Recent actions by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the G-20 industrialized nations have targeted tax haven countries, focusing primarily on evasion issues. There are also a number of legislative proposals that address these issues including the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (S. 506, H.R. 1265); draft proposals by the Senate Finance Committee; two other related bills, S. 386 and S. 569; and a proposal by President Obama.

Multinational firms can artificially shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions using a variety of techniques, such as shifting debt to high-tax jurisdictions. Since tax on the income of foreign subsidiaries (except for certain passive income) is deferred until repatriated, this income can avoid current U.S. taxes and perhaps do so indefinitely. The taxation of passive income (called Subpart F income) has been reduced, perhaps significantly, through the use of "hybrid entities" that are treated differently in different jurisdictions. The use of hybrid entities was greatly expanding by a new regulation (termed "check-the-box") introduced in the late 1990s that had unintended consequences for foreign firms. In addition, earnings from income that is taxed can often be shielded by foreign tax credits on other income. On average very little tax is paid on the foreign source income of U.S. firms. Ample evidence of a significant amount of profit shifting exists, but the revenue cost estimates vary from about $10 billion to $60 billion per year.

Individuals can evade taxes on passive income, such as interest, dividends, and capital gains, by not reporting income earned abroad. In addition, since interest paid to foreign recipients is not taxed, individuals can also evade taxes on U.S. source income by setting up shell corporations and trusts in foreign haven countries to channel funds. There is no general third party reporting of income as is the case for ordinary passive income earned domestically; the IRS relies on qualified intermediaries (QIs)who certify nationality without revealing the beneficial owners. Estimates of the cost of individual evasion have ranged from $40 billion to $70 billion.

Most provisions to address profit shifting by multinational firms would involve changing the tax law: repealing or limiting deferral, limiting the ability of the foreign tax credit to offset income, addressing check-the-box, or even formula apportionment. President Obama's proposals include a proposal to disallow overall deductions and foreign tax credits for deferred income and restrictions on the use of hybrid entities. Provisions to address individual evasion include increased information reporting, and provisions to increase enforcement, such as shifting the burden of proof to the taxpayer, increased penalties, and increased resources. Individual tax evasion is the main target of the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act and the Senate Finance Committee proposals; some revisions are also included in President Obama's plan.



Contents

Where Are the Tax Havens?


Formal Lists of Tax Havens



Developments in the OECD Tax Haven List



Other Jurisdictions With Tax Haven Characteristics


Methods of Corporate Tax Avoidance


Allocation of Debt and Earnings Stripping



Transfer Pricing



Contract Manufacturing



Check-the-Box, Hybrid Entities, and Hybrid Instruments



Cross Crediting and Sourcing Rules for Foreign Tax Credits


The Magnitude of Corporate Profit Shifting


Evidence on the Scope of Profit Shifting



Estimates of the Cost and Sources of Corporate Tax Avoidance



Importance of Different Profit Shifting Techniques


Methods of Avoidance and Evasion by Individuals


Tax Provisions Affecting the Treatment of Income by Individuals



Limited Information Reporting Between Jurisdictions



U.S. Collection of Information on U.S. Income and Qualified Intermediaries



European Union Savings Directive


Estimates of the Revenue Cost of Individual Tax Evasion

Alternative Policy Options to Address Corporate Profit Shifting


Broad Changes to International Tax Rules



Repeal Deferral



Targeted or Partial Elimination of Deferral



Allocation of Deductions and Credits with Respect to Deferred Income/Restrictions on Cross Crediting



Formula Apportionment



Eliminate Check the Box, Hybrid Entities, and Hybrid Instruments; Foreign Tax Credit Splitting From Income



Narrower Provisions Affecting Multinational Profit Shifting



Tighten Earnings Stripping Rules



Foreign Tax Credits: Source Royalties as Domestic Income for Purposes of the Foreign Tax Credit Limit, Or Create Separate Basket; Eliminate Title Passage Rule; Restrict Credits for Taxes Producing an Economic Benefit



Transfer pricing



Codify Economic Substance Doctrine



Prevent Dividend Repatriation Through Reorganizations


Options to Address Individual Evasion


Information Reporting



Multilateral Information Sharing or Withholding; International Cooperation



Expanding Bilateral Information Exchange



Unilateral Approaches: Withholding/Refund Approach; Increased Information Reporting Requirements



Other Measures That Might Improve Compliance



Incentives/Sanctions for Tax Havens



Revise the and Strengthen the Qualified Intermediary (QI)Program



Placing the Burden of Proof on the Taxpayer



Treat Shell Corporations as U.S. Firms



Impose Restrictions on Foreign Trusts



Treat Dividend Equivalents as Dividends



Extend the Statute of Limitations



Greater Resources for the Internal Revenue Service to Focus on Offshore



Make Civil Cases Public as a Deterrent



Revise Rules for FBAR (Foreign Bank Account Report)



Joe Doe Summons



Strengthening of Penalties



Address Tax Shelters; Codify Economic Substance Doctrine



Regulate the Rules Used by States to Permit Incorporation



Make Suspicious Activity Reports Available to Civil Side of IRS


Summary of Legislative Proposals


President Obama's International Tax Proposals



Provisions Affecting Multinational Corporations and Other Tax Law Changes



Provision Relating to Individual Tax Evasion



Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506 and H.R. 1265



Finance Committee Proposal



Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, S. 386



Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 569




Tables

Table 1. Countries Listed on Various Tax Haven Lists

Table 2. U.S. Company Foreign Profits Relative to GDP, G-7

Table 3. U.S. Foreign Company Profits Relative to GDP, Larger Countries (GDP At Least $10 billion) on Tax Haven Lists and the Netherlands

Table 4. U.S. Foreign Company Profits Relative to GDP, Small Countries On Tax Haven Lists

Table 5. Source of Dividends from "Repatriation Holiday": Countries Accounting for at Least 1% of Dividends



Contacts

Author Contact Information

The federal government loses both individual and corporate income tax revenue from the shifting of profits and income into low-tax countries. The revenue losses from this tax avoidance and evasion are difficult to estimate, but some have suggested that the annual cost of offshore tax abuses may be around $100 billion per year. 1 International tax avoidance can arise from wealthy individual investors and from large multinational corporations; it can reflect both legal and illegal actions.

Tax avoidance is sometimes used to refer to a legal reduction in taxes, while evasion refers to tax reductions that are illegal. Both types are discussed in this report, although the dividing line is not entirely clear. A multinational firm that constructs a factory in Ireland rather than in the United States to take advantage of low Irish corporate tax rates is engaged in avoidance, while a U.S. citizen who sets up a secret bank account in the Caribbean and does not report the interest income is engaged in evasion. There are, however, many activities, particularly by corporations, that are often referred to as avoidance but could be classified as evasion. One example is transfer pricing, where firms charge low prices for sales to low-tax affiliates but pay high prices for purchases from them. If these prices, which are supposed to be at arms-length, are set at an artificial level, then this activity might be viewed by some as evasion, even if such pricing is not overturned in court because evidence to establish pricing is not available.

Most of the international tax reduction of individuals reflects evasion, and this amount has been estimated to range from about $40 billion to about $70 billion a year. 2 This evasion occurs in part because the U.S. does not withhold tax on many types of passive income (such as interest) paid to foreign entities; if U.S. individuals can channel their investments through a foreign entity and do not report the holdings of these assets on their tax returns, they evade a tax that they are legally required to pay. In addition, individuals investing in foreign assets may not report income from them.

Corporate tax reductions arising from profit shifting have also been estimated As discussed below, estimates of the revenue losses from corporate profit shifting vary substantially, ranging from about $10 billion to about $60 billion.

In addition to differentiating between individual and corporate activities, and evasion and avoidance, there are also variations in the features used to characterize tax havens. Some restrictive definitions would limit tax havens to those countries that, in addition to having low or non-existent tax rates on some types of income, also have such other characteristics as the lack of transparency, bank secrecy and the lack of information sharing, and requiring little or no economic activity for an entity to obtain legal status. A definition incorporating compounding factors such as these was used by the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) in their tax shelter initiative. Others, particularly economists, might characterize as a tax haven any low-tax country with a goal of attracting capital, or simply any country that has low or non-existent taxes. We address tax havens in their broader sense as well as in their narrower sense in this report.

While international tax avoidance can be differentiated by whether it is associated with individuals or corporations, whether it is illegal evasion or legal avoidance, and whether it arises in a tax haven narrowly defined or broadly defined, it can also be characterized by what measures might be taken to reduce this loss. In general, revenue losses from individual taxes are more likely to be associated with evasion and more likely to be associated with narrowly defined tax havens, while corporate tax avoidance occurs in both narrowly and broadly defined tax havens and can arise from either legal avoidance or illegal evasion. Evasion is often a problem of lack of information, and remedies may include resources for enforcement, along with incentives and sanctions designed to increase information sharing, and possibly a move towards greater withholding. Avoidance may be more likely to be remedied with changes in the tax code.

Several legislative proposals have been advanced that address international tax issues. President Obama has proposed several international corporate tax revisions which relate to multinational corporations, including profit shifting, as well as individual tax evasion. Some of these provisions had earlier been included in a bill introduced in the 110 th Congress by Chairman Rangel of the Ways and Means Committee (H.R. 3970). The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has been engaged in international tax investigations since 2001, holding hearings proposing legislation. 3 In the 11 th Congress, the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, has been introduced by the Chairman of that committee, Senator Levin, with a companion bill, H.R. 1265, introduced by Representative Doggett. The Senate Finance Committee also has circulated draft proposals addressing individual tax evasion issues. S. 386, introduced by Chairman Leahy of the Senate Judiciary Committee, would expand the money-laundering provisions to include tax evasion, and provide additional funding for the tax division of the Justice Department. S. 569, also introduced by Chairman Levin, would impose requirements on the states for determination of beneficial owners of corporations formed under their laws. This proposal has implications for the potential use of incorporation in certain states as a part of an international tax haven plan.

The first section of this report reviews what countries might be considered tax havens, including a discussion of the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) initiatives and lists. The next two sections discuss, in turn, the corporate profit-shifting mechanisms and evidence on the existence and magnitude of profit shifting activity. The following two sections provide the same analysis for individual tax evasion. The report concludes with overviews of alternative policy options and a summary of specific legislative proposals.



Where Are the Tax Havens?

There is no precise definition of a tax haven. The OECD initially defined the following features of tax havens: no or low taxes, lack of effective exchange of information, lack of transparency, and no requirement of substantial activity. 4 Other lists have been developed in legislative proposals and by researchers. There are also a number of other jurisdictions that have been identified as having tax haven characteristics.



Formal Lists of Tax Havens

The OECD created an initial list of tax havens in 2000. A similar list was used in S. 396, introduced in the 110 th Congress, which would treat firms incorporated in certain tax havens as domestic companies; the only difference between this list and the OECD list was the exclusion of the U.S. Virgin Islands from the list in S. 396. Legislation introduced in the 111 th Congress to address tax haven abuse (S. 506, H.R. 1265) uses a different list taken from IRS court filings, but has many countries in common. The definition by the OECD excluded low- tax jurisdictions, some of which are OECD members, that were thought by many to be tax havens, such as Ireland and Switzerland. These countries were included in an important study of tax havens by Hines and Rice. 5 GAO also provided a list. 6

Table 1 lists the countries that appear on various lists, arranged by geographic location. These tax havens tend to be concentrated in certain areas, including the Caribbean and West Indies and Europe, locations close to large developed countries. There are 50 altogether.


Table I. Countries Listed on Various Tax Haven Lists





____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Caribbean/West Indies Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, d,e British
Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, a
Netherlands Antilles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
Grenadines, Turks and Caicos, U.S. Virgin Islands a,e

Central America Belize, e Costa Rica, b,c Panama e

Coast of East Asia Hong Kong, a,b,e Macau, a,b,e Singapore b,e

Europe/Mediterranean Andorra, a Channel Islands (Guernsey and Jersey), e Cyprus, e
Gibralter, Isle of Man, e Ireland, a,b,e Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
a,b Malta, e Monaco, a San Marino, a,e Switzerland a,b

Indian Ocean Maldives, a,d,e Mauritius, a,c,e Seychelles a,e

Middle East Bahrain, Jordan, a,b,e Lebanon a,b,e

North Atlantic Bermuda

Pacific, South Pacific Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, a Samoa, Nauru, c Niue, a,c Tonga,
a,c,d,e Vanuatu

West Africa Liberia

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Sources: Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), Towards Global Tax
Competition , 2000; Dhammika Dharmapala and James R. Hines, "Which Countries Become Tax Havens?"
December 2006; Tax Justice Network, "Identifying Tax Havens and Offshore Finance Centers:
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/ldentifying_Tax_Havens_Jul_07.pdf. The OECD's "gray" list
as of April 2, 2009 is posted at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/14/42497950.pdf. The countries in
Table I are the same as the countries, with the exception of Tonga, in a recent GAO Report,
International Taxation: Large U.S. Corporations and Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in
jurisdictions Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy jurisdictions , GAO-09-157, December 2008.

Notes: St. Kitts may also be referred to as St. Christopher. The Channel Islands are sometimes
listed as a group and sometimes Jersey and Guernsey are listed separately. S. 506 and H.R. I 245
specifically mention Jersey, and also refer to Gurensey/Sark/Alderney, the latter two are islands
associated with Guernsey.

a. Not included in S. 506, H.R. 1245.

b. Not included in original OECD tax haven list.

c. Not included in Hines and Rice (1994)

d. Removed from OECD's List; Subsequently determined they should not be included.

e. Not included in OECD's "gray" list as of April 7, 2009. Note that the "gray" list is divided
into countries that are tax havens and countries that are other financial centers. The latter
classification includes three countries listed in Table I (Luxembourg, Singapore, and Switzerland)
and five that are not (Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Chile, and Guatemala). Of the four countries moved
from the "black" to the "gray" list, one, Costa Rica, is in Table I and three, Malaysia, Uruguay
and the Philippines are not.






Developments in the OECD Tax Haven List

The OECD list, the most prominent list, has changed over time. Nine of the countries in Table 1 did not appear on the earliest OECD list. These countries not appearing on the original list tend to be more developed larger countries and include some that are members of the OECD (e.g., Switzerland and Luxembourg).

It is also important to distinguish between OECD's original list and its blacklist. OECD subsequently focused on information exchange and removed countries from a "blacklist if they agree to cooperate." OECD initially examined 47 jurisdictions and identified a number as not meeting the criteria for a tax haven; it also initially excluded six countries with advance agreements to share information (Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, and San Marino). The 2000 OECD blacklist included 35 countries; this list did not include the six countries eliminated due to advance agreement. The OECD had also subsequently determined that three countries should not be included in the list of tax havens (Barbados, the Maldives, and Tonga). Over time, as more tax havens made agreements to share information, the blacklist dwindled until it included only three countries: Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco.

A study of the OECD initiative on global tax coordination by Sharman, also discussed in a book review by Sullivan, argues that the reduction in the OECD list was not because of actual progress towards cooperation so much as due to the withdrawal of U.S. support in 2001, which resulted in the OECD focusing on information on request and not requiring reforms until all parties had signed on. 7 This analysis suggests that the large countries were not successful in this initiative to rein in on tax havens. A similar analysis by Spencer and Sharman suggests little real progress has been made in reducing tax haven practices. 8

Interest in tax haven actions has increased recently. The scandals surrounding the Swiss bank UBS AG (UBS) and the Liechtenstein Global Trust Group (LGT), which led to legal actions by the United States and other countries, focused greater attention on international tax issues, primarily information reporting and individual evasion. 9 The credit crunch and provision of public funds to banks has also heightened public interest. The tax haven issue was revived recently with a meeting of the G20 industrialized and developing countries that proposed sanctions, and a number of countries began to indicate commitments to information sharing agreements. 10

The OECD currently has three lists: a "white list" of countries implementing an agreed-upon standard, a "gray" list of countries that have committed to such a standard, and a "black" list of countries that have not committed. On April 7, 2009 the last four countries on the "black list, which were countries not included on the original OECD list, Costa Rica, Malaysia, the Philippines and Uruguay, were moved to the "gray" list. 11 The gray list includes countries not identified as tax havens but as "other financial centers." According to news reports, Hong Kong and Macau were omitted from the OECD's list because of objections from China, but are mentioned in a footnote as having committed to the standards; they also noted that a "recent flurry of commitments brought 11 jurisdictions, including Austria, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg Singapore, and Switzerland into the committed category." 12

Many countries that were listed on the OECD's original blacklist protested because of the negative publicity and many now point to having signed agreements to negotiate tax information exchange agreements (TIEA) and some have negotiated agreements. The identification of tax havens can have legal ramifications if laws and sanctions are contingent on that identification, as is the case of some current proposals in the United States and of potential sanctions by international bodies.



Other Jurisdictions With Tax Haven Characteristics

Criticisms have been made by a range of commentators that many countries are tax havens or have aspects of tax havens and have been overlooked. These jurisdictions include major countries such as the United States, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Hungary Iceland, Israel, Portugal, and Canada. Attention has also been directed at three states in the United States, Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming. Finally there are a number of smaller countries or areas in countries, such as Campione d'Italia, an Italian town located within Switzerland, that have been characterized as tax havens.

A country not on the list in Table 1 , but which is often considered a tax haven, especially for corporations, is the Netherlands, which allows firms to reduce taxes on dividends and capital gains from subsidiaries and has a wide range of treaties that reduce taxes. 13 In 2006, for example, Bono and other members of the U2 band moved their music publishing company from Ireland to the Netherlands after Ireland changed its tax treatment of music royalties. 14

Some have identified the United States and the United Kingdom as having tax haven characteristics. Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Junker urged other EU member states to challenge the United States for tax havens in Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming. 15 One website offering offshore services mentions, in their view, several overlooked tax havens which include the United States, United Kingdom, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, and Portugal's Madeira Island. 16 (Others on their list and not listed in Table 1 were Hungary, Brunei, Uruguay, and Labuan (Malaysia)). 17 In the case of the United States the article mentions the lack of reporting requirements and the failure to tax interest and other exempt passive income paid to foreign entities, the limited liability corporation which allows a flexible corporate vehicle not subject to taxation, and the ease of incorporating in certain states (Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming).

Another website includes in its list of tax havens Delaware, Wyoming, and Puerto Rico, along with other jurisdictions not listed in Table 1 : the Netherlands, Campione d'Italia, a separate listing for Sark (identified as the only remaining "fiscal paradise"), the United Kingdom, and a coming discussion for Canada. 18 Sark is an island country associated with Guernsey, part of the Channel Islands, and Campione d'Italia is an Italian town located within Switzerland.

The Economist reported a study by a political scientist experimenting with setting up sham corporations; the author succeeded in incorporating in Wyoming and Nevada, as well as the United Kingdom and several other places. 19 Michael McIntyre discusses three U.S. practices that aid international evasion: the failure to collect information on tax exempt interest income paid to foreign entities, the system of foreign institutions that act as qualified intermediaries (see discussion below) but do not reveal their clients, and the practices of states such as Delaware and Wyoming that allow people to keep secret their identities as stockholder or depositor. 20

In a meeting in late April 2009, Eduardo Silva, of the Cayman Islands Financial Services Association, claimed that Delaware, Nevada, Wyoming, and the United Kingdom were the greatest offenders with respect to, among other issues, tax fraud. He suggested that Nevada and Wyoming were worse than Delaware because they permit companies to have bearer shares, which allows anonymous ownership. A U.S. participant at the conference noted that legislation in the United States, S. 569, would require disclosure of beneficial owners in the United States. 21

In addition, any country with a low tax rate could be considered as a potential location for shifting income to. In addition to Ireland, three other countries in the OECD not included in Table 1 have tax rates below 20%: Iceland, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. 22 Most of the eastern European countries not included in the OECD have tax rates below 20%. 23

The Tax Justice Network probably has the largest list of tax havens, and includes some specific cities and areas. 24 In addition to the countries listed in Table 1 , they include in the Americas and Caribbean, New York and Uruguay; in Africa, Mellila, Sao Tome e Principe, Somalia, and South Africa; in the Middle East and Asia, Dubai, Labuan (Malaysia), Tel Aviv, and Taipei; in Europe, Alderney, Belgium, Campione d'Italia, City of London, Dublin, Ingushetia, Madeira, Sark, Trieste, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and Frankfurt; and in the Indian and Pacific oceans, the Marianas. The only county listed in Table 1 and not included in their list was Jordan.



Methods of Corporate Tax Avoidance

U.S. multinationals are not taxed on income earned by foreign subsidiaries until it is repatriated to the U.S. parent as dividends, although some passive and related company income that is easily shifted is taxed currently under anti-abuse rules referred to as Subpart F. (Foreign affiliates or subsidiaries that are majority owned U.S. owned are referred to as controlled foreign corporations, or CFCs, and many of these related firms are wholly owned.) Taxes on income that is repatriated (or, less commonly, earned by branches and taxed currently) is allowed a credit for foreign income taxes paid. (A part of a parent company treated as a branch is not a separate entity for tax purposes, and all income is part of the parent's income.)

Foreign tax credits are limited to the amount of tax imposed by the United States, so that they, in theory, cannot offset taxes on domestic income. This limit is imposed on an overall basis, allowing excess credits in high-tax countries to offset U.S. tax liability on income earned in low-tax countries, although separate limits apply to passive and active income. Other countries either employ this system of deferral and credit or, more commonly, exempt income earned in foreign jurisdictions. Most countries have some form of anti-abuse rules similar to Subpart F.

If a firm can shift profits to a low-tax jurisdiction from a high-tax one, its taxes will be reduced without affecting other aspects of the company. Tax differences also affect real economic activity, which in turn affects revenues, but it is this artificial shifting of profits that is the focus of this report. 25

Since the United States taxes all income earned in its borders as well as imposing a residual tax on income earned abroad by U.S. persons, tax avoidance relates both to U.S. parent companies shifting profits abroad to low-tax jurisdictions and the shifting of profits out of the United States by foreign parents of U.S. subsidiaries. In the case of U.S. multinationals, one study suggested that about half the difference between profitability in low-tax and high-tax countries, which could arise from artificial income shifting, was due to transfers of intellectual property (or intangibles) and most of the rest through the allocation of debt. 26 However, a study examining import and export prices suggests a very large effect of transfer pricing in goods (as discussed below). 27 Some evidence of the importance of intellectual property can also be found from the types of firms that repatriated profits abroad following a temporary tax reduction enacted in 2004; a third of the repatriations were in the pharmaceutical and medicine industry and almost 20% in the computer and electronic equipment industry. 28



Allocation of Debt and Earnings Stripping

One method of shifting profits from a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax one is to borrow more in the high-tax jurisdiction and less in the low-tax one. This shifting of debt can be achieved without changing the overall debt exposure of the firm. A more specific practice is referred to as earnings stripping where either debt is associated with related firms or unrelated debt is not subject to tax by the recipient. As an example of the former earnings stripping method, a foreign parent may lend to its U.S. subsidiary. Alternatively, an unrelated foreign borrower not subject to tax on U.S. interest income might lend to a U.S. firm.

The U.S. tax code currently contains provisions to address interest deductions and earnings stripping. It applies an allocation of the U.S. parent's interest for purposes of the limit on the foreign tax credit. The amount of foreign source income is reduced when part of U.S. interest is allocated and the maximum amount of foreign tax credits taken is limited, a provision that affects firms with excess foreign tax credits. 29 There is no allocation rule, however, to address deferral, so that a U.S. parent could operate its subsidiary with all equity finance in a low-tax jurisdiction and take all of the interest on the overall firm's debt as a deduction. A bill introduced in 2007 (H.R. 3970) by Chairman Rangel of the Ways and Means Committee would introduce such an allocation rule, so that a portion of interest and other overhead costs would not be deducted until the income is repatriated. 30 This provision is also included in President Obama's proposals for international tax revision.

While allocation-of-interest approaches could be used to address allocation of interest to high-tax countries in the case of U.S. multinationals, they cannot be applied to U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations. To limit the scope of earnings stripping in either case, the United States has thin capitalization rules. (Most of the United States' major trading partners have similar rules.) A section of the Internal Revenue Code (163(j)) applies to a corporation with a debt-to-equity ratio above 1.5 to 1 and with net interest exceeding 50% of adjusted taxable income (generally taxable income plus interest plus depreciation). Interest in excess of the 50% limit paid to a related corporation is not deductible if the corporation is not subject to U.S. income tax. This interest restriction also applies to interest paid to unrelated parties that are not taxed to the recipient.

The possibility of earnings stripping received more attention after a number of U.S. firms inverted, that is, arranged to move their parent firm abroad so that U.S. operations became a subsidiary of that parent. The American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004 addressed the general problem of inversion by treating firms that subsequently inverted as U.S. firms. During consideration of this legislation there were also proposals for broader earnings stripping restrictions as an approach to this problem that would have reduced the excess interest deductions. This general earnings stripping proposal was not adopted. However, the AJCA mandated a Treasury Department study on this and other issues; that study focused on U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents and was not able to find clear evidence on the magnitude. 31

An noted in the Treasury's mandated study, there is relatively straightforward evidence that U.S. multinationals allocate more interest to high-tax jurisdictions, but it is more difficult to assess earnings stripping by foreign parents of U.S. subsidiaries, because the entire firm's accounts are not available. The Treasury study focused on this issue and used an approach that had been used in the past of comparing these subsidiaries to U.S. firms. The study was not able to provide conclusive evidence about the shifting of profits out of the United States due to high leverage rates for U.S. subsidiaries of foreign firms but did find evidence of shifting for inverted firms.



Transfer Pricing

The second major way that firms can shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions is through the pricing of goods and services sold between affiliates. To properly reflect income, prices of goods and services sold by related companies should be the same as the prices that would be paid by unrelated parties. By lowering the price of goods and services sold by parents and affiliates in high-tax jurisdictions and raising the price of purchases, income can be shifted.

An important and growing issue of transfer pricing is with the transfers to rights to intellectual property, or intangibles. If a patent developed in the U.S. is licensed to an affiliate in a low-tax country (such as one in Ireland) income will be shifted if the royalty or other payment is lower than the true value of the license. For many goods there are similar products sold or other methods (such as cost plus a mark up) that can be used to determine whether prices are set appropriately. Intangibles, such as new inventions or new drugs, tend not to have comparables, and it is very difficult to know the royalty that would be paid in an arms-length price. Therefore, intangibles represent particular problems for policing transfer pricing.

Investment in intangibles is favorably treated in the United States because costs, other than capital equipment and buildings, are expensed for research and development, which is also eligible for a tax credit. In addition, advertising to establish brand names is also deductible. Overall these treatments tend to produce an effective low, zero, or negative tax rate for overall investment in intangibles. Thus, there are significant incentives to make these investments in the United States. On average, the benefit of tax deductions or credits when making the investment tend to offset the future taxes on the return to the investment. However, for those investments that tend to be successful, it is advantageous to shift profits to a low-tax jurisdiction, so that there are tax savings on investment and little or no tax on returns. As a result, these investments can be subject to negative tax rates, or subsidies, which can be significant.

Transfer pricing rules with respect to intellectual property are further complicated because of cost sharing agreements, where different affiliates contribute to the cost. 32 If an intangible is already partially developed by the parent firm, affiliates contribute a buy-in payment. It is very difficult to determine arms length pricing in these cases where a technology is partially developed and there is risk associated with the expected outcome. One study found some evidence that firms with cost sharing arrangements were more likely to engage in profit shifting. 33



Contract Manufacturing

When a subsidiary is set up in a low-tax country and profit shifting occurs, as in the acquisition of rights to an intangible, a further problem occurs: this low-tax country may not be a desirable place to actually manufacture and sell the product. For example, an Irish subsidiary's market may be in Germany and it would be desirable to manufacture in Germany. But to earn profits in Germany with its higher tax rate does not minimize taxes. Instead the Irish firm may contract with a German firm as a contract manufacturer, who will produce the item for cost plus a fixed markup. Subpart F taxes on a current basis certain profits from sales income, so the arrangement must be structured to qualify as an exception from this rule. There are complex and changing regulations on this issue. 34



Check-the-Box, Hybrid Entities, and Hybrid Instruments

Another technique for shifting profit to low-tax jurisdictions was greatly expanded with the "check-the-box" provisions. These provisions were originally intended to simplify questions of whether a firm was a corporation or partnership. Their application to foreign circumstances, through the "disregarded entity" rules has led to the expansion of hybrid entities, where an entity can be recognized as a corporation by one jurisdiction but not by another. For example, a U.S. parent's subsidiary in a low-tax country can lend to its subsidiary in a high-tax country, with the interest deductible because the high-tax country recognizes the firm as a separate corporation. Normally, interest received by the subsidiary in the low-tax country would be considered passive or "tainted" income subject to current U.S. tax under Subpart F. However, under check-the-box rules, the high-tax corporation can elect to be disregarded as a separate entity, and thus from the perspective of the United States there is no interest income paid because the two are the same entity. Check-the-box and similar hybrid entity operations can also be used to avoid other types of Subpart F income, for example from contract manufacturing arrangements. According to Sicular, this provision, which began as a regulation, has been effectively codified, albeit temporarily. 35

Hybrid entities relate to issues other than Subpart F. For example, a reverse hybrid entity can be used to allow U.S. corporations to benefit from the foreign tax credit without having to recognize the underlying income. As an example, a U.S. parent can set up a holding company in the Netherlands that is treated as a disregarded entity, and the holding company can own a corporation that is treated as a partnership in a foreign jurisdiction. Under flow through rules, the holding company is liable for the foreign tax and, because it is not a separate entity, the U.S. parent corporation is therefore liable, but the income can be retained in the foreign corporation that is viewed as a separate corporate entity from the U.S. point of view. In this case, the entity is structured so that it is a partnership for foreign purposes but a corporation for U.S. purposes. 36

In addition to hybrid entities that achieve tax benefits by being treated differently in the U.S. and the foreign jurisdiction, there are also hybrid instruments that can avoid taxation by being treated as debt in one jurisdiction and equity in another. 37



Cross Crediting and Sourcing Rules for Foreign Tax Credits

Income from a low-tax country that is received in the United States can escape taxes because of cross crediting: the use of excess foreign taxes paid in one jurisdiction or on one type of income to offset U.S. tax that would be due on other income. In some periods in the past the foreign tax credit limit was proposed on a country-by-country basis, although that rule proved to be difficult to enforce given the potential to use holding companies. Foreign tax credits have subsequently been separated into different baskets to limit cross crediting; these baskets were reduced from nine to two (active and passive) in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-357).

Because firms can choose when to repatriate income, they can arrange realizations to maximize the benefits of the overall limit on the foreign tax credit. That is, firms that have income from jurisdictions with taxes in excess of U.S. taxes can also elect to realize income from jurisdictions with low taxes and use the excess credits to offset U.S. tax due on that income. Studies suggest that between cross crediting and deferral, U.S. multinationals typically pay virtually no U.S. tax on foreign source income. 38

This ability to reduce U.S. tax due to cross crediting is increased, it can be argued, because income that should be considered U.S. source income is treated as foreign source income, thereby raising the foreign tax credit limit. This includes income from U.S. exports which is U.S. source income, because a tax provision (referred to as the title passage rule) allows half of export income to be allocated to the country in which the title passes. Another important type of income that is considered foreign source and thus can be shielded with foreign tax credits is royalty income from active business, which has become an increasingly important source of foreign income. This benefit can occur in high-tax countries because royalties are generally deductible from income. (Note that the shifting of income due to transfer pricing of intangibles, advantageous in low-tax countries, is a different issue.) Interest income is another type of income that may benefit from this foreign tax credit rule.

Since all of this income arises from investment in the United States, one could argue that this income is appropriately U.S. source income, or that, failing that, it should be put in a different foreign tax credit basket so that excess credits generated by dividends cannot be used to offset such income. Two studies, by Grubert and by Grubert and Altshuler have discussed this sourcing rule in the context of a proposal to eliminate the tax on active dividends. 39 In that proposal, the revenue loss from exempting active dividends from U.S. tax would be offset by gains from taxes on royalties.



The Magnitude of Corporate Profit Shifting

This section examines the evidence on the existence and magnitude of profit shifting and the techniques that are most likely to contribute to it.



Evidence on the Scope of Profit Shifting

There is ample, and simple, evidence that profits appear in countries inconsistent with an economic motivation. This section first examines the profit share of income of controlled corporations compared to the share of gross domestic product. 40 The first set of countries, acting as a reference point, are the remaining G-7 countries that are also the United States' major trading partners. They account for 32% of pre-tax profits and 38% of rest-of-world gross domestic product. The second group of countries are larger countries from Table 1 (with GDP of at least $10 billion), plus the Netherlands, which is widely considered a tax conduit for U.S. multinationals because of their holding company rules. These countries account for about 30% of earnings and 5% of rest-of-world GDP. The third group of countries are smaller countries listed in Table 1 , with GDP less than $10 billion. These countries account for 14% of earnings and less than 1% of rest-of-world GDP.

As indicated in Table 2 , income to GDP ratios in the large G-7 countries range from 0.2% to 2.6%, the latter reflecting in part the United States' relationships with perhaps its closest trading partners. Overall, this income as a share of GDP is 0.6%. Outside the United Kingdom and Canada, they are around 0.2 to 0.3% and do not vary with country size (Japan, for example, has over twice the GDP of Italy). Note also that Canada and the United Kingdom have also appeared on some tax haven lists and the larger income shares could partially reflect that. 41


Table 2. U.S. Company Foreign Profits Relative to GDP, G-7





____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Profits of U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations
Country as a Percentage of GDP

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Canada 2.6

France 0.3

Germany 0.2

Italy 0.2

Japan 0.3

United Kingdom 1.3

Weighted Average 0.6

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: CRS calculations, see text




Table 3 reports the share for the larger tax havens listed in Table 1 for which data are available, plus the Netherlands. In general, U.S. source profits as a percentage of GDP are considerably larger than those in Table 2 . In the case of Luxembourg, these profits are 18% of output. Shares are also very large in Cyprus and Ireland. In all but two cases, the shares are well in excess of those in Table 2 .


Table 3. U.S. Foreign Company Profits Relative to GDP, Larger Countries (GDP At Least $10 billion) on Tax Haven Lists and the Netherlands





____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Profits of U.S. Controlled Corporations as a
Country Percentage of GDP

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Costa Rica 1.2

Cyprus 9.8

Hong Kong 2.8

Ireland 7.6

Luxembourg 18.2

Netherlands 4.6

Panama 3.0

Singapore 3.4

Switzerland 3.5

Taiwan 0.7

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: CRS calculations, see text




Table 4 examines the small tax havens listed in Table 1 for which data are available. In three of the islands off the U.S. coast (in the Caribbean and Atlantic) profits are multiples of total GDP. Profits are well in excess of GDP in four jurisdictions. In other jurisdictions they are a large share of output. These numbers clearly indicate that the profits in these countries do not appear to derive from economic motives related to productive inputs or markets, but rather reflect income easily transferred to low-tax jurisdictions.


Table 4. U.S. Foreign Company Profits Relative to GDP, Small Countries On Tax Haven Lists





____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Profits of U.S. Controlled Corporations as a
Country Percentage of GDP

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Bahamas 43.3

Barbados 13.2

Bermuda 645.7

British Virgin Islands 354.7

Cayman Islands 546.7

Guernsey 11.2

Jersey 35.3

Liberia 61.1

Malta 0.5

Marshall Islands 339.8

Mauritius 4.2

Netherland Antilles 8.9

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: CRS calculations, see text




Evidence of profit shifting has been presented in many other studies. Grubert and Altshuler report that profits of controlled foreign corporations in manufacturing relative to sales in Ireland are three times the group mean. 42 GAO reported higher shares of pretax profits of U.S. multinationals than of value added, tangible assets, sales, compensation or employees in low-tax countries such as Bermuda, Ireland, the UK Caribbean, Singapore, and Switzerland. 43 Martin Sullivan reports the return on assets for 1998 averaged 8.4% for U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries, but with returns of 23.8% in Ireland, 17.9% in Switzerland, and 16.6% in the Cayman Islands. 44 More recently, he noted that of the ten countries that accounted for the most foreign multinational profits, the five countries with the highest manufacturing returns for 2004 (the Netherlands, Bermuda, Ireland, Switzerland, and China) all had tax rates below 12% while the five countries with lower returns (Canada, Japan, Mexico, Australia, and the United Kingdom) had tax rates in excess of 23%. 45 Anumber of econometric studies of this issue have been done. 46



Estimates of the Cost and Sources of Corporate Tax Avoidance

There are no official estimates of the cost of international corporate tax avoidance, although a number of researchers have made estimates; nor are there official estimates of the individual tax gap. 47 In general, the estimates are not reflected in the overall tax gap estimate. The magnitude of corporate tax avoidance has been estimated through a variety of techniques and not all are for total avoidance. Some address only avoidance by U.S. multinationals and not by foreign parents of U.S. subsidiaries. Some focus only on a particular source of avoidance.

Estimates of the potential revenue cost of income shifting by multinational corporations varies considerably, with estimates as high as $60 billion. The only study by the IRS in this area is an estimate of the international gross tax gap (not accounting for increased taxes collected on audit) related to transfer pricing based on audits of returns. They estimated a cost of about $3 billion, based on examinations of tax returns for 1996-1998. 48 This estimate would reflect an estimate not of legal avoidance, but of non-compliance, and for reasons stressed in the study has a number of limitations. One of those is that an audit does not detect all non-compliance, and it would not detect avoidance mechanisms which are, or appear to be, legal.

Some idea of the potential magnitude of the revenue lost from profit shifting by U.S. multinationals might be found in the estimates of the revenue gain from eliminating deferral. If most of the profit in low-tax countries has been shifted there to avoid U.S. tax rates, the projected revenue gain from ending deferral would provide an idea of the general magnitude of the revenue cost of profit shifting by U.S. parent firms. The Joint Committee on Taxation projects the revenue gain from ending deferral to be about $11 billion in FY2010. 49 This estimate could be either an overstatement or an understatement of the cost of tax avoidance. It could be an overstatement because some of the profits abroad accrue to real investments in countries that have lower tax rates than the United States and thus do not reflect artificial shifting. It could be an understatement because it does not reflect the tax that could be collected by the United States rather than foreign jurisdictions on profits shifted to low-tax countries. For example, Ireland has a tax rate of 12.5% and the United States a 35% rate, so that ending deferral (absent behavioral changes) would only collect the excess of the U.S. tax over the Irish tax on shifted revenues, or about two thirds of lost revenue.

The Administration's estimates for ending deferral are slightly larger, over $14 billion. 50 Altshuler and Grubert estimate for 2002 that the corporate tax could be cut to 28% if deferral were ended, and based on corporate revenue in that year the gain is about $11 billion. 51 That year was at a low point because of the recession; if the share remained the same, the gain would be around $13 billion for 2004 and $26 billion for 2007. All of these estimates are based on tax data.

Researchers have looked at differences in pretax returns and estimated the revenue gain if returns were equated. This approach should provide some estimates of the magnitude of overall profit-shifting for multinationals, whether through transfer pricing, leveraging, or some other technique. Martin Sullivan, using Commerce Department data, estimates that, based on differences in pre-tax returns, the cost for 2004 was between $10 and $20 billion. Sullivan subsequently reports an estimated $17 billion increase in revenue loss from profit shifting between 1999 and 2004, which suggests that earlier number may be too small. 52 Sullivan suggests that the growth in profit shifting may be due to check-the-box. Christian and Schultz, using rate of return on assets data from tax returns, estimated $87 billion was shifted in 2001, which, at a 35% tax rate, would imply a revenue loss of about $30 billion. 53 As a guide for potential revenue loss from avoidance, these estimates suffer from two limits. The first is the inability to determine how much was shifted out of high-tax foreign jurisdictions rather than the United States, which leads to a range of estimates. At the same time, if capital is mobile, economic theory indicates that the returns should be lower, the lower the tax rate. Thus the results could also understate the overall profit shifting and the revenue loss to the United States.

Pak and Zdanowicz examined export and import prices, and estimated that lost revenue due to transfer pricing of goods alone was $53 billion in 2001. 54 This estimate should cover both U.S. multinationals and U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents, but is limited to one technique. Kimberly Clausing, using regression techniques on cross country data, which estimated profits reported as a function of tax rates, estimated that revenues of over $60 billion are lost for 2004 by applying a 35% tax rate to an estimated $180 billion in corporate profits shifted out of the United States. 55 She estimates that the profit shifting effects are twice as large as the effects from shifts in actual economic activity. This methodological approach differs from others which involve direct calculations based on returns or prices and is subject to the econometric limitations with cross country panel regressions. In theory, however, it had an overall of coverage of shifting (that is both outbound by U.S. parents of foreign corporations and inbound by foreign parents of U.S. corporations and covering all techniques).

Clausing and Avi-Yonah estimate the revenue gain from moving to a formula apportionment based on sales that is on the order of $50 billion per year because the fraction of worldwide income in the United States is smaller than the fraction of worldwide sales. 56 While this estimate is not an estimate of the loss from profit shifting (since sales and income could differ for other reasons) it is suggestive of the magnitude of total effects from profit shifting. A similar result was found by another study that applied formula apportionment based on an equal weight of assets, payroll, and sales. 57

It is very difficult to develop a separate estimate for U.S. subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies because there is no way to observe the parent firm and its other subsidiaries. Several studies have documented that these firms have lower taxable income and that some have higher debt to asset ratios than domestic firms. There are many other potential explanations these differing characteristics, however, and domestic firms that are used as comparisons also have incentives to shift profits when they have foreign operations. No quantitative estimate has been made. 58 However some evidence of earnings stripping for inverted firms was found. 59



Importance of Different Profit Shifting Techniques

Some studies have attempted to identify the importance of techniques used for profit shifting. Grubert has estimated that about half of income shifting was due to transfer pricing of intangibles and most of the remainder to shifting of debt. 60 In a subsequent study, Altshuler and Grubert find that multinationals saved $7 billion more between 1997 and 2002 due to check the box rules. 61 Some of this gain may have been at the cost of high-tax host countries rather than the United States, however.

Some of the estimates discussed here conflict with respect to the source of profit shifting. The Pak and Zdanowich estimates suggest that transfer pricing of goods is an important mechanism of tax avoidance, while Grubert suggests that the main methods of profit shifting are due to leverage and intangibles. The estimates for pricing of goods may, however, reflect errors, or money laundering motives rather than tax motives. Much of the shifting was associated with trade with high-tax countries; for example, Japan, Canada, and Germany accounted for 18% of the total. 62 At the same time, about 14% of the estimate reflected transactions with countries that appear on tax haven lists: the Netherlands, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Ireland.

Some evidence that points to the importance of intangibles and the associated profits in tax haven countries can be developed by examining the sources of dividends repatriated during the "repatriation holiday" enacted in 2004. 63 This provision allowed, for a temporary period, dividends to be repatriated with an 85% deduction, leading to a tax rate of 5.25%. The pharmaceutical and medicine industry accounted for $99 billion in repatriations or 32% of the total. The computer and electronic equipment industry accounted for $58 billion or 18% of the total. Thus these two industries, which are high tech firms, accounted for half of the repatriations. The benefits were also highly concentrated in a few firms. According to a recent study, five firms (Pfizer, Merck, Hewlett-Packard, Johnson & Johnson, and IBM) are responsible for $88 billion, over a quarter (28%) of total repatriations. 64 The top ten firms (adding Schering-Plough, Du Pont, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, and PepsiCo) accounted for 42%. The top 15 (adding Procter and Gamble, Intel, Coca-Cola, Altria, and Motorola accounted for over half (52%). These are firms that tend to, in most cases, have intangibles either in technology or brand names.

Finally, as shown in Table 5, which lists all countries accounting for at least 1% of the total of eligible dividends (and accounting for 87% of the total), most of the dividends were repatriated from countries that appear on tax haven lists.


Table 5. Source of Dividends from "Repatriation Holiday": Countries Accounting for at Least I% of Dividends





____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Country Percentage of Total

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Netherlands 28.8

Switzerland 10.4

Bermuda 10.2

Ireland 8.2

Luxembourg 7.5

Canada 5.9

Cayman Islands 5.9

United Kingdom 5.1

Hong Kong 1.7

Singapore 1.7

Malaysia 1.2

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Internal Revenue Service






Methods of Avoidance and Evasion by Individuals

Individual evasion of taxes may take different forms and they are all facilitated by the growing international financial globalization and ease of making transactions on the Internet. Individuals can purchase foreign investments directly (outside the United States), such as stocks and bonds, or put money in foreign bank accounts and simply not report the income (although it is subject to tax under U.S. tax law). There is little or no withholding information on individual taxpayers for this type of action. They can also use structures such as trusts or shell corporations to evade tax on investments, including investments made in the United States, which may take advantage of U.S. tax laws that exempt interest income and capital gains of non-residents from U.S. tax. Rather than using withholding or information collection the United States largely relies on the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program where beneficial owners are not revealed. To the extent any information gathering from other countries is done it is through bilateral information exchanges rather than multilateral information sharing. The European Union has developed a multilateral agreement but the United States does not participate.



Tax Provisions Affecting the Treatment of Income by Individuals

The ability of U.S. persons (whether firms or individuals) to avoid tax on U.S. source income that they would normally be subject to arises from U.S. rules that do not impose withholding taxes on many sources of income. In general interest and capital gains are not subject to withholding. Dividends, non-portfolio interest (such as interest payments by a U.S. subsidiary to its parent), capital gains connected with a trade or business, and certain rents are subject to tax, although treaty arrangements widely reduce or eliminate the tax on dividends. In addition, even when dividends are potentially subject to a withholding tax, new techniques have developed to transform, through derivatives, those assets into exempt interest. 65

The elimination of tax on interest income was unilaterally initiated by the United States in 1984, and other countries began to follow suit. 66 Currently, fears of capital flight are likely to keep countries from changing this treatment. However, it has been accompanied with a lack of information reporting and lack of information sharing that allows U.S. citizens, who are liable for these taxes, to avoid them whether on income invested abroad or income invested in the United States channeled through shell corporations and trusts. Citizens of foreign countries can also evade the tax, and the U.S. practice of not collecting information contributes to the problem.

Based on actual tax cases, Guttenberg and Avi-Yonah describe a typical way that U.S. individuals can easily evade tax on domestic income through a Cayman Islands operation using current technology with little expense with current technology. The individual, using the Internet, can open a bank account in the name of a Cayman corporation that can be set up for a minimal fee. Money can be electronically transferred without any reporting to tax authorities, and investments can be made in the United States or abroad. Investments by non-residents in interest bearing assets and most capital gains are not subject to a withholding tax in the United States. 67

In addition to corporations, foreign trusts can be used to accomplish the same approach. Trusts may involve a trust protector who is an intermediary between the grantor and the trustees, but whose purpose may actually be to carry out the desires of the grantor. Some taxpayers argue that these trusts are legal but in either case they can be used to protect income from taxes, including those invested in the United States, from tax, while retaining control over and use of the funds.



Limited Information Reporting Between Jurisdictions

In general, the international taxation of passive portfolio income by individuals is easily subject to evasion because there is no multilateral reporting of interest income. Even in those cases where bilateral information sharing treaties, referred to as Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) are in place, they have limits. As pointed out by Avi-Yonah most of these agreements are restricted to criminal matters, which are a minor part of the revenues involved and pose difficult issues of evidence. Also, these agreements sometimes require that the activities related to the information being sought constitute crimes in both countries which can be a substantial hurdle in cases of tax evasion. The OECD has adopted a model agreement with the "dual criminality" requirements. 68 TIEAs usually allow for information only upon request, requiring the United States and other countries to identify the potential tax evaders in advance and they do not override bank secrecy laws.

In some cases the countries themselves have little or no information of value. One article, for example, discussing the possibility of an information exchange agreement with the British Virgin Islands, a country with more than 400,000 registered corporations, where laws require no identification of shareholders or directors, and require no financial records, noted: "Even if the BVI signs an information exchange agreement, it is not clear what information could be exchanged." 69



U.S. Collection of Information on U.S. Income and Qualified Intermediaries

Under the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program the United States itself does not require U.S. financial institutions to identify the true beneficiaries of interest and exempt dividends. The IRS has set up a Qualified Intermediary (QI) Program in 2001, under which foreign banks that received payments certify the nationality of their depositors and reveal the identity of any U.S. citizens. 70 However, although QIs are supposed to certify nationality, 71 apparently some rely on self certification. 72 They are also subject to audit. However, UBS, the Swiss bank involved in a tax abuse scandal that helped clients set up offshore plans, was a QI, and that event has raised some questions about the QI program.

A non-qualified intermediary must disclose the identity of its customers to obtain the exemption for passive income such as interest and or the reduced rates arising from tax treaties, but there are also questions about the accuracy of disclosures.



European Union Savings Directive

The European Union, in its savings directive, has developed among their members an option of either information reporting or a withholding tax. The reporting or withholding option covers the member countries as well as some other countries. Three states, Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg have elected the withholding tax. While this multilateral agreement aids these countries' tax administration, the United States is not a participant.



Estimates of the Revenue Cost of Individual Tax Evasion

While there are a number of different approaches that have been used to estimate corporate tax avoidance, all of these approaches rely on data reported on assets and income. For individual evasion, estimates are much more difficult because the initial basis of the estimate is the amount of assets held abroad whose income is not reported to the tax authorities. In addition to this estimate, the expected rate of return and tax rate are needed to estimate the revenue cost.

Guttentag and Avi-Yonah estimate a value of $50 billion in individual tax evasion, based on an estimate of holdings by high net worth individuals invested outside the United States at $1.5 trillion. 73 Using a rate of return of 10% and a tax rate of approximately a third, they obtain an estimate of $50 billion. They also summarize two other estimates in 2002 of $40 billion for the international tax gap by the IRS and $70 billion by an IRS consultant.

Dharmapala suggests that this cost is overestimated. 74 To the extent that the earnings are interest, he argues that the 10% rate of return is too high, while if it is dividends and capital gains, the tax rate is too high. Using a tax rate of 15% (currently applicable to capital gains and dividends) would lead to about $23 billion. In the case of equity investments, if a third of the return is in dividends and half of capital gains is never realized, the tax rate would be 10% or about $15 billion assuming the 10% return. During 2002 and beginning in 2011, however, the tax rate on capital gains and dividends is 20%, indicating a loss of $20 billion rather than $15 billion. Dharmapala argues that 2% is a more reasonable rate for interest returns. Since investors can earn tax free returns in the neighborhood of 4% to 5% on domestic state and local bonds, that argument is not persuasive. To yield a 5% after-tax return at a 35% tax rates would require a pre-tax yield of about 7.7%. The estimate would then be $40 billion.

The Tax Justice Network has estimated a worldwide revenue loss for all countries of $255 billion from individual tax evasion, basically using a 7.5% return and a 30% tax rate. 75 These assumptions would be consistent with a $33 billion loss for the United States using the $1.5 trillion figure.



Alternative Policy Options to Address Corporate Profit Shifting

Since much of the corporate tax revenue loss arises from activities that either are legal or appear to be so, it is difficult to address these issues other than with changes in the tax law Outcomes would likely be better if there is international cooperation. Currently, the possibilities for international cooperation appear to play a bigger role in options for dealing with individual evasion than with corporate avoidance.



Broad Changes to International Tax Rules

The first set of provisions would introduce broad changes in international tax rules, and include significant restrictions in deferral or allocation of income and capital.



Repeal Deferral

One approach to mitigate the rewards of profit shifting is to repeal deferral, or to institute true worldwide taxation of foreign source income Firms would be subject to current tax on the income of their foreign subsidiaries, although they would continue to be able to take foreign tax credits. According to estimates cited above, this change currently would raise from $11 to $14 billion per year.

Many of the issues surrounding the repeal of deferral have focused on the real effects of repeal on the allocation of capital. Traditionally, economic analysis has suggested that eliminating deferral would increase economic efficiency, although recently some have argued that this gain would be offset by the loss of production of some efficient firms from high-tax countries. Some have also argued for retaining the current system or moving in the other direction to a territorial tax. These economic issues are discussed in detail in another CRS report. 76

Repeal of deferral would largely eliminate the value of the planning techniques discussed in this report. There are concerns, however, that firms could avoid the effects of repeal by having their parent incorporate in other countries that continue to allow deferral. The most direct and beneficial to reducing firms' tax liabilities of these planning approaches, inversion, has been addressed by legislation in 2004. 77 Mergers would be another method to counter the implementation of deferral, although mergers involve real changes in organization that would not likely be undertaken to gain a small tax benefit. Another possibility is that more direct portfolio investment (i.e. buying shares of stock by individual investors) in foreign corporations will occur. There has been a significant growth in this direct investment, although the evidence suggests this investment has been due to portfolio diversification and not tax avoidance. 78



Targeted or Partial Elimination of Deferral

More narrow proposals to address deferral and tax avoidance would tax income in tax havens currently, or tax some additional income of foreign subsidiaries. They include:


Ÿ Eliminating deferral for specified tax havens.



Ÿ Eliminating deferral in countries with tax rates that are below the U.S. rate by a specified proportion.



Ÿ Eliminating deferral for income on the production of goods that are in turn imported into the United States.



Ÿ Eliminate deferral for income on the production of goods that are exported.



Ÿ Requiring a minimum payout share.


Restricting current taxation to tax havens would likely address some of the problems associated with transfer pricing and leveraging, without ending deferral entirely. Defining a tax haven under those circumstances would be crucial. A bill introduced in the 110 th Congress, S. 396, which defined as a U.S. firm any U.S. subsidiary in a tax haven not engaged in an active business, had a list of countries that was the same as the original OECD tax haven list, except for the U.S. Virgin Islands. Some countries, such as Ireland, that are often considered tax havens, would not be subject to such provisions, leaving some scope for corporate tax avoidance. In addition, firms could shift some operations to other lower tax countries and increase the amount of foreign tax credits available, which would be a loss to U.S. revenue. Some concerns have also been expressed that listing specific tax haven countries would make cooperative approaches, such as tax information sharing treaties, more difficult.

An alternative, which would not require identifying particular countries, would be to restrict deferral based on a tax rate that is lower than the U.S. rate by a specified amounts. For example, the French, who generally have a territorial tax, tax income earned in jurisdictions with tax rates 1/3 lower than the French rate. For the U.S., whose tax rate is similar to the French rate, this ratio would indicate a tax rate lower than 24%.

Another proposal directed to "runaway" plans would eliminate deferral for investments abroad that produce exports into the United States. S. 1284, also in the 110 th Congress, would impose current taxation on such activities by expanding Subpart F income to include income attributable to imports into the United States of goods produced by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms. The main problem with this proposal is administering it, which would include tracing selling to a third party for resale.

A somewhat different and more restrictive proposal was made by Senator Kerry during the 2004 presidential campaign. He proposed to eliminate deferral except in the case where income is produced and sold in the controlled foreign corporation's (CFC's) jurisdiction. This approach would, like deferral in general, be likely to significantly restrict opportunities for artificial profit shifting, since most of the income in tax haven or low-tax jurisdictions do not arise from real activity; indeed, these jurisdictions are too small in many cases to provide a market. As with the previous proposal, however, the administration of such a plan would be difficult.

A final option that would not go as far as eliminating deferral altogether would be to require some minimum share to be paid out.



Allocation of Deductions and Credits with Respect to Deferred Income/Restrictions on Cross Crediting

A proposal that does not end deferral but makes the shifting of profits from high-tax countries less attractive is a provision to allocate deductions and credits, so as to deny those benefits until income is repatriated. This approach was included in a tax reform bill introduced by Chairman Rangel of the Ways and Means Committee in 2007 (H.R. 3970) and is included in the current proposals by President Obama. Under this proposal, a portion of certain overall deductions, such as interest or overhead, that reflects the share of foreign deferred income, would be disallowed. The foreign tax credit allocation rule would allow credits for the share of foreign taxes paid that is equal to the share of foreign source income repatriated. Disallowed deductions and credits would be carried forward. (President Obama's proposal does not allocate research and experimental expenses).

The allocation-of-deductions provision would decrease the tax benefits of sheltering income in low-tax jurisdictions and encourage repatriation of income relative to current law and presumably reduce profit shifting, as well as decreasing benefits of real investment abroad. The foreign tax credit allocation rule could have a variety of effects. It would make foreign investment abroad less attractive because it would increase the tax on income when eventually repatriated, it would discourage investment in low-tax jurisdictions that could no longer be sheltered by foreign tax credits, and it would discourage repatriation of earnings on existing activities because of the potential tax to be collected.

The allocation of credits accomplishes some of the restrictions on cross crediting that could also be achieved by increasing the number of baskets. As discussed below, one possible separate basket would be for active royalties. Another possibility would be to impose a per country limit with a separate basket for each country (and baskets within each for passive, active, etc. income).



Formula Apportionment

Another approach to addressing income shifting is through formula apportionment, which would be a major change in the international tax system. With formula apportionment, income would be allocated to different jurisdictions based on their shares of some combination of sales, assets, and employment. This approach is used by many states in the United States and by the Canadian provinces to allocate income. (In the past, a three factor apportionment was used, but some states have moved to a sales based system.) Studies have estimated a significant increase in taxes from adopting formula apportionment. Slemrod and Shackleford estimate a 38% revenue increase from an equally weighted three factor system. 79 A sales based formula has been proposed by Avi-Yonah and Clausing that they estimate would raise about 35% of additional corporate revenue, or $50 billion annually over the 2001-2004 period. 80

The ability of a formula apportionment system to address some of the problems of shifting income becomes problematic with intangible assets. 81 If all capital were tangible capital, such as buildings and equipment, a formula apportionment system based on capital would at least lead to the same rate of return for tax purposes across high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions. Real distortions in the allocation of capital would remain, since capital would still flow to low-tax jurisdictions, but paper profits could not be shifted. An allocation system based on assets becomes more difficult when intangible assets are involved. It is probably as difficult to estimate the stock of intangible investment (given lack of information on the future pattern of profitability) as it is to allocate it under arms length pricing. In the case of an allocation based on sales, profits that might appropriately be associated with domestic income as they arise from domestic investment in R&D would be allocated abroad. Moreover, new avenues of tax planning, such as selling to an intermediary in a low-tax country for resale, would complicate the administration of such a plan. Whether the benefits are greater than the costs is in some dispute.

One problem is that if the Untied States adopted the system there could be double taxation of some income and no taxation of other income unless there were a multinational plan. The European Union has been considering a formula apportionment, based on property, gross receipts, number of employees and cost of employment. This proposal and the consequences for different countries are discussed by Devereux and Loretz. 82 If the European Union adopted such a plan it would be easier for the United States to adopt a similar apportionment formula without as much risk of double or no taxation with respect to its major trading partners.



Eliminate Check the Box, Hybrid Entities, and Hybrid Instruments; Foreign Tax Credit Splitting From Income

A number of proposals have been made to eliminate check the box, and in general to adopt rules that would require that legal entities be characterized in a consistent manner by the United States and the country where the entity is established. This proposal has been made by McIntyre. 83 In general rules to require that legal entities be characterized in a consistent manner by the U.S. and by the country where established and that tax benefits that arise from inconsistent treatment of instruments be denied would address this particular class of provisions that undermine Subpart F and the matching of credits and deductions with income. President Obama's proposal includes a provision that disallows a subsidiary to treat a subsidiary chartered in another country as a disregarded entity. It also includes a provision to prevent foreign tax credits without the associated income, which can currently be accomplished with reverse hybrids.



Narrower Provisions Affecting Multinational Profit Shifting

A number of more narrow provisions could be considered that would be more focused on preventing abuses and have fewer consequences for the overall structure of international corporate taxation.



Tighten Earnings Stripping Rules

In the American Jobs Creation Act a further restriction on earnings stripping rules was considered as an alternative to the anti-inversion measure. These provisions were not enacted, but were to be studied in a Treasury report. The 2004 House proposal would have raised revenue by dropping the debt to asset share test and lowering the interest share standard to 25% for ordinary debt, 50% for guaranteed debt, and 30% overall. In general, further restrictions on earnings stripping could be considered to address shifting through debt for U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents.

President Obama's plan includes dropping the asset test and lowering the interest share standard to 25% for inverted firms, with respect to related party non-guaranteed debt.



Foreign Tax Credits: Source Royalties as Domestic Income for Purposes of the Foreign Tax Credit Limit, Or Create Separate Basket; Eliminate Title Passage Rule; Restrict Credits for Taxes Producing an Economic Benefit

As noted above, one of the issues surrounding the cross-crediting of the foreign tax credit is the use of excess credits to shield royalties from U.S. tax on income that could be considered U.S. source income. Two options might be considered to address that issue: sourcing these royalties as domestic income for purposes of the credit or putting them into a separate foreign tax credit basket. 84 The same issue applies to the provision that allows half of the income from exports to be allocated to the country in which the title passes. President Obama's proposal includes a provision to restrict the crediting of taxes that are in exchange for an economic benefit (such as payments that are the equivalent of royalties).



Transfer pricing

Michael McIntyre has suggested some other proposals to deal with transfer pricing, which include making transfer pricing penalties nearly automatic for taxpayers who have not kept contemporaneous records. He also suggests use of some type of formula apportionment plan as a default for transfer pricing for non-complying taxpayers so the IRS does not have to conduct a detailed transaction by transaction assessment for the court.

President Obama's proposals would address some of the transfer pricing issues associated with the transfer of intangibles, by clarifying that intangibles include workforce in place, goodwill, and going concern value and that they are valued at their highest and best use. The plan would allow the IRS Commissioner to aggregate intangibles if that leads to a more appropriate value.

These proposals would likely have small effects. Any significant solution to the transfer pricing problem, especially for intangibles, is difficult to entertain short of an elimination of deferral.



Codify Economic Substance Doctrine

A final proposal that does not focus specifically on international tax avoidance and evasion but is relevant to these issues is a codification of the economic substance doctrine. Firms that enter into tax savings arrangements that are found not to have economic substance can have their tax benefits disallowed by the courts under what has become known as the economic substance doctrine. The doctrine is sometimes interpreted differently by different courts and recent legislative proposals have sought to make the doctrine more uniform through statute. Generally these proposals would require a transaction to meet both an objective test (profit was made) and a subjective test (profit was intended). Penalties are also imposed. Supporters argue that the stricter test will not only reduce tax avoidance but also make treatment more consistent across the courts. Some tax attorneys are concerned that more specific rules might provide a roadmap to structuring arrangements that will pass the test. President Obama's budget proposals include a two-part statutory standard.



Prevent Dividend Repatriation Through Reorganizations

President Obama's plan would revise the rule on reorganizations when property as well as stock is received to treat distributions as dividends in the case of cross border transactions.



Options to Address Individual Evasion

Most of the options for addressing individual evasion involve more information reporting and additional enforcement. There are options that would involve fundamental changes in the law, such as shifting from a residence to a source basis for passive income. That is, the United States would tax this passive income earned in its borders, just as is the case for corporate and other active income. This change involves, however, many other economic and efficiency effects that are probably not desirable. The remainder of the proposals discussed here do not involve any fundamental changes in the tax itself, but rather focus on administration and enforcement.

The options discussed below are drawn from many sources, including academics and practitioners, organizations, and the Internal Revenue Service, and contained in legislative proposals; citations to these sources are provided at this point and legislative proposals are summarized in the next section. 85



Information Reporting

Expanded information reporting can involve multilateral efforts, changes in the current bilateral treaties, or unilateral changes.



Multilateral Information Sharing or Withholding; International Cooperation

The option that appears likely to recover most of the revenues would be to join in the European Union Directive, which would require information reporting on all income paid to foreign entities by U.S. banks and other institutions. If the beneficial owner cannot be identified, withholding could be imposed (a refund would be allowed if evidence of reporting to the home country could be shown). This approach has been proposed by the Tax Justice Network, which also suggests expanding the treaty to other tax havens. If the European Union is receptive, it would benefit other countries by reporting income paid to foreign nationals and benefit the U.S. by achieving third party information reporting on foreign investments of U.S. citizens.

Avi-Yonah and Avi-Yonah and Guttentag have suggested that current Treasury policy is to focus on bilateral agreements to achieve information exchange, but that the United States should also focus on cooperation with the OECD and G-20 and other appropriate organizations to improve information and persuade tax havens to enter into exchanges based on the OECD model. Shay suggests this approach as well and particularly references electronic information exchange.

The Tax Justice Network has proposed that the United Nations develop a global tax cooperation standard, set up a panel to determine compliant states, and deny recognition to non-compliant jurisdictions. They have also suggested that the IMF and Word Bank country assessments address tax compliance.



Expanding Bilateral Information Exchange

A number of commentators have suggested an increase in the scope of bilateral information treaties to provide for regular and automatic exchanges of information. This would require the U.S. banks to increase their collection of information.

Avi-Yonah and Avid-Yonah and Guttentag suggest adopting the model OECD bilateral Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA). This information exchange would relate to civil as well as criminal issues, it would not require suspicion of a crime other than tax evasion, and would override tax haven bank secrecy laws. Non-tax havens could be induced to make such agreements to obtain information, and thus, such a change would require collection of information on interest payments by banks and financial institutions. Treasury has proposed only 16 countries, but Avi-Yonah and Guttenberg suggest no reason to restrict the provision in this way. Treasury could use existing authority not to exchange information that might be misused by non-democratic foreign governments.

Martin Sullivan suggests that automatic information exchange might be the only way to stop evasion, which would require renegotiating existing agreements and a major policy change. He notes that that the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (S. 506, H.R. 1265) requires automatic information exchange for a country to stay off the tax haven list.



Unilateral Approaches: Withholding/Refund Approach; Increased Information Reporting Requirements

This step is one that the United States could undertake without multilateral or bilateral cooperation, namely imposing withholding taxes on interest income and other exempt income received from U.S. sources by foreign intermediaries and providing a refund upon proof that the beneficial recipient was eligible. Avi-Yonah suggests this change with the hope that it would be adopted multilaterally.

A variation of this approach would be to require disclosure of the names of customers including beneficial owners, with withholding imposed if disclosure was not forthcoming. Such a proposal has been made by Michael McIntyre.

President Obama's proposals would impose withholding requirements with a refund mechanism, but only on non-qualified intermediaries.

The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would require banks and QIs to file 1099 information returns for U.S. owners, based on beneficial ownership, which they are already required to know under anti-money-laundering rules. Also, any financial institution that establishes a trust, corporation, or bank account in a tax haven country would be required to report it to the IRS. President Obama's proposals appear to contain similar provisions. President Obama's proposals also include provisions to require information reporting by U.S. financial intermediaries and qualified intermediaries on transfers of funds and by U.S. persons and qualified intermediaries on the formation or acquisition of a foreign entity.

The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would also require reporting by U.S. shareholders and persons forming, sending or receiving assets from Passive Foreign Investment Corporations (PFICs).



Other Measures That Might Improve Compliance



Incentives/Sanctions for Tax Havens

Avi-Yonah and Avi-Yonah and Guttenberg suggest a carrot and stick approach to tax havens. They argue that little of the benefit of tax havens flows to their sometimes needy residents, but rather to the professionals providing banking and legal services, who often live elsewhere. They suggest transitional aid to move away from these offshore activities. For non-cooperating tax havens, they suggest the Treasury use its existing authority to deny benefits of the interest exemption. They suggest that tax havens cannot continue to exist unless the wealthy countries permit it, because funds are not productive in tax havens.

The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would extend to tax enforcement the sanctions of the Patriot Act used to impose penalties for money laundering and terrorist financing. Sanctions vary in severity and range from increased reporting on transactions to prohibitions. Sullivan points out that the U.S. government has used the Patriot Act sparingly, however, and questions whether this change would be a credible threat.

Blessing suggests that sanctions should be multilateral rather than unilateral.



Revise the and Strengthen the Qualified Intermediary (QI)Program

Several proposals relating to the QI program, which were discussed by witnesses at a Ways and Means Committee hearing on March 31, 2009, were reported by Sullivan. Some of these provisions are also included in the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act. If enough effective revisions could be made in the QI program, a great deal of potential information about U.S. taxpayers' income would be obtained. These proposals include the following. QIs would be required to inquire about and independently verify the ownership of foreign corporations and similar entities, information that they already must acquire to deal with money laundering. QIs would also be required to report any non-U.S. income of U.S. taxpayers. QIs would be required to submit information electronically, and IRS would be given resources to handle and use this information. The current exemption from withholding rules for bearer bonds (where no registration occurs) would be eliminated. Another possible change is to require QIs to share information about foreign customers to U.S. treaty partners (although one witness warned that this might be too severe a requirement). Finally, external audits of QIs would be strengthened by requiring QIs to promptly notify the IRS of any material failure in oversight, improve the evaluation of risk of circumvention of U.S. taxes by U.S. persons, and require audit oversight by a U.S. auditor.

Blum emphasizes the problem of accepting a shell corporation as the beneficial owner, and says this loophole in the law should be closed. He also suggests that penalties for failure to enforce should include withholding of capital gains as well as interest and dividends.

McIntyre stresses that audits of the QIs should be done by firms that do not at the same time sell tax shelters. Avi-Yonah and Avi-Yonah and Guttentag also suggest that IRS should require U.S. payors to issue form 1099s when they know or have reason to suspect the beneficial owner is a U.S. citizen (rather than the W8-BEN which provides evidence of foreign status).

President Obama's proposals would revise the treatment of non-qualified intermediaries. As noted above, the proposal includes a withholding/refund mechanism for non-qualified intermediaries. It would require that QIs can qualify only if all of their affiliates are QIs and, as noted above, increase information reporting by QIs.



Placing the Burden of Proof on the Taxpayer

An important part of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse proposal is to place the burden of proof in court on the taxpayer; this approach was also suggested by Blum. As noted above, there is also a shift in the burden of proof for accounts with non-qualified intermediaries for filing an FBAR (Foreign Bank and Financial Account Report).

President Obama's proposal would create a presumption that the funds in foreign accounts are large enough to require an FBAR which is required when amounts exceed $10,000. It would treat failure to file for amounts in excess of $200,000 as willful, which permits criminal penalties and larger civil penalties.



Treat Shell Corporations as U.S. Firms

The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act includes a provision to treat any firm that is publicly traded or has assets over $50 million as a U.S. corporation. This provision would include hedge funds but would not affect subsidiaries of multinational firms because decisions are made by the parent firm. Sullivan argues that such a provision would have a devastating effect on the U.S. hedge fund industry, where offshore firms generally attract tax exempt U.S. investors and foreigners who wish to avoid filing tax returns, as well as U.S. tax evaders, and that legislative relief for U.S. tax exempt investors (pension funds, university endowments) would be likely.



Impose Restrictions on Foreign Trusts

The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Acts would impose further restrictions on foreign trusts, by providing that any powers held by trust protectors would be attributed to the trust grantor, providing that any U.S. person who benefits from the trust will be treated as a formal beneficiary even if not named, providing that a future or contingent beneficiary be treated as a current one, and treating loans of assets and property as distributions. The Senate Finance Committee draft would expand the definition of contributions to include items such as art and jewelry.



Treat Dividend Equivalents as Dividends

As noted earlier, the withholding tax on dividends has been avoided with the use of derivatives and other arrangements to re-characterize them as interest. The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would treat dividend equivalents as dividends. Proposals for change in this area were also made by Avi-Yonah. President Obama's plan treats equity swaps as dividends.



Extend the Statute of Limitations

Extensions in the statute of limitations are saidby some to be needed due to the complexity of the international cases and difficulty of obtaining information. Extension has been proposed by numerous commentators, is supported by the IRS officials and is included in the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, proposals discussed by the Senate Finance Committee, and proposals made by President Obama. These legislative proposals would extend the statute of limitations from three years to six years, but Blum also suggests the possibility of ten years.



Greater Resources for the Internal Revenue Service to Focus on Offshore

Numerous suggestions have been made to expand IRS resources for combating overseas tax abuses. President Obama's proposal, for example, has proposed to fund 800 new positions to combat international abuses.

Blum says that agents should not be pressured to give up difficult cases because of short term performance goals based on closing cases and collecting revenues.



Make Civil Cases Public as a Deterrent

Blum suggests all settlements involving offshore schemes in excess of $1 million should be excluded from the restrictions of Section 6103 that require settled civil cases to be confidential. He argues that no one knows about these cases and thus taxpayers think the possibility of being caught is small.



Revise Rules for FBAR (Foreign Bank Account Report)

Blum argues that language in the FBAR should be clarified to make it easier for the Justice Department to pursue cases; the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would change the disclosure rules to make this information easier to use. The FBAR report on foreign bank accounts is filed separately from the tax return; individuals must check a box to indicate whether or not they have these accounts. It is possible that a reporting requirement on the tax return would increase the visibility and force of this requirement. The Senate Finance Committee would require this report to be filed with the tax return and require due diligence on the part of tax preparers to determine if it should be filed. (Note also, as discussed below, that some of the strengthened penalties relate to FBAR.) President Obama's plan would require the information from the FBAR to also be reported on the tax return and any transfer of funds that sums to more than $10,000 would also be reported.



Joe Doe Summons

A provision in the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would make it easier to issue John Doe summons where the IRS does not know the names of taxpayers and now must ask courts for permission to serve the summons. This section provides that in any case involving offshore secret accounts, the court is to presume tax compliance is at issue, to relieve the IRS of the obligation when the only records sought are U.S. bank records, and to issue John Doe summons for large investigative projects without addressing each set of summons separately.



Strengthening of Penalties

Increased penalties are included in the proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, the Finance Committee Draft and President Obama's proposals. Among the penalty provisions in various proposals are: increased penalties for failure to file FBARs; basing the FBAR penalty on the highest amount in period rather than on a particular day; and increased penalties on abusive tax shelters, failure to file information on foreign trusts, and certain offshore transactions. President Obama's proposals would double accuracy related penalties for foreign transactions and increase penalties for trusts and permit them to be imposed if the amount in the trust cannot be established.

The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act also includes a provision that legal opinions that take the position that a transaction is more likely than not to prevail for tax purposes will no longer shield taxpayers from penalties.

S. 386, the Fraud Recovery and Investment Act. would introduce criminal penalties. Some tax attorneys have questioned whether these proposals are too harsh or might undermine amnesty or voluntary compliance. 86



Address Tax Shelters; Codify Economic Substance Doctrine

The proposed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would make a number of additional changes addressing tax shelters, including prohibiting the patenting of tax shelters, developing an examination procedure so that bank regulators could detect questionable tax activities, disallowing fees contingent on tax savings, removing communication barriers between enforcement agencies, codifying regulations, making it clear that prohibition of disclosure by tax preparers does not prevent congressional subpoenas, and providing standards for tax shelter opinion letters.

It would also codify the economic substance doctrine. This proposal is discussed among options for reducing corporate tax avoidance, but would also be applicable to individual evasion issues.



Regulate the Rules Used by States to Permit Incorporation.

Blum suggests that all U.S. Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) have a taxpayer ID number, a requirement not imposed in Delaware and other states that keep no records of ownership. S. 569 would tighten regulations to require record-keeping and identification of beneficial owners of corporations and LLCs and commission a study of partnerships and trusts.



Make Suspicious Activity Reports Available to Civil Side of IRS

The proposal that information on suspicious activity reports filed by financial institutions under anti-money laundering acts be made available to the civil side of IRS was made by Blum, who indicated that agency policy at the top levels had prohibited this information sharing. It is included in a provision in the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act.



Summary of Legislative Proposals

This section summarizes current legislative proposals that are designed to address or have consequences for international tax evasion and avoidance.



President Obama's International Tax Proposals 87

President Obama's international proposals include several proposals that relate to multinational corporations: allocation of deductions and credits, a restriction on use of foreign tax credits when associated income is not recognized, and a restriction on check-the-box. They also include proposals addressing individual tax evasion. Overall these provisions are projected to raise $210 billion for FY2010-2019. The provisions are discussed in the order in which they are presented unless otherwise noted, since revenue effects depend on that order. Note also that the budget proposes additional resources for the IRS for international enforcement.



Provisions Affecting Multinational Corporations and Other Tax Law Changes



Hybrid Entities and Check-the Box

The most significant provision based on revenue gain is a revision directed at hybrid entities and check-the-box. This provision requires that a corporation cannot disregard a subsidiary corporation unless it is incorporated in the same jurisdiction. This rule does not apply to the parent and its first level subsidiary. Thus, a U.S. parent with a subsidiary in Ireland could treat that subsidiary as a branch (disregard it as a separate entity). The Irish subsidiary, however, could not treat its German subsidiary as a disregarded entity. This provision is projected to raise $86.5 billion for FY2010-2019. 88



Allocation of Deductions and Credits

Two of these proposals would allocate deductions and credits, so as to deny those benefits until income is repatriated. This approach was included in a tax reform bill introduced by Chairman Rangel of the Ways and Means Committee in 2007 (H.R. 3970). A portion of overall deductions, such as interest, that reflects the share of foreign deferred income, would be disallowed until the income is repatriated. The foreign tax credit allocation rule would allow credits for the share of foreign taxes paid that is equal to the share of foreign source income repatriated, a provision the discussion of the proposals refers to as pooling. Disallowed deductions and credits would be carried forward. The proposal specifically excludes deductions for research and experimentation from the allocation rule.

The revenue gain for FY2010-2019 is $60.1 billion for the deduction allocation and $24.5 billion for the foreign tax credit pooling.



Limiting the Foreign Tax Credit; Reverse Hybrids

Another provision aimed at multinational corporations would disallow foreign tax credits when the associated income is not received, as can occur with reverse hybrids. A matching rule would apply. This provision is estimated to raise $18.5 billion in revenue for FY2010-2019.



Transfer Pricing of Intangibles

The proposal would clarify several rules that are relevant to the transfer of intangibles. First, it would clarify that intangibles include workforce in place, goodwill, and going concern value. Second, it would allow the IRS commission to aggregate intangibles if that leads to a more appropriate value. Finally, it would clarify that intangibles are to valued at their highest and best as it would be by a willing buyer and seller with reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. This provision is projected to raise $2.9 billion for FY 2-10-2019.



Earnings Stripping by Inverted Firms

The proposal would apply the provisions on earnings stripping discussed in 2004 to inverted firms. For these firms the debt-to-equity safe harbor would be eliminated and non-guaranteed related party debt would not be deductible when debt exceeded the 25% threshold This provision is projected to raise $1.2 billion for FY2010-FY2019.



Prevent Repatriation of Earnings in Cross Border Transactions

The plan includes a proposal to require that distributions that are characterized as reorganizations but are in the nature of a dividend repatriation are subject to tax. This issue arises within the framework of an exchange of stock on the one hand for stock and property (called "boot") and rules that provide the minimum of gain be based on the boot or overall gain. This proposal is projected to raise $297 million from FY2010-2019.



Repeal 80/20 Rules

This provision is related to dividends and affects individuals. Under current law, withholding is applied to interest and dividends paid by corporations, but there is an exception for firms who have 80% of their income from active foreign operations. This provision would repeal that exception, raising projected revenues of $1.2 billion for FY2010-2019.



Treat Equity Swaps as Dividends

This provision addresses the problem of disguising dividends that are subject to taxation as interest that is not. This provision, which would generally treat equity swaps as dividends, would raise $1.4 billion for FY2010-2019.



Foreign Tax Credits for Dual Capacity Taxpayers

This provision would disallow a foreign tax credit for taxes paid where there is an income tax that is paid in part to receive a benefit (i.e. the firm is paying a tax in a dual capacity) unless the income tax is generally imposed on the country's own residents as well as foreign persons. The current rule does not require the tax to be imposed on the country's residents. This provision typically relates to taxes being substituted for royalties in oil producing countries; there is a provision that it will not abrogate any existing treaties. This provision is projected to raise $4.5 billion for FY2010-2019.



Economic Substance Doctrine

Although not included with the international proposals, the proposal includes a codification of the economic substance doctrine, that requires both a subjective (profit intended) and objective (profit achieved) test.



Provision Relating to Individual Tax Evasion

The President's proposal includes a number of provisions relating to individual evasion including reporting of information, withholding and various penalties. Overall these provisions are projected to raise revenues of $8.7 billion from FY2010 to FY2019.



Qualified Intermediaries

Qualified Intermediaries would be required to identify all account holders that are U.S. persons and file 1099s information forms relative to them. All related firms of a QI wouldbe required to be QIs. QIs would also have to report on the transfer of funds and the forming or acquisition of foreign entities (along with U.S. third party reporting discussed below).



Nonqualified Intermediaries

Nonqualified intermediaries would be required to withhold 30% on periodic payments (these payments are termed FDAP for fixed or determinable annual or periodic payments) and 20% on gross gains from sale; exempt taxpayers would have to apply for refunds. Some exceptions are allowed.



Other Increased Third Party Reporting

U.S. financial intermediaries and qualified intermediaries would be required to report financial transfers. U.S. person and qualified intermediaries would be required to report the formation or establishment of a foreign entity,



Additional Information Reported on Tax Returns

Individuals who are required to file an FBAR (Foreign Bank and Financial Account Reports) would also be required to report this information on the tax return. They would also be required to report any transfer of funds to a foreign entity, unless they are less than $10,000.



Burden of Proof and Presumption Provisions

The proposal contains a number of provisions that provide evidentiary presumptions (shifts in the burden of proof). If an individual has a foreign account it is presumed to be large enough to require filing an FBAR. If a person has an account of over $200,000 it is presumed that failure to file is willful (which opens the possibility of criminal as well as higher civil penalties). If a payment subject to withholding is made to a foreign person on an FDAP, the presumption is that that person is not eligible for withholding.



Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations for cross border transactions is extended from three to six years.



Penalties

The 20% accuracy related penalty that already applies would be increased to 40% for transactions involving foreign accounts where the taxpayer failed to disclose reportable information. A reasonable cause exception would not be available. In the case of failure to report or underreporting foreign trusts, the initial penalty is 35% of the trust amount. If the failure to report continues for ninety days an additional penalty of $10,000 is imposed for each 30-day period, but the total cannot exceed the amount of the trust. This provision would change the initial penalty from 35% of the trust amount to the greater of 35% or $10,000. The $10,000 for each 30-day period would be continued indefinitely, with a refund of any excess when the taxpayer does report. This proposal addresses the problem of the IRS not being able to assess a penalty because it cannot determine the amount in the account.



Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506 and H.R. 1265 89

This bill has been introduced in the Senate by Senator Carl Levin and in the House by Representative Lloyd Doggett.

Section 101 would provide a burden of proof change. It would require the taxpayer involved in offshore secrecy jurisdictions to produce evidence, based on the presumption that the taxpayer is in control, that funds or other property are not taxable income, and that the account is not large enough to trigger a reporting threshold. (The bill also addresses securities law issues.) This section also contains the list of 34 tax haven jurisdictions taken from IRS court filings, and provides Treasury with the authority to add or remove jurisdictions. An important standard for being excluded from the list is an effective, and automatic, exchange of information.

Section 102 would expand the provisions in the Patriot Act of 2001, which gave Treasury the authority to require domestic financial institutions to take special measures (including providing information and prohibiting transactions) with respect to foreign jurisdictions relating to money laundering to cover instances of impeding U.S. tax enforcement.

Section 103 would require a publicly traded corporation or one with gross assets of $50 million or more whose management and control occurs primarily in the United States to be treated as a U.S. company. This provision is directed at shell corporations, including hedge funds and investment management businesses, set up in jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands. It would not apply to subsidiaries of U.S. corporations simply because some decisions are made at the parent headquarters, but would still apply to shell subsidiaries.

Section 104 would extend the limit on audit periods from three years to six years for offshore jurisdictions with secrecy laws.

Section 105 would require U.S. financial institutions and brokers to file 1099 forms for any foreign account when they know the beneficial owner is a U.S. person. It would also require these institutions to report to the IRS when they set up offshore accounts and entities.

Section 106 addresses potential trust abuses. Foreign trusts have employed liaisons called trust protectors as a way for shielding U.S. taxpayers exercising control over the trust; the legislation provides that any powers held by a trust protector would be attributed to the trust grantor. It also provides that any U.S. person benefitting from a trust is treated as a beneficiary even if not named in the trust instrument, that future or contingent beneficiaries are treated as current ones, and that loans of assets and property as well as cash or security are treated as trust distributions.

Section 107 addresses legal opinions, stating that an activity is more likely than not to survive challenge by the IRS, which are used to shield taxpayers from large penalties. The legislation provides that a legal opinion of this nature would not apply in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction, providing exceptions to protect legitimate operations.

Section 108 would prevent dividend equivalents from escaping the dividend withholding tax.

Section 109 addresses reporting by passive foreign investment corporations (PFICs) by codifying proposed regulations regarding PFIC reporting by direct or indirect shareholders who are U.S. persons, and also requiring reporting by U.S. persons who directly or indirectly cause the PFIC to be formed or sent or receive assets.

Some of the sections of title II of the bill affect securities law rather than tax issues. Some provisions are tax-related, however.

Section 204 addresses an IRS John Doe summons where the IRS does not know the names of taxpayers and now must ask courts for permission to serve the summons. This section provides that in any case involving offshore secret accounts, the court is to presume tax compliance is at issue, to relieve the IRS of the obligation when the only records sought are U.S. bank records, and to allow them to issue John Doe summonses for large investigative projects without addressing each set of summonses separately.

Section 205 would address issues relating to the Foreign Bank and Financial Account Report (FBAR) requirement for a person controlling a foreign financial account of over $10,000. This is a additional rule from the requirement to report this information on the tax return, and IRS is now charged with enforcing this FBAR requirement. This provision would amend tax disclosure rules to more easily permit IRS to use tax data., change the penalty to refer to the highest average in the account during a year (and not on a specific day), and allow IRS access to information on Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR).

The last title of the bill relates to abusive tax shelters, and contains several provisions. It would strengthen penalties, prohibit the patenting of tax shelters, require development of an examination procedure so that bank regulators could detect questionable tax activities, disallow fees contingent on tax savings for tax shelters, remove communication barriers between enforcement agencies, codify regulations and make it clear that prohibition of disclosure by tax preparers does not prevent congressional subpoenas, and provide standards for tax shelter opinion letters. It would also codify the economic substance doctrine, to require both an objective and subjective test for economic substance.



Finance Committee Proposal

A draft of this proposal was circulated on March 12 and has been discussed by Sullivan. 90


Ÿ It would require entities transferring funds offshore to report to the IRS the amount, destination, and account information. Publicly traded companies would be excluded.



Ÿ The statute of limitations would be extended from three to six years for tax returns that report or should have reported certain international transactions.



Ÿ It would require the foreign bank and financial account report (FBAR) to be filed with the tax returns.



Ÿ Tax preparers would be required to ask due diligence questions to determine whether an FBAR should be filed.



Ÿ The foreign trust failure-to-file penalty would be increased to a $10,000 minimum and the definition of property considered to be a distribution for foreign trusts would be expanded, and would include artwork and jewelry.



Ÿ Fines and penalties on payments attributable to certain offshore transactions would be doubled.



Ÿ A provision in the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-245) would be modified to require offshore entities that hire workers under a government contract be treated as American employers by establishing a rule that any individual who performs at least 100 hours of service a month is an employee and not an independent contractor.




Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, S. 386

This proposal, introduced by the Chairman Leahy of the Senate Judiciary Committee, includes a provision to apply the international money laundering statute to tax evasion, and set aside funds for the Justice Department to pursue financial fraud, including funds to the tax division. It has been passed by the Senate. The House version of the bill, H.R. 1748, does not include the tax provision but does include additional funds.



Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 569

This proposal would establish uniform requirements for states relating to the disclosure of beneficial owners of corporations and limited liability companies, including updating and maintenance of information after terminating, imposing additional requirements for those not U.S. citizens or permanent residents, providing penalties, and updating of such disclosures. It also authorizes a study of requirements of partnerships, trusts, and other legal entities. This bill is relevant, among other things, to issues raised about the use of states as international tax havens.



Author Contact Information

Jane G. Gravelle

Senior Specialist in Economic Policy

jgravelle@crs.loc.gov, 7-7829

1 See U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, Staff Report on Dividend Tax Abuse , September 11, 2008.

2 Joseph Guttentag and Reven Avi-Yonah, "Closing the International Tax Gap, In Max B. Sawicky, ed. Bridging the Tax Gap: Addressing the Crisis in Federal Tax Administration , Washington, D.C., Economic Policy Institute, 2005.

3 For a chronology, see Martin Sullivan, "Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax Evasion, Part 3," Tax Notes May 4, 2009, p. 517.

4 Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue , 1998, p. 23.

5 J.R. Hines and E.M. Rice, "Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax havens and American Business," Quarterly Journal of Economics , vol. 109, February 1994, pp. 149-182.

6 Government Accountability Office, International Taxation: Large U.S. Corporations and Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions, GAO-op-157, December 2008.

7 J. C. Sharman, Havens in a Storm, The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation , Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2006; Martin A. Sullivan, "Lessons From the Last War on Tax Havens," Tax Notes , July 30, 2007, pp. 327-337.

8 David Spencer and J.C. Sharman, International Tax Cooperation, Journal of International Taxation , published in three parts in December 2007, pp. 35-49, January 2008, pp. 2744, 64, February 2008, pp. 39-58.

9 For a discussion of these cases see Joint Committee on Taxation Tax Compliance and Enforcement Issues With Respect to Offshore Entities and Accounts , JCX-23-09, March 30, 2009. The discussion of UBS begins on p. 31 and the discussion of LGT begins on p. 40. This document also discusses the inquiries of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Homeland Security Committee relating to these cases.

10 Anthony Faiola and Mary Jordan, "Tax-Haven Blacklist Stirs Nations: After G-20 Issues mandate, Many Rush to Get Off Roll," Washington Post , April 4, p. A7.

11 This announcement by the OECD was posted at http://www.oecd.org/document/0/0,3343,en_2649_34487_42521280_1_1_1_1,00.html.

12 David D. Stewart, "G-20 Declares End to Bank Secrecy as OECD Issues Tiered List," Tax Notes , April 6, 2009, pp. 38-39.

13 Micheil van Dijk, Francix Weyzig, and Richard Murphy, The Netherlands: A Tax Haven? SOMO (Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations), Amersterdam, 2007.

14 Fergal O'Brien, "Bono, Preacher on Poverty, Tarnishes Halo Irish Tax Move," October 15, 2006, Bloomberg.com, http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&refer=home&sid=aef6sR60oDgM#.

15 Charles Gnaedinger, "Luxembourg P.M Calls out U.S. States as Tax Havens" Tax Notes International , April 6, 2009, p. 13.

16 http://www.offshore-fox.com/offshore-corporations/offshore-corporations_0401.html.

17 Another offshore website lists in addition to the countries in Table 1 Austria, Campione d'Italia, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Madeira, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Brunei, Dubai, Lebanon, Canada, Puerto Rico, South Africa, New Zealand, Labuan, Uruguay, and the United States. See http://www.mydeltaquest.com/english/.

18 http://www.offshore-manual.com/taxhavens/.

19 "Haven Hypocrisy," The Economist , March 26, 2008.

20 Michael McIntyre, "A Program for International Tax Reform," Tax Notes , February 23, 2009, pp. 1021-1026.

21 Charles Gnaedinger, "U.S., Cayman Islands Debate Tax Haven Status," Tax Notes , May 4, 2009, p. 548-545.

22 http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34897_1942460_1_1_1_1,00.html.

23 For tax rates see http://www.worldwide-tax.com/index.asp#partthree.

24 Tax Justice Network, Tax Us if You Can , September, 2005.

25 Effects on economic activity are addressed in CRS Report RL34115, Reform of U.S. International Taxation: Alternatives , by Jane G. Gravelle.

26 Harry Grubert, "Intangible Income, Intercompany Transactions, Income Shifting and the Choice of Locations," National Tax Journal , vol. 56, March 2003, Part II, pp. 221-242.

27 Simon J. Pak and John S. Zdanowicz, U.S. Trade With the World, An Estimate of 2001 Lost U.S. Federal Income Tax Revenues Due to Over-Invoiced Imports and Under-Invoiced Exports , October 31, 2002

28 CRS Report R40178, Tax Cuts on Repatriation Earnings as Economic Stimulus: An Economic Analysis , by Donald J. Marples and Jane G. Gravelle.

29 In 2004 the interest allocation rules were changed to allocate worldwide interest, but the implementation of that provision was delayed and has not yet taken place. See CRS Report RL34494, The Foreign Tax Credit's Interest Allocation Rules , by Jane G. Gravelle and Donald J. Marples.

30 See CRS Report RL34249, The Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007: An Overview, by Jane G. Gravelle.

31 U.S. Department of Treasury, Report to Congress on Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing and U.S. Income Tax Treaties, November 2007.

32 The Treasury Department recently issued new proposed regulations relating to cost sharing arrangements. See Treasury Decision 9441, Federal Register, vol. 74, No. 2, January 5, 2009, pp. 340-391. These rules include a periodic adjustment which would, among other aspects, examine outcomes. See "Cost Sharing Periodic Payments Not Automatic, Officials Say," Tax Notes , February 23, 2009, p. 955.

33 Michael McDonald, "Income Shifting from Transfer Pricing: Further Evidence from Tax Return Data," U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, OTA Technical Working Paper 2, July 2008.

34 See for example William W. Chip, "'Manufacturing' Foreign Base Company Sales Income," Tax Notes, November 19, 2007, p. 803-808.

35 See David R. Sicular, "The New Look-Through Rule: W(h)ither Subpart F? Tax Notes, April 23, 2007, pp. 349-378 for a discussion of the look-through rules under Section 954(c)(6).

36 For a discussion of reverse hybrids see Joseph M. Calianno and J. Michael Cornett, "Guardian Revision: Proposed Regulations Attach Guardian and Reverse Hybrids," Tax Notes International, October 2006, pp. 305-316.

37 See Sean Foley, "U.S. Outbound: Cross border Hybrid Instrument Transactions to gain Increased Scrutiny During IRS Audit," http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/?Page=10&PUBID=35&ISS=24101&SID=692834&TYPE=20. Andrei Kraymal, International Hybrid Instruments: Jurisdiction Dependent Characterization, Houston Business and Tax Law Journal , 2005, http://www.hbtlj.org/v05/v05Krahmalar.pdf

38 Government Accountability Office, U.S. Multinational Corporations: Effective Tax Rates are Correlated With Where Income is Reported, GAO-08-950, August 2008.

39 Harry Grubert, "Tax Credits, Source Rules, Trade and electronic Commerce: Behavioral Margins and the Design of International Tax Systems. Tax Law Review , vol. 58, January 2005; also issued as a CESIFO Working Paper (No. 1366), December 2004.; Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, "Corporate Taxes in a World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income," in John W. Diamond and George Zodrow, eds., Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices and Implications , Cambridge, MIT Press, 2008.

40 Data on earnings and profits of controlled foreign corporations are taken from Lee Mahoney and Randy Miller, Controlled Foreign Corporations 2004, Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Bulletin , Summer 2008, http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-soi/04coconfor.pdf Data on GDP from Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook , https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook. Most GDP data are for 2008 and based on the exchange rate but for some countries earlier years and data based on purchasing power parity were the only data available.

41 One offshore website points out that Canada can be desirable as a place to establish a holding company; see Shelter Offshore,http://www.shelteroffshore.com/index.php/offshore/more/canada_offshore.

42 Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, "Corporate Taxes in a World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income," in John W. Diamond and George Zodrow, eds., Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices and Implications , Cambridge, MIT Press, 2008.

43 Government Accountability Office, U.S. Multinational Corporations: Effective Tax Rates are Correlated With Where Income is Reported , GAO-08-950, August 2008.

44 Martin Sullivan, U.S. Citizens Hide Hundreds of Billions in the Caymans, Tax Notes , May 24, 2004, p. 96.

45 Martin Sullivan, "Extraordinary Profitability in Low-Tax Countries," Tax Notes , August 25, 2008, pp. 724-727.

46 See James R. Hines, Jr., "Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International Taxation," National Tax Journal , vol. 52 (June 1999): 305-322, and Joint Committee on Taxation, Economic Efficiency and Structural Analyses of Alternative U.S. Tax Policies for Foreign Direct Investment, JCX-55-08, June 25, 2008 for reviews. Studies are also discussed in U.S. Department of Treasury, The Deferral of Income of Earned Through Controlled Foreign Corporation , May, 2000, http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/subpartf.pdf

47 This point is made by The Treasury Inspector General for Tax administration, "A Combination of Legislative Actions and Increased IRS Capability and Capacity are Required to Reduce the Multi-billion Dollar U.S. International Tax Gap," January 27 2009, 2009-I-R001.

48 U.S. Department of the Treasury, IRS, Report on the Application and Administration of Section 482, 1999.

49 Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for 2008-2012 , October 31, 2008.

50 Budget for FY2010, Analytical Perspectives , p. 293.

51 Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, "Corporate Taxes in the World Economy," in Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices, and Implications ed. John W. Diamond and George R. Zodrow, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2008.

52 "Shifting Profits Offshore Costs U.S. Treasury $10 Billion or More," Tax Notes , September 27, 2004, pp. 1477-1481; "U.S. Multinationals Shifting Profits Out of the United States," Tax Notes , March 10, 2008, pp. 1078-1082. $75 billion in profits is artificially shifted abroad. If all of that income were subject to U.S. tax, it would result in a gain of $26 billion for 2004. Sullivan acknowledges that there are many difficulties in determining the revenue gain. Some of this income might already be taxed under Subpart F, some might be absorbed by excess foreign tax credits, and the effective tax rate may be lower than the statutory rate. Sullivan concludes that an estimate of between $10 billion and $20 billion is appropriate. Altshuler and Grubert suggest that Sullivan's methodology may involve some double counting; however, their own analysis finds that multinationals saved $7 billion more between 1997 and 2002 due to check the box rules. Some of this gain may have been at the cost of high-tax host countries rather than the United States, however. See Rosanne Altshuler and Harry Grubert, "Governments and Multinational Corporations in the Race to the Bottom," Tax Notes International , February 2006, pp. 459-474.

53 Charles W. Christian and Thomas D. Schultz, ROA-Based Estimates of Income Shifting by Multinational Corporations, IRS Research Bulletin , 2005 http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05christian.pdf

54 Simon J. Pak and John S. Zdanowicz, U.S. Trade With the World, An Estimate of 2001 Lost U.S. Federal Income Tax Revenues Due to Over-Invoiced Imports and Under-Invoiced Exports , October 31, 2002.

55 Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and U.S. Government Revenue, Kimberly Clausing, Working Paper, March 2008. Her method involved estimating the profit differentials as a function of tax rate differentials over the period 1982-2004 and then applying that coefficient to current earnings.

56 Kimberly A. Clausing and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment , Brookings Institution: The Hamilton Project, Discussion paper 2007-2008, June 2007.

57 Douglas Shackelford and Joel Slemrod, "The Revenue Consequences of Using Formula apportionment to Calculate U.S. and Foreign Source Income: A Firm Level Analysis," International Tax and Public Finance , vol. 5, no. 1, 1998, pp. 41-57.

58 These studies are discussed and new research presented in U.S. Department of Treasury, Report to Congress on Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing and U.S. Income Tax Treaties , November 2007. One study used a different approach, examining taxes of firms before and after acquisition by foreign versus domestic acquirers, but the problem of comparison remains and the sample was very small; that study found no differences. See Jennifer L. Blouin, Julie H. Collins, and Douglas A. Shackelford, "Does Acquisition by Non-U.S. Shareholders Cause U.S. firms to Pay Less Tax?" Journal of the American Taxation Association , Spring 2008, pp. 25-38. Harry Grubert, Debt and the Profitability of Foreign Controlled Domestic Corporations in the United States, Office of Tax Analysis Technical Working Paper No. 1, July 2008, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/otapapers/otatech2008.shtml#2008.

59 In addition to the 2007 Treasury study cited above, see Jim A. Seida and William F. Wempe, "Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings Stripping Following Corporate Inversion," National Tax Journal , vol. 57, December 2007, pp. 805-828. They estimated $0.7 billion of revenue loss from four firms that inverted. Inverted firms may, however, behave differently from foreign firms with U.S. subsidiaries.

60 Harry Grubert, "Intangible Income, Intercompany Transactions, Income Shifting, and the Choice of Location," National Tax Journal , Vo. 56,March 2003, Part 2.

61 Rosanne Altshuler and Harry Grubert, "Governments and Multinational Corporations in the Race to the Bottom," Tax Notes International , February 2006, pp. 459-474.

62 Data are presented in "Who's Watching our Back Door?" Business Accents , Florida International University, Fall 2004, pp. 26-29.

63 Data are taken from Melissa Redmiles, "The One-Time Dividends-Received Deduction," Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Bulletin , Spring 2008, http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-soi/08codivdeductbul.pdf.

64 Rodney P. Mock and Andreas Simon, "Permanently Reinvested Earnings: Priceless," Tax Notes , November 17, 2008, pp. 835-848.

65 See Joint Committee on Taxation Tax Compliance and Enforcement Issues With Respect to Offshore Entities and Accounts , JCX-23-09, March 30, 2009, p. 6 for a discussion.

66 This history is described by Reuven Avi-Yonah in testimony before the Committee on Select Revenue Measures of the Ways and Means Committee, March 5, 2008.

67 Joseph Guttentag and Reven Avi-Yonah, "Closing the International Tax Gap," in Max B. Sawicky, ed. Bridging the Tax Gap: Addressing the Crisis in Federal Tax Administration , Washington, D.C., Economic Policy Institute, 2005.

68 Testimony of Reuven Avi-Yonah, Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures, Ways and Means Committee, March 31,2009.

69 "Brown Pushes U.K. Tax havens On OECD Standards" Tax Notes International , April 20, 2009, pp. 180-181.

70 A very clear and brief explanation of the origin of the QI program and of the requirements can be found in Martin Sullivan, "Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax Evasion," Tax Notes , April 20, 2009, pp. 264-268.

71 For additional discussion of the QI program, see Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Compliance and Enforcement Issues With Respect to Offshore Entities and Accounts , JCX-23-09, March 30, 2009.

72 Martin A. Sullivan, "Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax Evasion," Tax Notes , April 20, 2009.

73 Joseph Guttentag and Reven Avi-Yonah, "Closing the International Tax Gap," in Max B. Sawicky, ed. Bridging the Tax Gap: Addressing the Crisis in Federal Tax Administration , Washington, D.C., Economic Policy Institute, 2005.

74 Dhammika Dharmapala, "What Problems and Opportunities are Created by Tax Havens?" Oxford Review of Economic Policy Issues , Vo. 24, Winter 2008, pp. 661-679.

75 Tax Justice Network, Tax Us If You Can , September, 2005.

76 CRS Report RL34125, Mortality of Americans Age 65 and Older: 1980 to 2004 , by Andrew R. Sommers.

77 Firms with 80% continuity of ownership would be treated as U.S. firms and firms with at least 60% continuity of ownership would be subject to tax on the transfer of assets for the next ten years.

78 See CRS Report RL34125, Mortality of Americans Age 65 and Older: 1980 to 2004 , by Andrew R. Sommers, CRS Report RL34115, Reform of U.S. International Taxation: Alternatives , by Jane G. Gravelle. See also International Corporate Tax Reform Proposals: Issues and Proposals, Forthcoming, Florida Tax Review , by Jane G. Gravelle.

79 Douglas Shackelford and Joel Slemrod, "The Revenue Consequences of Using Formula apportionment to Calculate U.S. and Foreign Source Income: A Firm Level Analysis," International Tax and Public Finance , vol. 5, no. 1, 1998, pp. 41-57.

80 Kimberly A. Clausing and Reuven A. Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment , Brookings Institution: The Hamilton Project, Discussion paper 2007-08, June 2007.

81 These and other issues are discussed by Rosanne Altshuler and Harry Grubert, "Formula Apportionment: Is it Better than the Current System and Are There Better Alternatives?" Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Working paper 09/01.

82 Michael P. Devereux and Simon Loretz, "The Effects of EU formula Apportionment on Corporate Tax Revenues," Fiscal Studies , Vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 1-33. http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119399105/PDFSTART?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0.

83 Michael McIntyre, "A Program for International Tax Reform," Tax Notes , February 23, 2009, pp. 1021-1026.

84 Harry Grubert, "Tax Credits, Source Rules, Trade and electronic Commerce: Behavioral Margins and the Design of International Tax Systems," Tax Law Review , vol. 58, January 2005; also issued as a CESIFO Working Paper (No. 1366), December 2004.; Harry Grubert and Rosanne Altshuler, "Corporate Taxes in a World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income," in John W. Diamond and George Zodrow, eds., Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices and Implications , Cambridge, MIT Press, 2008.

85 For discussions of various proposals listed see Tax Justice Network, "Ending the Offshore Secrecy System," March 2009, http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/TJN_0903_Action_Plan_for_G-20.pdf; testimony of Reuven Avi-Yonah, Peter Blessing, Stephen Shay, and Douglas Shulman before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the Ways and Means Committee, March 31, 2009; Martin Sullivan, "Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax Evasion," Tax Notes , part 1, April 20, 2009, pp. 264-268; part 2: April 27, 2009, pp. 371-373; part 3, May 4, 2009, pp. 516-520; Reuven Avi-Yonah, Testimony before the Committee on Select Revenue Measures of the Ways and Means Committee, March 5, 2008; Testimony of Jack A. Blum and, Testimony on the Cayman Islands and Offshore Tax Issues before the Senate finance Committee, July 24, 2008; Michael McIntyre, "A Program for International Tax Reform," Tax Notes , February 23, 2009, pp. 1021-1026.

86 See Jeremiah Coder, "Proposed offshore Crime Legislation Worries Defense Bar," Tax Notes Today , March 23, 2009. The attorneys are concerned that money laundering charges would not have to be approved through the Department of Justice's tax division, that penalties of up to 20 years gives prosecutors too much power, that the provisions may trap taxpayers who want to participate in IRS voluntary disclosure, and that they would also discourage the "quiet disclosure" where taxpayers simply report past information.

87 A summary was posted at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/LEVELING-THE-PLAYING-FIELD-CURBING-TAX-HAVENS-AND-REMOVING-TAX-INCENTIVES-FOR-SHIFTING-JOBS-OVERSEAS/.

88 A discussion of these provisions and revenue estimates can be found in the Treasury's Green Book, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2010 Revenue Proposals, http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/grnbk09.pdf.

89 For a more detailed explanation of the bill see Senator Levin's Introductory Remarks, March 3, 2009. This proposal has also been discussed by Martin Sullivan, "Proposals to Fight Offshore Tax Evasion, Part 3," Tax Notes , May 4, 2009, pp. 516-520.

90 See Committee on Finance News Release, March 12, 2009, http://finance.senate.gov/press/Bpress/2009press/prb031209b.pdf; See also Martin A. Sullivan, "Proposals to fight Offshore Tax Evasion, Part 2," Tax Notes , April 27, 2009, pp. 371-373/.

Labels:

Tuesday, June 23, 2009

IRS - sectuib 183 - Activities not Engaged in for Profit

IRC §183: Activities Not Engaged in For Profit Audit Technique Guide, June 19, 2009

June 23, 2009

Internal Revenue Service : Audit Technique Guide : Hobby losses .



IRC § 183: Activities Not Engaged in For Profit (ATG)

NOTE: This document is not an official pronouncement of the law or the position of the Service and can not be used, cited, or relied upon as such. This guide is current through the publication date. Since changes may have occurred after the publication date that would affect the accuracy of this document, no guarantees are made concerning the technical accuracy after the publication date.

Audit Guide Rev. 6/09



Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction and Overview
 Purpose of Guide

 Objectives of Guide

 IRC §183 Overview

 Taxpayer's Subject to IRC § 183 Activities Not Engaged in For Profit

 Presumption that Activity is Engaged in for Profit

 Election to Postpone Determination

Chapter 2: Examination Techniques
 Examination Techniques Overview

 Pre-audit Analysis

 Information Document Request

 Initial Interview

 Place of Examination

 Business/Activity Tour

 Factual Development

 Income Tax Savings Benefit Analysis

Chapter 3: Supporting Law
 Internal Revenue Code

 Treasury Regulations

 Revenue Rulings

 Case Law

Chapter 4: Report Writing
 Calculating the Examination Adjustments under IRC § 183

 RGS Input

 Taxpayer Penalties

 Return Preparer Penalties

 Unagreed Reports

 Alternative positions

 Inadequate Books and Records

Appendix
 Appendix A - Treas. Regs. § 1.183-2(b)

 Appendix B - Suggested Interview Questions for Each of 9 Relevant Factors

 Appendix C - Tax Savings Benefit Analysis

 Appendix D - Comparative Analysis Income Expense and Losses

 Appendix E - Example of an IDR for a Yacht Charter Activity



Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview



Purpose of Guide

This audit technique guide (ATG) has been developed to provide guidance to Revenue Agents and Tax Compliance Officers in pursuing the application of Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 183, Activities Not Engaged in for Profit (sometimes referred to as the "hobby loss rule").

The purpose of the guide is to:
 assist in distinguishing between a business activity (where deductions may be allowable under IRC § 162); a non-business "for profit" activity (where deductions may be allowable under IRC § 212; an activity not engaged in for profit (where deductions are strictly limited by specific rules contained in IRC § 183); and a personal activity (where deductions are generally disallowed by IRC § 262, except to the extent not otherwise allowable),

 provide examination techniques,

 supply applicable law, and

 provide written guidance in report writing.

This guide is not designed to be all inclusive.

This guide is not legal precedent and should not be relied upon as such. It is not designed to remove the discretion given to managers and examiners in the application of a variety of audit techniques or procedures appropriate to any given examination.



Objectives of Guide

Upon completion of this audit techniques guide, the examiner will be able to:

1. Determine when and to whom IRC § 183 may be asserted,

2. Identify and develop relevant factors for making an IRC § 183 determination, and

3. Compute the examination adjustments when a determination is made that an activity is not engaged in for profit.



IRC § 183 Overview

A number of taxpayers who have significant income from other sources reduce their taxable income by reporting losses from activities that may or may not be engaged in for profit. It is up to IRS examiners to make a factual determination whether an activity is engaged in for profit.

On September 27, 2007, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) issued a report entitled "Significant Challenges Exist in Determining Whether Taxpayers With Schedule C Losses are Engaged in Tax Abuse." The review looked at high income Small Business/Self-Employed (SB/SE) taxpayers (total income sources of $100,000 or greater) who claimed business losses using a U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) Profit or Loss From Business (Schedule C) for activities considered to be not-for-profit. The results of the audit found the following:
"In general, if a taxpayer has hobby income and expenses, the expense deduction should be limited to the hobby income amount. About 1.5 million taxpayers, many with significant income from other sources, filed form 1040 Schedules C showing no profits, only losses, over consecutive Tax Years 2002 - 2005 (4 years); 73 percent of these taxpayers were assisted by tax practitioners. By claming these losses to reduce their taxable incomes, about 1.2 million of the 1.5 million taxpayers potentially avoided paying $2.8 billion in taxes in Tax Year 2005. Changes are needed to prevent taxpayers from continually deducting losses in potentially not-for-profit activities to reduce their tax liabilities."

It is important to note that the report limited their review to Schedule C's with four years of consecutive losses and to total income sources of $100,000 or greater. It did not cover Schedule F farm activities nor did it cover any type of entity other than the 1040.

IRC § 183 generally limits deductions, in the case of an activity engaged in by a taxpayer, if the activity is not engaged in for profit. The term "activity not engaged in for profit" is defined by IRC § 183(c) to mean any activity, other than one with respect to which deductions are allowable for the taxable year under IRC § 162 or under paragraphs (1) or (2) of IRC § 212. IRC § 183 applies to individuals, partnerships, S corporations, trusts and estates. It does not apply to C corporations.

The determination of whether an activity is an activity not engaged in for profit is a factual determination. Neither the Code nor the Regulations provide an absolute definition. They instead serve to provide guidance in formulating the facts necessary to determine whether an activity is a not for profit activity. Historically, IRC § 183 has been a difficult issue to pursue.

The first "hobby loss" provision in the Internal Revenue Code was enacted by the Revenue Act of 1943 as IRC § 270. The act was intended to limit the ability of individuals with multiple sources of income to apply losses incurred in "side-line" diversions to reduce their overall tax liabilities. IRC § 270 was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 1969, and replaced with IRC § 183.

Generally, the Code allows individuals to deduct expenses which are incurred (1) in a trade or business (IRC § 162); or (2) for the production or collection of income, or for the management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the production of income (IRC § 212).

For the expenses to be deductible under IRC §§ 162 or 212, the taxpayer must engage in or carry on an activity to which the expenses relate with an actual and honest objective of making a profit. Keanini v. Comr ., 94 T.C. 41 (1990) (citing Golanty v. Comr ., 72 T.C. 411, 425 (1979), aff'd without published opinion, 647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981)); Dreicer v. Comr ., 78 T.C. 642 (1982), aff'd without opinion, 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they engaged in the activity with an actual and honest objective of realizing a profit. Hendricks v. Comr ., 32 F.3d 94 (4th Cir. 1994), aff'g T.C. Memo 1993-396, Comr. v. Groetzinger , 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987); Bot v. Comr ., 353 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 2003), aff'g 118 T.C. 138 (2002); Am. Acad. Of Family Physicians v. U.S. , 91 F.3d 1155, 1157-58 (8th Cir. 1996).

The taxpayer must devote time to the business in the honest belief that the business will sometime in the future become profitable. It is necessary for the taxpayer to show what their projected profit is expected to be.

If an activity is not engaged in for profit, IRC § 183(b) allows a taxpayer the deductions that would be allowable without regard to whether or not the activity is engaged in for profit. If the gross income derived from the activity for the taxable year exceeds these deductions, IRC § 183(b) also allows a taxpayer to deduct the amounts that would be allowable as deductions if the activity were engaged in for profit, to the extent of any remaining gross income.

Treas. Regs. § 1.183-1(e) provides that for purposes of IRC § 183, gross income includes the total of all gains from the sale, exchange or other disposition of property and all other gross receipts derived from such activity. It also provides that gross receipts from the activity may be reduced by cost of goods sold to determine gross income.

It is generally to the taxpayer's advantage to determine gross income based on gross profit (gross receipts less cost of goods sold). The examiner should ensure that cost of goods sold is reduced by any personal expenses or nondeductible items prior to making the gross income computation.

Making a determination as to whether an activity is not for profit has more implications than whether the loss will be allowed to offset other income. Many other areas on the tax return can be affected by this determination including but not limited to:
 self-employment tax

 deductions for health insurance premiums

 alternative minimum tax (AMT)

 itemized deductions

 adjusted gross income (AGI)

 personal exemption phase out

 Roth IRA contributions

The determination of the proper amount of adjusted gross income can affect many items on the return, including but not limited to rental losses, medical expenses, casualty losses, miscellaneous deductions, the adoption expense credit and interest on education loans.

Also, when there is an IRC § 183 problem, the taxpayer may be subject to AMT since miscellaneous itemized deductions (where many not for profit expenses end up) are not deductible for AMT purposes.

Whether or not an activity is presumed to be operated for profit requires an analysis of the facts and circumstances of each case. Deciding whether a taxpayer operates an activity with an actual and honest profit motive typically involves applying the nine non-exclusive factors contained in Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b). Those factors are:
1. the manner in which the taxpayer carried on the activity,

2. the expertise of the taxpayer or his or her advisers,

3. the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity,

4. the expectation that the assets used in the activity may appreciate in value,

5. the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities,

6. the taxpayer's history of income or loss with respect to the activity,

7. the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned,

8. the financial status of the taxpayer, and

9. elements of personal pleasure or recreation.

No single factor controls, other factors may be considered, and the mere fact that the number of factors indicating the lack of a profit objective exceeds the number indicating the presence of a profit objective (or vice versa) is not conclusive. For example, if five factors say the activity is not for profit, but four are on the profit side, the activity still could be determined to be engaged in for profit. More weight is given by the courts to objective facts than to the taxpayer's statement of his or her intent. Dreicer v. Comr ., 78 T.C. 642 (1982).

A profit objective in an earlier year does not automatically provide a taxpayer a blank check with regard to losses incurred in later years. For example, in a later year an activity may be treated as an activity not engaged in for profit even though in an earlier year the activity may have been conducted by the taxpayer with a profit objective. See Daugherty v. Comr. , T.C. Memo 1983-188; Dennis v. Comr. , T.C. Memo 1984-4.

An examiner should not tell a taxpayer that, because he is involved in a particular business activity, it is not possible to make a profit and his/her losses are therefore disallowed. Each taxpayer is entitled to be evaluated by a fair, impartial examiner so that a fully reasoned determination of whether an activity is engaged in for profit can be made.

IRC § 183(d) is a safe harbor for the taxpayer. It allows a presumption that the taxpayer is engaged in for profit if in 3 of 5 consecutive years (2 of 7 in the case of breeding, training, showing or racing of horses), the activity is profitable. This is covered in more detail below.

IRC § 183(e) allows the taxpayer to elect to postpone the determination as to whether the IRC § 183(d) presumption applies. This is also covered in more detail below.

IRC §162 allows as a deduction "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. A bona fide business must truly exist prior to claiming expenses under IRC § 162. An expense may qualify as ordinary and necessary if it is appropriate and helpful in carrying on a trade or business, is commonly and frequently incurred in the type of business conducted by the taxpayer, and is not a capital expenditure." Welch v. Helvering , 290 U.S. 111 (1933).

A trade or business expense deduction under IRC § 162, however, is not permitted with respect to a taxpayer's residence unless specifically permitted in certain limited circumstances by IRC § 280A. An examiner should consult the rules of IRC § 280A (which generally supersede the IRC § 183 rules) if the taxpayer's deductions are suspect and involve a personal residence. See e.g., Rev. Rul. 2004-32.



Multiple Activities

Treas. Regs. § 1.183-1(d) provides that if a taxpayer engages in two or more separate activities, deductions and income from each separate activity are not aggregated either in determining whether a particular activity is engaged in for profit or in applying IRC § 183. Multiple undertakings may be treated as one activity if the undertakings are sufficiently interconnected.

The regulations define an activity and provide that where the taxpayer is engaged in several undertakings, each of these may be a separate activity, or several undertakings may constitute one activity. In ascertaining the activity or activities of the taxpayer, all the facts and circumstances of the case must be taken into account. Generally, the most significant facts and circumstances in making this determination are the degree of organizational and economic interrelationship of various undertakings, the business purpose which is (or might be) served by carrying on the various undertakings separately or together in a trade or business or in an investment setting, and the similarity of various undertakings. Generally, the Commissioner will accept the characterization by the taxpayer of several undertakings either as a single activity or as separate activities. The taxpayer's characterization will not be accepted, however, when it appears that his characterization is artificial and cannot be reasonably supported under the facts and circumstances of the case.

If the taxpayer engages in two or more separate activities, deductions and income from each separate activity are not aggregated either in determining whether a particular activity is engaged in for profit or in applying IRC § 183.



Farming Activities and Farmland Appreciation

Where land is purchased or held primarily with the intent to profit from increase in its value, and the taxpayer also engages in farming on such land, the farming and the holding of the land will ordinarily be considered a single activity only if the farming activity reduces the net cost of carrying the land for its appreciation in value. Thus, the farming and holding of the land will be considered a single activity only if the income derived from farming exceeds the deductions attributable to the farming activity which are not directly attributable to the holding of the land (that is, deductions other than those directly attributable to the holding of the land such as interest on a mortgage secured by the land, annual property taxes attributable to the land and improvements, and depreciation of improvements to the land). Treas. Regs. § 1.183-1(d).

Some courts have avoided the restrictive rule discussed in the preceding paragraph by finding that the taxpayer did not purchase or hold the land primarily with the intent to profit from increase in its value. Instead, these courts have found the taxpayer purchased and held the land for farming. See e.g., Engdahl v. Comr ., 72 T.C. 659 n.4 (1979), acq. 1979-C.B.1. On distinguishable facts, an opposite conclusion was reached in Burrus v. Comr ., T.C. Memo 2003-285.



Taxpayer's Subject to IRC § 183 Activities Not Engaged in For Profit

The IRC § 183 activities not engaged in for profit rules applies to (1) individuals; (2) S corporations; (3) partnerships; (4) and trusts and estates. IRC § 183 does not apply to C corporations.



Individuals

The provisions under IRC § 183(a) specifically applies to individuals.



S corporations

The provisions under IRC § 183(a) specifically applies to S corporations. Treas. Regs. §1.183-1(f) provides that IRC § 183 and this section shall be applied in determining the allowable deductions of an electing small business corporation.



Partnerships

Rev. Rul. 77-320 holds that IRC § 183 of the Code applies to the activities of a partnership, and the provisions of IRC § 183 are applied at the partnership level and reflected in the partners' distributive shares. IRC § 703(a) provides in general that the taxable income of a partner shall be computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual.



Trusts and Estates

Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(a) states that "Pursuant to § 641(b), the taxable income of an estate or trust is computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual with certain exceptions not here relevant. Accordingly, where an estate or trust engages in an activity or activities which are not for profit, the rules of IRC § 183 apply in computing the allowable deductions of such trust or estate."



C Corporations

The provisions of IRC § 183 do not apply to C corporations.



Presumption that Activity is Engaged in for Profit

IRC § 183(d) provides a presumption that an activity is engaged in for profit if the activity is profitable for 3 years of a consecutive 5 year period or 2 years of a consecutive 7 year period for activities that consist of breeding, showing, training, or racing horses.

This presumption rule applies only after an activity incurs a third profitable (or second) profitable year within a 5 year (or 7 year) presumption period that begins with the first profitable year.

Note: Treasury Regulation § 1.183-1(c) has not been updated to reflect the 1986 amendment increasing the number of profit years required from two to three out of five years for activities other than horse racing, breeding or showing).

Example 1 - A taxpayer has the following profits and losses with a car racing activity (5 year presumption period):
Example 1 profits and losses



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Tax Year Gain or (Loss)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2000 (30,000)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2001 5000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2002 (60,000)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2003 2,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2004 5,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2005 (70,000)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2006 3,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2007 (63,000)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


The first 5 year presumption period begins with the first profit year of 2001, but the benefit of the presumption does not begin until the third profit year of 2004. The presumption is not available for 2001 through 2003 because it does not apply until the third profit year. The presumption is available during the first presumption period only in 2004 and 2005. The second five year presumption period begins with the 2003 profit year and runs through 2007. The presumption applies to the third profit year of 2006 and will be of benefit to the taxpayer for 2006 and 2007.

If the taxpayer meets the presumption rule, the Service can still argue that the activity is not engaged in for profit; however, the burden of proving that the activity is not engaged in for profit shifts to the Service. In addition, examiners cannot use IRC § 183(d) as the sole basis for disallowing losses under IRC § 183 even if it is shown that the taxpayer has not met the presumption rule.

Examiners should be alert for situations where the taxpayer may have manipulated income and or expenses to meet the presumption rule determination.



Election to Postpone Determination

Under IRC § 183(e), a taxpayer may elect to postpone a determination of whether the presumption applies until the close of the fourth taxable year (or the sixth year for qualifying horse activities) following the first taxable year in which the taxpayer engages in the activity. An electing taxpayer may file returns in the interim on the assumption that the activity is conducted for profit.

If an activity that is generating losses has not yet been carried on for the full profit presumption period, the taxpayer may elect to postpone a determination of whether or not an activity is engaged in for profit.

The examiner should first determine whether or not the activity is engaged in for profit from all available facts without regard to the presumption test or the possible election to postpone determination under IRC § 183(e). This determination should take into account the "nine relevant factors" listed in Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) as well as the pertinent facts.

Upon the filing of all or a sufficient number of the returns of the presumption period, the case file will be returned to the examiner for a determination if the activity is presumed to be an activity engaged in for profit.



Making the Election

Form 5213, Election to Postpone Determination as To Whether the Presumption Applies That an Activity Is Engaged in for Profit, is used when taxpayers wish to postpone an IRS determination as to whether the presumption applies that they are engaged in an activity for profit. An election made by a partnership or an S corporation is binding on all persons who were partners or shareholders at any time during the presumption period.

The election to postpone determination generally can be filed anytime within three years after the due date of the return (determined without regard to extensions) for the first year of the activity but not later than 60 days after the taxpayer receives written notice from the IRS proposing to disallow deductions attributable to the activity.

Note: Form 5213 is rarely used by the taxpayer until an examiner proposes to disallow the activity as not engaged in for profit.

The examiner should determine if the taxpayer wants, and is eligible to elect to postpone the determination under IRC § 183(e). If the taxpayer makes the decision to make the election, all legal and procedural implications should be explained. If the taxpayer is eligible to make the election but does not wish to, the examiner should obtain a written statement from the taxpayer or his representative stating that the taxpayer does not wish to elect the provisions of IRC § 183(e).



Placing in Suspense

If there is an election to postpone the determination, the examiner will generally close the case to suspense until the end of the presumption period. Upon the filing of all or a sufficient number of the returns of the presumption period, the case file will be returned to the examiner for a final determination if the activity is engaged in for profit.

If the taxpayer wishes to make an §183(e) election to postpone determination, the examiner should:
1. secure fully completed and properly signed Form 5213,

2. requisition all returns beginning with the initial year,

3. obtain AMDISA, IMFOLT, IMFOLR for all tax returns,

4. perform audit functions as warranted, paying particular attention to the full development of the activity not engaged in for profit issue,

5. examine and complete any open years prior to placing in suspense,

6. prepare a report on each of the open years of the IRC § 183 adjustments,

7. attach a completed Form 3198, Special Handling Notice for Examination Case Processing, checking the blocks "Suspense Cases" and "Sec. 183 (Form 5213),"

8. make appropriate comments in the workpapers to document the election,

9. advise the taxpayer of the suspense process and to retain all pertinent books and records for each of the presumptive years,

10. attach the Form 5213 to the back of the first year's return with the form number showing above the tax return, and, if applicable,

11. resolve all other issues through partial assessments or unagreed procedures prior to sending the case to Technical Services for suspense.

A partially agreed report should be prepared if there are other issues which are agreed and generate a deficiency. One report will contain the agreed issues and the other report only the IRC § 183(a) issue as unagreed. IRM 4.10.8.5 contains the report writing instructions for partially agreed cases.

The Form 4549-A, Income Tax Discrepancy Adjustments, in the "Other Information' section should include the following statement:
"You have elected to postpone the determination with respect to the presumption that this activity is engaged in for profit by filing Form 5213 on (insert date) and thus, this issue will be suspended.

On the unagreed report, the IRC § 183(a) issue should be written up as if the case will go directly to Appeals. The Form 3198 should indicate in the Other Section "Partial Agreement Secured and Processed."

If there are other unagreed issues besides the § 183 (a) issue, the unagreed report will contain both the unagreed issue(s) and the IRC § 183(a) issue(s) before the case is forwarded to Appeals. The Form 3198 should be notated "Case to be forwarded to Technical Services for suspense after resolution of unrelated issues."

It is the IRS's position that the interest suspension period specified in IRC § 6404(g) is tolled (ceases to run) during the time the IRC § 183 election is in effect and for the particular activity to which the election relates.



Statute of Limitations

The filing of Form 5213 automatically extends the period of limitations for assessing any income tax deficiency specifically attributable to the activity during any year in the presumption period.

Under IRC § 183(e)(4), if a taxpayer elects a postponement, the statutory period for the assessment of any deficiency attributable to the issue is extended to 2 years after the due date (without extensions) for filing the return for the last taxable year in the 5 or 7 year presumption period to which the election relates.

For example, for an activity subject to a 5 year presumption period that began in 2004 and ends in 2008, the period of limitations automatically extends to April 15, 2012, for all tax years in the presumption period that would otherwise expire before that date with regards to the § 183 issue.

Note: The automatic extension applies only to those deductions attributable to the activity and to any deductions (such as medical expenses or charitable contribution deductions) that are affected by changes to AGI. It does not extend the statute of limitations for issues not related to the IRC § 183 issue.



Chapter 2: Examination Techniques



Examination Techniques Overview

Once an examiner believes there is a possible activity not engaged in for profit issue, the case must be adequately developed. In order to adequately develop an IRC § 183 issue, the examiner must address each of the nine relevant factors contained in Treas. Reg. 1.183-2(b). The nine factors found in the regulations along with a discussion of each factor are contained in Appendix A .

An IRC § 183 issue will not be sustained in Appeals or in the courts if it has not been properly developed and documented.

Included below are examination techniques specific to the IRC § 183 issue. Some of these techniques are the same or similar to techniques performed on a typical case.



Pre-audit Analysis

It is not always easy to determine from looking at the return if an activity is not engaged in for profit. Examiners should be alert to see if there is a "reasonable" indication that there is a "likelihood" of an activity not engaged in for profit in the pre-audit stage of the examination. The amount of pre-plan time spent will vary with the complexity of the case.

Examiners should consider the following in their pre-audit analysis:
 Are there activities with large expenses and little or no income?

 Are losses offsetting other income on the return?

 Does the activity result in a large tax benefit to the taxpayer?

 Does the history of the activity show that it is generating any profit in any years?

Examples of possible IRC § 183 activities include but are not limited to:
Possible IRC § 183 activities



Fishing Horse Racing Horse Breeding

Farming Motorcross Racing Auto Racing

Craft Sales Bowling Stamp Collecting

Dog Breeding Yacht Charter Artists

Gambling Fishing Bowling

Direct Sales Photography Writing

Entertainers Airplane Charter Rentals



An in-depth pre-audit analysis is essential to conducting a quality examination Examiners should prepare a comparative analysis of the taxpayer's returns for multiple years to assist in the identification of:
 large, unusual and questionable items,

 missing schedules,

 inconsistencies between different years, and

 audit potential.

A successful taxpayer interview depends upon what is done before the interview. The examiner should obtain as much information about the taxpayer, be organized, and prepare an interview outline that is tailored to the taxpayer under examination.

Information may be obtained by the use of internal sources such as IDRS, CFOL, MACS/CDE, IRP transcripts and YK-1 to learn everything possible about the taxpayer. External electronic sources of information such as Accurint, Google, Yahoo, and Altavista should also be searched. This information should be compared with the taxpayer's return.

Examiners should perform any preliminary research including reviewing applicable code sections, regulations, court cases, revenue rulings and procedures, and ATGs.

As preliminary information is gathered, it should be carefully reviewed and documented.



Information Document Request

The initial Information Document Request (IDR) for a possible IRC § 183 case should be tailored to the specific taxpayer under examination but will more than likely be the same as for a typical case.

The examiner should not issue an IDR asking the taxpayer to respond to each of the nine factors. This should be done in person with the taxpayer present and the examiner documenting responses. Also, examiners should not request the Business Plan with the first IDR as this should be addressed at the initial interview.

Subsequent IDR's should address other needed information to complete the examination.

An example of an IDR with possible items an examiner might request to assist in determining if a yacht charter activity is an activity engaged in for profit is in Appendix E .



Initial Interview

An examiner may not become aware that there is a possible IRC § 183 activity until the initial interview with the taxpayer and/or representative. A subsequent interview may be necessary to gather the factual information to evaluate each of the nine factors contained in Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b). The nine factors found in the regulations along with a discussion of each factor are in Appendix A . An effective and well documented interview is vital to the success in developing an IRC § 183 issue.

The business history should be developed and documented in the examiner's workpapers. Interviews provide information about the taxpayer's financial history, business/activity operations, and accounting records. Interviews should be used to obtain information needed to reach informed judgments about the scope of an examination and the resolution of issues. Interviews can be used to obtain leads, develop information and establish evidence.

A list of possible interview questions to consider for each of the nine factors used in determining whether an IRC § 183 issue present is in Appendix B . Not all of these questions are warranted in every case and questions should be tailored to address items specific to the taxpayer under examination. This interview plan is a guide, which should be modified based upon the responses of the taxpayer and should not be used as an inflexible outline.

Examiners should use short questions that can be easily understood and in a logical order. Sufficient questions should be asked to give a clear understanding of the taxpayer's operations. Follow-up questions should be used to clarify questionable areas. If both the taxpayer and preparer/authorized representative are present for the interview, direct the questions to the taxpayer. Listen to the answers and follow up on any answers that are incomplete or unclear.

The examiner should consider preparing Memorandum of Interview summarizing information obtained and statements made. This will become part of the case file to aid in the case development.



Authority to conduct interviews

The authority to conduct interviews and request information is granted by IRC § 7602.

Every attempt should be made to schedule the initial appointment with the taxpayer. IRC § 7521(c) permits a representative authorized by the taxpayer to represent that taxpayer at any interview. Although a request for the taxpayer's voluntary presence should be made through his/her representative, the taxpayer's presence will not be mandated as long as the person being interviewed has first hand knowledge of the taxpayer's business, business practices, bookkeeping methods, accounting practices and the daily operation of the business. That person must commit to having first hand knowledge of the information requested and affirm that the examiner can rely upon the information provided.

A representative may claim to have first hand knowledge, but when questions are asked it is clear he/she is unable to give adequate answers. If an examiner determines that the representative does not have sufficient knowledge of the taxpayer and his/her business to provide factual information, the examiner should request a subsequent interview with the individual who possesses that information. The examiner should not conduct the audit with someone who will serve as a courier, shuffling back and forth between the examiner and the taxpayer with IRS questions and client answers.

If the taxpayer's representative does not comply with the request to interview someone more knowledgeable, including the taxpayer, the examiner should consider management involvement, issuing an administrative summons to the taxpayer (IRC § 7521(c) and/or by-passing the representative. More information can be found in IRM 4.10.2.and 4.11.55.2.

The examiner may need to use third party contacts order to obtain corroborating information from third parties.



Place of Examination

IRC § 7605(a) states, in part, that "the time and place of examination shall be such time and place as may be fixed by the Secretary and as are reasonable under the circumstances."

For office examination cases the examination will be conducted in the office of the IRS closest to the taxpayer's residence in the assigned area.

For field examinations an examination will be conducted at the location where the original books, records and source documents are maintained. This is usually the taxpayer's principal place of the business/activity being examined.

On a case-by-case basis, examiners should consider requests by the taxpayer or representative to change the place of the examination (Treas. Reg. § 301.7605-1(e).) In considering these requests, the following factors should be considered:
 The location of the taxpayer's current residence and location of the business/activity.

 The location where the books and records and source documents are maintained.

 The physical restrictions at the activity which could cause disruption of taxpayer's daily operations.



Business/Activity Tour

Viewing the facilities and observing the activities is an opportunity to acquire an overview of the operation, establish that books and records accurately reflect operations, observe and test internal controls, clarify information obtained through interviews, and identify potential audit issues.

Treas. Reg. § 301.7605-1 states "regardless of where an examination takes place, the Service may visit the taxpayer's place of business or residence to establish facts that can only be established by direct visit, such as inventory or asset verification." The visit can show evidence of financial status, equipment usage, undisclosed aspects of the operation, etc.

Tours should be conducted after the initial interview and early in the examination process. Examiners should be alert to the physical surroundings and confirm that assets identified on the tax return are physically present and identify assets that are physically present but are not represented on the return. Examiners should ask questions to confirm an understanding of what is observed.

When determining the validity of office in the home deductions, the office or activity should be toured.

Examiners should document that a tour was completed and describe the results, including observations and resolution of any questions. If a tour of the business/activity is not conducted, the reason(s) for not conducting the tour should be documented in the workpapers.

A Tax Compliance Officer (TCO) does not always have the opportunity to perform a physical tour of the taxpayer's activity. However, the TCO can inspect any photographs that the taxpayer may have of the activity.



Factual Development

Examiners must determine whether the taxpayer engaged in the activity with an objective of earning a profit. Although a "reasonable" expectation of profit is not required, the profit objective must be bona fide, as determined from a consideration of the facts and circumstances.

Treas. Reg. §1.183-2(b) ( Appendix A ) contains nine relevant factors to be used in determining whether a taxpayer is conducting an activity with the intent to make a profit. An IRC §183 case is not adequately developed until all nine relevant factors are considered and documented. No one factor is more important or heavily weighted; a numerical majority does not decide the issue.

The examiner should obtain copies of prior year returns from the inception of the activity and should prepare a comparative analysis schedule of income and losses (expenses) since the inception of the business through the present as shown in Appendix D . All trends in profits or losses should be addressed and explained. Any unusual income items or expense items that occur and then "drop off" may mean the taxpayer's profit is contrived. The examiner should consider whether the profits shown were manipulated in order to meet the presumption test.

Examiners should be alert to the nature of the gross receipts that have been reported and determine if the income source truly exists or relates to the activity. Income may have been "created" in order to make it appear as though the activity earned income.

The case file should reflect an adequately documented interview. Each of the nine factors must be addressed and documented. Sample questions for each factor are contained in Appendix B .

A taxpayer who claims a business expense deduction has the burden of proof. Deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace, and taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they are entitled to the deductions claimed. Hawthorne v. Comr , T.C. Memo 1999-31 (citing Indopco, Inc. v. Comr , 503 U.S. 79, 84, (1992)).

A taxpayer seeking a deduction must be able to point to an applicable statute and show that he comes within its terms. New Colonial Ice v. Helvering , 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Also see Indopco, Inc. v. Comr , 503 U.S. 79, 84, (1993); Rockwell v. Comr , 512 F.2d 882, 886 (1975), aff'g TC Memo 1972-133.

To take any deduction, the taxpayer must be able to cite an authority: Code, regulations, revenue rulings, notices. This includes the burden of substantiating the amount and purpose of the deduction claimed. IRC § 6001 imposes a broad recordkeeping responsibility on all taxpayers, requiring them to maintain adequate records to substantiate the liability. IRC § 6001 gives the IRS authority to require whatever records it deems necessary. If the taxpayer proves that a portion of the expenditure was made for a deductible purpose, the taxpayer may allocate that portion to the deductible purpose when the record contains sufficient evidence for a reasonable allocation. See Dillon v. Commissioner , 902 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1990).

IRC § 6201 provides examiners with the authority to resolve issues and to make determinations of tax liability. It also provides broad authority to exercise professional judgment to weigh conflicting factual information, data, and opinions on issues of law to determine the correct tax liability.



Factual Development of IRC § 162 Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses

Like any other examination, the examiner should evaluate each large, unusual or questionable item to determine its deductibility as a business expense. IRC § 162 allows the deduction of ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred to carry on any trade or business. Examiners should be alert for personal expenses which may be disguised as business deductions.



Factual Development of Other Non § 183 Issues

Whether or not it is determined that an activity is engaged in for profit, the examiner should consider whether other Internal Revenue Code sections apply and treat as alternative positions. Substantiation of all large, unusual or questionable items should be performed on each examination.

Some of the other Internal Revenue Code sections include, but are not limited to:
 IRC § 704 partnership loss limitations

 IRC § 1366 S corporation stock or debt basis limitations

 IRC § 465 at-risk limitations

 IRC § 469 passive activity loss limitations

 IRC § 162 ordinary and necessary

 IRC § 274(d) record keeping requirements

 IRC § 179 election to expense certain depreciable assets

 IRC § 167 and 168 depreciation

 IRC § 212 expenses for production of income

 IRC § 280A disallowance of certain expenses in connection with business use of the home, rental of vacation homes, motor homes, houseboats, yachts, etc.

 IRC § 195 start up expenses

Taxpayers may use the activity to claim personal expenses. Examiners should be on the alert for any one or a combination of the following:
 Deducting all or most of the cost of maintaining a personal residence. See IRC § 280A. Taxpayers sometimes erroneously claim that the "exclusive use" restriction of IRC § 280A can be avoided by placing business-related items in any given room of the house. The taxpayers sometimes cite the IRC § 280A(c)(2) exception for storage use (storage on a regular basis of inventory or product samples). For example, the taxpayer may erroneously claim that if a poster, calendar, desk, file cabinet, telephone or other business item is placed in a room that secures the room's business status without regard to the fact that the room is used for personal purposes as a kitchen, bathroom, child's bedroom, etc.

 Paying children and/or family members for household duties that are not ordinary and necessary to the operation of any business (e.g. disposing of trash, mowing the law, answering the telephone, washing cars). Also, the payment may be excessive for the services performed.

 Deducting family education expenses by claiming an Education Assistance Program for family members claimed as employees. See IRC §127.

 Deducting excessive car and truck expenses when the vehicle was used for both personal and business use. Taxpayers sometimes claim a business purpose for every trip, whether it is to commute to a regular job or a trip to the grocery store, golf course, church, etc. Taxpayers sometimes erroneously argue that the trips are deductible given that there is always a potential of recruiting new clients.

 Deducting personal furniture, home entertainment equipment, children's toys, etc.

 Deducting personal travel, meals, and entertainment under the guise that since everyone is a potential client, these are deductible, not personal expenses.

 Deducting 100% of personal medical expenses merely by "employing" a family member who is not a bona fide employee and creating a medical reimbursement plan.



Income Tax Savings Benefit Analysis

The examiner needs to obtain information regarding the history of the activity under consideration. This information should be reviewed to see if any profits are being generated in any years and to determine the overall history of losses exceeding the profits. Completing an analysis of tax savings is important in developing a § 183 case. The analysis should begin, if possible, with the first year of the activity.

This analysis should be discussed with the taxpayer and included in the examination report.

A template that can be used in performing an income tax savings benefit analysis is in Appendix C .



Chapter 3: Supporting Law



Internal Revenue Code

Various code sections may come into play whenever there is an adjustment that may involve IRC §183, including but not limited to the following:

§ 67(a) - In the case of an individual, the miscellaneous itemized deductions are allowed only to the extent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2% of AGI.

§ 67(c) - In the case of pass-thru entities (1120S and 1065), a partner or S corporation shareholder must take into account separately his/her distributive or pro rata share of the partnership's or S corporation's miscellaneous itemized deductions which are subject to the 2% limitation in IRC § 67(a);

§ 68(a) - Overall limitation on itemized deductions.

§ 162 - A deduction is allowed for all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business.

§ 183 - Provides, generally, that if an activity is not engaged in for profit, deductions are allowable in the following order and only to the following extent:
1. amounts allowable as deductions during the taxable year without regard to whether the activity was engaged in for profit are allowable in full (e.g. home mortgage interest, real estate taxes, etc.);

2. amounts that would otherwise be allowable if the activity were engaged in for profit and that would not result in an adjustment to the basis of the property if allowed are allowed only to the extent the gross income derived from the activity exceeds the deductions allowed or allowable in (1);

3. amounts that would otherwise be allowable if the activity were engaged in for profit that would result in an adjustment to the basis of the property if allowed are allowed only to the extent that gross income derived from the activity exceeds the deductions allowed or allowable in (1) and (2).

§ 212 - An itemized deduction is allowed for individuals for all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred for the production or collection of income, for the management, conservation, or maintenance held for the production of income; or in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.

§ 262 - Except as otherwise expressly provided, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expense.

§ 280A - A trade or business expense deduction under IRC § 162 is not permitted with respect to a taxpayer's residence unless specifically permitted in limited circumstances by IRC § 280A(a). In order for allocable expenses to be deductible, the portion of the taxpayer's residence must be used exclusively by the taxpayer on a regular basis as a principal place of business for the taxpayer's trade or business, or to meet or deal with patients, clients or customers in the normal course of the taxpayer's trade or business. If the taxpayer is an employee, the exclusive and regular use of a portion of the taxpayer's residence must be for the convenience of the taxpayer's employer before any expenses relating to the part of the taxpayer's residence may be deducted.

§ 465 - This code section limits a taxpayer's deduction for losses from an activity to the amount at risk. IRC § 465 applies to activities in which the taxpayer is engaged in carrying on a trade or business or for the production of income. Therefore, for the rules of IRC § 465 to apply, the taxpayer must be engaged in the activity for profit. Accordingly, an activity subject to IRC § 183 cannot be subject to IRC § 465 in the same year. If IRC § 465 applies, any loss in excess of the taxpayer's amount at-risk cannot be deducted in the current year. If the taxpayer has no personal liability, but has pledged property as security for repayment of the debt, the amount at-risk is the fair market value of the pledged property, less any superior liens. If the taxpayer pledges property that is used in the activity as security, that property does not increase the amount at-risk. There is a special rule for real estate activities - a nonrecourse loan qualifies as an amount at-risk if it is "qualified non-recourse financing."

§ 469 - Passive losses in excess of passive income are nondeductible. A passive activity is any rental activity or any business activity in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. If the average customer use is 7 days or less, the rental activity falls outside the rental definition and is treated like a business subject to material participation. If the average customer use is 30 days or less, and there are significant personal services, the activity falls outside the rental definition and is treated like a business subject to material participation.

§ 704 - A partner's distributive share of partnership loss shall be allowed only to the extent of the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership.

§ 1366 - A S corporation's shareholder's pro rata share of loss is not deductible if the loss exceeds the shareholder's basis in his or her stock, plus certain debt basis.



Treasury Regulations

Below are applicable Treasury regulations:

1.183-1 - General information for IRC § 183.

Caution: Treasury Regulation § 1.183-1(c) has not been updated to reflect the 1986 amendment increasing the number of profit years required from two to three out of five years for activities other than horse racing, breeding or showing).

1.183-2 - Nine relevant factors to be used in determining if an activity is engaged in for profit. These factors are included in their entirety in Appendix A .



Revenue Rulings

Rev. Rul. 55-258 - holds that income received in an activity not engaged in for profit must be included in taxable income but is not subject to self-employment tax.

Rev. Rul. 75-14 - holds that the rental of a house to a relative at less than the full fair market value and less than the total expenses attributable to the house is an activity not engaged in for profit within the meaning of IRC § 183. Therefore, the taxpayer may only deduct the expenses to the extent allowable under Treas. Reg. 1.183-1(b)(1) provided he itemizes deductions.

Rev. Rul. 77-320 - holds that IRC § 183 of the Code applies to the activities of a partnership, and the provisions of IRC § 183 are applied at the partnership level and reflected in the partners' distributive shares.

Rev. Rul. 2004-32 - holds that taxpayers cannot use schemes designed to create the appearance of having a home-based business, where none actually exists, for the purpose of converting otherwise nondeductible personal, living or family expenses into purportedly legitimate deductions.



Case Law

There are numerous court cases which discuss IRC § 183. Some opinions are taxpayer-favorable while other opinions support the Government's position.

Where the specific facts warrant, the examiner should cite cases both favorable and unfavorable to the Government. The taxpayer or authorized representative should be requested to provide any cases which defend the taxpayer's position.



Chapter 4: Report Writing



Calculating the Examination Adjustments under IRC § 183

When the examiner has determined that the taxpayer falls under the provisions of IRC § 183, it is important to calculate the proper adjustments.

A common error is for the examiner to simply disallow the net loss from the activity. Income must be reported on the 1040, line 21, as unearned income and expenses that fall in category 2 and/or 3 are deductible only as miscellaneous itemized deductions. These category 2 and/or 3 deductions are subject to the 2% of AGI limitations (IRC §67) and the overall limitation on itemized deductions (IRC § 68). Also, an individual may be subject to alternative minimum tax since miscellaneous deductions are not deductible for alternative minimum tax purposes.



Gross Income

Treas. Reg. 1.183-1(e) provides that for purposes of IRC § 183, gross income derived from an activity not engaged in for profit includes the total of all gains derived from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of property, and all other gross receipts derived from such activity. Gross income may be determined from any activity by subtracting the cost of goods sold from the gross receipts as long as the taxpayer consistently does so and follows generally accepted methods of accounting in determining such income.



Deductions

If an activity is not engaged in for profit, deductions are allowable under IRC § 183(b) in the following order on the Schedule A and only to the following extent:
 Category 1 - First, deduct expenses that are allowable without regard to the taxpayer's profit motive from the gross income produced by the activity. For example, taxes, mortgage interest, casualty and theft losses, and contributions. These expenses are not limited by gross income from the activity since they are allowable under other sections of the Internal Revenue Code regardless of whether or not such activity is engaged in for profit. These expenses should appear in the proper places on the Schedule A and be allowed in full after taking into account any limitations such as the limitation on excess investment interest.

 Category 2 - Second, deduct expenses that would be allowable if the activity were to be engaged in for profit. For example, rent, labor, wages, travel, transportation, etc. These expenses are limited to the amount of gross income less the expenses in Category 1.

 Category 3 - Third, allow deductions which lead to basis adjustments (e.g. depreciation, amortization and the portion of casualty losses that is not deductible in Category 1). These expenses are limited to the amount of gross income from the activity less the expenses in Categories 1 and 2. If there is any gross income remaining after Category 1 and 2 items, the depreciation must be allocated to each depreciable asset.

The allowed expenses are reported as itemized deductions possibly subject to the overall limitation on itemized deductions and subject to the 2% AGI floor for miscellaneous itemized deductions. Also, for alternative minimum tax purposes, no deduction is allowed for miscellaneous items, as defined in IRC § 67(b).



Incorrect Computation Example

The following is an incorrect computation and examiners should not use this method.

Schedule C has gross receipts of $13,000 from a direct sales activity not engaged in for profit. After expenses of $50,000, the per return ordinary loss is $37,000.
An example for incorrect computation



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Gross Receipts $13,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Less Expenses (Mortgage Interest) $-2,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Less Expenses (Supplies, Repairs, Etc.) $-11,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Balance of Gross Receipts $0

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Remaining Expenses ($50,000 - 13,000) = Incorrect Adjustment $37,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


In the above example, AGI would only have been increased by $37,000 and no adjustments would have been made on the Schedule A.

The correct method would have been to increase AGI by $50,000 by:
1. removing the $13,000 of gross receipts from the Schedule C;

2. reclassifying the $13,000 of gross receipts from Schedule C to other income (line 21 of the Form 1040);

3. removing all $50,000 in expenses from the Schedule C;

4. allowing $2,000 as a Schedule A mortgage expense deduction (Category 1 item); and

5. allowing $11,000 (Category 2 items) as Schedule A miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to the 2% AGI limitation.

By utilizing this method there will be an additional adjustment due to the miscellaneous itemized deductions limitation and possible other adjustments due to the possible overall limitation on itemized deductions, and other items (e.g., exemption deduction, AMT and change in AGI which could affect other items on the return.)

Activities not engaged in for profit expenses are deductible only as Schedule A items, therefore individual's who do not itemize cannot claim any deductions attributable to an IRC § 183 activity.

IRC § 183 adjustments are permanent adjustments unlike passive activity losses which are timing adjustments. Any adjustments made due to IRC §183 are not permitted to be carried forward.



IRC § 183(b) Computation Example

The following computation shows how to correctly compute the deductions allowable under IRC § 183(b).

An examiner is auditing a horse breeding activity and made the determination that it is not engaged in for profit. The AGI per return is $125,000 which includes the Schedule F loss of $64,000. All expenses on the Schedule F have been verified. The Schedule F loss is computed as follows:
The Schedule F loss computation



Schedule F Gross Income $23,200

Expenses $87,200

Schedule F Loss Per Return ($64,000)



Step 1 - Remove gross income of $23,200 from the Schedule F.

Step 2 - Reclassify income of $23,200 as other income - unearned, to line 21 of the Form 1040.

Step 3 - Remove all $87,200 expenses from the Schedule F.

Step 4 - Compute corrected AGI
The corrected AGI computation



AGI Per Return $125,000

Less Schedule F Gross Income ($23,200)

Plus Other Income-Unearned $23,200

Plus Disallowed Expenses $87,200

Corrected AGI $212,200



Step 5 - Sort expenses into Categories 1, 2 and 3
Expenses sorted into different categories



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Expense Amount Category 1 Category 2 Category 3

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Real estate taxes 6,000 6,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Mortgage interest 12,000 12,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Insurance 1,600 1,600

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Utilities 4,200 4,200

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Cell Phone 400 400

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Veterinary Visits 2,000 2,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Auto 6,000 6,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Repairs 16,000 16,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Feed 8,000 8,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Depreciation 31,000 31,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total 87,200 18,000 38,200 31,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


Step 6 - Determine amount of Category 1, 2 and 3 expenses allowable.
Determine amount of Category 1, 2 and 3 expenses allowable



Gross Income $23,200

Less Category 1 Expenses (18,000)

Maximum Category 1 and 2 Deductions $5,200

Less Category 2 Expenses * * (5,200)

Remaining Gross Income to offset Against Category 3 Expenses 0

* * Category 2 items which are deductible to the extent of gross income remaining after Category 1
items (and subject to IRC §§ 67 and 68).



The Category 2 expenses of $5,200 must further be reduced under IRC §67 by $4,244 (2% of the corrected AGI - 2% X 212,200). The itemized deduction limitation under IRC § 68 applies but not enough facts have been presented to determine this limitation.

There is no amount of gross income remaining for Category 3 expenses.

In this example, if the loss had simply been disallowed it would have resulted in a $64,000 adjustment. By moving the expenses to the Schedule A it resulted in an additional adjustment of $4,244 due to the miscellaneous itemized deduction limitation under IRC § 67 and possibly other adjustments due to the change in AGI.



RGS Input



Leadsheets

A leadsheet is available on IRC § 183 Activities Not Engaged in for Profit and should be used when the examiner determines that there is a possibility that an activity is not for profit. This issue should be categorized as de minimis with Per Return and Per Exam fields being zero. The compliance information will be completed with Reason Code 52, Form/Schedule X and Line number 99. For the NAICS code, enter "D."

All workpapers and supporting documentation pertaining to the development of the IRC § 183 issue should be contained in the Activities Not Engaged in for Profit leadsheet and should be included with the report issued to the taxpayer. The supporting documentation should include a schedule which shows how each category 1, 2 and 3 expenses were arrived at along with the factual development of the case addressing each of the nine relevant factors found in Treas. Reg.§1.183-2(b) used in determining whether a taxpayer is conducting an activity with the intent to make a profit.

The actual adjustments should be made in each income and expense leadsheet and reference made to the documentation contained in the IRC § 183 leadsheet. If an expense item is adjusted because of lack of verification or reasons other than IRC § 183, the supporting documentation and conclusions should be contained in each individual issue leadsheet and be treated as an alternative position in the event that, on appeal, the primary activity not engaged in for profit position is overturned.



Entering Adjustments in Report Generation Software (RGS)

After determining the expense categories and limitations, the adjustments need to be entered in RGS.

Each income and expense item on the schedule used to report the activity should be disallowed. Items should not be combined into one adjustment. The issues for these items may already be classified and created. Reason Code 10 or 14 should be used only if the item is allowed in full elsewhere on the return. All adjustments using Reason Code 10 or 14 must net to zero. Appropriate reason codes should be used for other adjustments.

Reason Code 10 description is "Income/Expenses entered on wrong item to reduce tax or increase credits." This reason code should be made to issues when penalties are applied

Reason Code 14 description is "Taxpayer entered item on the wrong form, schedule or line" for any expense disallowed which has been allowed in full on the Schedule A. In this example, Reason Code 14 would be used for all of the Category 1 expenses. This reason code should be made when no penalties have been asserted and the item has been allowed in full on the Schedule A.

An issue must be created moving the "earned income" to "unearned income (line 21 of Form 1040)" for the activity. This income should be categorized as "other income - unearned." Issues must be created separately for any Category 1 expenses fully allowable on Schedule A, e.g. mortgage interest, real estate taxes. An additional issue must be added for any other Category 2 and 3 allowable miscellaneous itemized deductions (these items may be grouped into one adjustment.) These Category 2 and 3 expenses are limited by the gross income from the activity after subtracting Category 1 expenses.



Partnerships and S Corporations

Where a flow through entity is engaged in several activities, if the activities are separate, the expenses and income from both may not be aggregated in order to apply the limits of IRC § 183.

Flow through entities are required to 'separately state" certain items of income and deductions. Items must be 'separately stated" if the item would result in a tax liability for any partner/shareholder different from the person's tax liability, if the items weren't 'separately stated.' E.g. charitable contributions, portfolio income, IRC § 179 deduction, investment interest expense.

Each income and expense item on the schedule used to report the activity should be disallowed. Income from an activity not engaged in for profit should be categorized separately in RGS as "Other Income' for both the Schedule K and K-1. Similarly, expenses should be grouped by category (1, 2 or 3) and categorized as 'other deductions' and deducted only up to the extent of hobby income. Any remaining deductions should be categorized as non-deductible expenses. The non-deductible expenses will result in a reduction in the investor basis. An issue should be created in RGS to reflect the non-deductible expenses.



1040 Schedule C Example

An examiner is auditing a Schedule C bass fishing activity not engaged in for profit with $3,000 of gross income. The taxpayer had $120,000 of AGI. The following Schedule C expenses were reported and verified by the taxpayer:
1040 Schedule C Example



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Expense Amount Category 1 Category 2 Category 3

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Property taxes 700 700

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Mortgage interest 900 900

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Insurance 400 400

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Utilities 700 700

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Auto/Travel 23,000 23,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Bait/Tackle 2,000 2,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Entrance Fees 8,000 8,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Depreciation 28,000 28,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total 63,700 1,600 34,100 28,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


Total expenses reported on the Schedule C were $63,700 resulting in a net loss of $60,700. The Schedule C was classified as a potential activity not for profit and all income and expense items were classified.
 Category 1 expenses total $1,600

 Category 2 expenses total $34,100

 Category 3 expenses total $28,000

Category 1 expenses of $1,600 are allowed in full leaving $1,400 remaining of gross income for Category 2 and 3 expenses. Since Category 2 expenses totaling $$34,100 exceed the remaining gross income of $1,400, the taxpayer is allowed only $1,400 of the Category 2 expenses. None of the Category 3 expenses may be allowed since there is no remaining gross income remaining.

Step 1 - Remove Income from Schedule C

The first step in RGS is to remove the Schedule C income. Enter $3,000 in the Per Return field Enter zero in the Per Exam field. For the NAICS code enter "D" in the Per Exam field (the Schedule C is disallowed in full).

Step 2 - Add an issue for Other Income - Unearned

Add an issue as a New Issue Resulting from a Classified Issue. Categorize the adjustment as Other Income - unearned (this income is not subject to self employment tax). Enter zero in the Per Return field. Enter $3,000 in the Per Exam Field.

Step 3 - Remove All Schedule C Expenses

In the example, all Schedule C expenses have been classified. Disallow the Category 1 expenses in full by entering zero in the Per Exam field. Use Reason code 10 or 14 only if the item is allowed in full elsewhere on the return. Enter "D" in the NAICS code Per Exam field. Note that if these issues had not been classified the examiner would need to add each individual expense item as a separate adjustment into RGS.

Step 4 -Allow Category 1 Expenses on Schedule A

Category 1 expenses are allowable in full on Schedule A without regard to gross income limitations. Add each issue as a New Issue Resulting from a Classified Issue. In this example there are two separate adjustments - one to mortgage interest and one to real estate taxes. Use Reason Code 10 or 14.

Step 5 - Allow Category 2 and 3 Expenses on Schedule A

The remaining allowable expenses ($3,000 income less $1,600 category 1 expenses) are limited to the remaining income from the activity and entered as Schedule A Miscellaneous Itemized Deductions subject to 2% of AGI. One adjustment can be made for the combined expenses. In this example, the taxpayer will have $1,400 of Category 2 expenses. There is no remaining income with which to offset Category 3 expenses.


____________________________________________________________________________________________________
AGI Per Return 120,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Sch C Expenses Disallowed 63,700

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Removal of Sch C Income -3,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Increase of Other Income-Unearned 3,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Corrected AGI 183,700

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


In the above example the taxpayer's per return AGI was $120,000. After the adjustments it is now $183,700. Miscellaneous itemized deductions are limited to the amount that they exceed $2% of AGI (2% X $183,700 = $3,674). In this example, the taxpayer would get no tax deduction for the $1,400 in Category 2 expenses since they did not exceed the 2% of AGI.

If the examiner had chosen (incorrectly) to simply disallow the loss from the Schedule C activity it would have resulted in a total adjustment of $ 60,700 to AGI.

By correctly removing the income and expenses from the Schedule C and treating the income as unearned, the adjustments result in an increase in AGI of $63,700 and an increase in total itemized deductions of $1,600 for a total adjustment of $62,100 ($63,700 - $1,600). In this example none of the miscellaneous itemized deductions exceeded the corrected AGI 2% limitation ($3,674). By correctly reclassifying the income and expenses, it results in a $62,100 increase of taxable income rather than the $60,700 had an adjustment been made to simply disallow the loss. Also, the taxpayer may have other items on their tax return that could be affected by the increase in AGI.



Partnerships, S Corporations, Trusts and Estates

The IRC § 183 activities not engaged in for profit rules are applied at the entity level for partnership, S corporations, trusts and estates. These rules apply on an activity by activity basis and the income and deductions arising in one activity cannot be combined with the income and deductions from another activity in an entity. The identification of whether there is one or two activities is necessary to apply the rules of IRC § 183. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 of this guide.

In Magassy vs. Commr , TC Memo 2004-4, the taxpayer (an S corporation) had the burden of proving that it was engaged in the activity of restoring, chartering, and selling a yacht with the actual and honest objective of realizing profit. The court determined that the S corporation was involved in an activity that was not engaged in for a profit.

Income from an IRC § 183 issue for these type of entities determined not to be engaged in for profit should be removed from ordinary income and reclassified as separately stated income (generally as other income). All expenses should be grouped by category and separately stated and limited to gross income from the activity. There would seldom be any Category 1 expenses other than possibly investment interest or contributions. The limitation is determined at the entity level.

Even if the expenses of the activity may not be of beneficial use to the shareholder/partner due to the gross income limitation, they will still result in a reduction in the basis of the shareholder/partner.



S Corporation Example

An S corporation has gross receipts of $4,000 from a car racing activity not engaged in for profit. After expenses of $55,000 the ordinary loss is $51,000. The interest expense is in connection with the purchase of the race car.


____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Expense Amount Category 1 Category 2 Category 3

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Entrance Fees 10,000 10,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Interest 12,000 12,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Insurance 400 400

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Utilities 1,600 1,600

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Auto and Travel 13,000 13,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Repairs 2,000 2,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Depreciation 16,000 16,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Total 55,000 0 39,000 16,000

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


All of the income and expenses should be removed from the ordinary business operations of the S corporation return. The income should then be separately stated and reported on line 10 of the 1120S Schedule K . This income would then be reported on the shareholder's individual income tax return on line 21 as other income - unearned.

The interest expense in this example is not included as a Category 1 expense since it would not be deductible on the 1040 Schedule A because the interest is not home mortgage interest or investment interest.

Category 2 expenses would be allowed up to the $4,000 of gross income from the car racing activity and would be separately stated on line 12d of the 1120S Schedule K. The remaining non-deductible expenses of $51,000 would be reported as non-deductible expenses on line 16c of the 1120S Schedule K and K-1. The shareholder would then have $4,000 as a miscellaneous itemized deduction.

The $51,000 in non-deductible expenses will result in a reduction in the shareholder's stock basis and the Accumulated Adjustments Account (AAA) of the S corporation.



Taxpayer Penalties

When proposing audit adjustments, penalties should always be considered. All penalties including the accuracy-related and fraud penalties are important deterrents to non-compliance.

The IRS asserts the accuracy related penalty under IRC § 6662 for negligence or disregard of rules or regulations and/or a substantial understatement of income tax in appropriate cases.

Whether the accuracy related penalty applies to the activity must be determined on a case-by-case basis and will depend on the specific facts and circumstances of each case. It is the examiner's responsibility to develop the facts and circumstances.

IRC § 6662 imposes an accuracy related penalty in the amount equal to 20% of the portion of an underpayment attributable to, among other things:
 IRC § 6662(b)(1) - negligence or disregard of rules or regulations,

 IRC § 6662(b)(2) - any substantial understatement of income tax.

See also IRC § 6662(b)(3) for substantial or gross valuation misstatement and IRC § 6662A for accuracy-related penalty on understatements with respect to reportable transactions.

The penalty applies only when a tax return is filed. There is no stacking of the accuracy-related penalty components. The maximum accuracy-related penalty imposed on any portion of an underpayment is 20% (40% in the case of a gross valuation misstatement), even if that portion of the underpayment is attributable to more than one type of misconduct (e.g. negligence and substantial valuation misstatement). Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(c).

No accuracy-related penalty under IRC § 6662 is imposed if it is shown that the taxpayer had reasonable cause for the position taken and that the taxpayer acted in good faith. IRC § 6664(c).

Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all of the facts and circumstances, including the experience, knowledge and education of the taxpayer. Reliance on an information return, professional advise, or other facts may constitute reasonable cause and good faith if, under all the circumstances, such reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith. For a taxpayer to have reasonable cause, the taxpayer must have exercised ordinary business care and prudence regarding their tax affairs.

For purposes of IRC § 6662, the term "underpayment" is defined as "the amount by which any tax imposed exceeds the excess of the sum of the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return, plus amounts not so shown previously assessed (or collected without assessment), over the amount of rebates made."

Taxpayer penalty procedures and case development instructions can be found in IRM 20.1.5, Return Related Penalties. This IRM covers the accuracy related penalties under IRC § 6662 and the fraud penalty under IRC § 6663.



Negligence or Disregard of Rules or Regulations

Negligence is any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of the Code and includes any failure by the taxpayer to keep adequate books and records or to substantiate items properly. Negligence includes the failure to exercise due care or the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would do under the circumstances. Negligence is strongly indicated when a taxpayer fails to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of a deduction, credit or exclusion on a return which would seem to a reasonable and prudent person to be "too good to be true" under the circumstances. A return position is not attributable to negligence if there is a reasonable basis for that position. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(h)(1).

Disregard includes any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard of rules or regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.666-3(b)(2) defines "rules or regulations," "careless," "reckless," and "intentional" as follows:
 "Rules or regulations" include the provisions of the Code, temporary or final Treasury regulations issued under the Code and revenue rulings or notices (other than notices of proposed rulemaking) issued by the IRS and published in the Internal Revenue Bulletins.

 "A disregard of rules or regulations is 'careless' if the taxpayer does not exercise reasonable diligence to determine the correctness of a return position that is contrary to the rule or regulation."

 "A disregard is 'reckless' if the taxpayer makes little or no effort to determine whether a rule or regulation exists, under circumstances which demonstrate a substantial deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe."

 "A disregard is 'intentional' if the taxpayer knows of the rule or regulation that is disregarded."



Substantial Understatement

For individual taxpayers a substantial understatement of income tax exists for a taxable year if the amount of understatement exceeds the greater of 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return or $5,000. An "understatement" is defined as the excess of any tax required to be shown on the return over the tax actually shown on the return, less any rebate. IRC § 6662(d). This excess is determined without regard to items to which IRC § 6662A applies. The amount of any reportable transaction understatement is, as determined under § 6662A(b), is added to this excess to determine whether the understatement is "substantial" (i.e. whether it is more than the greater of 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return or $5,000). See IRC § 6662A(e)(1).

For purposes of determining the amount of the understatement, for items not attributable to a "tax shelter," the understatement is reduced by the understatement attributable to any item (1) for which there is or was substantial authority for the tax treatment; or (2) for which the taxpayer has adequately disclosed the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment and for which there is a reasonable basis for the taxpayer's tax treatment. IRC § 6662(d). The taxpayer also is required to substantiate the position and keep adequate books and records. IRC § 6662(d)(2)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(e)(2)(iii); see Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).

"Substantial authority" is an objective standard and involves an analysis of the law and the application of that law to the relevant facts. It is a more stringent standard than "reasonable basis" but less stringent than a 50% likelihood of the possibility of being upheld. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2). Whether authority is substantial depends on the weight of supporting authority relative to contrary authority, the relevance and persuasiveness of the authority, and the type of document providing the authority. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3).

Reasonable basis is a relatively high reporting standard and is not satisfied by a return position that is merely arguable or merely colorable. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3). A position will generally satisfy the reasonable basis standard if the position is reasonably based on applicable statutory provisions, regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, court cases, and other documents listed in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii). Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).



Reasonable Cause Exception

No accuracy-related penalty under IRC § 6662 is imposed with respect to any portion of the underpayment if the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and good faith. IRC § 6664(c). See also, IRC § 6664(d) for reasonable cause regarding reportable transactions. The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, and all relevant facts and circumstances are taken into account. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b). Generally the most important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the taxpayer's proper tax liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1).

Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all of the facts and circumstances, including the experience, knowledge, and education of the taxpayer. Reliance on an information return, professional advice, or other facts may constitute reasonable cause and good faith if, under all the circumstances, such reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1).

A taxpayer cannot rely on professional advice if the taxpayer fails to disclose a relevant fact that the taxpayer reasonably should have known was relevant if the advice is based on unreasonable assumptions, or if the advice relies upon the undisclosed position that a regulation is invalid. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1).



Return Preparer Penalties

The primary purpose of return preparer penalties is to bring non-compliant tax return preparers into compliance. In preparer penalty cases, the IRS focuses on the conduct of the preparer rather than the taxpayer. All examiners should consider if any of the following preparer penalties are applicable.
 IRC § 6694(a) Understatements Due to Unreasonable Positions

 IRC § 6694(b) Understatement Due to Willful or Reckless Conduct

 IRC § 6701 Aiding and Abetting Understatement of Tax Liability

The IRS recognizes that the vast majority of return preparers and practitioners are ethical, honest and serve their clients' best interests by preparing complete and accurate tax returns.

Taxpayers are sometimes advised by preparers to claim activities which are not engaged in for profit or are sham. Examiners should consider preparer penalties if deductions claimed are not ordinary and necessary expenses incurred during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business or for profit activity.

Examiners should also consider whether an attempt has been made to characterize personal expenses as business expenses.

Preparer penalty procedures and case development instructions can be found in IRM 20.1.6, Preparer, Promoter Penalties

IRC § 6694 provides for penalties on tax return preparers who unreasonably or willfully understate a taxpayer's tax liability. IRC § 6694 was amended by the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 (SBWOTA) which was enacted into law on May 25, 2007, for tax returns prepared after May 25, 2007. SBWOTA extended the application of the income tax return preparer penalties to all tax return preparers, altered the standards of conduct, and increased applicable penalties. IRC § 6694 was again amended by the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008 (TEAMTRA). TEAMTRA reorganized IRC § 6694 and added a section regarding tax shelters and reportable transactions. The tax shelter reportable transaction addition to IRC § 6694 was effective as of October 3, 2008. The rest of TEAMTRA, as it pertained to IRC § 6694, was retroactively effective as of May 25, 2007. This effective date eliminated the applicability of the SBWOTA amendments as they pertain to IRC § 6694.

Prior to May 25, 2007, IRC § 7701(a)(36) defined income tax return preparer as any person who prepared for compensation, or employs one or more persons to prepare for compensation, an income tax return or claim for refund, or a substantial portion of an income tax return or claim for refunded. After May 24, 2007, IRC§ 7701(a)(36) defined tax return preparer as any person that prepared for compensation, or employs one or more persons to prepare for compensation, a tax return or claim for refund, or a substantial portion of a tax return or claim for refund, and is no longer limited to persons who prepare income tax returns.



IRC § 6694(a) Understatement Due to Unreasonable Positions

Prior to May 25, 2007, the amount of the IRC § 6694(a) penalty was $250 and the penalty only applied to income tax returns and claims for refund. After May 24, 2007, the penalty applied to all tax returns and claims for refund, including estate and gift tax returns, generation-skipping transfer tax returns, employment tax returns, and excise tax returns. The amount of the penalty was increased to $1,000 or 50% of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer with respect to all tax returns.

The amendment also changed the standard for the penalty. The below table provides a comparison of IRC § 6694(a) standards.
IRC § 6694(a) is applied if:



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Prior to May 25, 2007 After May 24, 2007 After Oct. 2, 2008

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
 There was an  There was an  There was an understatement,
understatement, understatement,  there was no substantial authority
 there was not a  there was no for the position,
realistic possibility substantial  the tax return preparer knew (or
(i.e. one in three authority for the reasonably should have known) of such
chance) that the position, position, AND
position would be  the tax return  such position was not disclosed or
sustained on its merits, preparer knew (or there was no reasonable basis for it,
reasonably should OR if the position is with respect to a
 the income tax return have known) of such tax shelter or reportable transaction,
preparer knew (or position, AND there was no reasonable belief that the
reasonably should have  such position was position would more likely than not be
known) of such position, not disclosed or sustained on the merits .
AND there was no
reasonable basis
 such position was not for it.
disclosed or was
frivolous .

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Penalty $250 Penalty greater of Penalty greater of $1,000 or 50% of the
$1,000 or 50% of the income derived by the preparer.
income derived by the
preparer.

____________________________________________________________________________________________________


IRC § 6694(a) does not apply if the position taken is adequately disclosed and there was a reasonable basis for such position, or, if the position is with respect to a tax shelter or reportable transaction, there was no reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be sustained on the merits. IRC § 6694(a)(3).

The preparer generally may rely in good faith without verification upon information furnished by the taxpayer and upon information and advice furnished by another advisor, another tax return preparer, or another party (including another advisor or another tax return preparer at the tax return preparer's firm). The preparer is not required to audit, examine or review books and records, business operations, or documents or other evidence in order to verify independently information provided by the taxpayer, advisor, other tax return preparer or other party. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694(e).

However, the preparer:
 may not ignore the implications of information furnished to the preparer or actually known by the preparer,

 must make reasonable inquiries if the information as furnished appears to be incorrect or incomplete,

 must make appropriate inquiries to determine the existence of facts and circumstances required by a Code section or regulation as a condition to the claiming of a deduction.

Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(e).

The statute of limitations for IRC § 6694(a) expires three years from the later of the due date of the underlying related return or the date the return was filed. Remember, extending the statute on a taxpayer's return does not extend the statute for the return preparer penalty case. Use Form 872-D, Consent to Extend the Time on Assessment of Tax Return Penalty.



IRC § 6694(b) Willful or Reckless Conduct

SBWOTA increased the amount of the penalty under IRC § 6694(b) and made that penalty applicable with respect to all tax returns. The standard for application of the IRC § 6694(b) penalty, however, was not changed. Both prior to and after SBWOTA, the IRC § 6694(b) penalty applies if any part of an understatement of liability on a return, amended return, or claim for refunds is due:
 to a willful attempt in any manner to understate the liability for tax by a return preparer (income tax return preparers only prior to SBWOTA); or

 to any reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations by a tax return preparer (income tax return preparers only prior to SBWOTA.

The criteria to consider for the imposition of IRC § 6694(b) are:
 a tax return preparer,

 an understatement of income tax liability,

 an understatement due to a willful attempt to understate the income tax liability or due to any reckless or intentional disregard of the rules or regulations.

SBWOTA increased the IRC § 6694(b) penalty to the greater of $5,000 or 50% of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer with respect to returns, amended returns, and claims for refund prepared on or after May 26, 2007. Former IRC § 6694(b) (returns prepared prior to May 26, 2007) applied only to preparers of income tax returns and the penalty was $ 1,000.

Under IRC § 7427, the IRS bears the burden of proof on the issue of whether the preparer willfully attempted to understate the tax liability.

The preparer bears the burden of proof on issues such as whether:
 the preparer recklessly or intentionally disregarded a rule or regulation.

 a position contrary to a regulation represents a good faith challenge to the validity of the regulation.

 disclosure was adequately made (Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(h)).

If both IRC § 6694(a) and IRC § 6694(b) penalties apply to a tax return preparer, the IRC § 6694(b) penalty amount must be reduced by the IRC § 6694(a) penalty amount per IRC § 6694(b)(3).

There is no statute of limitations for IRC § 6694(b).



IRC § 6701 Aiding and Abetting

IRC § 6701 imposes a $1,000 penalty ($10,000 if the prohibited conduct relates to a corporation's tax return) for aiding or assisting in the understatement of tax.

The penalty is imposed on a person who:
 aids or assists in, procures or advises with respect to, the preparation or presentation of any portion of a return, affidavit, claim or other document;, regardless of whether a fee is charged,

 knows (or has reason to know) that such portion will be used in connection with any material matter arising under the internal revenue laws; and

 knows that such portion (if used) would result in an understatement of another person's tax liability, even if no actual understatement exists.

A "document" for these purposes can be any portion of a return, affidavit, claim or other document. Therefore, a single letter distributed and used by many taxpayers can lead to multiple penalties.

It is not necessary for the taxpayer whose tax is understated to either have knowledge of or give his consent to the actions which result in the understatement. To aid in an understatement, it is not necessary to actually prepare the tax return or document that leads to the understatement. A person who controls the activities of subordinates and either orders the subordinate to act or does not prevent their participation is subject to the penalty.

The IRS bears the burden of proof with respect to this penalty.

If the IRC § 6701 penalty is asserted, no penalties under IRC § 6694(a) or IRC § 6694(b) can be assessed.

There is no statute of limitations for IRC § 6701.



Unagreed Reports

The examiner may find that the taxpayer will not agree to the proposed adjustments from an IRC § 183 activity not engaged in for profit issue. Therefore, the examiner should prepare the report showing the facts, law and argument, taxpayer's position and conclusion. Since the report is the government's position, all pertinent information must be included in the case write-up. Any relevant computations or documents should be attached to the report.

In cases where the IRS has been unsuccessful on IRC § 183 issues it is largely due to inadequate development and/or application of the tax law. Some of the reasons mentioned in Appeals feedback include:
 Alternative arguments were not addressed.

 Disallowed expenses were not first verified as to whether they would be deductible at all or were personal in nature.

 The nine factors in Treas. Reg. §1.183-2(b) were not addressed.

 No mention was made of whether there would ever be a realistic possibility of a profit.

 No mention was made documenting the history of the activity including losses incurred and taxes saved in the prior period.

 Lack of factual development.

It is important the case be fully developed in order to be sustained in Appeals or the courts. Any alternative positions should be addressed in the unagreed report.

If the examiner determines that there are other adjustments unrelated to the IRC § 183 issue, the examiner should attempt to secure a partial agreement of these adjustments.



Rebuttals

Rebuttals issued by examiners to the taxpayer's protest to the 30 day letter should be shared with the taxpayer and their authorized representative. The goal of this sharing is to resolve factual disputes before the case is submitted to Appeals.

Rebuttals should focus on the points raise in the protest. Sometimes the protest raises valid points that the unagreed write-up does not address.



Alternative positions

If it is determined that there is no profit motive and the taxpayer does not agree, the examiner should also consider an alternative position in the event that, on appeal, the primary activity not engaged in for profit position is overturned.

An alternative position for an issue in an unagreed case is a secondary position that the IRS may ultimately rely on if the primary position cannot be upheld. An alternative position is recommended as Appeals generally is not permitted to raise new issues.

Alternative positions should be developed when appropriate. If the IRC § 183 issue is not sustained, the examiner must have addressed whether the taxpayer meets the requirements under other code sections, i.e. 162, 179,195, 262, 274(d), 280A, 465, 469, etc. or due to lack of substantiation of the expense.

IRC § 183 adjustments are permanent adjustments and should generally be treated as the primary position (unless the alternative issues convert the loss into a profit). The passive activity loss rules of IRC § 469, the at risk limitations of IRC § 465, and the basis limitations of IRC §1366 and § IRC § 704 are timing adjustments and should be treated as alternative positions when the §183 issue is also present.

The examiner should discuss the alternative position with the taxpayer and/or authorized representative prior to issuing the examination report. The unagreed report should outline all alternative positions that may be applicable if the primary position is not sustained.

The facts, applicable law, taxpayer's position, and conclusions for the alternative position on an issue should be presented on a separate lead sheet from the primary position.

Further procedures regarding alternative positions can be found in IRM 4.10.8.11.



Inadequate Books and Records

IRC § 6001 contains the requirements for taxpayers to maintain and keep records.

Treas. Regs. § 1.6001-1(a) provides that taxpayers must keep permanent books of account or records, including inventories, as are sufficient to establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits, or other matters required to be shown in the taxpayer's returns.

Treas. Regs. § 1.6001-1(e) provides that the books or records required by this section shall be kept at all times available for inspection by authorized internal revenue officers or employees, and shall be retained so long as the contents thereof may become material in the administration of any internal revenue law.

If the taxpayer has not kept adequate books and records this should be documented in the examiner's workpapers. It is relevant in the nine factor regulatory analysis. See Treas. Regs. § 1.183-2(b)(1).

Whenever the taxpayer's books and records are deemed inadequate for purposes of an examination of income, the examiner should consider the issuance of an inadequate records notice at the conclusion of the examination. The procedures for issuance of an inadequate records notice can be found in IRM 4.10.8.16.



Appendix

This appendix provides additional information that will assist in the development of IRC § 183 activity not for profit cases.

A -Treas. Regs. § 1.183-2(b) (9 Relevant Factors)

B - Suggested Questions for each of 9 Relevant Factors

C - Tax Savings Benefit Analysis

D - Year by Year Comparative Analysis of Income, Expenses and Losses

E - Sample IDR for Yacht Charter



Appendix A - Treas. Regs. § 1.183-2(b)

The nine relevant factors used to evaluate whether an activity is engaged in for profit with a brief explanation of each factor are included below.



Factor 1
(1) Manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity. - The fact that the taxpayer carries on the activity in a businesslike manner and maintains complete and accurate books and records may indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit. Similarly, where an activity is carried on in a manner substantially similar to other activities of the same nature which are profitable, a profit motive may be indicated. A change of operating methods, adoption of new techniques or abandonment of unprofitable methods in a manner consistent with an intent to improve profitability may also indicate a profit motive.

The examiner needs to inquire about the books and records maintained for the activity during the Initial Interview. The examiner should document in the workpapers regarding the sophistication of the taxpayer's books and records. The examiner should determine if the taxpayer maintains checking accounts for the activity which are separate from the accounts used for the taxpayer's personal living expenses.

Depending upon the volume, the examiner should obtain photocopies of the taxpayer's entire set of books and records. If photocopying the entire set of books and records proves to be cost prohibitive, the examiner should only photocopy samples representative of the overall books and records.

The presence of sophisticated books and records does not automatically equate to profit motive. The taxpayer must be relying upon these records in order to operate the activity and make decisions or changes. The examiner needs to document how these records are utilized by the taxpayer.

The taxpayer should have a formal written Business Plan. This plan should demonstrate the taxpayer's financial and economic forecast for the activity. The plan should not be a "fantasy profit and loss statement." In other words, some taxpayers may wish to submit a business plan that is nothing more than a Schedule F or C, which unrealistically overstates the gross receipts and unrealistically understates the expenses for the activity.

The examiner should not request the business plan in the first IDR. Otherwise, the examiner will possibly receive a "canned" document. The examiner should inquire as to the business plan during the Initial Interview and follow-up with a subsequent appointment and/or IDR.

A business plan should show a short range and long range forecast for the activity. The forecast should allow for changes due to potential unforeseen and fortuitous circumstances.

The plan should be realistic. The examiner should perform quantitative analyses in order to determine the reasonableness of the projected gross receipts and various expense items. The examiner may consult with IRS economists in order to review the business plan.

The examiner should determine if the taxpayer followed the plan and if the original plan was not successful did the taxpayer made any amendments to the plan to increase profitability.

The examiner needs to document the taxpayer's method of operation. The examiner should document the daily operation as well as the history of the activity's operation in the workpapers. Denote changes in the method of operation over the years and indicate why these changes were initiated. Most of this information will be gathered during the Initial Interview.

The examiner needs to document the efficiency of the taxpayer's operation. Denote the taxpayer's use of any experts or specialists. Indicate if any changes were initiated and why. Obtain names, position titles, and addresses. Most of this information will be gathered during the Initial Interview.

The examiner will note whether the taxpayer is making changes to the operation that will result in improved operational efficiency.

The examiner needs to review the actual copy of any advertising in instances where the taxpayer has deducted such expenditures. Many taxpayers will buy advertising space for "vanity" ads. These spaces are sometimes purchased to place photographs of their children. These ads may wish the children "Best of luck" prior to upcoming competitions. The examiner should use professional judgment to determine whether the advertisements truly represent promotion of the taxpayer's activity.

The examiner needs to be alert for the children's activities being deducted on the parents' tax return. The examiner needs to review reports and determine who actually competes in certain activities. The parents may contend that the children are promoting the activity through the competitions. The examiner needs to consider the substance of the facts.

Depreciation and Inventory can be viable issues for the examiner to consider as an aside from IRC § 183. The examiner should develop a clear understanding of the taxpayer's activity and verify that the proper tax treatment is used for the activity.



Summary of Factor 1

The examiner must document the manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity. Most of this information will be gathered during the Initial Interview and the tour of the operation. It is important for the examiner to document a clear understanding of the activity. Assumptions should not be made that each activity operates the same as another similar activity.



Factor 2
(2) The expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors. - Preparation for the activity by extensive study of its accepted business, economic, and scientific practices, or consultation with those who are expert therein, may indicate that the taxpayer has a profit motive where the taxpayer carries on the activity in accordance with such practices. Where a taxpayer has such preparation or procures such expert advice, but does not carry on the activity in accordance with such practices, a lack of intent to derive profit may be indicated unless it appears that the taxpayer is attempting to develop new or superior techniques which may result in profits from the activity.

Factor 2 addresses the expertise of the taxpayer or his or her advisors. The examiner should document the extent to which the taxpayer has relied upon his or her advisors. The examiner should also document the instances where the taxpayer received advice from his or her advisors, but failed to heed this advice.

The Initial Interview should include questions regarding the taxpayer's expertise, the use of any experts, and any changes or decisions regarding the operation of the activity.

The examiner should establish and document the taxpayer's background in the activity and determine how long the taxpayer has been engaged in the activity. Many times the taxpayer was involved in the activity in some capacity during youth and later became involved again as an adult. These adults have re-entered the activity after they have obtained the financial wherewithal to commence the activity. The examiner should establish a history of the taxpayer's growth of knowledge within the activity and how this knowledge was obtained.

The examiner should establish if the taxpayer has used any advisors or experts in the operation of the activity. Obtain names, position titles, and addresses of these advisors. Document how the advisors were chosen by the taxpayers. Establish the credentials of the advisors. Document if a personal relationship exists between the taxpayer and his advisors.

The examiner needs to document specific instances where the taxpayer was provided advice that was implemented in the activity. Describe how this information affected the operation and any resulting changes. Document whether the advised changes were successful or unsuccessful.

The examiner also needs to document specific instances whereby the taxpayer was advised by his or her experts to make changes and the taxpayer ignored the advice. The examiner should document why the taxpayer chose to ignore this advice. Many taxpayers will provide names of advisors in an effort to demonstrate profit motivation. However, if the taxpayer chooses not to implement the suggested changes and cannot provide just cause for doing so, then the taxpayer's use of advisors is questionable.



Summary of Factor 2

The examiner should document the expertise and knowledge of the taxpayer regarding the activity. The examiner should also document any advisors or experts that the taxpayer has used. Documentation should be prepared which shows specific instances where the taxpayer has followed the advice of the advisor.

Documentation should also show how the advice affected the operation of the activity. The examiner should especially note instances when the taxpayer has ignored the recommendations of the advisor and why that decision was made.



Factor 3
(3) The time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity. - The fact that the taxpayer devotes much of his personal time and effort to carrying on an activity, particularly if the activity does not have substantial personal or recreational aspects, may indicate an intention to derive a profit. A taxpayer's withdrawal from another occupation to devote most of his energies to the activity may also be evidence that the activity is engaged in for profit. The fact that the taxpayer devotes a limited amount of time to an activity does not necessarily indicate a lack of profit motive where the taxpayer employs competent and qualified persons to carry on such activity.

This factor addresses how much time and effort is expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity. In addition to the taxpayer's time, the examiner needs to consider the amount of time expended by any other individuals involved in the activity. The development of this factor may lead to the development of an alternative position under the provisions of IRC § 469 for Passive Activities.

The examiner needs to establish precisely how much time the taxpayer devotes to this activity as well as all other activities. The amount of time devoted to the activity may be an indicator of profit motive. If the taxpayer devotes a limited amount of time to the activity, then the taxpayer may be lacking a profit motive. However, if the taxpayer employs competent and qualified individuals to operate the activity, then the taxpayer's time and effort will be reduced. Time and effort expended reading magazines, journals, and other periodicals are consistent with engaging in a hobby.

After the examiner determines the amount of time that the taxpayer devotes to the activity, then the examiner should consider the possibility that the provisions under IRC § 469 may apply to the taxpayer. If the examiner determines that IRC § 469 may be applicable, then the examiner could use IRC § 469 as an alternative position to IRC §183.

The examiner should prepare an analysis that shows how much time is devoted to the activity as well as a breakdown of how that time is spent. For example, the examiner should designate how much is spent attending seminars, reading magazines and journals, or how much time is spent performing repairs and maintenance and so forth.

The examiner should note specifically the amount of time that the taxpayer devotes to other activities.



Summary of Factor 3

The examiner should consider the amount of time that the taxpayer devotes to the activity. The time analysis should precisely detail how much time the taxpayer devotes to each task related to the activity. The examiner should consider whether IRC § 469 Passive Activity provisions might be applicable. IRC § 469 could provide an alternative position for IRC §183.



Factor 4
(4) Expectation that assets used in activity may appreciate in value. - The term "profit" encompasses appreciation in the value of assets, such as land, used in the activity. Thus, the taxpayer may intend to derive a profit from the operation of the activity, and may also intend that, even if no profit from current operations is derived, an overall profit will result when appreciation in the value of land used in the activity is realized since income from the activity together with the appreciation of land will exceed expenses of operation. See, however, paragraph (d) of §1.183-1(d) for definition of an activity in this connection.

A taxpayer's "profit" expectations may include appreciation in the value of assets used in the activity. The courts have differed in their application of this factor. Some have included unrealized appreciation in boats, limousines, equipment and real property in determining if the taxpayer had a bona fide profit motive.

Factor 4 has been the most difficult of the nine relevant factors for examiners to correctly develop. The taxpayer has generally been successful with respect to this factor because of the potential for land appreciation. However, proper development of this factor can overcome the potential for land appreciation.

Factor 4 hinges on whether the operation of the taxpayer's activity and the holding of the land are considered to be a separate or single activity.

According to the Treasury Regulations, Factor 4 states that the term "profit" also includes the appreciation of assets, such as land, used in the activity. An overall profit may occur, in spite of losses from current operations, if the appreciation of the assets is realized.

The examiner needs to prepare an analysis that shows the history of the activity. Beginning with gross receipts, the examiner needs to separate current operating expenses from the costs of carrying the assets. These carrying costs would include depreciation and related interest expense.

The examiner needs to determine if gross receipts exceed current operating expenses with a resulting net profit. For the purpose of this calculation, depreciation expense and related interest expense should be excluded.

As previously mentioned, taxpayers can frequently show potential appreciation of asset value, usually with respect to the land. However, the appreciation of the assets may only be used as a consideration for overall profitably if the operation of the activity and the holding of the assets are considered to be a single activity.

If the operation of the activity and the holding of the assets are considered to be separate activities, then the appreciation of the assets will not be considered for overall profit. In other words, if the operation of the activity and the holding of the assets are considered to be separate activities, the history of operational losses cannot be offset by the potential gain from asset appreciation.

In order to show that the operation of the activity and the holding of the assets should be treated as separate activities, the examiner needs to refer to the previous analysis. If gross receipts do not exceed current operating expenses, then the operation of the activity and the holding of the assets will be considered as two separate activities. As two separate activities, the history of losses cannot be offset by the appreciation of the assets.

Factor 4 relies upon future asset gain potential to offset current losses. The examiner should inquire during the Initial Interview if the taxpayer intends to retire on the site. Frequently taxpayers have purchased these properties for the purpose of future retirement. If the taxpayer intends to retire on the property, then no future gain will be realized. Tax Court cases have gone both ways with respect to taxpayers who have expressed retirement purposes as an intention for land acquisition. Nonetheless, the examiner should document such intentions, if known. Since no one factor is determinative by itself, the examiner should address the taxpayer's intention for holding the land.

The examiner should consider the potential for appreciation of the activity assets, especially the land. This information can be gathered from comparables. Comparables would show land values for properties similar to the taxpayer's parcel. Comparables can be obtained from area realtors. Comparables are extremely important in determining land valuation. The potential for asset appreciation should be documented on a separate workpaper in the examiner's case file.



Summary of Factor 4

The examiner needs to determine if a potential for asset appreciation exists within the activity exists. The examiner also needs to determine whether the operation of the activity and the holding of the land are considered a single activity or separate activities. In the instances of single activities, the history of losses from current operations will be offset by the future potential gain. In the instances of separate activities, the taxpayer cannot offset current operating losses by future potential gains. A determination of separate activities will frequently result in the taxpayer not meeting Factor 4.



Factor 5
(5) The success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities. - The fact that the taxpayer has engaged in similar activities in the past and converted them from unprofitable to profitable enterprises may indicate that he is engaged in the present activity for profit, even though the activity is presently unprofitable.

The examiner needs to document the taxpayer's financial success in other activities. This information will be gathered from prior year tax returns as well as the years under examination.

The examiner will prepare a worksheet that details the history of other activities.

This detail should show the profits and losses derived from the activities. In general, many taxpayers have achieved financial success in other business endeavors and yet failed in the operation of the activity in question.

The examiner should focus on activities in addition to the taxpayer's primary source of income. For example, if the taxpayer is a medical doctor, the examiner should not focus on his or her success with his or her medical practice. The examiner should focus on success or failure of other unrelated ventures that were conducted in addition to the medical practice, such as the operation of a restaurant or a kennel.

In addition to the aforementioned worksheet, the examiner needs to document any specific instances where the taxpayer has abandoned certain activities when those activities have proven to be unsuccessful.



Summary of Factor 5

The examiner needs to document the financial successes that the taxpayer has had with other activities. A statement should also address specific instances where the taxpayer has abandoned any activities.



Factor 6
(6) The taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity . - A series of losses during the initial or start-up stage of an activity may not necessarily be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. However, where losses continue to be sustained beyond the period which customarily is necessary to bring the operation to profitable status such continued losses, if not explainable, as due to customary business risks or reverses, may be indicative that the activity is not being engaged in for profit. If losses are sustained because of unforeseen or fortuitous circumstances which are beyond the control of the taxpayer, such as drought, disease, fire, theft, weather damages, other involuntary conversions, or depressed market conditions, such losses would not be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. A series of years in which net income was realized would of course be strong evidence that the activity is engaged in for profit.

The examiner needs to document the history of income or losses generated by the activity. This documentation should be prepared on a detailed worksheet with any narrative as necessary. While this factor may present the taxpayer in a negative light, examiners should not use this relevant factor by itself in reaching a conclusion regarding the profit motive of the activity.

Some of the nine relevant factors will overlap through the course of the examination process. Information developed for one factor may be used in the development of other factors. Factor 6 is one of the most important factors of the nine. This factor supports the framework of this Code section.

The examiner needs to prepare a worksheet that shows a history of the activity's profits and losses such as that shown in Appendix D . The examiner will need to gather prior year tax information using Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS). The examiner should order the original returns for any prior years that are no longer "online." These returns would be ordered for review purposes using local procedures. The examiner can copy the original returns and place them in the administrative file. The taxpayer can also be requested to provide copies of the applicable returns.

The examiner should prepare the worksheet with a separate column that shows the amount of depreciation that was deducted in each tax period. This separation is required for use in the development of other relevant factors. If the taxpayer has deducted other land carrying costs, such as real estate taxes or related interest expense, then these expenses should be shown in a separate column. Such real estate taxes and mortgage interest would be deductible on Schedule A subject to AGI phase-out limitations.



Summary of Factor 6

IRC § 183 focuses on the lack of profit potential for a specific activity. The question regarding profit motive is initially triggered by history of losses. For this reason, the development of this relevant factor provides the framework for this section. Examiners should not base any conclusions using this relevant factor alone.



Factor 7
(7) The amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned. - The amount of profits in relation to the amount of losses incurred, and in relation to the amount of the taxpayer's investment and the value of the assets used in the activity, may provide useful criteria in determining the taxpayer's intent. An occasional small profit from an activity generating large losses, or from an activity in which the taxpayer has made a large investment, would not generally be determinative that the activity is engaged in for profit. However, substantial profit, though only occasional, would generally be indicative that an activity is engaged in for profit, where the investment or losses are comparatively small. Moreover, an opportunity to earn a substantial ultimate profit in a highly speculative venture is ordinarily sufficient to indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit even though losses or only occasional small profits are actually generated.

The examiner needs to address the amount of occasional profits that the taxpayer has derived from the activity. In most instances where the provisions of IRC § 183 are considered, the taxpayer will have few profits, if any.

The examiner needs to consider whether the taxpayer has generated any profits from the activity. A worksheet would be a useful tool in showing these profits or the lack thereof.

The examiner should pinpoint the exact source of the gross receipts reported for the activity on the tax return. There have been instances where taxpayers have reported gross receipts, which were derived from sources other than the activity, onto the Schedule for the activity. The misplacement of income may be an error, or it may be a deliberate attempt to show revenue where revenue did not exist.

If the examiner determines that certain gross receipts were mistakenly reported on the activity's Schedule, the examiner should not include these gross receipts in any of the worksheets prepared for the purpose of developing the IRC § 183 issue. If any worksheets are prepared with the omission of any such gross receipts, a footnote should be included on each worksheet disclosing such omission.



Example

A Schedule C for a dog breeding activity contained gross receipts for $3,200.

Upon further development, the examiner discovered that the entire amount of the gross receipts pertained to a separate activity, other than the dog breeding.

The examiner did not include the $3,200 of misplaced gross receipts in any worksheets during the development of the IRC § 183 issue. The examiner did incorporate footnotes that disclosed that $3,200 of gross receipts was erroneously reported on the Schedule C.

If as in the aforementioned example, a significant sum of gross receipts was misreported on the activity's Schedule and significant misrepresentation for the profitability results, the examiner should consider the implications of such misplacement. Civil fraud may be a consideration depending upon the overall impact.

If the examiner in the previous example had not excluded the misplaced gross receipts from the various IRC § 183 worksheets, then a true picture of the taxpayer's activity would not have been portrayed.

Some taxpayers have fabricated income for the activity in an effort to put forth an appearance of profit motive. The examiner needs to verify the income. Such fabrication raises consideration of potential fraud.



Summary of Factor 7

The examiner should consider the amount of occasional profits that the activity may generate. However, the examiner should determine the source of the gross receipts just in the event the gross receipts have been misreported on the tax return. Such misplacement could misstate the profitability of the activity and should be removed from the IRC § 183 issue development with footnotes or disclosures to that effect.



Factor 8
(8) The financial status of the taxpayer. - The fact that the taxpayer does not have substantial income or capital from sources other than the activity may indicate that an activity is engaged in for profit. Substantial income from sources other than the activity (particularly if the losses from the activity generate substantial tax benefits) may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit especially if there are personal or recreational elements involved.

This factor addresses the financial status of the taxpayer. In some instances, the taxpayer may have the financial wherewithal to sustain a history of financial losses for the activity. Certain taxpayers may receive a tax benefit from the losses incurred by the activity as these losses will offset other substantial sources of income.

In general, taxpayers with other substantial sources of income have the financial wherewithal to sustain significant losses from activities that appear to meet the criteria of the provisions set forth under IRC § 183.

Misinformation has been written that advises taxpayers to enter into certain activities for the purpose of deriving a tax benefit. Taxpayers with other substantial sources of income have the financial wherewithal to enter such activities irrespective of the motivation. The examiner needs to understand why the taxpayer has not abandoned an unsuccessful activity when other taxpayers who lack the same financial wherewithal would most likely abandon the unprofitable activity.

Many Tax Court cases have been pursued which involve taxpayers that have other substantial sources of income that have engaged in historically unprofitable activities without abandonment. In general, taxpayers who have other substantial sources of income have not faired as well in Tax Court litigation as taxpayers who do not have such financial wherewithal.

The examiner needs to document the financial status of the taxpayer in the workpapers. The examiner should also make a statement to the effect that the financial status has enabled the taxpayer to sustain a history of losses in the activity.

Earlier text directed the examiner to prepare a tax savings benefit analysis. This spreadsheet would show possible motivation for certain taxpayers to continue participation in an unsuccessful financial endeavor.



Summary of Factor 8

In general, taxpayers who have other substantial sources of income have the financial wherewithal to sustain a history of losses with respect to not for profit activities. Some taxpayers actually derive a tax benefit from participation in these activities since the losses offset the other sources of substantial income.



Factor 9
(9) Elements of personal pleasure or recreation. - The presence of personal motives in carrying on of an activity may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit, especially where there are recreational or personal elements involved. On the other hand, a profit motivation may be indicated where an activity lacks any appeal other than profit. It is not, however, necessary that an activity be engaged in with the exclusive intention of deriving a profit or with the intention of maximizing profits. For example, the availability of other investments which would yield a higher return, or which would be more likely to be profitable, is not evidence that an activity is not engaged in for profit. An activity will not be treated as not engaged in for profit merely because the taxpayer has purposes or motivations other than solely to make a profit. Also, the fact that the taxpayer derives personal pleasure from engaging in the activity is not sufficient to cause the activity to be classified as not engaged in for profit if the activity is in fact engaged in for profit as evidenced by other factors whether or not listed in this paragraph.

Section 183 has been referred to as the "hobby loss" section because many taxpayers have engaged in unprofitable activities due to the pleasurable attributes of the activities. Factor 9 addresses the elements of personal pleasure or recreation of the activity.

The examiner must develop an understanding of the taxpayer's activity. This understanding must be documented in the workpapers. The examiner must document all tasks that the taxpayer performs within the activity.

Some taxpayers will attempt to downplay any pleasurable aspects of the activity. Many taxpayers will express a passion for their activity. A skilled examiner will be able to draw this passion from the taxpayer through conversation. The courts do not mandate that taxpayers cannot enjoy the method by which they derive their income. Many taxpayers resist the phraseology of "hobby loss" in reference to IRC § 183. Examiners may wish to refrain from that terminology and refer to the actual title "Activity Not Engaged in for Profit."



Summary of Factor 9

The examiner needs to address the pleasurable and recreational aspects of the activity. By this point in the examination, the taxpayer is aware of the direction that the exam is going. The taxpayer knows about the nine relevant factors. A taxpayer with a savvy representative has been advised to downplay the pleasurable aspects and emphasize the hard work of the activity. Skilled listening will help the examiner to document and sort the details regarding this relevant factor.



Appendix B - Suggested Interview Questions for Each of 9 Relevant Factors

The following are suggested possible interview questions for each of the nine factors contained in Treas. Regs. §1.183-2(b)(1) through (9) which may be used by examiners to establish if an activity is or is not for profit. Other factors not listed may also need to be considered.

These questions should not be considered all-inclusive. The interview should be tailored to each specific taxpayer. The questions should be asked of the taxpayer in an interview and not be given to the taxpayer and/or authorized representative to complete.



1.183-2(b)(1) Manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity
 Background and general description of the business.

o When did the taxpayer first include (first Schedule C, F. 1120S, 1065, etc.) this business for tax purposes?

o General industry, what specialized niche?

o Where is business conducted?

o What geographical area?

o Specific demographic target population?

o Is the business seasonal?

o Did the taxpayer have a business plan?

o Was the plan followed?

o How did the taxpayer propose to compete with similar businesses?

o When/how did the idea for the business activity originate?

o Was a business plan written-up?

o What were the financial requirements to start the business?

o How were the funds obtained?

o Bank loans, investors, personal savings, family, etc.?

o What documentation is available?

o How is the business currently being financed?

o What financial risks are involved in this type of business?

o Is any type of business insurance carried?

o Are policies in the business name?

o Did the taxpayer carry on any of these same policies prior to starting the business?

o Did the taxpayer stand to lose or have expenses beyond what he normally incurs?

o Does the activity involve multiple undertakings; and if so, what is the organizational and economic interrelationship between them?

o Does taxpayer have a license to operate?

o Is the activity in an area zoned for business?

o Is the taxpayer's telephone number listed in the white/yellow pages?

o Does the taxpayer have an internet site?

o How do customers find out about the business?

o Are signs posted?

o Is the activity still being conducted?

o Are any relatives employed in the business?

o If relatives are employed, how is wage determined?

 How are the business records maintained?

o Describe the system for recording income and expenses.

o Are budgets prepared?

o When and by whom are expenses recorded?

o What types of journals are maintained?

o Are books on cash or accrual?

o Are books and records accurate and complete? If not, why not?

o Are books comparable to types of books kept by others in same activity?

o Is a computer used? What software program is used?

o Are financial statements prepared?

o How often and by whom?

o Is an accountant or bookkeeper involved?

o What do they do and how often?

o Have they given any advice on the business?

o Are separate bank account(s) used for the business?

o If no, why not?

o Are ATM (cash or credit/debit) cards used on the account(s)?

o Are there transfers between business and personal accounts?

o If yes, how are they kept track of in the business books?

o Are the bank statements used to determine business and expenses for the year?

 What efforts are made in terms of attracting customers and securing suppliers or products necessary for the business?

o What advertising and promotion activity did the taxpayer perform to gain clients/buyers?

o What other relationship did the taxpayer have with his clients/buyers?

o What other relationship did the taxpayer have with his suppliers?

o What other relationship did the taxpayer have with his employees?

o What forms of advertising have been used? How often? How much?

o How effective was the advertising? Have ineffective methods been discontinued?

o Have steps been taken to improve profitability?

o Any changes in operating methods? What changes?

 When is a profit expected?

o What type of profit expectations are there?

o What is maximum profit expected?

o When will profit occur?

o Is it reasonable to expect any profit will result?

o How many "widgets" must be sold in order to obtain a profit?



1.183-2(b)(2) The expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors

Preparation for the activity by extensive study of its accepted business, economic, and scientific practices, or consultation with those are experts therein, may indicate that the taxpayer has a profit motive where the taxpayer carries on the activity in accordance with such practices.
 What background information was gathered about this type of activity prior to beginning the business?

o Has the taxpayer ever been employed in this area before?

o When, where, for whom, how long, what experience specifically pertains to this activity?

 Does the taxpayer have any education which is relevant?

o Educational institution?

o Degree, classes, how does it apply to this business or how did it prepare the taxpayer in any way to enter this field of business?

o Does the education relate to any other business or employment activities?

 Did the taxpayer rely on the advice of others in starting or developing the business?

o Did the taxpayer consult with experts?

o What are the credentials of others in starting or developing the business?

o What experience, education, degrees, business success do they possess which qualify them to advice the taxpayer?

o How did the taxpayer decide to rely on the person(s) advice?

o Was there any kind of previous personal, family or business relationship with the advisor?

 Did the taxpayer prepare for the activity by conducting research or an extensive study of its accepted business, economic, and scientific practices?

o What types of journals, publications, or other reference material did the taxpayer study in preparation to enter this business?

o What did the taxpayer learn which entered into the decision to engage in this business activity?

o What professional publications does the taxpayer now subscribe to and what specific benefit does the taxpayer derive?

 What other life experiences does the taxpayer have which would have prepared the taxpayer to engage in this type of activity?

 What related organizations does the taxpayer belong to? How long?



1.183-2(b)(3) The time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity

The fact that the taxpayer devotes much of his personal time and effort to carrying on an activity, particularly if the activity does not have substantial personal or recreation aspects, may indicate an intention to derive profit.

Note - This factor may be given greater weight (in taxpayer's favor) if there are no substantial personal or recreational aspects present.
 For the taxpayer personally, is this a full-time or part- time activity?

o How many hours per week? per month? per year? per season? are spent on this activity?

o What tasks does taxpayer perform?

o Is this more or less time than others in the same line of work devote?

o Did the taxpayer have to give up or reduce the time devoted to a different job or occupation?

o If personal time was given up, what did the taxpayer previously do with that time?

o If time is not devoted to the activity, did the taxpayer employ competent and qualified persons to carry on the activity?

 Who is involved with the day to day business operations?

o Does the activity have employees?

o How many?

o What are their duties and who does what?

o What are their hours? Full-time or part-time? Salaries?

o Are employment tax returns filed?

o Are any relatives involved with the business in any respect?

o Are information returns prepared?

o What are the taxpayer's own duties and responsibilities with respect to the business?

o If someone other than the taxpayer is running the business for them, what qualifications and relevant business background do they have?

o What decisions do they make?



1.183-2(b)(4) Expectation that assets used in activity may appreciate in value

The term "profit" encompasses appreciation in the value of assets used in the activity. Thus, the taxpayer may intend to derive a profit from the operation of the activity, and may also intend that even if no profit when appreciation in the value of the land used in the activity realized since income from the activity together with appreciation of land will exceed expenses of operation.
 List assets used in the activity.

o Were the assets held prior to starting the business?

o Was depreciation previously taken as a deduction?

o What was the prior use?

o How and when were the assets acquired (verify taxpayer's basis)?

o Are any assets used personally?

o How much is each asset worth today?

o Has anyone ever offered to buy any of the assets?

o Is it likely the assets will appreciate in value?

o Why does the taxpayer expect the appreciation to occur?

o At what rate are assets expected to appreciate?

o Over what period of time (how many years)?

o What are the taxpayer's plans for the appreciated asset(s)?

o At what point does the taxpayer intend to realize the inherent gain for tax purposes?

o Will the gain on appreciated assets offset operating losses - to the extent that the overall net result on the business is a profit?



1.183-2(b)(5) The success of the taxpayer in other similar or dissimilar activities

The fact that the taxpayer has engaged in similar activities in the past and converted these from unprofitable to profitable enterprises may indicate that he is engaged in the present activity for profit, even though the activity is presently unprofitable.
 What other activities has the taxpayer had previous success?

o Which, if any, were converted from unprofitable into profitable ventures (describe how the taxpayer was involved in this process - what did the taxpayer do to convert it)?

o What happened to that prior business?

o Ultimately, were the business(s) profitable on an overall net basis?



1.183-2(b)(6) The taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity

A series of losses during the initial or start-up stage of an activity may not necessarily be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. However, where losses continue to be sustained beyond the period which customarily is necessary to bring the operation to profitable status, such continued losses, if not explainable, as due to customary business risks or reverses, may be indicative that the activity is not engaged in for profit. If losses are sustained because of unforeseen or fortuitous circumstances, which are beyond the control of the taxpayer, such as drought, disease, fire, theft, weather damages, other involuntary or depressed market conditions, such losses would not be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit. A series of years in which net income was realized would of course by strong evidence that the activity is engaged in for profit.

The examiner should prepare a comparative schedule of income and losses (expenses) since inception of the business through the present. Appendix D contains a sample year by year analysis of income and expenses.


____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Year XXXX12 XXXX12 XXXX12 XXXX12 XXXX12

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Gross Income

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Expenses (Other than
Depreciation)

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Depreciation

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
(Losses) or Gains

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

 Is there a trend toward profitability?

 Are there any profitable years?

 Are there consistent losses?

 Do the losses increase from year to year?

 Have losses continued beyond what would ordinarily be considered customary?

 What is the taxpayer's explanation for continuing with an unprofitable activity?

 Did the taxpayer change operating methods, adopt new techniques, or abandon nonprofitable methods in a manner consistent with intent to improve profitability.

 Why did the taxpayer continue the operation if it continued to lose money?

 Were there unforeseen circumstances?

 Were they beyond the control of the taxpayer?

 What happened and when?

 How did this change the taxpayer's business plans and what action was taken to deal with the unforeseen circumstances?



1.183-2(b)(7) The amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned

The amount of profits in relation to the amount of losses incurred, and in relation to the amount of the taxpayer's investment and the value of the assets used in the activity, may provide useful criteria in determining the taxpayer's intent. An occasional small profit from an activity generating large losses, or from an activity in which the taxpayer has made a large investment, would not generally be determinative that the activity is engaged in for profit. However, substantial profit, though only occasional, would generally be indicative that an activity is engaged in for profit, where the investment or losses are comparatively small. Moreover, an opportunity to earn a substantial ultimate profit in a highly speculative venture is ordinary sufficient to indicate the activity is engaged in for profit even though losses or only occasional small profits are actually generated.
 What profits have been earned in any year?

o Is this a highly speculative business?

o Is there any change that the activity could generate a substantial profit in the future which would recover prior losses and the taxpayer's investment?

 What amount of an investment has the taxpayer made in the business?

o Is this amount significant in relation to the taxpayer's net worth?

o What percent of the taxpayer's net worth has been invested in this venture (obtain financial statements or other evidence of taxpayer's net worth)?



1.183-2(b)(8) The financial status of the taxpayer

The fact that the taxpayer does not have substantial income or capital from sources other than the activity may indicate that the activity is engaged in for profit. Substantial income from sources other than the activity (particularly if the losses from the activity generate substantial tax benefits) may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit especially if there are personal or recreational elements involved.

Note - When substantial tax benefits are being derived, greater weight may be given to the possibility the activity is not for profit, especially if personal or recreational elements are present.
 Does the taxpayer have substantial income or capital (investments, etc.) from other sources (list types, sources and amounts)?

o What tax benefit does the taxpayer receive from the losses on the activity?

o Are there other economic reasons for the taxpayer to be engaged in the activity? E.g. reduced property taxes for farmland, low interest loans, or federal grants?

o Can the taxpayer otherwise afford (based on taxpayer's net worth) to continue with the activity regardless of continued losses?



1.183-2(b)(9) Elements of personal pleasure or recreation

The presence of personal motives in carrying on of an activity may indicate that the activity is not engaged in for profit, especially where there are recreational or personal elements involved. On the other hand, a profit motivation may be indicated where an activity lacks any appeal other than profit. It is not, however, necessary that an activity be engaged in with the exclusive intention of deriving a profit or with the intention of maximizing profits. For example, the availability of other investments which would yield a higher return, or which would be more likely to be profitable, is not evidence that an activity is not engaged in for profit. An activity will not be treated as not engaged in for profit merely because the taxpayer has purposes or motivations other than solely to make a profit.

Also, the fact that the taxpayer derives personal pleasure from engaging in the activity is not sufficient to cause the activity to be classified as not engaged in for profit if the activity is in fact engaged in for profit as evidenced by other factors whether or not listed in this paragraph.
 Was the taxpayer involved or interested in this, or a related activity, prior to establishing it as a business for tax purposes?

o Are elements of fun or recreation generally associated with it by either the taxpayer, members of the taxpayer's family or by the taxpayer's friends?

o If there are any personal benefits (other than that of succeeding in the business) to being in this business, are they substantial?

o If the taxpayer previously engaged in the activity for other than business purposes, what currently distinguishes the activity as a business over what was done before?

o Would the taxpayer continue the activity even if he or she never made a profit?



Appendix C - Tax Savings Benefit Analysis

Completing an analysis of tax savings is important in developing a § 183 case. The analysis should begin, if possible, with the first year of the activity.

This analysis may also be applicable with respect to property tax savings when a taxpayer has derived such a tax benefit due to agricultural status (also known as an agriculture exemption.

The examiner should discuss this analysis with the taxpayer and also include this analysis in any report issued to the taxpayer.


____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Tax Period Tax With Loss Tax Without Loss Tax Savings

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1995

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1996

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1997

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1998

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1999

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2000

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2001

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2002

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2003

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2004

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2005

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2006

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2007

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
2008

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Totals

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Appendix D - Comparative Analysis Income, Expense and Losses

Completing an analysis of the year by year income, expense and loss of an activity is important in developing a § 183 case. Losses that continue beyond the start up stage are an indication that no profit motive is present. However, it is important to remember that losses sustained because of unforeseen circumstances beyond the taxpayer's control (fire, drought, theft, etc.), do not preclude a profit motive.

All trends in profits or losses should be addressed and explained. Any unusual income items or expense items that occur and then "drop off" may mean the taxpayer's profit is contrived. The examiner should consider whether the profits shown were manipulated in order to meet the presumption test. An occasional small profit from an activity generating large losses does not mean that the activity is engaged in for profit.

The examiner should discuss this analysis with the taxpayer and also include this analysis in any report issued to the taxpayer. Below is a sample of a 1040 Schedule C year by year income, expense and loss analysis:
Income, Expense and Loss Analysis



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

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Income

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Gross Receipts

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Cost of Goods Sold

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Gross Profit

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Other Income

____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Gross Income

____________________________________________________________________________________________________



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Expenses

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Advertising

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Car and Truck

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Commissions and Fees

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Contract Labor

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Depletion

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Deprecation

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Employee Benefit Programs

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Insurance (Other than Health)

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Interest

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Legal and Professional

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Office Expense

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Pension and Profit Sharing Plans

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Rent or Lease

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Repairs and Maintenance

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Supplies

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Taxes and Licenses

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Travel, Meals, and Entertainment

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Utilities

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Wages

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Other Expenses

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Office in Home Expenses

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Total Expenses

____________________________________________________________________________________________________



____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Gross Income Less Expenses

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Appendix E - Example of an IDR for a Yacht Charter Activity

Below is a listing of possible items an examiner might request to assist in determining if a yacht charter activity is an activity engaged in for profit. Some of the items would best be answered in a face to face interview. Examiners should tailor IDR's to the specific taxpayer under examination.
1. Statement of taxpayer's sailing experience.

2. Copies of experience profiles submitted by potential charterers.


Note to examiner: Is this a crewed charter where the yacht comes with a permanent captain and cook? Or, is this a bareboat charter where the charterer captains the yacht himself?

3. Purchase agreement, Bill of Sale and Invoice, and all canceled checks showing verification of yacht purchase.

4. Statement of actions taken to investigate boat chartering business before entering into this business.

5. Name and address of all charterers and their lease agreement.

6. Schedule of fees or charges billed to charters.

7. Copies of original loan agreements/promissory notes on financed portion of property.

8. Insurance policy(s) on yacht and its contents (collision and liability).


Note to examiner: Does policy cover rental of boat? Is it a commercial or personal asset?

9. Copy of First Preferred Ship Mortgage.


Note to examiner: The Preferred Ship Mortgage provides the financer of a vessel competitive status among competing claims that might arise against a vessel. The lender of an ocean vessel, if eligible, secures a loan with a Preferred Ship Mortgage. Otherwise, in a foreclosure situation the lender will be ranked first among the various maritime creditors that may be competing to collect on a vessel's proceeds.

10. Promotional materials and charter sailing brochures for yacht.

11. Invoices and ad copies for advertisements on availability of yacht for rental.

12. Copies of any management agreements or management contracts for boat supervision, maintenance, or operation.

13. Ships log(s) for engine and/or boat use.

14. Maintenance records and service check performance records.

15. Certificate of Origin.

16. Certification of Documentation from U.S. Coast Guard.

17. Copy of commercial captain's license.


Note to examiner: Is potential charterer required to provide taxpayer a copy of their captain's license?

18. Shipping document or other record which verifies delivery date of property.

19. Copy of any prospectus, private placement memorandum or other promotional material received when yacht was purchased.

20. Yacht operating budgets.

21. Break-even point calculations for chartering activity.

22. All books and records pertaining to the boat business.

23. Copies of your federal tax return for XXXX though XXXX (including any amendments thereto).

24. Please, complete the attached "Statement of Supplementary Examination."

25. Please complete a Schedule of Boat Use and Schedule of Taxpayer/Shareholder/Partner Time Spent to Operate the Activity of Boat Chartering."

Labels:

Monday, June 22, 2009

Notice of tax lien case

The importance of this case is to make sure that the IRS had the correct address of every clilent

United States of America, Plaintiff v. Theodore T. Navolio, Seiko Kaneyama, Gail P. Kendall, Ivan D. Saxe, Dorothy E. Saxe, Option One Mortgage Corporation, Defendants.

U.S. District Court, Mid. Dist. Fla., Orlando Div.; 6:06-cv-1461-Orl-19GJK, August 6, 2008.

[ Code Secs. 6212 and 7403]

The government was entitled to reduce to judgment the unpaid tax liabilities of the individual and to foreclose federal tax liens on his property. The IRS properly sent a statutory notice of deficiency by certified mail to the individual's the last known address and other possible addresses after searching the IRS database and requesting "postal tracers" from the United States Postal Service. Contrary to the individual's argument, the IRS exercised reasonable diligence in determining his address. Although the individual was in contact with the IRS's criminal division while he was incarcerated, the IRS's civil division and criminal division generally do not share information and, therefore, the IRS's civil division was not aware of the individual's changes in address while he was incarcerated.




[ Code Sec. 7121]

Settlement agreement: Unilateral mistake doctrine. --
A settlement agreement between the IRS and an individual concerning his unpaid federal tax liabilities was not enforceable because the state's (Florida) unilateral mistake doctrine applied. The individual's mistaken belief that he was bargaining to resolve all issues relating to the tax liabilities for the years at issue, including the levy on his social security benefits, went to the substance of the agreement. This mistaken belief arose from ambiguous language used in the letter from the IRS and was not a result of an inexcusable lack of due care. Moreover, the government did not demonstrate that it relied on the settlement agreement or change its position to its detriment. Back reference: ¶41,090.279.







ORDER


FAWSETT, Chief District Judge: This case comes before the Court sitting as trier of fact after a one-day trial held on July 9, 2008. (Doc. No. 101.) Also pending before the Court is the Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement by Plaintiff United States of America. (Doc. No. 99, filed July 8, 2008.)

This action was brought by the United States (1) to reduce to judgment the unpaid federal income tax liabilities of Defendant Theodore T. Navolio for 1992 and 1993, and (2) to foreclose federal tax liens against two pieces of property in which Navolio possesses an interest. (Doc. No. 1 at 1-2, ¶1, filed Sept. 22, 2006.) The United States named as Defendants several other individuals possessing interests in these properties: Navolio's wife Seiko Kaneyama, Gail P. Kendall, Ivan D. Saxe, Dorothy E. Saxe, and Option One Mortgage Corporation. ( Id. at 2-3, ¶ ¶5-10.) However, Navolio and Kaneyama are the only Defendants actively opposing this action. 1



I. Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement

On July 3, 2008, the United States filed a Notice of Settlement in the record of this case. (Doc. No. 97.) The following day, Defendants Theodore T. Navolio and Seiko Kaneyama informed counsel for the United States, Bruce T. Russell, that there might be a misunderstanding about the terms of the agreement and therefore no settlement. Mr. Russell then filed a Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement on July 8, 2008 (Doc. No. 99), and Defendants filed a Notice of Retraction and Renouncement of Compromise (Doc. No. 100) with the Court. Both parties appeared before this Court on July 9, 2008 for an evidentiary hearing on the Motion of the United States and, in the event such Motion was denied, trial. (Doc. No. 101.) The Court reserved ruling on the Motion and proceeded with a joint evidentiary hearing and trial. ( Id.)




Findings of Fact


During his testimony, Navolio explained that he and Mr. Russell exchanged a number of phone calls at the end of June and the beginning of July concerning a possible settlement of this matter. In a letter to Mr. Russell dated June 11, 2008 and introduced by the United States at trial, 2 Navolio and Kaneyama listed the following proposed settlement terms:


1. We would not contest the foreclosure of the Condo.



2. I, Theodore T. Navolio would sign a judgment in favor of the government for the balance of the amount alleged to be owed to date.



3. The properties and monies that the government has taken to this point in time will not be further contested.



4. The foreclosure action of the final property still in litigation i.e. 24 hibiscus Dr. Ormond Beach Florida [sic] will not be further pursued by the government.


(Ex. 26 at 1.)

Nathan J. Hochman from the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), Tax Division, responded to Navolio and Kaneyama's offer to compromise in a letter dated June 26, 2008. (Ex. 27.) In this letter, Mr. Hochman recited the terms of the offer as follows:


1. You will sign a consent judgment in favor of the United States for the balance of the amount alleged to be owed for taxable years 1992 and 1993, and you will not [] contest the properties and monies that the United States has levied on to date.



2. You agree not to contest the foreclosure of the United States' liens on the condominium unit located at 219 S. Atlantic Avenue, # 335, Daytona Beach, in Volusia County, Florida.



3. The United States will discharge the property still at issue in the litigation, located at 24 Hibiscus Drive, Ormond Beach, Florida, from the tax liens that attach to it.



With the exception of the discharge of lien from this latter property, we understand your offer will not impair the ability of the United States to collect a consent judgment entered in this case.



In addition, we understand that a compromise will resolve all issues still pending between the parties in this litigation, and each party will bear its own costs of litigation, including any possible attorney's fees.





* * *



Upon receipt of your signed acknowledgment, your offer will be processed in accordance with our usual procedures. Final action will then be taken by the Attorney General or an official designated by him for that purpose. We are sure you understand that, unless you receive a formal notice of acceptance from this office, the Department of Justice is in no way committed to resolving this matter in the manner set forth above.


( Id. at 1-2.) On June 27, 2008, Navolio and Kaneyama signed a confirmation indicating that these terms accurately reflected their offer to compromise. (Ex. 28 at 2.)

Later, on July 3, 2008, Mr. Hochman sent Navolio and Kaneyama a letter which stated in part:


This offer has been accepted on behalf of the Attorney General on the condition that Mr. Navolio agree not to pursue any claim against the United States under 26 U.S.C. §7433 with respect to the taxes at issue in this case, or otherwise contest the continuing levy on his Social Security income, and to file federal income tax returns for future taxable years as required by law. Please acknowledge these conditions by signing the acknowledgment below and returning it to this office as quickly as possible.



We will prepare a Consent Judgment for your signature for the balance of the liabilities for 1992 and 1993 remaining at issue in the lawsuit and a proposed Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale with respect to the condominium unit described in the complaint. When we receive the executed Consent Judgment, we will ask the IRS to prepare and file a Certificate of Discharge of Lien from the Ormond Beach, Florida [property] described in the complaint.


(Ex. 29 at 1.) That same day, Navolio spoke with Mr. Russell on the phone and expressed his concern about the phrase "or otherwise contest the continuing levy on his Social Security income."

According to the undisputed testimony at trial, 3 Navolio, throughout his settlement conversations with Mr. Russell, maintained that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") was permitted by statute to levy only fifteen percent of his Social Security benefits. His understanding was that the agreed upon sale of the condominium unit would pay off the majority of his tax liabilities for 1992 and 1993 and that he would be responsible for the balance. Navolio believed that the IRS would collect this balance through a fifteen percent levy on his Social Security benefits.

However, the conditional acceptance that Mr. Hochman sent on July 3, 2008 gave Navolio pause. Navolio felt that if he signed the agreement as written, he would be forever consenting to a one hundred percent levy on his Social Security benefits. Therefore, he wanted the language "or otherwise contest the continuing levy on his Social Security income" struck from the agreement. Mr. Russell permitted this alteration, agreeing that the language was perhaps overly broad. Navolio and Kaneyama then signed an acknowledgment which stated: "The foregoing accurately reflects the amended terms of our offer to compromise the claims of the United States of America in the abovereferenced case, as amended through our telephone discussions with Bruce T. Russell of the Tax Division, U.S. Department of Justice." (Ex. 30 at 3.) They faxed this confirmation to Mr. Russell.

Despite the confirmation, Navolio was again concerned that his understanding of the terms of the settlement differed from the understanding of the DOJ. Therefore, on July 4, 2008, Navolio sent an email to Mr. Russell to clarify their agreement. (Ex. 31 at 1.) The email stated:


Please see the attached letter. I just want to be sure that I have the correct understanding. It was towards the end of our conversations where you made so[me] statements about my social security that got me thinking maybe I was reading something into the compromise letter of June 26, 2008 that was not there. I need clarification.


( Id.) Navolio further explained in the attached letter that he believed that the phrase "will resolve all issues still pending" in the July 3, 2008 letter meant "that the IRS would cease from the further taking of my social security, based on the pending litigation." ( Id. at 2.) Navolio stated that if this was not the agreement, then he and Kaneyama would "retract and renounce the compromise of June 26, 2008 and the modification of July 03, 2008." ( Id.) Upon receiving this email from Navolio, Mr. Russell filed the instant Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. (Doc. No. 99.)




Conclusions of Law


As explained by the Eleventh Circuit, "A settlement agreement is a contract and, as such, its construction and enforcement are governed by principles of Florida's general contract law." Schwartz v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Wong v. Bailey, 752 F.2d 619, 621 (11th Cir. 1985)). "The Court's role is to determine the intention of the parties from the language of the agreement, the apparent objects to be accomplished, other provisions in the agreement that cast light on the question, and the circumstances prevailing at the time of the agreement." Id. (citing K & S Coin Operated Machs., Inc. v. Gottlieb, 362 So. 2d 38, 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)).

To compel enforcement of a settlement agreement, its terms must be sufficiently specific and mutually agreed upon as to every essential element. BP Prods. of N. Am. v. Oakridge at Winegard,